Myanmar: Martial law is Another Dangerous Escalation of Repression

Myanmar: Martial law is Another Dangerous Escalation of Repression

Imposition of Martial Law in several areas of Myanmar subjects civilians to trial by military tribunals, a dangerous escalation of the military’s repression of peaceful protests, said the ICJ today.

“Use of martial law marks the return to the dark days of completely arbitrary military rule in Myanmar. It effectively removes all protections for protestors, leaving them at the mercy of unfair military tribunals.”

– Ian Seiderman, ICJ’s director of law and policy

On 14 March, the Myanmar military issued Martial Law Order 3/2021, covering a number of townships of different provinces in Myanmar. According to this order, military officials assume full authority from civilian officials, and civilians may be subjected to military tribunals for charges of 23 violations of the criminal code and other laws. The 23 crimes include many of the charges used most against peaceful protesters in the past month, including charges of ‘disrupting or hindering government employees and services’ and ‘spreading false news’ about the government, and ‘exciting disaffection towards the government.’

The Martial Law Order also assigns disproportionately severe sentences, including the death penalty and prison sentences with hard labor. Judgments of military tribunals are not subject to appeal, even if the death penalty is imposed.

“Martial law has been imposed in precisely the areas where the military have used unlawful and lethal force against peaceful protesters, and removes even the pretense of access to courts for the people whose rights have been violated systematically by the military, ” said Seiderman.

The ICJ’s detailed review of military courts  has documented that they lack competence, independence and impartiality to prosecute civilians. International law provides that the jurisdiction of military tribunals must generally be restricted solely to specifically military offenses committed by military personnel.

“The military courts lack transparency, due process and judicial oversights. It leaves no possibility to appeal the sentences, including the death sentences that have been handed down by military generals, ” said Seiderman.

Since the military coup d’etat of February 1 and the declaration of a state of emergency, the military has enacted and amended legislation enabling ongoing gross human rights violations, including possible crimes against humanity. More than 200 people have been unlawfully killed, with 2,000 more injured as security forces have used excessive force to suppress peaceful protests.

Background

On 14 March, the military-appointed State Administration Council, in accordance with Article 419 of the Constitution, enacted Martial Law Order 1/2021, imposing martial law in a number of areas in Yangon. The affected areas were further expanded through two other orders issued on 15 March, Martial Law Order 2/2021 and 3/2021. These orders transfer all power to the Military Commander in those areas.  All local administration bodies have been placed under martial law, effectively giving military full control of all judicial and administrative processes.

The Order 3/2021 in particular is divided into six main sections with the most concerning provisions in relation to the list of crimes to be heard by military tribunals, and the proscribed punishments.

Contact

Osama Motiwala, ICJ Asia-Pacific Communications Officer, e: osama.motiwala(a)icj.org

Mandira Sharma: ICJ Senior Legal Adviser, e: mandira.sharma(a)icj.org

Thailand: Lift martial law and return the country to civilian authority

Thailand: Lift martial law and return the country to civilian authority

Thailand must lift martial law and return the country to civilian rule, instead of invoking arbitrary powers under Article 44 of the country’s interim constitution, said the ICJ today.

Today, Prime Minister and head of the ruling National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), General Prayut Chan-o-cha, announced that he had submitted a revocation of the Martial Law, imposed nationwide on 20 May 2014, to King Bhumibol Adulyadej.

Gen. Prayut stated that in place of Martial Law, he would invoke Article 44 of the Interim Constitution, which effectively gives him the authority to rule without any legal restrictions or accountability.

“Ending Martial Law is a necessary step, but replacing it with Article 44 does not address the serious violations of Thailand’s obligations under international human rights law. Article 44 of the Interim Constitution is drafted so broadly that it could give the head of the junta even greater powers than Martial law,” said Wilder Tayler, Secretary General of the ICJ. “Article 44 would allow the head of the NCPO to issue any orders he wishes under the pretext of strengthening public unity and national security, and also deems any such order to be legal and constitutional, removing any possibility of judicial oversight.”

Article 44 of the interim Constitution gives the NCPO power to give any order deemed necessary for “…the benefit of reform in any field and to strengthen public unity and harmony, or for the prevention, disruption or suppression of any act which undermines public peace and order or national security, the Monarchy, national economics or administration of State affairs …,” and provides that any such order “…is deemed to be legal, constitutional and conclusive…”

“Article 44 violates the fundamental pillars of the rule of law and human rights, including equality, accountability, and predictability. Article 44 could potentially allow for arbitrary rule by the head of the NCPO, so using it would not be a real improvement over the Martial Law, which at least has been in existence since 1914, and has a degree of clarity to its scope and application,” said Tayler.

“The NCPO should revoke Martial Law and also explicitly commit itself to observing Thailand’s international obligations, which means avoiding any use of Article 44,” he added.

International law strictly regulates attempts by governments to suspend or restrict protection for human rights on grounds of emergency.

Such “derogations” are permissible under Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Thailand is a State Party, only “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”.

“The situation in Thailand does not meet the extremely high threshold required for derogating from international human rights law,” said Tayler. “Thai authorities have repeatedly promised a rapid return to the rule of law and respect for human rights in the country, but replacing Martial Law with rule by Article 44 doesn’t suggest an improvement for the rule of law or respect for human rights.”

Thailand-Martial Law-Article 44-News-Press release-2015-THA (Thai version, full text in PDF)

ICJ holds strategic litigation meeting with Muslim Attorney Centre in Thailand’s deep South

ICJ holds strategic litigation meeting with Muslim Attorney Centre in Thailand’s deep South

On 11-12 October 2014, the ICJ held a “Strategic Litigation” meeting for 25 Muslim Attorney Centre (MAC) lawyers and paralegals in Hat Yai, in Thailand’s deep South.

