Myanmar: Appointment and promotion of judges; Security of tenure

To safeguard the independence of the judiciary and the rights to equality before the law and equal access to the profession, international standards clarify that judges should be appointed though an open process on the basis of prescribed criteria based on merit and integrity, and without discrimination.{{35}} To ensure that the composition of the judiciary is essentially reflective of the population and to combat discrimination and ensure equality before the law, steps should be taken to ensure the appointment of qualified women and members of minority communities.{{36}}

As regards appointment criteria, the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary stipulate that persons selected must be “individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training of qualifications in law”.{{37}}

An appropriate method of appointment of judges is a prerequisite for the independence of the judiciary{{38}} and is a means of ensuring equal access to the profession. On the procedure for judicial appointments, the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary underscore the fact that “any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives”.{{39}} In relation to the appointment and promotion of judges the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers have repeatedly recommended the use of bodies that are independent from the executive,{{40}} plural and are composed mainly (if not solely) of judges and members of the legal profession;{{41}} they should apply transparent procedures.{{42}}

Promotions within the judiciary must be based on objective factors, particularly ability, integrity and experience.{{43}}

It is widely accepted that when judges have security of tenure in office they are less vulnerable to pressure from those who can influence or make decisions about the renewal of their terms of office. Accordingly, international standards prescribe that judges tenure must be guaranteed until a mandatory retirement age or expiry of the term of office.{{44}}

While as described below in section 4, judges nonetheless remain accountable throughout their terms of office, as a necessary corollary to the guarantee of security of tenure, international standards specify that during their term of office, judges may be removed only in exceptional, strictly limited and well-defined circumstances provided for by law, involving incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to carry out the duties of their office, and following a fair procedure.

Myanmar does not have a Judicial Service Commission or other comparable body entrusted with the appointment, promotion and discipline of judges, and protecting and promoting judicial independence and the efficiency of justice.

Different political institutions manage judicial appointment in Myanmar. The processes used and criteria they apply are opaque.

The President and the Parliament jointly appoint the members of the Constitutional Tribunal.{{45}} The President nominates the Chief Justice of the Union and, in co-ordination with the latter, the judges of the Supreme Court; they are appointed with the approval of Parliament, who cannot refuse to approve the appointment of the nominee unless it can clearly be proven that the person does not meet the required qualifications.{{46}}

The President also nominates the Chief Justices of the High Courts of the Regions and States, in co-ordination with the Chief Justice of the Union and the pertinent Region or State Chief Minister. Other judges of the High Courts are nominated by the Chief Minister of the Region or State concerned, in co-ordination with the Chief Justice of the Union. The President appoints the Chief Justices and judges of the High Courts with the approval of the Region or State Parliament, who cannot refuse to approve the appointment of the nominees unless it can clearly be proven that the person does not mean the required qualifications.{{47}}

Notably, the criteria for appointment do not necessarily require that candidates for judicial office hold a law degree or have professional experience in the legal field (be it as an academic, practicing lawyer, or any other type of legal professional). Instead, being “a person who, in the opinion of the President, is an eminent jurist” can suffice.{{48}}

The Supreme Court is tasked with appointing lower court judges, which it reportedly has delegated to a Civil Service Selection and Training Board.{{49}}

It is unclear which criteria or process are applied to promotions.

Many judges in Myanmar lack knowledge of the law and standards on judicial conduct, as well as experience.{{50}} In an interview with an ICJ researcher in May 2013, a senior legal adviser to the President acknowledged that “judges lack the knowledge to conduct free and fair trials”. {{51}} Government officials, however, appear open to programmes organized by the international community that aim to improve the training of judges.

[[35]]35. [expand title=”Principle 10″]Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.[/expand] of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary provides in part: “In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.” See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), [expand title=”para. 19.”]The requirement of competence, independence and impartiality of a tribunal in the sense of article 14, paragraph 1, is an absolute right that is not subject to any exception. The requirement of independence refers, in particular, to the procedure and qualifications for the appointment of judges, and guarantees relating to their security of tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exist, the conditions governing promotion, transfer, suspension and cessation of their functions, and the actual independence of the judiciary from political interference by the executive branch and legislature. States should take specific measures guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, protecting judges from any form of political influence in their decision-making through the constitution or adoption of laws establishing clear procedures and objective criteria for the appointment, remuneration, tenure, promotion, suspension and dismissal of the members of the judiciary and disciplinary sanctions taken against them. A situation where the functions and competencies of the judiciary and the executive are not clearly distinguishable or where the latter is able to control or direct the former is incompatible with the notion of an independent tribunal. It is necessary to protect judges against conflicts of interest and intimidation. In order to safeguard their independence, the status of judges, including their term of office, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law.[/expand][[35]]

