Judicial Accountability

An Adaptation of Practitioners Guide No. 13 for Zimbabwe, October 2020
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Judicial Accountability

*International standards on accountability mechanisms for judicial corruption and judicial involvement in human rights violations*

An Adaptation of Practitioners Guide No. 13 for Zimbabwe
ICJ Practitioners’ Guide no 13 on Judicial Accountability, originally published in 2016, was researched and written by ICJ Senior Legal Adviser Matt Pollard, with assistance from: research consultant Lina Biscaia; ICJ Legal Adviser Laurens Hueting; ICJ Geneva interns Marlitt Brandes and Alina Charniauskaya; ICJ MENA Programme Associate Legal Adviser Doireann Ansbro and intern Arianna Rafiq; ICJ Asia and Pacific Programme International Legal Adviser (Pakistan) Reema Omer, Nepal Office consultant Govinda ‘Bandi’ Sharma, and Myanmar Office International Legal Adviser Vani Sathisan; and consultant Leyla Slama. Ian Seiderman provided legal and policy review.

The Guide was greatly informed by the contributions of outside experts, including the participants to a consultation on judicial accountability in developing countries, convened by the ICJ Centre for the Independence of Judges & Lawyers in Tunisia 8-9 October 2015, as well as the 2015 CIJL Geneva Forum of Judges & Lawyers, 14-15 December 2015. Participants in the two meetings are listed in an Annex. While the Guide has benefited from the detailed discussion at these events, the opinions and recommendations expressed in the Guide are those of the ICJ and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and recommendations of any particular participant.

This version of the Guide, adding annotations to specific national legal and policy frameworks in Zimbabwe, draws on country-specific research by Musa Kika. The addition of Zimbabwe-specific material was completed by Justice Mavedzenge, with assistance from Elizabeth Mangenje. Final Review was done by Matt Pollard.
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<td>Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa</td>
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<td>Bangalore Principles</td>
<td>Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct</td>
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<td>Bangalore Implementation Measures</td>
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<td>Beijing Statement</td>
<td>Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA Region</td>
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<td>CIJL</td>
<td>ICJ Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers</td>
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<td>ECTHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>General Comment</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAmCtHR</td>
<td>Inter-American Court of Human Rights</td>
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<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<td>International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Commission of Jurists</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
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<tr>
<td>Istanbul Declaration</td>
<td>Istanbul Declaration on Transparency in the Judicial Process</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NHRI</td>
<td>National human rights institution</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNBP Remedy</td>
<td>UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian law</td>
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<td>UN Impunity Principles</td>
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1. Introduction

This publication is an adaptation of Judicial Accountability - Practitioners Guide No. 13 (PG13) originally published in 2016. By adding references to the specific national legal and policy frameworks in Zimbabwe, it is intended to enrich the understanding of academics, practitioners and judicial officers in Zimbabwe of accountability of judges and magistrates.

The original text of the 2016 edition is reproduced, affording the reader an opportunity to extensively engage with the international principles and standards. Thereafter, the Guide briefly sets out the law in Zimbabwe on the issue discussed. With the exception of chapter two, which provides some guidance on the Zimbabwean context, this publication maintains all of the original text of PG13. Through a series of text boxes, it sets out the law and practice as this relates to the Zimbabwean situation.

This publication does not generally seek to assess Zimbabwean law or practice against the international standards, and accordingly the inclusion of any particular Zimbabwean laws or practices should not be taken as implying that it necessarily complies with the relevant international standards.

The present Guide aims to help practitioners ensure accountability for serious judicial misconduct, such as corruption or complicity in human rights violations, while preserving the independence of the judiciary.¹

¹ This Guide is intended to focus on conduct by judges that involves an exercise or failure to exercise their judicial authority - as such, the Guide does not directly address the commission by judges of ordinary crimes or civil wrongs in an
The search for measures that secure judicial accountability within the framework of the rule of law is not new. Ancient Roman legal codes already prescribed specific penalties for judges who sought or received personal reward or advantage for deciding cases in particular ways, or who intentionally sentenced someone to death for any improper motive.²

Neither are such efforts obsolete or uncomplicated, in any region of the world. A 2010 resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe "deplores the fact that judicial corruption is deeply embedded in many Council of Europe member states" and recommends a series of counter-measures. In 2016, finding key measures to have been "left unaddressed by member states", the Assembly adopted a further resolution stressing the "urgent" need for European States to take action against judicial corruption.³

The International Commission of Jurists' own global consultations in 2015 on institutions and procedures for judicial accountability revealed broad agreement on the need for such mechanisms and on most of their elements, but considerable disagreement on certain details. (See Annex 3 for the lists of participants in the Tunis expert meeting in October and the Geneva Forum of Judges & Lawyers in December).

