ICJ's Legal Analysis of Israel's Separation Barrier in the Occupied Territories considers pertinent legal issues under international human rights and humanitarian law raised by the construction and operation of the Barrier.
CONTENTS
Executive summary
Part I: Introduction
1. Object and purpose of the opinion
2. Basic features of the Separation Barrier
2.1. Structure and course of the Separation Barrier
2.2. The legal regime of the Separation Barrier
Part II: Sources and scope of applicable international law
1. International humanitarian law
1.1. Obligations as State Party to the Geneva Conventions
1.2. Humanitarian law reflecting international customary law
1.3. Application to the West Bank and East Jerusalem
2. International human rights law
2.1. Extraterritorial applicability
2.2. Concurrent applicability with humanitarian law
2.3. The fight against terrorist acts and the applicable law
Part III: Violations of human rights and humanitarian law
1. Freedom of movement
1.1. Movement restrictions under international human rights law
1.2. Freedom of movement under international humanitarian law
1.3. Prohibitions under international humanitarian law affected by movement restrictions
2. Property confiscation, requisition and destruction
2.1. Confiscation of private and public land and property
2.2. Destruction and appropriation of property
2.3. Possible future appropriation of land
3. Freedom from arbitrary interference into home and family life
4. Economic, social and cultural rights
4.1. State responsibility under the ICESCR
4.2. Scope of Israel's state responsibility in respect to the Occupied Territories
4.3. Violations of economic, social and cultural rights by the Separation Barrier
5. Respect for the rule of law and due process
5.1. Administrative procedures
5.2. Effective remedies and the right to an independent tribunal
5.3. Effective remedy
6. Prohibition of discrimination
7. The Separation Barrier in light of the right of peoples to self-determination
Part IV: Conclusions
Executive summary
This document summarizes an analysis undertaken by the International Commission of Jurists of Israel's Separation Barrier (hereafter: Barrier) in light of international law, in particular international human rights and humanitarian law.
Background of Israel's Separation Barrier
The construction of the Barrier started in June 2002 following a decision by the Government of Israel to approve its first phase. Further plans for the construction of the Barrier in the West Bank were approved on 1 October 2003. While some parts of the Barrier have already been completed, its construction is a continuous process. The exact route may be subject to changes, but it is planned to stretch to approximately 660 kilometres in length. The Barrier is built largely within the Occupied Territories and a majority of Israeli settlements will be included on the Israeli side of the Barrier.
The Barrier creates Palestinian enclaves within the Occupied Territories and prevents the access by Palestinians to considerable parts of the Occupied Territories. The Barrier separates not only Israelis from Palestinians but also Palestinians from Palestinians. It severely reduces access to land, workplaces and markets, as well as access to education and health institutions within the Occupied Territories, creating harsh repercussions on the wellbeing of the Palestinian population. Israelis, even those not residing in Israel, continue to enjoy their freedom of movement, while Palestinians' access to their land or workplace is limited by a system of gates regulated by a restrictive regime of special permits.
Objective of International Commission of Jurists' legal memorandum
In light of the current public discussion on the Barrier and the arguments raised in the debates in the United Nations General Assembly, Security Council and before the International Court of Justice, the International Commission of Jurists considers it necessary to reiterate some basic principles regarding the scope and applicability of humanitarian law and in particular human rights law. This legal memorandum seeks to place the debate on the legitimacy of the Barrier on a more objective basis, namely that of the rule of law and of international human rights and humanitarian law. It is also motivated by the fact that the Barrier is likely to affect the human rights situation within the Occupied Territories for a significant period of time. The International Commission of Jurists also hopes that its analysis of key legal principles with regard to the Barrier may provide some guidance to the legal community in Israel and the Occupied Territories, where a number of important legal challenges to the construction of the Barrier are pending.
International human rights and humanitarian law both apply in the Occupied Territories. The Barrier in its present route and projection and with the set of rules and regulations that govern its construction and operation constitutes a severe violation of international human rights and humanitarian law. In particular, it interferes disproportionately with a range of fundamental rights and freedoms. In its present form, the Barrier cannot be justified under international law. Israel is therefore under an obligation to cease the construction of the Barrier in the Occupied Territories and to restitute property requisitioned for its construction.
Main conclusions and findings
1. The applicable legal framework includes international human rights law. The respect for human rights and the rule of law is imperative for the legitimacy of the Barrier.
Contrary to the position taken by the Israeli Government, the international legal framework governing the Barrier includes not only international humanitarian law but also international human rights law. Israel is bound by human rights and humanitarian law obligations found in international treaties and in customary international law.
Obligations under international humanitarian law include the obligations set forth in the Fourth Geneva Convention as well as the 1907 Hague Regulations. Both Conventions apply to the West Bank as well as to East Jerusalem. Israel's obligations under international human rights law are found most relevantly in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
It is well established on universal as well as regional level that human rights treaties apply concurrently with international humanitarian law. While international humanitarian law occasionally provides a more specialized rule that may influence the interpretation of a human rights provision, both sets of law apply in their own right: they are complementary and not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, human rights treaties apply in all places where a state exercises "effective control" - even outside a state's formal territory - as is the case in the territories affected by the Barrier.
The Barrier is a contentious issue that has generated intense political debate. However, it does not exist in a legal vacuum. The Barrier's political legitimacy should flow from its compliance with the rule of law and the international legal obligations that bind Israel. The International Commission of Jurists recognizes Israel's legitimate security concerns. Israel has the right and obligation to protect those under its jurisdiction. However, the Barrier - even though motivated by the need to fight terrorist acts and to protect its citizens - must comply with Israel's fundamental obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law. Counter-terrorism measures should be seen as a response by a state that continues to abide by the rule of law and does not abrogate it. Both sets of law were crafted by states themselves, who were very conscious of the need to balance security risks with respect for individual freedoms. The obligations already take into account security threats, such as terrorist acts.
2. The present Separation Barrier exceeds the limits of a justifiable security response both under human rights as well as under international humanitarian law.
With its current route through the Occupied Territories, the Barrier causes severe hardship to the protected population and cannot be justified under international law as a legitimate response to the existing security threats that Israel faces. When one takes into account the cumulative impact of the following factors, the Barrier constitutes a disproportionate interference into the human rights of the Palestinian population.
1) The Barrier is not only a structure that separates Israelis from Palestinians; it also separates Palestinian communities from each other. It creates enclaves within the Occupied Territories and destroys the social and economic fabric of society. It is the specific course of the Barrier, which tears apart homogenous communities and infrastructures, that leads to many of the grave repercussions on the Palestinian population.
2) The Israeli Government has decided to route the Barrier largely within the Occupied Territories and to encompass most Israeli settlements. The inclusion of the settlements has largely led to severe restrictions on the movement of Palestinians and to the separation of Palestinian communities from each other. Israel is entitled to take measures to protect all those under its jurisdiction, both Israelis and Palestinians. This could include some short-term measures to protect its settlements. However, as these settlements are illegal under international law, Israel cannot support the interests of the settlements to the sole detriment of the original population. Yet, this is precisely the result of the Barrier system. It restricts the right and freedoms of Palestinians within their own territory, while ensuring that the settlers do enjoy these same rights and freedoms by integrating them on the western side of the Barrier. Whether or not the Barrier is a permanent structure, the timeframe is clearly open-ended and not merely short-term or truly temporary.
3) The Barrier is not simply a "neutral" physical structure. It is characterized by a restrictive legal regime that regulates its operation. This legal regime severely affects property rights, the use of and access to land, and establishes a system of personal and permanent permits for Palestinians for a limited number of specific purposes and subject to various restrictions. The separation from land, workplace and home leads to severe repercussions, in particular on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights in the Occupied Territories.
4) This legal regime is inherently discriminatory. The movement and residence restrictions and permit requirements apply only to Palestinians because of their national origin and not to Israelis, Israeli settlers or those who fall under Israel's law of return.
International humanitarian law may exceptionally allow for reasonable and proportionate distinctions based on nationality. While the specific context of occupation may enable a state to distinguish between an occupying force and the local population, it does not justify blanket differences in movement restrictions between Israeli and Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territory or between Israelis eligible under the law of return and the local Palestinian population.
5) The Barrier regime's interference into the rights of the occupied population comes with an element of arbitrariness in the way the project is implemented and with a lack of effective remedy against the orders of the Military Commander. The inability to effectively challenge disproportionate measures exacerbates the arbitrary impact of the Barrier.
6) Finally, it is the severity and the sweeping nature of the restrictions that makes the measure disproportionate. The Barrier severely affects many civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Aggravated by its long-term and open-ended perspective it has adverse repercussions on all walks of Palestinian life and is likely to severely affect all aspects of Palestinian society. The cumulative impact of the Barrier regime on the rights of the occupied population must lead to the conclusion that the Barrier in its present route is a non-proportionate security response.