[[36]]36. Gabriela Knaul, Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Report to the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/66/289 (2011), para. 22-33, 92; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/73/UK (2001), [expand title=”para. 15;”]The Committee notes that, despite recent improvements, the proportions of women participating in public life, particularly at senior levels of the executive and judiciary and in Parliament, and also in the private sector, remain at low levels. The State party should take necessary steps towards achieving an appropriate representation of women in these fields.[/expand] Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on France, UN Doc. CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4, (2008), [expand title=”para. 26;”]The Committee notes with concern that persons belonging to racial, ethnic or national minorities are rarely selected for representative bodies, including the National Assembly, and may occupy few positions in the police, the public administration and the judiciary. (articles 2, 25 and 26) The State party should facilitate the participation of persons who are members of minority groups in publicly elected bodies, including the National Assembly and local government. In particular, the State party should seek ways to increase the number of candidates belonging to minorities included in the list of political parties running for elections. The appointment of persons from minority backgrounds as members of the police, public administration and the judiciary, is also important to assure the representation of the needs of varied communities in the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of policies and programmes affecting them.[/expand] Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Sudan, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.85 (1997), [expand title=”para. 21;”]The Committee is concerned that in appearance as well as in fact the judiciary is not truly independent, that many judges have not been selected primarily on the basis of their legal qualifications, that judges can be subject to pressure through a supervisory authority dominated by the Government, and that very few non-Muslims or women occupy judicial positions at all levels. Therefore: Measures should be taken to improve the independence and technical competence of the judiciary, including the appointment of qualified judges from among women and members of minorities. Training in human rights law should be given to all judges, law enforcement officers and members of the legal profession.[/expand] Committee Against Torture Conclusions and recommendations on Bahrain, UN Doc. CAT/C/CR/34/BHR (2005), [expand title=”para. 7(h);”]Fully ensure the independence of the judiciary and include female judicial officials in its judicial system;[/expand] Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XXXI on the prevention of racial discrimination in the administration and functioning of the criminal justice system, UN Doc. A/60/18, (pp. 98-108) (2005), [expand title=”para. 5(d);”]To promote proper representation of persons belonging to racial and ethnic groups in the police and the system of justice;[/expand] Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations on Guatemala, UN Doc. CERD/C/GTM/CO/12-13 (2010), [expand title=”para. 8;”]While noting the efforts made by the judiciary in the area of training, in the provision of interpreters, in the application of cultural expertise and in the appointment of bilingual staff to the courts to improve indigenous peoples’ access to the official system of justice, the Committee reiterates its concern about the problems experienced by indigenous peoples in gaining access to justice, particularly because the indigenous legal system is not recognized and applied and because of the lack of a sufficient number of interpreters and bilingual court officials who are knowledgeable about judicial proceedings. It regrets, in particular, that, when a number of judges were appointed to the Supreme Court in late 2009, no indigenous person was selected (art. 5 (a)).[/expand] Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations on Colombia, UN Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.76 (1999), [expand title=”para. 13.”]It is noted that indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities are underrepresented in State institutions, including in the legislature, the judiciary, government ministries, the military, and the civil and diplomatic services.[/expand][[36]]

[[37]]37. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, [expand title=”Principle 10.”]Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.[/expand][[37]]

[[38]]38. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), [expand title=”para. 19.”] The requirement of competence, independence and impartiality of a tribunal in the sense of article 14, paragraph 1, is an absolute right that is not subject to any exception. The requirement of independence refers, in particular, to the procedure and qualifications for the appointment of judges, and guarantees relating to their security of tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exist, the conditions governing promotion, transfer, suspension and cessation of their functions, and the actual independence of the judiciary from political interference by the executive branch and legislature. States should take specific measures guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, protecting judges from any form of political influence in their decision-making through the constitution or adoption of laws establishing clear procedures and objective criteria for the appointment, remuneration, tenure, promotion, suspension and dismissal of the members of the judiciary and disciplinary sanctions taken against them. A situation where the functions and competencies of the judiciary and the executive are not clearly distinguishable or where the latter is able to control or direct the former is incompatible with the notion of an independent tribunal. It is necessary to protect judges against conflicts of interest and intimidation. In order to safeguard their independence, the status of judges, including their term of office, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law.[/expand] [[38]]