The Guide updates and expands on previous guidance contained in the 2007 ICJ publication, Practitioners Guide no. 1: International Principles on the Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors, as well as the more general 2014/2015 Practitioners Guide No. 7: International Law and the Fight Against Impunity. It also builds on earlier work of the ICJ on the theme of judicial corruption (see for example

entirely private capacity, or other purely private conduct that could be perceived as compromising the dignity of their office.

² Joseph Plescia, "Judicial Accountability and Immunity in Roman Law" (2001), 45 Am. J. Legal Hist. 51. See also Judicial Integrity Group, Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007), Annex on "Cultural and Religious Traditions".

³ Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1703 (2010), "Judicial corruption", and Resolution 2098 (2016), "Judicial corruption: urgent need to implement the Assembly’s proposals".

The Guide also complements guidance produced by other organisations, such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Implementation Guide and Evaluative Framework for Article 11 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2015) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), A Transparent and Accountable Judiciary to Deliver Justice for All (2016). While these tend to focus mainly on judicial corruption rather than judicial complicity in human rights violations per se, many of the tools and recommendations they contain are potentially applicable more broadly to other forms of judicial misconduct including judicial complicity.

The Guide is also indebted to and complementary to the relatively few scholarly works that specifically address judicial accountability in situations of transition, including particularly: David Dyzenhaus, Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and the Apartheid Legal Order (Hart Publishing, 1998); Hakeem O. Yusuf, Transitional Justice, Judicial Accountability and the Rule of Law (Routledge, 2010); and Hans Petter Graver, Judges against Justice: On Judges When the Rule of Law is Under Attack (Springer, 2015). These and other scholarly works also treat in intriguing and illuminating fashion some fundamental questions of a philosophical and legal-theoretical character as to the grounds for holding judges to account - or for exonerating them - when judges choose to serve within an overall framework of national law that is grossly inconsistent with international human rights norms, as well as what judges can and should choose to do when faced with such circumstances. This Guide does not seek to address these questions directly. It takes as its starting point that international law requires that States and individual judges be accountable for judicial perpetration of or complicity in violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, and for judicial corruption, and focuses primarily on the adoption and characteristics of mechanisms and procedures aimed at meeting this international legal obligation.
This Guide addresses not only the accountability of individual judges, and the accountability of judiciary as an institution, but also State responsibility under international law, particularly in relation to harm caused to victims of violations caused by judges.

The Guide is intended to address judges, magistrates, registrars and most other judicial officers, but does not deal with the specific situation of prosecutors, which in some States are seen as part of the judiciary and in others are seen as totally distinct from it.

The ICJ recognizes that a holistic and preventive approach to corruption, and to impunity for human rights violations, is important. In a context of broader corruption or systematic impunity in a country, measures taken only by or only in relation to the judiciary are unlikely to succeed if they are not matched, sooner or later but preferably at the same time, by similar efforts to address corruption and abuses by other governmental and non-governmental actors. (At the same time, the absence of initiatives addressing other sectors should not be an excuse for the judiciary to fail to adopt measures within its own sector.) Further, accountability measures that respond after corrupt or criminal acts have already occurred contribute to deterring future wrongs but cannot fully substitute for the much broader range of preventive measures that should be in place. Formal mechanisms and rules for prevention and accountability should be joined by changes in the professional culture within the national judiciary. Again, then, while this Guide specifically focuses on judicial accountability mechanisms, implementation of its particular recommendations should be situated in a much broader framework of anti-corruption and anti-impunity measures.
2. The Zimbabwean Legal and Institutional Context

The Constitutional Framework

The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20) Act 2013, which established the current Constitution, in Chapter 8 provides for the setting up of the judiciary and the courts. In section 162, the Constitution states that judicial authority is derived from the people of Zimbabwe and is vested in the Constitutional Court; the Supreme Court; the High Court; the Labour Court; the Administrative Court; the Magistrates’ Courts; and the Customary law courts. Section 164 provides for the independence of the judiciary. Section 164(1), in particular, affirms that the courts are independent and are subject only to the provisions of the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially, expeditiously and without fear, favour or prejudice.

Broadly speaking, transparency and accountability are central themes throughout the Constitution. It imagines a break from the past where power was used arbitrarily, towards a more egalitarian society in which every exercise of power is justified. To this end the Constitution consistently deals with issues of accountability. In its preamble the Constitution recognises the need to entrench democracy, good, transparent and accountable governance and the rule of law. Furthermore, under the Founding Values and Principles, the Constitution acknowledges transparency, justice, accountability and responsiveness as good governance principles that bind the State. In the context of the judiciary, accountability entails that judges' performance of their functions should be subject to certain constraints and oversights.

McNally J, presenting a paper at the Southern African Chief Justice Forum, elaborated that judicial accountability exists on three levels. These are: the personal conduct level; the

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4 See Section 9 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
5 Section 3(2)(g) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
personal decision-making level; and the conduct of the judiciary as a whole, usually expressed through its highest court in relation to judicial review of administrative action or to judicial questioning of the constitutionality of legislative or executive action, or to the protection of human rights or the protection of minorities.