The Barrier is equally unjustifiable under the concept of military necessity found in international humanitarian law. The particular course of the Barrier within the Occupied Territories and the deliberate choice to include the majority of settlements results in unnecessary infringements into the rights of the protected population. The severity of the measure and its impact on the social fabric of the protected population render the Barrier excessive.
In conclusion, it is the route of the Barrier as well as the legal regime that regulates its operation that renders the Barrier disproportionate and discriminatory. A different Barrier with a different route and with a different set of legal rules and regulations accompanying its operation may be justifiable under international law. In its present form, however, it constitutes a violation of international human rights and humanitarian law.
3. Individual rights and obligations violated by the Separation Barrier
The Barrier affects many human rights and humanitarian law provisions. The scope of the rights affected illustrates the magnitude of the interference. The main human rights concerns are the following:
Freedom of movement
The Barrier and its restrictive movement regime violate the right to liberty of movement and the right to residence, guaranteed under article 12, para. 1 ICCPR.
The Barrier also violates freedom of movement guarantees under international humanitarian law, as its severe impact is not justified under article 27 Fourth Geneva Convention.
Movement related prohibitions
The Barrier and its movement regulations will also constitute a violation of freedom of movement related prohibitions under international humanitarian law if they change the demographic composition of the Occupied Territories. This would violate the prohibition of forced transfer of the protected population in article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This would especially be the case if Palestinians were forced to leave their place of residence as a result of the Barrier and arbitrary denials of permanent permits.
The Barrier also helps to maintain and perpetuate the existence of illegal settlements and may facilitate further population transfer into those parts of the Occupied Territories that are located on the western side of the Barrier. This contradicts article 49, para. 6 Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the transfer of foreign populations into occupied territory.
Property confiscation and requisition
The so-called "requisition" of private property constitutes for the most part an unlawful de facto confiscation of private property in violation of Israel's obligations as Occupying Power under article 46 Hague Regulations. Even in the absence of a formal act of expropriation, the taking of property for the construction of the Barrier dispossesses the property owner of any meaningful perspective to use the "substance" of the right to property in any foreseeable future.
Contrary to the Israeli position private property requisition cannot be justified by reference to article 23 (g) Hague Regulations. This provision would allow for the confiscation of property only in the context of armed fighting to the extent justified on the basis of military necessity. It is not applicable to the present situation of occupation, nor are the private property requisitions for this Barrier "absolutely necessary as a result of war".
The requisition of public land also violates article 55 Hague Regulations, which requires the Occupying Power to administer Palestinian land in the interest of the protected population as so-called usufruct. The destruction of property, such as buildings, dwellings, olive trees and alike may violate article 53 Fourth Geneva Convention.
Right to privacy, family life
The Barrier also violates a range of other human rights provisions, including the right to family life and freedom from arbitrary interference into one's home and family life (articles 17, 23 ICCPR, article 10 ICESCR). Again, it is the course of the Barrier that separates communities from each other and subjects any contact to a restrictive movement regime.
Economic, social and cultural rights
The Barrier, its severe restrictions on the freedom of movement and the confiscation of land and property prevent the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to work (article 6 ICESCR), the right to an adequate standard of living, including the right to food, water and housing (article 11 ICESCR), the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (article 12 ICESCR), the right to education (article 13 ICESCR) and the right to family life (article 10 ICESCR). As a State Party to the ICESCR, Israel is responsible for its implementation in the Occupied Territories. At the very least, Israel is obliged not to interfere in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed in the Covenant. The Barrier has led to a severe deterioration in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people, which would constitute a retrogressive measure in violation of the Covenant.
Due process and the rule of law
Of particular concern is the lack of respect for proper legal and administrative processes and elementary standards of fairness in the application of the legal regime surrounding the Barrier. The Barrier, the process of confiscation of land and the issuance and arbitrary denial of permits raise basic rule of law concerns, in particular with regard to the right to an effective remedy (article 2, para. 3 ICCPR) and the right of access to an independent tribunal in the determination of any dispute affecting a civil right, such as the property title over land (article 14, para. 1 ICCPR). Article 14 ICCPR requires in particular an effective access to an independent court that fully considers both questions of facts and law in the determination of property confiscations. The inability to effectively challenge disproportionate measures exacerbates the arbitrary impact of the Barrier.
Non-discrimination
The Barrier constitutes a discriminatory measure in the application of the rights set forth in both Covenants (article 2, para. 1 common to the ICCPR and the ICESCR), and the general discrimination clause of article 26 ICCPR. The movement and residence restrictions are de jure applicable only to Palestinians and not to Israelis, Israeli settlers or other people who fall under Israel's law of return. International law may allow exceptionally for reasonable and proportionate distinctions based on nationality provided that they are based on reasonable grounds and are proportionate. While the specific context of occupation may enable a state to distinguish between an occupying force and the local population, it does not justify blanket distinctions between Israeli and Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territory or between Israelis eligible under the law of return and the local Palestinian population. The application of restrictions exclusively and indiscriminately to all Palestinians as a group and the creation of severe interferences into their rights and lives cannot be regarded as reasonable within the meaning of the above-mentioned non-discrimination clauses.
Right to self-determination
The long-term consequences of the Barrier, the fact that its route lies within the Occupied Territories and departs from the Green Line and that it is constructed with an open-ended perspective, puts the exercise of the right to self-determination as enshrined in article 1, para. 1 common to the ICCPR and the ICESCR of the Palestinian people under threat. The construction of the Barrier will isolate Palestinian people from East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza strip. In combination with the restrictive movement regime, it will over time change the demographic structure of parts of the Occupied Territories. Under these circumstances, it may endanger the viability of any future Palestinian state.
4. The obligation to cease violations of international law
The Barrier as constructed constitutes a serious violation of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. It constitutes an internationally wrongful act that requires Israel to cease the construction of the Barrier on the Occupied Territories and to dismantle what has been built so far. Moreover, Israel is under an obligation to restitute property and land to the owners in such a state that allows the use of land according to its previous purpose.
Third states are under an obligation not to aid and assist in the commission of this international unlawful act. States Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention are also under the obligation not only to respect, but also to ensure respect for the provisions of the Convention.
5. Respect of all parties for the international rule of law
Finally, the International Commission of Jurists strongly believes that any peaceful solution to the conflict in the Occupied Territories must be firmly based on respect for human rights and the rule of law by all sides. The International Commission of Jurists calls on the International Court of Justice as the principle judicial organ of the United Nations to uphold fully these fundamental principles of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. It also calls on the parties to the conflict to respect the forthcoming Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory."
The construction of the Barrier as constructed at present violates human rights law. It undermines efforts to obtain peace in the region through a just and durable solution. Suicide attacks also violate international law and undermine the search for peace and security. The International Commission of Jurists calls on all parties, including third parties facilitating political dialogue, to fully respect human rights and humanitarian law and to base their policies on these standards. Human rights and humanitarian law cannot be selectively invoked by either party and apply even in the fight against terrorist acts.
Part I: Introduction
1. Object and purpose of the opinion
This legal memorandum is prepared by the International Commission of Jurists and analyzes the most pertinent legal issues under human rights and international humanitarian law with respect to the construction of Israel's Separation Barrier. [1] Unless otherwise indicated, it is based on publicly available information about the already completed and projected construction of the Barrier and the legal regulation surrounding its operation.
The present memorandum does not address the political issues underlying the conflict in the Occupied Territories, but analyzes the Barrier exclusively from the perspective of international law. The Barrier is clearly an issue of intense political debate. However, as the then Secretary General of the International Commission of Jurists, Niall MacDermot, stressed in 1979 speaking about the Occupied Territories:
"As a non-governmental organization devoted to the promotion of the rule of law, we are a non-political organisation, though we are well aware that most of what we do or say is likely to have political repercussions. However, we seek to address problems as jurists, from a standpoint of legal norms." [2]
Any political legitimacy of the Barrier should flow from the respect for the rule of law and in particular from its compliance with human rights law. Israel has justified the construction of the Barrier by the necessity to ensure the security of its citizens and to prevent suicide attacks and other acts of terrorism. [3] The International Commission of Jurists unequivocally condemns attacks against Israeli civilians. Such acts are prohibited under international law. Indeed, Israel has the right and the duty to protect the security of all those under its jurisdiction.
At the same time, the construction of the Barrier, even if undertaken as an anti-terrorism measure, does not exist in a legal vacuum or no man's land. In addition to being a political issue, it is also a legal issue and more specifically a human rights issue of major proportion.
The subject of this analysis is the Barrier as constructed and planned at the moment. It does not seek to analyze under what circumstances Israel may be eligible to build another kind of Barrier with a different route. This memorandum considers the legality of the specific measures taken as response to the security threat. It concentrates on the question of the proportionality and necessity of the Barrier under human rights and humanitarian law. This memorandum neither speculates about the specific alternative steps, especially short-term security measures, Israel could take to protect its citizens in the Occupied Territories.