[[39]]39. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, [expand title=”Principle 10.”]Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.[/expand][[39]]

[[40]]40. See e.g. Concluding Observations on the Congo, CCPR/C/79/Add.118, [expand title=”para. 14;”]The Committee expresses its concern at the attacks on the independence of the judiciary, in violation of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. It draws attention to the fact that such independence is limited owing to the lack of any independent mechanism responsible for the recruitment and discipline of judges, and to the many pressures and influences, including those of the executive branch, to which judges are subjected. The State party should take the appropriate steps to ensure the independence of the judiciary, in particular by amending the rules concerning the composition and operation of the Supreme Council of Justice and its effective establishment. The Committee considers that particular attention should be given to the training of judges and to the system governing their recruitment and discipline, in order to free them from political, financial and other pressures, ensure their security of tenure and enable them to render justice promptly and impartially. It invites the State party to adopt effective measures to that end and to take the appropriate steps to ensure that more judges are given adequate training.[/expand] Concluding Observations on Liechtenstein, CCPR/CO/81/LIE, [expand title=”para. 12;”]While noting that the constitutional amendments of 2003 sought to clarify the system of appointment and tenure of judges, the Committee is concerned about some elements of the new mechanism which may not be compatible with the principle of the independence of the judiciary (art. 14). The State party should consider amending the mechanism for the appointment of judges to secure tenure, so as to guarantee fully the principle of the independence of the judiciary. The elements to be reviewed should include: the criteria for the appointment of members to the selecting body, the casting vote of the Princely House and the limited nature of tenure.[/expand] Concluding Observations on Tajikistan, CCPR/CO/84/TJK, [expand title=”para. 17;”]The Committee is concerned about the apparent lack of independence of the judiciary, as reflected in the process of appointment and dismissal of judges as well as in their economic status (art. 14, para. 1). The State party should guarantee the full independence and impartiality of the judiciary by establishing an independent body charged with the responsibility of appointing, promoting and disciplining judges at all levels and by remunerating judges with due regard for the responsibilities and the nature of their office. [/expand] Concluding Observations on Honduras, CCPR/C/HND/CO/1 (2006), [expand title=”para. 16;”]The Committee notes the State party’s implementation of selection procedures for judges in accordance with the Judicial Council Act. It is concerned, however, at the failure to establish an independent body to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and to supervise the appointment, promotion and regulation of the profession (article 14 of the Covenant). The State party should take effective action to safeguard the independence of the judiciary, including the prompt establishment of an independent body to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and to supervise the appointment, promotion and regulation of the profession.[/expand] Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan, UN Doc. CCPR/C/AZE/CO/3 (2009), [expand title=”para. 12;”]The Committee remains concerned that, despite the reforms undertaken and the progress made during the reporting period, through, inter alia, the amendments in the Judges Act, the adoption of the Judicial Council Act, the establishment of the statute of the Judges’ Selection Committee, the Code of Ethics for Judges, the State party’s judiciary does not appear to be fully independent from the executive branch or from political pressure. The Committee is also concerned about reports that corruption within the judiciary remains a problem (art. 14). The State party should strengthen its efforts to ensure a fully independent judiciary. Given the important prerogatives of the Judicial Council, in particular regarding selection, promotion, and disciplining of members of the judiciary, the State party should ensure that the Judicial Council, in its composition and work, is fully independent from the executive so as to create conditions ensuring full independence of the judiciary. The State party should increase efforts to combat corruption, in particular within its judiciary, by investigating promptly and thoroughly all incidents of suspected corruption. If corruption is established, the officials concerned should face criminal and not only disciplinary sanctions.[/expand] Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), UN Doc. CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1 (2006), [expand title=”para. 20.”]The Committee is concerned about the absence of adequate guarantees for the independence of international judges and prosecutors. It is concerned about the low remuneration of local judges and prosecutors, the low representation of ethnic minorities in the judiciary, the excessive length of civil court proceedings and court backlogs and the frequent failure to enforce judgements (art. 14). UNMIK, in cooperation with PISG as required, should establish independent procedures for the recruitment, appointment and discipline of international judges and prosecutors, ensure adequate terms and conditions for local judges and prosecutors whereby they are shielded from corruption, increase the representation of ethnic minorities in the judiciary, assign additional judges to courts with case backlogs and ensure enforcement of judgements without delay.[/expand] Also see Draft Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (also known as the Singhvi Declaration), [expand title=”Article 11;”]a) The process and standards of judicial selection shall give due consideration to ensuring a fair reflection by the judiciary of the society in all its aspects. (b) Any methods of judicial selection shall scrupulously safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. (c) Participation in judicial appointments by the Executive or the Legislature or the general electorate is consistent with judicial independence so far as such participation is not vitiated by and is scrupulously safeguarded against improper motives and methods. To secure the most suitable appointments from the point of view of professional ability and integrity and to safeguard individual independence, integrity and endeavour shall be made, in so far as possible, to provide for consultation with members of the judiciary and the legal profession in making judicial appointments or to provide appointments or recommendations for appointments to be made by a body in which members of the judiciary and the legal profession participate effectively.[/expand] Universal Charter of the Judge, Approved by the International Association of Judges on 17 November 1999, [expand title=”Article 9.”]The selection and each appointment of a judge must be carried out according to objective and transparent criteria based on proper professional qualification. Where this is not ensured in other ways, that are rooted in established and proven tradition, selection should be carried out by an independent body, that include substantial judicial representation.[/expand][[40]]