The Constitution entrusts the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), created in accordance with section 189 of the Constitution, with the overall duty to hold the judiciary accountable. The JSC is mandated by the Constitution in section 190 to promote and facilitate judicial accountability. The facilitatory role granted to the JSC relates to both judicial independence and accountability. Section 190 (2) places upon the JSC the duty to “promote and facilitate the independence and accountability of the judiciary.” The Constitution makes it clear that the two concepts of accountability and independence are not in conflict but rather, are complementary. It underscores the point that accountability does not mean non-independent, and independence does not mean non-accountability. The composition of the JSC is detailed in Chapter 4.

Further, the Constitution provides that the JSC may have further powers conferred upon it by an Act of Parliament in connection with the employment, discipline and conditions of service of persons employed in the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the High Court, the Labour Court, the Administrative Court and other courts. The contemplated legislation is the Judicial Service Act [Chapter 7:18]. This act was promulgated before the 2013 Constitution and came into force on 10 June 2010.

Part V of the Judicial Service Act deals with discipline of members of the Judicial Service. It provides in section 15 for the investigation and adjudication of misconduct cases; freedom of persons presiding over courts from arrest or search in court premises (section 16), and the development of judicial codes of conduct and codes of ethics in sections 17 and 18 respectively. Section 16 of the Judicial Service Act sets out the rights of judicial officers who may be faced with criminal proceedings. It creates immunity from arrest in chambers and within the
precincts of a court for all judicial officers.\textsuperscript{7} Similar restrictions apply to search, with the exception that the accused judicial officer can grant consent for the search to be conducted.\textsuperscript{8}

**The Legislative Framework**

**The Judicial Code of Ethics**

Section 18 of the Judicial Service Act [Chapter 7:18] provides for the enactment of service regulations prescribing the code of ethics for members of the judiciary. The provision anticipates the possibility of more than one such code.

The Judicial Service (Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2012, for judges was developed by members of the Zimbabwean judiciary. The Code, which mirrors the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct at the global level, was launched by the then Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku at a ceremony held in April 2012. Although the Code uses the phrase “judicial officers” in most of its provisions, its application is limited to the judges of the Supreme Court (and by extension Constitutional Court), the High Court, the Labour Court and the Administrative Court. The Code was not designed to apply to other presiding officers such as magistrates.

The Code is divided into five distinct sections as follows:

- **Part I Preliminary:** This part of the Code is concerned with the introductory issues which include definitions and scope of application.
- **Part II Values and Standards:** This part spells out the conduct expected of a judicial officer. The section is further divided into seven subcategories numbered a-g.
- **Part III Enforcement Procedures:** This part provides for enforcement procedure.

\textsuperscript{7} Section 16(a) of the Judicial Service Act.
\textsuperscript{8} Section 16(b) of the Judicial Service Act.
• Part IV Ethics Advisory Committee: This part provides for the establishment and functions of the Ethics Advisory Committee.
• Part V Transitionary Provisions: This part deals with complaints about reserved judgments that are more than 90 days overdue.

The Code outlines in section 25 the provisions for implementation and accountability. It makes the individual judge accountable to his conscience first. It provides in section 25(1) that to ensure effective implementation, every judicial officer shall use his or her best endeavours to uphold the values and standards enshrined in the Code. Subsection 25(2) states that the judicial officers are not accountable or answerable to any other State or non-State organ, entity or authority, subject only to the Judicial Service Act and the Constitution. Subsection 25(3) outlines the procedure to be followed in handling legitimate complaints against judicial officers. These procedures will be dealt with in greater detail in sections of this Guide to follow.

Magistrates are covered under the Judicial Service (Magistrate’s Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2019. As with the Code for judges, the Magistrate’s Code of Ethics is divided into five distinct parts, each addressing a key aspect, as follows:

• Part I Preliminary: This part of the Code is concerned with the introductory issues which include definitions and scope of application.
• Part II Values and Standards: This part spells out values attaching to judicial office, which magistrates are require to abide with. This part is further divided into seven sub-parts, addressing independence, integrity, propriety, impartiality, equality, competence and diligence, and efficient and expeditious conduct of judicial business.
• Part III Enforcement Procedure: This part provides for the enforcement procedure through a disciplinary committee, and implementation and accountability mechanisms.

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Part IV Magistrate’s Ethics Advisory Committee: This part provides for the establishment and functions of the Magistrate’s Ethics Advisory Committee.

Part V Transitionary Provisions: This part deals with the treatment of judgments that were reserved prior to the promulgation of the Code.

The Magistrate’s Code in many ways mirrors the Judges’ Code, in both form and substance, save that the provisions are peculiar to magistrates.