2. Basic features of the Separation Barrier
2.1. Structure and course of the Separation Barrier
In July 2001, the Israeli Cabinet first approved the Security Fence Programme as well as the establishment of a "Seam Zone Administration". [4] The construction of the Barrier started in June 2002 following a decision of the Government of Israel [5] to approve its first phase. Further plans for the construction of the Barrier in the West Bank were approved on 1 October 2003. [6] While considerable parts of the Barrier have already been completed, the erection of the Barrier is ongoing. [7]
In rural areas it consists of layers of razor wire, military patrol roads and sand paths to trace footprints, ditches, surveillance cameras and a three-meter high fence with sensors to warn of any incursion. The Barrier is approximately 50-100 meters wide. Palestinians are prohibited from entering this zone, which contains trenches, cameras and sensors and is patrolled by the Israeli military. Additional plans foresee the construction of so-called "depth barriers" of 150 meters in length, to be erected a few kilometers east of the Barrier itself. These barriers have been described as "barriers without a fence designed to direct movement to a number of security control points". [8] In urban areas, such as Qalqiliya and East Jerusalem, the Barrier is partly constructed of eight-meter high concrete walls with watchtowers.
The exact trajectory may be subject to changes, but it is planned to stretch to approximately 660 kilometers in length. [9] According to the United Nations, the course of the Barrier runs for 90 % within the Occupied Territories, east of the Green Line. [10] This would affect 943,000 dunams [11] of land according to recent data published by B'TSELEM. [12] Its route and planned route indents into the Occupied Territories and would, if fully implemented, encompass 54 Israeli settlements on the West Bank. For example, plans show that it will reach into the Occupied Territories for up to 22 km to include the settlement of Ariel. [13] Reports estimate that up to 320,000 Israelis, including in East Jerusalem, would be living on the western side of the Barrier. [14]
Some stages of the Barrier have already been built, whereas others have only been approved and may still be modified. On rare occasions, Israel has officially announced and dismantled part of an already erected piece of the Barrier. [15] Press reports in Israel indicate that the route might be further modified, including as a result of court challenges, though this has not been officially announced. [16] A number of earlier changes were also reported, but no information is available as to whether these were official decisions and whether, when and how they will be implemented. [17]
The Barrier physically separates parts of the Occupied Territories and isolates its inhabitants from the rest of the West Bank. It creates Palestinian enclaves within the territory between the Barrier and the Green Line. The route also turns cities and villages into enclaves that are almost entirely encircled by the Barrier. While figures on the affected land and population vary, partly because the construction is continuing and the route may change, estimates indicate that approximately 13.5% of West Bank land (not including East Jerusalem) will be separated from other parts of the West Bank [18], including some important fertile land with water resources. Estimates further indicate that around 13,500 Palestinians are located between the Barrier and the Green Line in the areas where the Barrier has been built so far, while 50,000 inhabitants find themselves encircled by the Barrier. [19] By virtue of the Barrier, they are separated to varying degrees from essential services, such as health care, education, water resources and in particular their farmland and workplace. A World Bank monitoring report suggests that the completed sections alone already directly or indirectly affect 170,000 people in 38 cities, towns and villages because they are either living in enclaves, are encircled by the Barrier, or have their land on the other side of the Barrier. [20] The construction of depth barriers would create additional encirclements. The United Nations Secretary General Report of November 2003 estimated that another 160,000 Palestinians would be affected if the Barrier was to be implemented according to plans, because they would then live in enclaves or in almost encircled cities or tracts of land. [21]
The construction of the Barrier in the Occupied Territories has led to the seizure of considerable amounts of land, including fertile agricultural land. It has been accompanied by the destruction of olive and fruit trees, irrigated agricultural lands, water networks and agricultural roads. [22] Palestinians in the enclaves, the encircled cities and villages and those living close to the Barrier are frequently separated from their land, jobs, and health and educational services. Movement through the Barrier is - subject to permissions and opening hours - only possible through a selected number of gates, including agricultural gates that are meant to facilitate the access of farmers and landowners to their land.
2.2. The legal regime of the Separation Barrier
As a physical structure the Barrier divides communities from each other. However, it must also be understood as a legal regime accompanied by a range of restrictions on the fundamental freedoms of the population in the Occupied Territories. The construction and operation of the Barrier is determined by a set of regulations and orders that affect property rights, use of and access to land, remedies, residency status and the freedom of movement of people and goods across the Barrier for various purposes.
The territory between the Barrier and the Green Line - also called the "Seam Area/Zone" - has been declared a "closed military zone" by a Military Order dated 2 October 2003. [23] The order stipulates, that "no person will enter the seam area and no one will remain there". [24] The order, however, exempts Israelis including Israeli settlers from its application ratione personae. [25] The regulation will not apply to Israelis, whereby an Israeli is defined as a citizen of the State of Israel, a resident of the State of Israel registered in the population registry in accordance with the Population Registry Law and anyone who is eligible to emigrate to Israel in accordance with the Law of Return. [26]
Palestinians residing in the closed zone, on the other hand, are allowed to enter and remain in the closed zone if they possess a written permit, which can authorize permanent residence. [27] Palestinians who are not resident in the "Seam Zone" can apply for personal permits if they have a specific reason to enter the closed area, such as to access their farmlands. Palestinians wishing to cross the Barrier have to apply for permits in advance. There are 12 different categories of personal permits defined by the purpose of the stay, including for farmers, employees, business owners and employees of the Palestinian Authority. The regulations do not, however, specify the criteria for accepting or refusing personal permits. Permit holders have to apply for special permission if they wish to travel by automobile, bring in merchandise or wish to stay overnight in the "Seam Area". Even for permit holders (permanent and personal), movement through the Barrier is limited to the single gate specified in the permit. Personal permits granted, for example for farmers to access their land, are often only valid for a limited period. Access to the closed military zone for permit holders is further limited by the specific operating regimes of the gate in question. These procedures may differ from gate to gate, in particular in their opening hours, and are not always entirely predictable. [28]
In order to construct the Barrier, property is seized by Military Orders (requisition orders for military needs) in the West Bank, and by the Ministry of Defence in East Jerusalem. Requisition orders are temporary (usually for a period of three years), but can be renewed without limit. Requisition orders become valid the day they are signed, and remain valid even if they are not personally delivered to the affected owner. [29] While the Palestinian District Coordination Office is requested to deliver copies to the owners, there have been frequent reports that orders are not delivered personally, but simply left on the land concerned. [30] Persons affected by such orders have two weeks to file an objection to the Legal Advisor of the Military Commander of the West Bank, who submits the petition to an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Appeals Committee. If the petition is made within the first week, there is a stay of execution. Later petitions may still be considered, but do not result in a stay of execution. The decisions of the Appeal Committee are, however, not binding on the Commander of the West Bank. [31]
Appeals can also be lodged with the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as High Court in the Occupied Territories. [32] A number of current appeals are challenging the specific route of parts of the Barrier and in one major petition leading Israeli human rights organizations are challenging the overall legality of the route east of the Green Line. [33] Some requisition orders also indicate the possibility to apply for usage fees or compensation for the land on which the Barrier is constructed. It does not, however, extend to land from which Palestinian landowners are separated by the Barrier, even if access to this land is prevented by the denial of the relevant personal permits.
Part II: Sources and scope of applicable international law
The Barrier and the regime that it establishes are subject to the norms and standards of international law applicable to the Occupied Territories. This includes in particular international humanitarian law and human rights law.
1. International humanitarian law
Israel is bound as a High Contracting Party by the Geneva Conventions of 1949, most notably the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. [34] Israel is also bound by the international humanitarian law that has become customary international law. The 1907 Hague Regulations, the Geneva Conventions, and to a large extent the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions all reflect norms that are now recognized as customary international law.
1.1. Obligations as State Party to the Geneva Conventions
Israel contests the de jure applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the Occupied Territories. It refers in particular to the lack of a recognized sovereign over the Occupied Territories prior to its annexation by Jordan and Egypt, and considers it, therefore, not to be a territory of a High Contracting Party as required by the four Geneva Conventions. [35] The International Commission of Jurists has consistently rejected this position. [36] Common article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions sets out the scope of application in the following way:
"In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace-time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
(…)"
The drafting history and the authoritative Commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reflects that the Geneva Conventions apply to armed conflicts between High Contracting Parties, including occupation of territory following armed conflict (article 2 para. 1), as well as to occupation not preceded by an international armed conflict (article 2, para. 2). [37] The occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem were clearly preceded by an armed conflict with Jordan and Egypt, both High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, an interpretation that excludes the applicability of the Conventions because there was no sovereign title over the territory, would also contradict the object and purpose of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which is to protect the civilian population subjected to a foreign power. Whether the Geneva Conventions apply is determined by the factual test of whether there has been an armed conflict or occupation, rather than on the legitimacy of the conflict, the goals pursued or on legal titles. The Geneva Conventions reaffirm that their object and purpose is to protect civilians from any foreign power, expressed, among others, in common article 1, according to which, States Parties "undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances" (emphasis added). By the same token, article 4 Fourth Geneva Convention, applies to persons "who, at any moment, and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals".