[[41]]41. Leandro Despouy, Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Report to the Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/41 (2009), [expand title=”para. 28-29.”]

28. The composition of this body matters greatly to judicial independence as it is required to act in an objective, fair and independent manner when selecting judges. While a genuinely plural composition of this body is recommended with legislators, lawyers, academicians and other interested parties being represented in a balanced way, in many cases it is important that judges constitute the majority of the body so as to avoid any political or other external interference. In the Special Rapporteur’s view, if the body is composed primarily of political representatives there is always a risk that these “independent bodies” might become merely formal or legal rubber-stamping organs behind which the Government exerts its influence indirectly.

29. In order to ensure that such a body is apt to select judges in an objective, fair and independent manner, the judiciary and other parties directly linked with the justice system must have a substantial say with respect to selecting and appointing the members of such a body. According to some regional standards, members of the independent body should be selected by the judiciary[/expand] See also International Commission of Jurists, International principles on the independence and accountability of judges, lawyers and prosecutors – Practitioners’ guide, no. 1 (2007), pp. 45-48.[[41]]

[[42]]42. Leandro Despouy, Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Report to the Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/41 (2009), [expand title=”para. 32.”]In this connection the Special Rapporteur refers to the appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court of Ecuador in 2005, which were made in accordance with his recommendations,31 in particular those referring to objective criteria to select candidates with a view to their independence, competencies and integrity. This ensured the transparency of the selection and appointment processes. Furthermore, for the first time in Ecuador’s history, public hearings were held at which backgrounds of the nominees could be openly scrutinized. This experience was qualified by the United Nations as a major example of good practices[/expand] See Leandro Despouy, Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Preliminary Report to the Human Rights Commission on a mission to Ecuador, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.4 (2005), [expand title=”para. 5(d).”]5. Various options for resolving the crisis are being discussed in Ecuador. Rather than expressing a view on the various alternatives, the Special Rapporteur believes that, in keeping with United Nations standards, the country should immediately arrive at a formula to govern the appointment of a Supreme Court which will include the following elements:… (d) Machinery to ensure transparency in the selection of judges and enable members of the public to be aware of the candidates and express their opinions about them.[/expand][[42]]

[[43]]43. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, [expand title=”Principle 13;”]Promotion of judges, wherever such a system exists, should be based on objective factors, in particular ability, integrity and experience.[/expand] Draft Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (also known as the Singhvi Declaration), [expand title=”Article 14.”]Promotion of a judge shall be based on an objective assessment of the judge’s integrity, independence, professional competence, experience, humanity and commitment to uphold the rule of law. No promotions shall be made from an improper motive.[/expand][[43]]

[[44]]44. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, [expand title=”Principle 12;”]Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists.[/expand] Draft Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (also known as the Singhvi Declaration), Article 16(b)[expand title=”Article 16(b)”]Subject to the provisions relating to discipline and removal set forth herein, judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or expiry of their legal term of office.[/expand] and [expand title=”Article 18(c);”]Retirement age shall not be altered for judges in office without their consent.[/expand] Universal Charter of the Judge, Approved by the International Association of Judges on 17 November 1999, [expand title=”Article 8.”]