Court System in Zimbabwe

To better comprehend judicial accountability within the context of Zimbabwean law, it is important to discuss the various interlocutors. Under the 2013 Constitution, the Chief Justice is the head of the judiciary and is in charge of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice is also given extensive power, as will become more apparent in subsequent chapters, to ensure that judges suspected of misconduct are subject to disciplinary procedures. Section 163 of the Constitution defines the judiciary as comprising the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice and the other judges of the Constitutional Court; the judges of the Supreme Court; the Judge President and other judges of the High, Labour and Administrative Courts, other judges in these courts and persons presiding over magistrates’ courts, customary law courts and other courts established by or under an Act of Parliament.  

Section 164 of the Constitution sets out and expressly guarantees the independence and impartiality of the courts. The structure of the courts reflects the dual nature of the Zimbabwean legal system, which incorporates customary law and common law.  

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12 Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 332 defines “law” as—
(a) any provision of this Constitution or of an Act of Parliament;
(b) any provision of a statutory instrument; or
accountability in Zimbabwe, it is prudent to look at the various courts and the officers that preside over them.

**Customary Law Courts**

Customary law courts lie at the bottom of the judicial system pyramid.\(^ \text{13} \) They are made up of the primary courts presided over by a Headman\(^ \text{14} \) and the community courts presided over by a Chief.\(^ \text{15} \) The 2013 Constitution grants authority to Parliament to establish and mandate the composition and jurisdiction of customary law courts, whose jurisdiction consists primarily of the application of customary law.\(^ \text{16} \) The Constitution does not, however, set out the appointment procedures and tenure of the presiding officers, as is the case with the other courts. These issues are dealt with in the Customary Law and Local Courts Act [Chapter 7:05].

**The Magistrates’ Courts**

The Magistrates Court, as the title implies, is presided over by a magistrate. The 2013 Constitution grants authority to Parliament to establish and mandate the composition and jurisdiction of this Court. In accordance with section 182 of the Constitution, the appointment of magistrates must be done by the JSC in a transparent manner free from any bias. Details of the appointment are set out in section 7 of the Magistrates Court Act [Chapter 7:10]. Neither the Constitution nor the Magistrates Court Act guarantee the security of tenure for the magistrates.

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\(^{13}\) Customary Law and Local Courts Act [Chapter 7:05], section 2 “local court” means a primary court or community court.

\(^{14}\) Customary Law and Local Courts Act, section 11 (1).

\(^{15}\) Customary Law and Local Courts Act, section 11 (2).

\(^{16}\) Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 174 (b).
The Magistrates’ Courts are the lowest courts that have jurisdiction to apply both general\(^\text{17}\) and customary law\(^\text{18}\). Any person arrested on allegations of having committed a criminal offence must appear in a Magistrates’ Court before reference to an appropriate court. Magistrates’ courts have jurisdiction over all criminal offences except treason, murder and any capital offence. In cases where a Magistrates’ Court imposes a prison sentence exceeding three months or a fine of a certain specified level, the record of proceedings is forwarded to a regional magistrate for scrutiny. Regional magistrates are the highest ranking magistrates in criminal courts. Below them are provincial magistrates, senior magistrates and ordinary magistrates. The ranks of the magistrates determine their jurisdiction to hear certain cases, and to impose certain sentences.

**The High Court**

The High Court is a superior court of record and comprises the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, the Judge President of the High Court and other judges of the High Court as may be appointed from time to time.\(^\text{19}\) The Constitution provides for the enactment of a law and the crafting of rules to give effect to the constitutional provisions governing the operation of the court.\(^\text{20}\) The rules so crafted may confer quasi-judicial authority on the Registrar to make orders in uncontested cases, other than orders affecting status or the custody or guardianship of children,\(^\text{21}\) and to decide preliminary or interlocutory matters, including applications for directions, but not matters affecting the liberty of any person.\(^\text{22}\)

\(^{17}\) Refers to all other laws referred to in section 332 of the Constitution which are not part of Customary Law,  
\(^{18}\) The Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 332 “Customary Law”  
“customary law” means the customary law of any section or community of Zimbabwe’s people.  
\(^{19}\) Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 170.  
\(^{20}\) Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 171(2).  
\(^{22}\) Constitution of Zimbabwe (20130, section 171(4)(b).
Under the Constitution and the High Court Act [Chapter 7:06], the High Court has original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters throughout Zimbabwe. These provisions may be slightly confusing in the light of section 172(2) of the Constitution which grants the Labour Court such jurisdiction over matters of labour and employment as may be conferred on it by an Act of Parliament. The Constitution also grants the High Court supervisory jurisdiction to oversee the magistrates’ courts and other subordinate courts and to review their decisions. It also has appellate jurisdiction as is conferred on it by the High Court Act and other Acts of Parliament. The Constitution also grants the High Court power to decide certain constitutional matters except those that only the Constitutional Court may decide. Section 176 of the Constitution grants the High Court together with the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court inherent power to protect and regulate their own processes. The same section also affords the court discretion to develop the common law or customary law, taking into account the interests of justice and the provisions of the Constitution.