Articles 1, 2 and 4 Fourth Geneva Convention read together reaffirm the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Territories. Palestinian civilians in the Occupied Territories, who are not taking part in the hostilities, are thus "protected persons" under article 4.
The de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Territories, including East Jerusalem, has specifically been the subject of a Conference of all High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions in 2001. The Conference was convened on the basis of the obligation of High Contracting Parties, expressed in common article 1, not only "to respect" but also "to ensure respect" for the Geneva Conventions. [38] The Conference adopted a declaration that reconfirmed the de jure applicability of the four Geneva Conventions to the Occupied Territories. [39] This declaration by the High Contracting Parties represents an authentic interpretation of the meaning of articles 1, 2 and 4 of the Geneva Conventions. [40]
The same position has also been consistently expressed by the international community as a whole through numerous resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly, [41] the Commission on Human Rights, [42] as well as by the ICRC - which is entrusted with a special role in the supervision of the proper application of international humanitarian law, especially of the Geneva Conventions. [43]
There can be no reasonable doubt that the four Geneva Conventions, and in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention, is de jure applicable to the Occupied Territories. The construction of the Barrier and the legal regime established to govern its operation must comply with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
1.2. Humanitarian law reflecting international customary law
Israel is also bound by customary international law. It is generally accepted that the provisions of the Hague Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV on the Customs of War on Land, as well as the Geneva Conventions, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention, have become an expression of customary international law. The International Court of Justice stated in its advisory opinion on The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) [44] that the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Regulation annexed to it, as well as the Geneva Conventions, have enjoyed broad accession and that these fundamental rules must be observed by all States, whether or not they had ratified the conventions that contain them, because they "constituted intransgressible principles of international customary law". [45]
The customary nature of international humanitarian law, and in particular the Geneva Conventions, has recently been recognized in a decision of the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as High Court in the Occupied territories. It stated in its case HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v IDF Commander of September 2002:
"The Court has held that the prohibition on forcible transfer is a rule of international treaty-based law, and thus is not applicable in domestic law unless it is enacted into the domestic law. However, this conception has changed, both in international public law and in the judgments of this court. Now, it is almost undisputed that the Fourth Geneva Convention reflects customary law and binds all states - even those that have not signed it - because it enshrines basic principles accepted by all states." [46]
Moreover, customary international law is to a considerable extent reflected in the two Additional Protocols to the four Geneva Conventions. [47]
1.3. Application to the West Bank and East Jerusalem
The Barrier is built predominantly on occupied territory as defined under international law. It should be emphasized that under article 42 Hague Regulations, a territory "is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army" and that "the occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised".
The Israeli occupation did not end with the Oslo process. While it has been argued that the transfer of authority in certain areas to the Palestinian Authority might have limited the scope of obligations of Israel as Occupying Power, consensus existed even prior to the recent Intifada, that such transfer of authority may at best have reduced, but not extinguished Israel's obligations as Occupying Power. [48] The law on occupation does not require the exercise of complete control over all parts of a territory at all times. Recent developments suggest that Israel has taken effective control over areas under Palestinian authority or demonstrated its capacity to exercise such effective control at any moment. [49] At the very least, it exercises control over the territory in which it constructs the Barrier irrespective of the existence of the Palestinian Authority and its formal mandate. The law governing occupation applies therefore to the construction of the Barrier, irrespective of the division of certain responsibilities between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, originally set forth in the Oslo Accords, and irrespective of the question of the present status of the Oslo Accords.
It should be emphasized that the application of the law on occupation also extends to East Jerusalem, since international humanitarian law prohibits the change of status of territory by force and annexation. Regarding the legal status of the Israeli presence in East Jerusalem, numerous UN Security Council resolutions have reiterated that Israel's attempts to change the legal status and demographic composition of East Jerusalem "have no legal validity" and are null and void. [50] The General Assembly has consistently confirmed this approach, illustrated again by its recent Resolution requesting an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. [51] These resolutions have confirmed that the international community regards East Jerusalem as occupied territory to which the Fourth Geneva Convention applies.
2. International human rights law
Israel is also bound by international human rights law in the Occupied Territories. It is party to core UN human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), [52] the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), [53] the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), [54] the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), [55] the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), [56] and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). [57]
Israel continues to reject, however, that human rights treaties are applicable in the Occupied Territories. The government argues that the protection granted in a conflict situation should be found in humanitarian law, whereas human rights treaties are intended to protect citizens from their own government in times of peace. [58] This position is not supported by international law and practice.
2.1. Extraterritorial applicability
There is today ample authority at universal and regional level that human rights treaties apply wherever a state "exercises jurisdiction" and that this determination is based on the test as to whether a state "exercises effective (not necessarily sovereign) control over a territory". Human rights treaties can therefore apply also extraterritorially.
This has been recognized with regard to all major human rights treaties, including the ICCPR. [59] It would not be compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant to exclude the applicability of the rights set forth in human rights treaties to situations where the State Party does exercise effective control over a territory or act.
The Human Rights Committee, which authoritatively interprets the ICCPR, has consistently applied the Covenant to acts committed outside the national territory in individual communications such as López Burgos v. Uruguay [60], as well as in a range of Concluding Observations on State Party's reports. [61] More specifically, it considers the Covenant applicable to cases of belligerent occupation, as illustrated by the Committee's observations on Iraq, which stated:
"The failure of the report to address events in Kuwait after 2 August 1990, given Iraq's clear responsibility under international law for the observance of human rights during its occupation of that country, was a matter of particular concern to the Committee". [62]
The UN Commission on Human Rights' Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Kuwait under Iraqi Occupation, Walter Kälin, similarly held both the ICCPR and ICESCR applicable to the belligerent occupation of Kuwait [63]
The Human Rights Committee could hardly have been clearer when it explained in its most recent General Comment on article 2:
"(…) a State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party",
and,
"(…) this principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation." [64]
This clear and unambiguous view by the Committee is reflected in its consistent position on Israel. Indeed, both the UN Human Rights Committee [65] and the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [66] hold Israel responsible under the Covenants in the Occupied Territories.
The extraterritorial applicability of human rights law is further underlined by jurisprudence of regional human rights systems. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has considered that the American Declaration on Human Rights is applicable to acts of foreign forces, for example during the occupation of Grenada [67] or more recently in the context of the detentions in Guantanamo Bay. [68]
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has held in a number of judgments that a state is responsible under the European Convention on Human Rights for acts committed outside its territory and, in particular, in cases of occupation, such as in northern Cyprus. [69] The jurisprudence reflects that a state has "jurisdiction" not only within its national territory, but also as a consequence of military action - whether lawful or unlawful. The state has jurisdiction if it exercises effective control in an area outside its national territory, whether directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration. [70] This responsibility extends to securing the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Conventions and Additional Protocols ratified by the State Party. [71] Even in its more recent Bankovic judgment, dealing with the NATO bombing of Serbia Montenegro, where the Court did not assume responsibility under the European Convention, it nevertheless reaffirmed the principle that extraterritorial jurisdiction applies:
"(…) when the respondent State, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally exercised by the Government." [72]
In light of the uniform practice of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, at the universal as well as regional level, it cannot be doubted that the ICCPR and the ICESCR apply extraterritorially, including in the Occupied Territories.
2.2. Concurrent applicability with humanitarian law
The jurisprudence of human rights bodies mentioned above clearly recognizes, contrary to Israeli Government arguments, that human rights law does not cease to apply in times of armed conflict or occupation. On the contrary, the cases show the applicability and importance of human rights law, especially in a situation of prolonged occupation.
The International Court of Justice has authoritatively affirmed in its Nuclear Weapons case that human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR, do apply in times of war. Under certain circumstances the content of a specific right (here the right to life) may, however, have to be interpreted in light of the applicable lex specialis, in this case the law of armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. [73]
Most recently, the UN Human Rights Committee clarified in its General Comment on article 2, that:
"(…) the Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable. While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, more specific rules of international humanitarian law may be specially relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant rights, both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive." [74]
This is in line with various statements and judgments at the regional level. The European Court of Human Rights has confirmed the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to situations such as the occupation of northern Cyprus. [75] The Inter-American Commission recently equally characterized the interrelationship of human rights and international humanitarian law as a relationship of complementary and reinforcement, while international humanitarian law may occasionally provide for a more specific rule influencing the interpretation of human rights law. [76]
Both, the UN Human Rights Committee [77] and the UN Committee on Economic, Socialand CulturalRights [78] have reaffirmed thisposition in recent concluding observations specifically relating to the Occupied Territories. Both Committees have affirmed not only the extraterritorial applicability of the Covenants but have explicitly rejected Israel's argument that the law of armed conflict supersedes their applicability.