The objective of the meeting was for MAC lawyers to discuss and exchange litigation strategies with a leading international criminal lawyer.

The meeting focused on the use of expert witnesses, forensic evidence and the appellate jurisdiction.

MAC was founded by a group of Muslim lawyers in February 2007 to provide free legal aid to disadvantaged people in the four southernmost provinces of Thailand, especially those who have been affected by the special security laws in place including Martial Law and the Emergency Decree.

Thailand: look beyond the troubled South in lifting security laws

Thailand: look beyond the troubled South in lifting security laws

An opinion piece by Benjamin Zawacki, Senior Legal Adviser for Southeast Asia at the International Commission of Jurists.

Thailand’s government recently passed up an opportunity for a new approach to the deep South, by declining to replace the Emergency Decree, which violates international standards on human rights, with the somewhat less heavy-handed Internal Security Act (ISA).

Equally concerning is why the government has not looked beyond the South in reconsidering the use of its other extraordinary security legislation: no fewer than 31 of Thailand’s 77 provinces are at least partially under Martial Law.

International law is clear that the extraordinary powers under security laws like the Emergency Decree and Martial Law may only be invoked under a strict set of circumstances, none of which is even arguably applicable in Thailand outside of the southern insurgency (four of the 31 provinces).

Martial Law may be invoked in Thailand “when a situation arises that makes it necessary to maintain law and order and to defend against the danger of attack”, or “when there is an outbreak of war or unrest”. All of Thailand’s provinces that are situated on one of the country’s four international borders are under Martial Law in whole or in part (including the 27 not in the deep South). Among them is Phitsanulok, whose shared border with Laos is roughly only 50km.

This province featured in Thailand’s last war, a three-month affair with Laos that ended in 1988.

Otherwise, Thailand’s border challenges are well-known: trafficking in persons, drugs, and weapons; landmines; refugees and migrants; smuggling of logs, oil, and other contraband; demarcation disputes. While doubtless all of these call for robust law enforcement, only the dispute with Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple even arguably involves defending against the danger of armed attack.

Several minor but deadly skirmishes with Cambodian forces, as well as considerable mutual saber-rattling, have occurred in several districts of Si Sa Ket province since 2009. It is not credible to claim that Thailand needs to impose Martial Law because of external threats.

A more likely explanation is that Martial Law’s expansive application in Thailand is due to what is common to most security legislation around the region, namely vague language that lends itself to broad interpretation and granting wide powers to the military.

The Martial Law term “law and order”, in addition to more typically applying to civilian law enforcement agencies than to the military, could apply to any situation in which a law is implicated – which is nearly all situations. “Order” and “unrest” are particularly ill-defined.

Moreover, “maintain” suggests law and order need only be threatened to invoke Martial Law, rather than be lost and in need of being restored.

What constitutes an “attack” and the likelihood of such required for Thailand to be in “danger” are also essentially judgment calls. And when is an attack (or a series of attacks) tantamount to an “outbreak of war”?

A second and related reason that Martial Law is so pervasive in Thailand is the large number of military personnel empowered to invoke the law, coupled with, inversely, the difficulty in revoking it later.

While order by royal decree is required for invoking Martial Law on the first set of grounds, even local military commanders can invoke Martial Law in the area under their control on the second set (“when there is an outbreak of war or unrest”), affording them enormous discretion and authority.

In contrast, any and all revocations of the law require order by royal decree, a level of involvement as centralized and bureaucratic as a district military commander’s invocation is local and simple.

Martial Law’s use in Thailand historically supports the analysis that imprecise grounds combined with bureaucratic inertia account for the wide geographical application of the law.

Twice in the past 22 years, orders by royal decree referencing “law and order” have imposed Martial Law on the whole of Thailand, both times via coups d’état in 1991 and 2006.

On only three occasions after the 1991 coup (twice later the same year and once in 1998) was Martial Law lifted in some but not all of Thailand’s provinces. On the eve of the 2006 coup, it was still in effect in all or part of 18 provinces.

Similarly, following the blanket invocation of Martial Law on the whole country in 2006, on only two occasions since (in January 2007 and 2008, respectively) has an order by royal decree revoked the law in 46 of Thailand’s 77 provinces. Why not everywhere?

International law requires that extraordinary security legislation be invoked only in response to an exceptional situation.

Powers granted to security forces and any derogation from human rights must be strictly necessary and proportionate to the situation, and must have a time limitation attached to them.

None of these elements is met in the case of Thailand’s application of Martial Law to its international borders.

Indeed, Martial Law in Thailand allows security forces to arrest people without a warrant, and to detain them for seven days prior to charging them.

Critically, it does not require that detainees be promptly brought before a judge, in flagrant violation of Thailand’s legal obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

This leaves detainees particularly vulnerable to torture or other ill-treatment at the hands of the security forces, which Thailand has also agreed to prevent and punish as a party to the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture.

In cases under Martial Law of alleged misconduct by security forces, victims are unable to institute a criminal prosecution (though they may initiate a civil action) or to choose their own lawyer; only a military prosecutor is entitled to institute a criminal charge. No appeal can be lodged against judgments or orders of military courts during this period.

The Thai government should reconsider its decision to keep the Emergency Decree in place throughout most of the deep South.

At the same time, it should take the long overdue step of lifting an equally heavy-handed Martial Law everywhere else.

 

 

 

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