**Labour Court and Administrative Court**

The structure of the Labour Court and the framework of its jurisdiction are laid out in section 172 of the Constitution. The Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] in section 84 further provides for the establishment of the Labour Court, while the functions, powers and jurisdiction of the court are laid out in section 89 of the Act. The Labour Court is a special court of record presided over by a judge, and mandated to hear and determine labour and employment matters. This court has its own set of rules, the Labour Court Rules, 2017.

The Constitution, in section 173(2), grants the Administrative Court jurisdiction over civil matters of an administrative nature.

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23 Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 171(1) a; High Court Act [Chapter 7:06], sections 13 and 26.
This is a specialist court presided over by a judge. The establishment, powers and functions of this court are delineated in the Administrative Court Act [Chapter 7:01]. Various other enactments confer jurisdiction on the Administrative Court, particularly as an appellate court against administrative decisions made by various bodies and entities. Unlike the High Court, the Administrative Court does not possess inherent or common law jurisdiction. The Administrative Court is not endowed with the power to enforce its own judgments and has to rely on other courts for enforcement.

**The Supreme Court**

The Supreme Court is made up of the Chief Justice, his or her deputy and at least two other judges. The Constitution allows the Chief Justice to appoint judges of the High Court or a former judge as acting judges of the Supreme Court for a limited period when this is required.

The Constitution allows for rules of the Supreme Court to grant to the Registrar of the Supreme Court quasi-judicial authority in civil cases to make orders in uncontested cases, other than orders affecting the status or custody or guardianship of children and to decide preliminary or interlocutory matters, including applications for directions, but not matters affecting the liberty of any person. However, persons affected by the exercise of such jurisdiction must be afforded recourse to review of the matter by a judge. The judge has broad discretion and can, depending on the circumstances, confirm, amend, set aside or give any other order or decision she or he thinks fit.

The Supreme Court is the apex court in the country, except on matters that have a constitutional dimension, in which case the

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27 Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 168(1).
28 Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 168(2).
Constitutional Court is the apex Court. The framework of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is set out in the Constitution. Unlike provisions on the High Court, the Constitution does not expressly grant the Supreme Court jurisdiction over constitutional matters. Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court “is the final court of appeal for Zimbabwe, except in matters over which the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction” and, subject to this condition, it may be granted additional jurisdiction by an Act of Parliament, and the power to make rules of court.

**Constitutional Court**

The Constitutional Court is comprised of the Chief Justice, his or her deputy and five other judges. The Constitution grants the Chief Justice authority to appoint judges or former judges as acting judges of the Constitutional Court on a temporary basis, when required.

The Constitutional Court is the highest court in all constitutional matters, and its decisions on those matters bind all other courts. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court includes decisions on constitutional matters, and issues connected with decisions on constitutional matters. It is expressly granted the discretion to make the final decision on whether a matter is a constitutional matter or whether an issue is connected with a decision on a constitutional matter. The Constitutional Court is granted exclusive jurisdiction to: -

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31 Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 169 “Jurisdiction of Supreme Court” (1) The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal for Zimbabwe, except in matters over which the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction.
33 Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 169.
34 Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 166(1). The transitional provisions of the Constitution provided for a different configuration of the Constitutional Court during the period of transition.
35 Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 166(2).
37 Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 167(1)(b).
38 Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 167(1)(c).
• advise on the constitutionality of any proposed legislation, but may do so only where the legislation concerned has been referred to it in terms of the Constitution;

• hear and determine disputes relating to election to the office of President;

• hear and determine disputes relating to whether or not a person is qualified to hold the office of Vice-President; or

• determine whether Parliament or the President has failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation.

**Removal from office, disciplinary sanctions, and other administrative measures**

The process of removing judges from office in Zimbabwe is prescribed by the Constitution, which states that a judge may only be removed from office prior to the expiration of their term or reaching the mandatory retirement age on the grounds of gross incompetence, gross misconduct or inability to perform the functions of office due to mental or physical incapacity.  

The Constitution provides that the President of Zimbabwe is to appoint a tribunal to inquire into any such matter, on his own motion if it involves the Chief Justice, and on request of the Judicial Service Commission as regards other judges. The tribunal appointed must consist of three members appointed by the President. The tribunal must inquire into the question of removing the judge concerned from office and after having done so, report its findings to the President and recommend whether or not the judge should be removed from office. The President must then act in accordance with the tribunal’s recommendations.

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40 Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 187 (2).
41 Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013, section 187(3)
43 Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), section 187 (8).
The Code of Ethics gives the Chief Justice the powers to initiate a disciplinary procedure for a judge. If, in the opinion of the Chief Justice, the judicial officer concerned has conducted himself or herself in a manner that appears to violate any provision of the Code of Ethics, the Chief Justice is required to appoint a disciplinary committee, which will investigate the matter. The disciplinary committee is appointed on an ad hoc basis, and is composed of three members who are sitting or retired judicial officers from Zimbabwe or any other country in which the common law is Roman-Dutch or English, and where English is an official language. The Code of Ethics also addresses the procedure and possible disciplinary measures for such proceedings (varying levels of reprimands). The committee reports its findings and recommendations to the Chief Justice. However, “Notwithstanding the recommendations of a disciplinary committee, the final decision as to what disciplinary measure to take shall be within the exclusive discretion of the Chief Justice.” The Code provides that the disciplinary procedure does not derogate from the relevant Constitutional powers of removal, or “the right of the Attorney-General [now Prosecutor-General] or any other person to institute criminal or civil proceedings against the judicial officer concerned, arising out of the conduct complained of.”