Thus, international practice and jurisprudence clearly indicate that both set of laws apply concurrently in their own right. The relationship is generally one of complementarity and mutual re-enforcement, rather than exclusivity, although international humanitarian law sometimes contains a more special rule that will affect the interpretation of human rights norms.
Finally, this is not only a matter of legal position, but a matter of common sense. Would it make sense to say that human rights law is not applicable and that one must rely completely on international humanitarian law, in a situation of a prolonged occupation of more than 37 years?
It should be borne in mind that the two universal Covenants should in fact be regarded as an expression of a universal ordre public. Rather than creating reciprocal relationships between states, they grant rights to people under a State Party's jurisdiction. Refusing the benefit of these rights in an occupation lasting for 37 years would clearly be unsatisfactory. As the UN Human Rights Inquiry Commission noted:
"(...) A prolonged occupation, lasting for more than 30 years, was not envisaged by the drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention (see art. 6). Commentators have therefore suggested that in the case of the prolonged occupation, the occupying Power is subject to the restraints imposed by international human rights law, as well as the rules of international humanitarian law." [79]
The Barrier is not just a short-time measure taken during an armed conflict or occupation following a conflict. It has long-term ramifications. It will affect lives and rights of the people in the Occupied Territories for a considerable time to come. International humanitarian law is particularly appropriate to deal with the immediate and acute consequences of conflict and occupation. By itself it is insufficient to regulate the broader and long-term relationship between a people and the authorities that effectively control the territory. The complementary application of human rights treaties in such a case is not only legally required, but also clearly appropriate.
2.3. The fight against terrorist acts and the applicable law
Increasingly, Israel justifies the construction of the Barrier by the necessity to ensure the security of Israeli citizens from terrorism. It argues that the Barrier is fully justified under article 51 of the UN Charter which preserves states' inherent right of self-defence and by Security Council Resolution 1373 which sets out obligations in the fight against terrorist acts. [80]
The International Commission of Jurists unequivocally condemns attacks against Israeli civilians. Such acts are prohibited under international law. Human rights law gives governments both the right and duty to protect the security of the people under their jurisdiction. This derives among others directly from articles 6 and 9 ICCPR. [81]
However, the fight against terrorist acts - even on the basis of Security Council Resolution 1373 - does not suddenly cancel out other aspects of international law. Irrespective of whether the law of self-defence applies and whether Resolution 1373 serves as a legal basis for the construction of the Barrier, Israel remains bound by international human rights and humanitarian law.
UN human rights treaty bodies, such as the UN Human Rights Committee, scrutinizing domestic measures undertaken under Resolution 1373 on its compliance with the Covenant, have reaffirmed the applicability of human rights norms. [82] This is also mirrored in recent work of various thematic experts appointed by the UN Commission on Human Rights. [83] Notably, on 20 January 2003, the Security Council meeting at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs recalled that:
"States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law". [84]
The UN General Assembly [85], the UN Commission on Human Rights [86] as well as the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights [87] have all affirmed the continuing application of international law, including human rights and humanitarian law when fighting terrorist acts.
The Human Rights Committee specifically stressed that Israel has "(…) to ensure that measures designed to counter acts of terrorism, whether adopted in connection with Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) or in the context of the ongoing armed conflict, are in full conformity with the Covenant." [88]
The Barrier and the legal regime surrounding it are not put beyond the realm of binding human rights and humanitarian law by asserting that it is a counter-terrorism measure.
International human rights law envisages that states may sometimes have to take exceptional measures and suspend some rights when facing an emergency that threatens the life of the nation. Moreover, limitation clauses allow the taking into account of legitimate security concerns of a State Party such as those posed by terrorist acts. The derogation and limitation provisions in the ICCPR were crafted by states themselves, who obviously had a keen sense of their national security interests and the need to balance these with their human rights obligations. They are a reflection of the fact that a response of a state to a security threat, including terrorist acts, must be an extension of the rule of law, not an abrogation of the rule of law.
Article 4 ICCPR requires that a situation amount to a public emergency, which threatens the life of the nation, and that the State Party has officially proclaimed the state of emergency. [89] It also puts a heavy burden on states to justify why every exceptional measure taken is temporary, necessary and proportionate to meet the specific security threat. [90] Even specific measures taken pursuant to a derogation must be shown to be required by the exigencies of the situation. Moreover, a derogation must not be used solely as a discriminatory measure and in violation of the State Party's other obligations under international law, such as humanitarian law. [91] A state is also under an obligation to comply with the procedural obligation under article 4, para. 3 ICCPR to notify the Secretary General of the measures of derogation imposed. [92] These rules are to be applied strictly.
As recently as 2003 the Human Rights Committee reiterated that all provisions of the Covenant apply to the Occupied Territories, including its non-derogable rights. [93] On 3 October 1991 Israel made a Declaration under article 4, para. 3 ICCPR to notify the derogation from some obligations under article 9 (right to be free from arbitrary detention). [94] The Human Rights Committee considered that as such no derogation beyond that of article 9 is allowed given the state of emergency declared by Israel. [95] No other derogation was subsequently made.
Israel has also not contended that the construction of the Barrier would be based on the derogation of human rights treaties. [96] The failure not to notify the Secretary General of the extension of the emergency powers would also constitute a violation of the procedural obligation under article 4, para. 3 ICCPR. [97] Moreover, the Barrier regime would also fail to fulfil the substantive test under article 4, para. 1 ICCPR, as the Barrier regime is not limited in time, but has all the appearance of a long-term and open-ended response to the security threat. This is illustrated not the least in the relevant regulations, such as Order 378 establishing the "Seam Zone" containing no time limit. Moreover, the interference of the Barrier is - as we shall see in the course of this study - of such magnitude that it is not a measure strictly necessary and proportionate to the specific threat. Furthermore, contrary to article 4 ICCPR it is in violation of other international obligations of Israel, including under international humanitarian law. It may also raise concerns for its discriminatory effect.
Follow this link to part III and IV of the report.
The following documents are available:
Israel's Separation Barrier : Challenges to the Rule of Law and Human Rights : full report
(PDF format)
Footnotes
[1] The terminology used in this paper follows the language employed by the United Nations Secretary General in his report to the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/ES-10/248, 24 November 2003.
[2] Speech by Niall MacDermot on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, 29 November 1979, reprinted in: International Commission of Jurists Newsletter No.3, 1979.
[3] See: Ministry of Defence on the Seam Zone, Israel's security fence at
www.seamzone.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/purpose.htm. It reads under the heading "purpose": the sole purpose of the Security Fence, as stated in the Israeli Government decision of July 23rd 2001, is to provide security. The Security Fence is a central component in Israel's response to the horrific wave of terrorism emanating from the West Bank, resulting in suicide bombers who enter into Israel with the sole intention of killing innocent people. See also: Summary legal position of the Government of Israel in the Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, UN Doc. A/ES-10/248, 24 November 2003, pp 8-9.
[4] See www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/purpose.htm and Government Decision 64/B of 14 April 2002.
[5] Cabinet Decision 2077 of 23 June 2002.
[6] Cabinet Decision 883 of 1st October 2003.
[7] See also the overview on the approved and completed sections of the Barrier provided by B'TSELEM at www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp.
[8] Israeli Ministry of Defence, "Israeli Ministry of Defence, Questions and Answer", at www.seamzone.mod.gov.il.
[9] Figures about the exact length differ. According to the approved route the main Barrier would have a length of 569 km and of 91 km for a secondary Barrier. See B'TSELEM at www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Preliminary analysis reveals that the planned route to complete the Barrier will have severe humanitarian consequences for hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank, January 2004 update refers to a total length of 638 km. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, E/CN.4/2004/6/Add.1, 27 February 2004, p 7, estimates a total length of 687 kilometres.
[10] See Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, 24 November 2003, A/ES-10/2/248.
[11] 4 dunams = 1 acre.
[12] B'SELEM as of March 2004, see www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp.
[13] See Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, 24 November 2003, A/ES-10/2/248, at 3. According to the estimates of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, E/CN.4/2004/6/Add.1, 27 February 2004, p 3., there will be 54 settlements and 142,000 settlers included on the Israeli side of Barrier.
[14] See Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: The place of the fence/wall in international law, February 2004, p 4; also B'TSELEM according to whom this would include 143,200 settlers of the West Bank and an additional 12 settlements with 179,000 inhabitants in East Jerusalem, see www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp.