Security of office

A judge cannot be transferred, suspended or removed from office unless it is provided for by law and then only by decision in the proper disciplinary procedure. A judge must be appointed for life or for such other period and conditions, that the judicial independence is not endangered. Any change to the judicial obligatory retirement age must not have retroactive effect.[/expand][[44]]

[[45]]45. Constitution, [expand title=”S. 321.”]The President shall submit the candidature list of total nine persons, three members chosen by him, three members chosen by the Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw and three members chosen by the Speaker of the Amyotha Hluttaw, and one member from among nine members to be assigned as the Chairperson of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union, to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw for its approval.[/expand] The President and the two houses of Parliament nominate three Justices each, who are appointed for five-year terms concurrent with the term of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (see Constitution, [expand title=”S. 335″]The term of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union is the same as that of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw being five years. However, the ongoing Constitution Tribunal of the Union, on expiry of its term, shall continue its functions till the President forms a new Tribunal under the Constitution.[/expand]).[[45]]

[[46]]46. Constitution, [expand title=”S. 299(c)-(d);”](c) (i) The President shall submit the nomination of the person suitable to be appointed as the Chief Justice of the Union to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and seek its approval.(ii) The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw shall have no right to refuse the person nominated by the President for the appointment of Chief Justice of the Union and Judges of the Supreme Court of the Union unless it can clearly be proved that the persons do not meet the qualifications for the post prescribed in Section 301. (iii) The President has the right to submit again the list furnished with a new name replacing the one who has not been approved by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw for the appointment of the Chief Justice of the Union. (iv) The President shall appoint the person who has been approved by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw as the Chief Justice of the Union. (d) (i) The President, in co-ordination with the Chief Justice of the Union, shall submit the nomination of the persons suitable to be appointed as the Judges of the Supreme Court of the Union to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and seek its approval. (ii) The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw has no right to refuse the persons nominated by the President for the appointment of the Chief Justice of the Union and Judges of the Supreme Court of the Union unless it can clearly be proved the persons concerned do not possess the qualifications prescribed for Judges of Supreme Court of the Union. in Section 301. (iii) The President has the right to submit again the list furnished with a new name replacing the one who has not been approved by Pyidaungsu Hluttaw for the appointment of a Judge of the Supreme Court of the Union. (iv) The President shall appoint the persons approved by Pyidaungsu Hluttaw as Judges of the Supreme Court of the Union.[/expand] Judiciary Law, [expand title=”S. 26-27.”]26. The President shall appoint a person who fulfils the qualifications contained in section 301 of the Constitution and section 30 of this Law as the Chief Justice of the Union, with the approval of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.˂br˃27. The President shall, in co-ordination with the Chief Justice of the Union, appoint the persons who fulfil the qualifications contained in section 301 of the Constitution and section 30 of this Law as the Judges of the Supreme Court of the Union, with the approval of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.[/expand][[46]]

[[47]]47. Constitution, [expand title=”S. 308(b);”](i) The President, in co-ordination with the Chief Justice of the Union and the Chief Minister of the Region or State concerned, shall prepare the nomination for the appointment of the Chief Justice of the High Court of the Region or State concerned and the Chief Minister of the Region or State concerned, in co-ordination with the Chief Justice of the Union, shall prepare the nomination for the appointment of the Judges of the High Court of the Region or State concerned, and the said nomination shall be sent to the Region or State Hluttaw concerned. (ii) The Region or State Hluttaw concerned shall have no right to refuse the person or persons nominated by the President, in coordination with the Chief Justice of the Union and the Chief Minister of the Region or State concerned, for the appointment of the Chief Justice of the High Court of the Region or State concerned, or the person or persons nominated by the Chief Minister of the Region or State concerned, in co-ordination with the Chief Justice of the Union, for the appointment of Judges of the High Court of the Region or State concerned unless it can clearly be proved that the person does not meet the qualifications prescribed under Section 310 for the Chief Justice of the High Court of the Region or State and the Judge of the High Court of the Region or State. (iii) There is the right to resubmit a new nomination list as prescribed in place of the persons who are refused under Sub-Section (ii). (iv) The President shall appoint persons approved by the Region or State Hluttaw as the Chief Justice of the High Court of the Region or State concerned and Judges of the High Court of the Region or State concerned.[/expand] Judiciary Law, [expand title=”S. 44-45.”]44. The President shall, in co-ordination with the Chief Justice of the Union, relevant Chief Minister of the Region or State appoint a person who fulfils the qualifications under section 310 of the Constitution and section 48 of this Law as the Chief Justice of the relevant Region or State, with the approval of the Region or State Hluttaw.˂br˃45. The President shall appoint the persons in respect of whom the Chief Minister of the Region or State co-ordinates with the Chief Justice of the Union, and who fulfil the qualifications under section 310 of the Constitution and section 48 of this Law as the Judges of the High Court of the Region or State, with the approval of the Region or State Hluttaw.[/expand][[47]]