The disciplinary procedure for magistrates is governed by Parts X and XI of the Judicial Service (Magistrate’s Code of Ethics) Regulations, published in Statutory Instrument 30 of 2015. Section 23(3) of the Code of Ethics provides that;

“(a) complaints against the person of the Chief Magistrate shall be directed for the attention of the Secretary;

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44 Code of Ethics, section 21(1).
45 Code of Ethics, section 21(2).
47 Code of Ethics, Section 23.
48 Code of Ethics, section 24(3).
(b) complaints against the person of the Deputy Chief Magistrate, Regional Magistrates and a Provincial Magistrate who is designated as head of a Province shall be directed for the attention of the Chief Magistrate;

(c) complaints against all other judicial officers shall be directed for the attention of the Provincial Magistrate who is designated as head of a Province.”\(^{50}\)

Section 23(4) of the Code of Ethics empowers the head of a Province to refer a complaint against any judicial officer that appears to have merit, to the Chief Magistrate, who in turn, consider whether the complaint merits being determined in terms of Part X of the Judicial Service Regulations, 2013. The Judicial Service Act indicates that, “any case involving misconduct or suspected misconduct on the part of a member of the Judicial Service shall be investigated, adjudicated upon and, where appropriate, punished by the Commission.”\(^{51}\) As such the Judicial Service Commission has the powers to initiate disciplinary procedures in which a three-member disciplinary committee sits to determine the case of misconduct.\(^{52}\)

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\(^{50}\) Section 23(3) of Judicial Service (Magistrate’s Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2019.

\(^{51}\) Section 15 of the Judicial Service Act [Chapter 7:18].

\(^{52}\) Section 5(1)(e) of the Judicial Service Act [Chapter 7:18].
3. The obligation to ensure an independent, impartial and accountable judiciary under international law

International law sources of the obligation to ensure judicial accountability

International human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and other international standards relevant to the rule of law, the administration of justice, and corruption, all include an obligation of States to ensure access to a competent, independent, impartial and accountable judiciary. It is this fundamental obligation that the specific mechanisms and procedures contemplated by this Guide are intended to implement.

The Preamble to the UN Human Rights Council resolution on independence and impartiality of the judiciary, jurors and assessors, and the independence of lawyers, most recently adopted in 2015, includes the following paragraph:

*Stressing* the importance of ensuring accountability, transparency and integrity in the judiciary as an essential element of judicial independence and a concept inherent to the rule of law, when it is implemented in line with the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and other relevant human rights norms, principles and standards.53

*Fair trial rights*

The right of every person to a "fair and public hearing" by a "competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law" in all criminal and civil legal proceedings, is recognized by

article 14 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* ("ICCPR") and similar provision is made by article 10 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* ("UDHR") and by other global human rights treaties. Similar provisions are found in the regional human rights treaties and standards,54 as well as in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols applicable in situations of armed conflict.55 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1986), sets out the right in article 26. It is given further expression in the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights’ Principles and Guideline on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa ("African Fair Trial Principles") (2005). International standards including the *UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary* ("UNBP Judiciary") (reproduced in Annex 1a to this Guide) also recognize that independence and impartiality of a tribunal cannot be guaranteed unless there are effective mechanisms in place to respond when judges do not act with independence, impartiality and integrity.56

55 Common article 3(1)(d) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions; article 75 of the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions; article 6(2) of the 1977 Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.
**Fair trial rights in Zimbabwean law**

The right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law is guaranteed in section 69 of the Constitution. The section provides that a person charged with an offence has a right to a fair and public trial within a reasonable time before an independent and impartial court.

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**Right to effective remedy and reparation**

International law and standards require that States ensure the availability of effective remedies for human rights violations (as well as certain violations of international humanitarian law) and reparation for harm suffered.\(^57\) The fact that a violation may have been perpetrated by a judicial officer rather than other kinds of public officials, or that a judge has been complicit in the violation, does not absolve the State of its responsibility to ensure an effective remedy.\(^58\)

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\(^{57}\) UDHR, article 8; ICCPR, article 2(3); UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law ("UNBP Remedy"), General Assembly resolution 60/147 (2005); African Fair Trial Principles, section C.

Section 85 of the Constitution provides broad access to the courts where a violation of the declaration of rights is alleged. Section 85(2) makes it clear that the fact that a person has contravened a law does not bar them from accessing the courts for relief where their rights have been violated. The courts are empowered to “grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights and an award of compensation”.