[15] www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/news.htm#news16. According to the Ministry of Defence it started to dismantle the fence on the eastern side of Baka al Sharqiya, 22/02/2004.
[16] See Haaretz Daily on 11 May 2004, "High Court will stop separation fence, defense officials fear".
[17] See B'TSELEM at www.btselem.org/English/Separation_Barrier/Route_Changes.asp.
[18] Figures differ, see UN OCHA January update, Preliminary analysis reveals that the planned route to complete the Barrier will have severe humanitarian consequences for hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank, January 2004 update, www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/. The report mentions that these figures are based on Israeli Government projections. B'TSLEM has referred to 16.8% of the land, including the land expropriated for the construction of the Barrier and land between the municipal boundaries of East Jerusalem and the Green Line, see at www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp.
[19] For reference see: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), The West Bank Wall, July 2003, available at www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/wall/report/wall.htm; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), West Bank Barrier, Humanitarian Access and the Jerusalem Barrier, December 2003, available at www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/wall/jm/index.htm; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Implications of the New Barrier Projections - Jan 2004 update, available at www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/docs/UN/OCHA/Barrierprojections_Jan04 _25Feb04_eng.pdf; The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), The West Bank Barrier, available at www.un.org/unrwa/emergency/Barrier/index.html (including "Impact of the First Phase of the Barrier on the Qalqiliya, Tulkarm and Jenin districts"; "Special report on the West Bank Barrier" and "The Impact of the First Phase of Barrier on UNRWA-Registered Refugees" at www.un.org/unrwa/emergency/Barrier/f-phase.html; See also Report of 30 April 2003 of the Mission to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) of the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC) - The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities, Follow-up Report of 31 July 2003 to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC) - The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities, Follow-up Report of 30 September 2003 to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC) - The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities, Follow-up Report of 30 November 2003 to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC) - The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities.
[20] See World Bank, The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities, Follow-up Report of 30 November 2003 to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC) - The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities, at 5.
[21] See Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, 24 November 2003, A/ES-10/2/248, at 3. OCHA estimated in its January update that 20,000 Palestinians would be living in closed areas and 169,000 in enclaves. B'TSELEM estimates that 263,200 people would be surrounded by the Barrier (i.e. main Barrier, secondary Barrier or a combination of the two), with another 210,000 affected in East Jerusalem. It estimates further that up to 402,400 people would be affected in 102 communities lying immediately east of the Barrier, see at www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp.
[22] World Bank, The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities, Follow-up Report of 4 May 2003 to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC) - The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities, at 33; para. I-23. B'TSELEM refers to 28,000 dunams (7000 acres) as expropriated land so far. See www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp.
[23] IDF - Order Concerning Security Directives (Judea and Samaria) (number 378), 1970, Declaration Concerning the Closure of Area Number s/2/03 (Seam Area), available in English translation at domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/c6114997e0ba34c885256ddc0077146a?OpenDocument
[24] See supra note 23, para. 3 (a).
[25] See supra note 23, article 4 (a).
[26] See supra note 23, para. 1 (a).
[27] Subsequent regulations by the head of the Civil Administration deal with requests for permanent residence permits as well as for personal permits to enter and stay in the "Seam Area", see IDF - Order Regarding Defense Regulations (Judea and Samaria) (No.378), 5730-1970 Regulations Regarding Permanent Resident in the Seam Area Permit; IDF - Order Regarding Defense Regulations (Judea and Samaria) (No.378), 5730-1970, Regulations Regarding Permits to Enter and Stay in the Seam Area; IDF - Order Regarding Defense Regulations (Judea and Samaria) (No.378), 5730-1970, Regulations Regarding Crossing in the Seam Area, available at www.hamoked.org.il/.
[28] See B'TSELEM, Not All It Seems - Preventing Palestinians Access to their Lands West of the Separation Barrier in the Tulkarm-Qalqilia Area, June 2004.
[29] See for a description, World Bank, The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities, Follow-up Report of 4 May 2003 to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC) - The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities, at 16; para. I-23.
[30] See for above, at 16; para. I-23.
[31] World Bank, The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities, Follow-up Report of 4 May 2003 to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC) - The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities, at 18 according to which the Military Commander has the authority to reverse this decision.
[32] See Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, 24 November 2003, A/ES-10/2/248. The legal regime differs, however, in East Jerusalem, where property requisitions are apparently based on the Emergency Requisition of Land Law, 5710 -1949, reference from B'TSELEM, Behind the Barrier, Human rights violations as a result of Israel's Separation Barrier, at 17 March 2003; On the Supreme Court sitting as High Court in the Occupied Territories, its jurisdiction and jurisprudence, see David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, 2002.
[33] See HaMoked - Center for the Defence of the Individual - versus the Government of Israel, HCJ 9961/03, briefs are available at www.hamoked.org.il/news_main_en.asp?id=25.
[34] Ratification on 6 July 1951.
[35] See on this position: Summary of legal position of the Government of Israel, Report of the Secretary General prepared pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, Annex 1.
[36] See among others, International Commission of Jurists, The Review, 1977, No.19, Israel's Settlements in the Occupied Areas, at 34.
[37] See J. Pictet (ed.), IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War: Commentary, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1958, pp. 21-22, Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions, ICRC, on article 2 para. 2 stating: "(…) the fact that the territory of one or another of the belligerents is later occupied in the course of hostilities does not in any way affect this; the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories simply become protected persons as they fall into the hands of the Occupying Power. The sense in which the paragraph under consideration should be understood is thus quite clear. It does not refer to cases in which territory is occupied during hostilities; in such cases the Convention will have been in force since the outbreak of hostilities or since the time war was declared (that is in accordance with article 2, para. 1 - emphasis added). The paragraph only refers to cases where the occupation has taken place without a declaration of war and without hostilities, and makes provision for the entry into force of the Convention in those particular circumstances. The wording of the paragraph [p.22] is not very clear, the text adopted by the Government Experts being more explicit (6). Nevertheless, a simultaneous examination of paras. 1 and 2 leaves no doubt as to the latter's sense: it was intended to fill the gap left by para. 1.(…)".
[38] Common article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions requires States Parties to "respect" and to "ensure respect" for the obligations under the Conventions.
[39] Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention Geneva, Declaration, 5 December 2001, para. 3, "Taking into account art. 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and bearing in mind the United Nations' General Assembly Resolution ES-10/7, the participating High Contracting Parties reaffirm the applicability of the Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and reiterate the need for full respect for the provisions of the said Convention in that Territory. Through the present Declaration, they recall in particular the respective obligations under the Convention of all High Contracting Parties (para. 4-7), of the parties to the conflict (para. 8-11) and of the State of Israel as the Occupying Power (para. 12-15)"; See www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList325/D86C9E662022D64E41256C6800366D55#1
[40] In line with article 31, para. 3 (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.
[41] See: Security Council Resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 (1426th meeting); Security Council Resolution 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 (1485th meeting); Security Council Resolution 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 (1582th meeting); Security Council Resolution 446 (1979) of 22 march 1979; Security Council Resolution 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980 (2242nd meeting); the Security Council Resolution 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980 (2245th meeting) is of particular relevance. ; see also General Assembly Resolution concerning the status of Jerusalem (not exhaustive) 36/120 E of 10 December 1981 ; 37/123 C of 16 December 1982 ; 38/180 C of 19 December 1983 ; 39/146 C of 14 December 1984 ; 40/168 C of 16 December 1985 ; 41/162 C of 4 December 1986 ; 42/209 D of 11 December 1987 ; 43/54 C of 6 December 1988 ; 44/40 C of 4 December 1989 ; 45/83 C of 13 December 1990 ; 46/82 B of 16 December 1991 ; 47/63 B of 11 December 1992 ; 48/59 A of 14 December 1993 ; 49/87 A of 16 December 1994 ; 50/22 A of 4 December 1995 ; 51/27 of 4 December 1996 ; 52/53 of 9 December 1997 ; 53/37 of 2 December 1998 ; 54/37 of 1 December 1999; 54/77 of 6 December 1999; 55/50, 1 December 2001; 55/131 of 8 December 2000; 56/60 of 10 December 2001; 57/125 of 11 December 2002 . See also Resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 (1548th plenary meeting), Measures Taken by Israel to Change the Status of the City of Jerusalem.
[42] For the most recent resolutions: United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2003/6 "Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine" of 15 April 2003; Resolution 2003/7 "Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories" of 15 April 2003,; Resolution 2002/7 "Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories" of 12 April 2002, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/8 "Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine" of 15 April 2002, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001/8 "Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories" of 18 April 2001; Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001/7 "Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine" of 18 April 2001; Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/8 "Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories" of 17 April 2000, pp 2; Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/6 "Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine" of 17 April 2000, pp 3 and 4.
[43] Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention: Statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 5 December 2001, para. 2 available at www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList325/D86C9E662022D64E41256C6800366D55#2.