[[48]]48. Constitution, [expand title=”S. 301″]The Chief Justice of the Union and Judges of the Supreme Court of the Union shall be a person of following qualifications : (a) not younger than 50 years and not older than 70 years; (b) who has qualifications, with the exception of the age limit, prescribed in Section 120 for Pyithu Hluttaw representatives; (c) whose qualifications does not breach the provisions under the Section 121 which disqualify him from standing for election as Pyithu Hluttaw representatives; (d) (i) who has served as a Judge of the High Court of the Region or State for at least five years; or (ii) who has served as a Judicial Officer or a Law Officer at least 10 years not lower than that of the Region or State level; or (iii) who has practised as an Advocate for at least 20 years; or (iv) who is, in the opinion of the President, an eminent jurist; (e) loyal to the Union and its citizens; (f) who is not a member of a political party; (g) who is not a Hluttaw representative. [/expand] and [expand title=”S. 310″]The Chief Justice of the High Court of the Region or State and Judges of the High Court of the Region or State shall be a person of the following qualifications : (a) not younger than 45 years and not older than 65 years of age; (b) who has the qualifications, with the exception of the age limit, prescribed under Section 120 for the Pyithu Hluttaw representatives; (c) whose qualifications does not breach the provisions under Section 121 which disqualify him from standing for election as Pyithu Hluttaw representatives; (d) (i) who has served as a Judicial Officer or Law Officer at least five years not lower than that of the Region or State level or as a Judicial Officer or Law Officer at least 10 years not lower than that of the District level for; or (ii) who has practised as an Advocate for at least 15 years; or (iii) who is, in the opinion of the President, an eminent jurist. (e) loyal to the Union and its citizens; (f) who is not a member of a political party; (g) who is not a Hluttaw representative.[/expand]; Judiciary Law, [expand title=”S. 30.”]The Chief Justice of the Union and Judges of the Supreme Court of the Union shall fulfil the following qualifications: (a) be a person not younger than 50 years of age and not older than 70 years of age; (b) be a person who has qualifications, prescribed in section 120 of the Constitution for Pyithu Hluttaw representatives with the exception of the age limit; (c) be a person who has not infringed the provisions of section 121 of the Constitution which disqualify him from standing for election as a Pyithu Hluttaw representative; (d) (i) be a person who has served as a Judge of the High Court of the Region or State for a minimum of five years; or (ii) be a person who has served as a Judicial Officer or a Law Officer not lower than that of the Region or State level for a minimum of 10 years; or (iii) be a person who has practised as an Advocate for a minimum of 20 years; or (iv) be a person who, in the opinion of the President, is an eminent jurist; (e) be a person loyal to the Union and its citizens; (f) be a person who is not a member of a political party; (g) be a person who is not a Hluttaw representative.[/expand] and [expand title=”S. 48″]The Chief Justices of the High Court of the Region or State and Judges of the High Court of the Region or State shall fulfil the following qualifications: (a) be a person not younger than 45 years of age and not older than 65 years of age; (b) be a person who has the qualifications, prescribed under section 120 of the Constitution for the Pyithu Hluttaw representatives with the exception of the age limit; (c) be a person who has not infringed the provisions of section 121 of the Constitution which disqualify him from standing for election as a Pyithu Hluttaw representatives; (d) (i) be a person who has served as a Judicial Officer or Law Officer not lower than that of the Region or State level for a inimum of five years or as a Judicial Officer or Law Officer not lower than that of the District level for a minimum of 10 years; or (ii) be a person who has practised as an Advocate for a minimum of 15 years; or (iii) be a person who, in the opinion of the President, is an eminent jurist; (e) be a person loyal to the Union and its citizens; (f) be a person who is not a member of a political party; (g) be a person who is not a Hluttaw representative.[/expand][[48]]