Whilst legislation in Zimbabwe does not explicitly provide for the right to an effective remedy and reparation in relation specifically to violations of the regional or international human rights treaties ratified by Zimbabwe, constitutional provisions require the judiciary to take into account international law and all treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a party under section 46(1)(c) when interpreting the Bill of Rights. Section 327 makes similar provision for legislation more generally.

Administration of justice, rule of law, and anti-corruption

Standards for the proper administration of justice, on the rule of law, and for countering corruption, also affirm the need for judges to be held to account when they act unlawfully.59

Article 11(1) of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), for instance, provides as follows:

Bearing in mind the independence of the judiciary and its crucial role in combating corruption, each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system and without prejudice to judicial independence, take measures to strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for corruption among members of the judiciary. Such measures may include rules with respect to the conduct of members of the judiciary.

In 2015, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published an Implementation Guide and Evaluative Framework for article 11, which includes practical tools to assist the judiciary and other government officials, as well as academics, the media, and civil society, to evaluate the State's implementation of article 11.  

The principle of the rule of law finds expression throughout the Constitution. Section 2 provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and any law, practice, custom or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency, and the Constitution is binding to all, including the judiciary which must fulfil the Constitution’s obligation. The rule of law is one of the founding values and principles of the Constitution in terms of section 3(1)(b).

Tenets of the rule of law such as the principles of legality, equality, separation of powers and independence of the judiciary amongst others are provided for in the Constitution. The principle of legality which includes, among other things, certainty of the law, accessibility and non-retroactivity are provided in the Declaration of Rights under Chapter 4 of the Constitution.

The principle of equality before the law is provided by section 56 as well as section 44 which requires all juristic and non-juristic persons, institutions and agencies of government to protect, promote and fulfil the rights and freedoms set out in the Constitution.

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Section 3(2)(e) of the Constitution includes observance of the principle of separation of powers as a key component of the principle of good governance. The three arms of government, that is, the executive, legislature and judiciary are provided for separately, to operate as separate entities in Chapters 5, 6 and 8 of the Constitution. The independence of the judiciary is provided for under section 164 which provides that the courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially, expeditiously and without fear, favour or prejudice.

Section 165 of the Constitution outlines principles guiding members of the judiciary in exercising judicial authority. Under section 165(1), the Constitution demands that justice must be done to all, irrespective of status, and efficiency and reasonable promptness must mark the operations of the judiciary. Section 165(2) provides that members of the judiciary, individually and collectively, must respect and honour their judicial office as a public trust and must strive to enhance their independence in order to maintain public confidence in the judicial system.

Specific to issues of corruption, section 165(3) provides that when making a judicial decision, a member of the judiciary must make such decision freely and without interference and undue influence. Members of the judiciary are required not to hold political office and partake in political activities, including attending political meetings, in terms of section 165(4). The Constitution in section 165(5) prohibits members of the judiciary from soliciting and accepting gifts, bequests, loans or favours that may influence their judicial conduct, or give the appearance of judicial impropriety, and under section 165(6) members of the judiciary are required to give precedence to their judicial duties over all, and must not engage in any activities that interfere with or compromise their judicial duties.
Chapter 13 of the Constitution provides for institutions that combat corruption and crime. The Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) is constituted under Part 1 of the Chapter. The functions of ZACC include investigating and exposing corruption in both the private and public sectors; promoting honesty, financial discipline and transparency in the public and private sectors; receiving, considering and taking appropriate action regarding corruption complaints from the public; directing the Commissioner-General of police to investigate cases of suspected corruption; referring matters to the National Prosecuting Authority for prosecution, and recommending measures to enhance integrity and accountability and prevent improper conduct in the public and private sectors.

The National Prosecuting Authority is the second institution provided for under Part 2 of Chapter 13 of the Constitution. It has the mandate of instituting and undertaking criminal prosecutions on behalf of the State and discharging any functions that are necessary or incidental to such prosecution (section 258 of the Constitution). These criminal prosecutions include those related to corruption. There is no specific provision explicitly mandating ZACC to investigate and act on judicial corruption, nor any provision explicitly prohibiting ZACC from doing so pursuant to its broad mandate. Neither is there any express requirement that ZACC seek permission from the Chief Justice or any official before instituting an investigation and action against a member of the judiciary. Section 24(3)(b) of the Judicial Service (Code of Ethics) Regulations, 212, provide that nothing in the Regulations derogate from the right of the Prosecutor-General or any other person to institute criminal or civil proceedings against the judicial officer concerned, arising out of the conduct complained of.
Judicial corruption and other serious derogations from judicial integrity are grounds for the removal of a judge, where such conduct amounts to gross misconduct under section 187(1)(c) of the Constitution.

The Constitution seeks to minimise and eliminate chances of judicial corruption occasioned by insecurities by providing for a stable regime of judicial salaries, allowances and other benefits, such that these cannot be reduced while a judge is holding office or acting in the office concerned (section 188(4)).