[44] Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, pp. 256-259, para. 75-84, especially para. 79. See also Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p 22; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p 112, pp 113-114, paras. 215 and 218-220.
[45] Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, pp. 256-259, paras. 75-84, especially para. 79.
[46] See: Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank, Case N° HCJ 7015/02 [2002], Israel Law report 1, Supreme Court of Israel, 3 September 2002, paras. 131-133, 138, 144 and 155-162, para. 155.
[47] See in this respect, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on 2 October 1995, Prosecutor versus Tadic, IT-94-1, Interlocutory Appeal, para. 117. Attention must also be drawn to Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. Many provisions of this Protocol can now be regarded as declaratory of existing rules or as having crystallised emerging rules of customary law or else as having been strongly instrumental in their evolution as general principles.
[48] For an overview on the argument, see International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, Briefing Note: IHL in Israel and the Occupied Territories, available at www.ihlresearch.org/opt/feature.php?a=31.
[49] See also Oxford Public Interest Lawyers, Legal Consequences of Israel's construction of a Separation Barrier in the Occupied Territories, February 2004, para. 78. Also UN Commission of Inquiry, Commission Resolution S-5/1 of 19 October 2000, Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine, E/CN.4/2001/121, 16 March 2001.
[50] See: Security Council Resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 (1426th meeting); Security Council Resolution 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 (1485th meeting); Security Council Resolution 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 (1582th meeting); Security Council Resolution 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980 (2242nd meeting); the Security Council Resolution 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980 (2245th meeting) is of particular relevance.
[51] See General Assembly Resolution concerning the status of Jerusalem (not exhaustive): ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003; 36/120 E of 10 December 1981 ; 37/123 C of 16 December 1982 ; 38/180 C of 19 December 1983 ; 39/146 C of 14 December 1984 ; 40/168 C of 16 December 1985 ; 41/162 C of 4 December 1986 ; 42/209 D of 11 December 1987 ; 43/54 C of 6 December 1988 ; 44/40 C of 4 December 1989 ; 45/83 C of 13 December 1990 ; 46/82 B of 16 December 1991 ; 47/63 B of 11 December 1992 ; 48/59 A of 14 December 1993 ; 49/87 A of 16 December 1994 ; 50/22 A of 4 December 1995 ; 51/27 of 4 December 1996 ; 52/53 of 9 December 1997 ; 53/37 of 2 December 1998 ; 54/37 of 1 December 1999 ; 55/50, 1 December 2001. See also Resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 (1548th plenary meeting), Measures Taken by Israel to Change the Status of the City of Jerusalem.
[52] Israel signed the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on 19 December 1966 and ratified it on 3 October 1991.
[53] Israel signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 19 December 1966 and ratified it on 3 October 1991.
[54] Israel signed the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination on 7 March 1966 and ratified it on 3 January 1979. It made a reservation on article 22.
[55] Israel signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women on 17 July 1980 and ratified it on 3 October 1991. It made reservations on articles 7(b), 16 and 29, para. 1.
[56] Israel signed the Convention against Torture on 22 October 1986 and ratified it on 3 October 1991. It made reservations on articles 20 and 30, para. 1 the competence of the Committee against Torture and to the competence of the International Court of Justice in case of a dispute concerning the application or interpretation of the Convention.
[57] Israel signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 3 July 1990 and ratified it 3 October 1991. In addition, it has signed the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children and Optional Protocol on Armed Conflict on 14 November 2001.
[58] See Summary legal position of the Government of Israel in the Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, UN Doc. A/ES-10/248, 24 November 2003, p 8, para. 4. See also Second Periodic Report of Israel to the Human rights Committee, CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2, 4 December 2001, para. 8.
[59] The more restrictive textual reading of article 2 ICCPR ("within the territory and under the jurisdiction") in comparison to other human rights treaties ("under its jurisdiction") has been meant to prevent the application of the Covenant to situations where the State Party has no reasonable influence to guarantee the application of the Covenant, for example the case of the protection of nationals living abroad. In this case the Covenant can naturally not be enforced other than by diplomatic protection. See also Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in: The International Bill of Rights (Louis Henkin ed.), 72, at 74, 75 (1981).
[60] Communication No. 52/1979, CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, 29 July 1981, para. 12.3, UN Doc. A/36/40 (1981), which states in para. 12.3 : "Article 2 (1) of the Covenant places an obligation upon a State party to respect and to ensure rights "to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction", but it does not imply that the State Party concerned cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of another State, whether with the acquiescence of the Government of that State or in opposition to it."
[61] Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, United States of America, 03/10/95, CCPR/C/79/Add.50; A/50/40, paras. 266-304. (Concluding Observations/Comments), 284: "(…) The Committee does not share the view expressed by the Government that the Covenant lacks extraterritorial reach under all circumstances. Such a view is contrary to the consistent interpretation of the Committee on this subject, that, in special circumstances, persons may fall under the subject-matter jurisdiction of a State Party even when outside that State's territory." See also Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel CCPR/CO/78/ISR of 21 August 2003, para. 11: "[…] Nor does the applicability of the regime of international humanitarian law preclude accountability of States Parties under article 2, para. 1 of the Covenant for the actions of their authorities outside their own territories, including in occupied territories. The Committee therefore reiterates that, in the current circumstances, the provisions of the Covenant apply to the benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories, for all conduct by the State Party's authorities or agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant and fall within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the principles of public international law." Likewise, see Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel CCPR/C/79/ Add.93, 18 August 1998, para. 10: "The Committee is deeply concerned that Israel continues to deny its responsibility to fully apply the Covenant in the occupied territories. In this regard, the Committee points to the long-standing presence of Israel in these territories, Israel's ambiguous attitude towards their future status, as well as the exercise of effective jurisdiction by Israeli security forces therein. (…) The Committee is therefore of the view that, under the circumstances, the Covenant must be held applicable to the occupied territories and those areas of southern Lebanon and West Bekaa where Israel exercises effective control. The Committee requests the State Party to include in its second periodic report all information relevant to the application of the Covenant in territories which it occupies"; see also UN Committee on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights has adopted an identical interpretation: see Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights: Israel, E/C.12/1/Add.90, 26 June 2003, para. 15 according to which "The Committee also reiterates its concern about the State Party's position that the Covenant does not apply to areas that are not subject to its sovereign territory and jurisdiction, and that the Covenant is not applicable to populations other than the Israelis in the occupied territories. The Committee further reiterates its regret at the State Party's refusal to report on the occupied territories", see E/C.12/1/Add.27, para. 11.
[62] CCPR A/46/40 (1991) The Committee considered the third periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/64/Add.6) at its 1080th to 1082nd meetings held on 18 and 19 July 1991 (see CCPR/C/SR.1080-1082). Para. 652.
[63] See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Occupied Kuwait, E/CN.4/1992/26 at para. 50-63.
[64] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment on article 2, The nature of the General Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (adopted at 2187th meeting on March 2004, CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.6/ para. 10.
[65] See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel CCPR/CO/78/ISR of 21 August 2003, para. 11: "[…] Nor does the applicability of the regime of international humanitarian law preclude accountability of States Parties under article 2, para. 1 of the Covenant for the actions of their authorities outside their own territories, including in occupied territories. The Committee therefore reiterates that, in the current circumstances, the provisions of the Covenant apply to the benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories, for all conduct by the State Party's authorities or agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant and fall within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the principles of public international law." Likewise, see Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel CCPR/C/79/ Add.93, 18 August 1998, para. 10: "The Committee is deeply concerned that Israel continues to deny its responsibility to fully apply the Covenant in the occupied territories."
[66] The UN Committee on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights has adopted an identical interpretation: see Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights: Israel, E/C.12/1/Add.90, 26 June 2003, para. 15 according to which "The Committee also reiterates its concern about the State Party's position that the Covenant does not apply to areas that are not subject to its sovereign territory and jurisdiction, and that the Covenant is not applicable to populations other than the Israelis in the occupied territories. The Committee further reiterates its regret at the State Party's refusal to report on the occupied territories (E/C.12/1/Add.27, para. 11)."
[67] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Coard et al. v. United States, Case 10.951, Report Nº 109/99, September 29, 1999, Inter-Am.C.H.R., para. 37.
[68] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Request for precautionary measures in favour of detainees being held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, 12 mars 2002, ILM, 2002, vol. 41, p 532-535.
[69] See European Court of Human rights, Case of Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Judgement of 23 March 1995, Series A N° 310, para. 60.
[70] See supra, para. 61.
[71] European Court of Human Rights, Cyprus v. Turkey, Judgement of 10 May 2001, para. 77. See also the earlier decision by the European Commission on Human Rights following the invasion of Turkish forces in 1974, Application 6780/74, DR 2, 125, 136 et seq..
[72] Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and 16 other contracting States, 12 December 2001, para. 71.
[73] See ICJ, Advisory opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p 240, para. 25; See also General Assembly Resolution 2675 of 1970, on "Basic principles of civilian population in armed conflicts", which states in para. 1: "Fundamental human rights, as accepted in international law and laid down in international instruments, continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict".
[74] General Comment, On the nature of state obligations, CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.6/ para. 11.
[75] See European Court of Human rights, Case of Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Judgement of 23 March 1995, Series A N° 310, para. 60;
[76] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, "Precautionary Measures in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba", Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 13 March 2002. It states: "[I]n situations of armed conflict, the protections under international human rights and humanitarian law may complement and reinforce one another, sharing as they do a common nucleus of non-derogable rights and a common purpose of promoting human life and dignity. In certain circumstances, however, the test for evaluating the observance of a particular right, such as the right to liberty, in a situation of armed conflict may be distinct from that applicable in time of peace. In such situations, international law, including the jurisprudence of this Commission, dictates that it may be necessary to deduce the applicable standard by reference to international humanitarian law as the applicable lex specialis."
[77] See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel CCPR/CO/78/ISR of 21 August 2003, para. 11: "[…] Nor does the applicability of the regime of international humanitarian law preclude accountability of States Parties under article 2, para. 1 of the Covenant for the actions of their authorities outside their own territories, including in occupied territories. The Committee therefore reiterates that, in the current circumstances, the provisions of the Covenant apply to the benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories, for all conduct by the State Party's authorities or agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant and fall within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the principles of public international law." Likewise, see Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel CCPR/C/79/ Add.93, 18 August 1998, para. 10: "In response to the arguments presented by the delegation, the Committee emphasizes that the applicability of rules of humanitarian law does not by itself impede the application of the Covenant or the accountability of the State under article 2, para. 1 for the actions of its authorities.The Committee is therefore of the view that, under the circumstances, the Covenant must be held applicable to the occupied territories and those areas of southern Lebanon and West Bekaa where Israel exercises effective control."
[78] TheUNCommitteeonEconomic.Social and Cultural Rights has adopted an identical interpretation: see Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights: Israel, E/C.12/1/Add.90, 26 June 2003, para. 15: "In addition, the Committee is deeply concerned at the insistence of the State Party that, giventhe circumstances in the occupied territories, the law of armed conflict and humanitarian law are considered as the only mode whereby protection may be ensured for all involved, and that this matter is considered to fall outside the sphere of the Committee's responsibility."
[79] Commission of Inquiry, Commission Resolution S-5/1 of 19 October 2000, Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine, E/CN.4/2001/121, 16 March 2001, para. 37.
[80] Summary legal position of the Government of Israel in the Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, UN Doc. A/ES-10/248, 24 November 2003, p 8, para. 6: "According to its statement made before the General Assembly on 20 October 2003, the Government of Israel believes the construction of the Barrier is consistent with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, its inherent right to self-defence and Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001). See Statement of Ambassador Gillerman at the General Assembly, A/ES-10/PV.21, 21st Meeting, 20 October 2003, p 6
[81] On the duty to protect, see Human Rights Committee, decision of 12 July 1990, William Eduardo Delgado Páez v. Colombia, Communication No. 195/1985, UN Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985, 23 August 1990, para. 5.5. Human Rights Committee, decision of 20 March 2000, Carlos Dias v. Angola, Communication N° 711/1996, UN Doc. CCPR/C/68/D/711/1996, 18 April 2000, para. 8.3, Human Rights Committee, decision of 25 October 2000, Rodger Chongwe v. Zambie, Communication No. 821/1998, UN. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/821/1998, 9 November 2000. para. 5.3. Regional jurisprudence is along the same line. See European Court Human Rights, Kiliç v. Turkey, 28 March 2000, para. 62: " The Court recalls that the first sentence of Article 2 para. 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see the L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998-III, p 1403, para. 36). See also Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Neira Alegría Case, Judgment of 19 January 1995, para. 75; Case 11.182, Report Nº 49/00, Carlos Florentino Molero Coca Rodolfo Gerbert Asencios Lindo, Rodolfo Dynnik Asencios Lindo, Marco Antonio Ambrosio Concha, and Peru, 13 April 2000, Annual Report of the IACHR 1999, para. 58.
[82] The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has examined national measures undertaken in the context of Resolution 1373 (2001) in respect of their compatibility with the ICCPR. The Committee's observations on the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland (6 December 2001, para. 6, 14 and 19), Sweden (24 April 2002, para. 12), Yemen (26 July 2002, para. 18), Moldova (26 July 2002, para. 8), New Zealand (7 August 2002, para. 11), Egypt (28 November 2002, para. 16), Estonia (3 April 2003, para. 8), Portugal (5 July 2003, para. 15) and Israel (5 August 2003, para. 14); Statement of the Committee against Torture: 22/11/2001. CAT/C/XXVII/Misc.7; Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Sweden. 06/06/2002. CAT/C/CR/28/6, para. 6 (b); Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Russian Federation. 28/05/2002. CAT/C/CR/28/4, para. 4; Statement on Racial Discrimination and Measures to Combat Terrorism: 01/11/2002. A/57/18 (Chapter XI) (C); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: New Zealand. 01/11/2002. A/57/18, paras.412-434, para. 429; Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Canada. 01/11/2002. A/57/18, paras. 315-343, para. 338.
[83] Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, E/CN.4/2003/8 of 16 December 2002; Special Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights Defenders, E/CN.4/2002/106 of 27 February 2002 and E/CN.4/2003/104 of 3 January 2003; Special Rapporteur on the question of contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, E/CN.4/2002/24 of 13 February 2002 and report on the "Situation of Muslim and Arab peoples in various parts of the world in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001" E/CN.4/2003/23 of 3 January 2003; Special Rapporteur on the Independence of judges and lawyers, E/CN.4/2003/65 of 10 January 2003; Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants, E/CN.4/2002/94 of 15 February 2002; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, E/CN.4/2002/75 of 30 January 2002 and E/CN.4/2003/67 of 30 December 2002. See also, the joint statement on June 27 June 2003 of the Special Rapporteurs/Representatives, experts and chairpersons of the working groups of the special procedures of the Commission on Human Rights and the chairpersons of human rights treaty bodies, available at www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/newsroom
[84] Declaration on the issue of combating terrorism adopted by the Security Council Meeting at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs on 20 January 2003, para. 6. Annex to Security Council Resolution 1456 (2003) of 20 January 2003, S/RES/1456 (2003).
[85] General Assembly Resolution 57/219 of 18 December 2002; Resolution 58/187 of 22 December 2003.
[86] Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/68 of 25 April 2003 on the "Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while countering Terrorism".
[87] UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 2003/15 "Effects of measures to combat terrorism on the enjoyment of human rights" of 13 August 2003.
[88] Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, CCPR/CO/78/ISR, 21 August 2003, para. 14.
[89] Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, "States of Emergency (art. 4)", CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 of 31 August 2001, para. 2.
[90] Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, "States of Emergency (art. 4)", CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 of 31 August 2001.
[91] Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, "States of Emergency (art. 4)", CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 of 31 August 2001, in particular para. 8 -10.
[92] See article 4, para. 3 ICCPR.
[93] Human Rights Committee, CCCP/CO/78/ISR, para. 11-19.
[94] See Report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights decision 1998/108: "Question of human rights and states of emergency - List of States which have proclaimed or continued a state of emergency", E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/39, 16 June 2003, pp. 3-4. It reads: Israel "The Government of Israel notified that the state of emergency proclaimed in May 1948 has remained in force. As the situation constitutes a public emergency within the meaning of article 4 (1) of the Covenant, the Government found it necessary to take measures to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation for the defence of the State and for the protection of life and property, including the exercise of powers of arrest and detention. Insofar as any of these measures are inconsistent with article 9 of the Covenant, Israel derogates from its obligations under that provision. The state of emergency is still in effect." Sources: Notification of the Government to the United Nations Secretary-General, received on 3 October 1991; United Nations Information Service, 27 March 2003.
[95] Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, CCPR/CO/78/ISR, 21/08/2003: para. 12. See also Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, CCPR/C/79/Add.93, 18/08/98. para. 4, 10 and 11.
[96] This is in line not only with the Concluding Observations of the UN Human Rights Committee, but also by regional human rights bodies. The Turkish Government had not declared any derogation under the European Convention on Human Rights following its invasion in Cyprus with the effect that the European Convention was unquestionably fully applicable in the Turkish Cypriot territory, see the decision by the European Commission on Human Rights, Application 6780/74, DR 2, 125, 136 et seq.; See also René Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 2002, at 270.
[97] Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, "States of Emergency (art. 4)", CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 of 31 August 2001, para. 17 - the obligation is an immediate one and covers the declaration of an emergency as well as any change in the scope of the existing derogation.