Judicial conduct for which accountability is required by international law

Judicial violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law

For purposes of international law, the acts of judicial officials constitute an act of the State just as for any other State official. In federal States, this is true whether the court is of a federal or sub-federal character. It is true of any conduct by the judicial official that is carried out in the person's judicial capacity, even if the wrongful act exceeded the person's authority.\(^{61}\)

Judges are as capable as any other kind of public official of perpetrating or being complicit in violations of international human rights. Furthermore, the State is responsible for all judicially perpetrated or judicially complicit human rights

violations, and this is true even if the judge's conduct was "lawful" under the State's domestic law.

Typical examples include:

- arbitrarily sentencing persons to imprisonment or death, or ordering or authorizing their arbitrary detention, including as a result of having exercised their protected rights to freedom of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, opinion and expression, association and peaceful assembly;

- convicting persons of criminal offences or imposing other penalties or restrictions after trials that have substantially failed to satisfy fundamental guarantees of fairness;

- enforcing domestic laws that discriminate on prohibited grounds or are otherwise inconsistent with international human rights;

- exercising or failing to exercise their authority in ways that seek to conceal violations perpetrated by military, para-military, or law enforcement agents, such as torture, extra-judicial execution, and enforced disappearance, or to protect the perpetrators from punishment, or to deprive victims of an effective remedy;

- authorizing arbitrary or unlawful interference with individuals' privacy, family, home or correspondence.

Many such violations would constitute "gross violations of human rights". "Gross" violations can be understood to include,

63 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, articles 1-3; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, article 27.
among other things: genocide; slavery and slavery-like practices; summary or arbitrary executions; torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; enforced disappearance; prolonged arbitrary detention; unlawful deportations or forcible transfers of population; and violations of economic, social and cultural rights of a particularly serious scale or severity of impact. In relation to such violations, international law requires States to ensure that the individuals who perpetrated or were complicit in such violations are held personally responsible for their actions; the rights of victims of such violations to have access to an effective remedy and reparation have also been addressed in particular detail in international standards.

Judges are also capable of perpetrating or being complicit in other violations consisting of crimes under international law, including international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict, or crimes against humanity. Many acts that constitute human rights violations, such as those described above, also constitute violations of international humanitarian law, as well as international criminal law, as described for instance in the jurisdiction provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the statutes of other international criminal

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65 See for example UNBP Remedy, article 4 ("In cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law constituting crimes under international law, States have the duty to investigate and, if there is sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to prosecution the person allegedly responsible for the violations and, if found guilty, the duty to punish her or him..."), and articles 11-23; Human Rights Committee, GC 31, supra note 12, para. 18. To be clear, the right of victims of human rights violations to an effective remedy and reparation is not limited to "gross" violations (see for example, ICCPR article 2(3); GC 31 paras 15-16).
tribunals. Wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial", for instance, is expressly listed in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocol I as a "grave breach" giving rise to criminal responsibility, and is included as a war crime within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court under the Rome Statute. Other forms of judicial misconduct in armed conflict, even if not rising to the level of a "grave breach", could place the State in violation of its legal obligations.

While the question of the individual judge's motivations or intent, or the lawfulness of their acts or omissions under domestic law, may be relevant to determinations of their individual criminal, civil or disciplinary responsibility, such factors do not relieve the State of its responsibility under international law for the judge's conduct.

66 See for example Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 3, articles 5 to 8.
67 See for example 1949 Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, article 130; 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, article 147; 1977 Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, article 85(4)(e); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 8(2)(a)(vi).
The Constitution by design is meant to be transformative. The Preamble affirms a commitment to gradually transform society by the tenets of the Constitution to build a united, just and prosperous nation, founded on values of transparency, equality, freedom, fairness, honesty and the dignity of hard work. A commitment to human rights is communicated throughout the Constitution, finding expression in the Preamble, the Founding Principles and the National Objectives.

Chapter 4 of the Constitution contains the Declaration of Rights, in which section 44 places a duty on the State and every natural and juristic person, and every institution and agency of the government at every level to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights and freedoms set out in this declaration. The Declaration of Rights is binding on the State, including all executive, legislative and judicial institutions. This provision is such that every exercise of power by any arm of government must be subject to or must comply with the provisions of the Declaration of Rights.

The tenets of international human rights law, and international judicial obligations, are contained in section 46(1)(c) of the Constitution which places a duty on members of the judiciary to take into account international law and all treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a party interpreting the Bill of Rights, and also section 165(7) which requires that members of the judiciary must take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their professional knowledge, skills and personal qualities, and in particular must keep themselves abreast of developments in domestic and international law.
**Judicial corruption**

The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has emphasized that:

Judicial corruption erodes the principles of independence, impartiality and integrity of the judiciary; infringes on the right to a fair trial; creates obstacles to the effective and efficient administration of justice; and undermines the credibility of the entire justice system.68

There is no universally agreed definition of "corruption". The Special Rapporteur has cited the informal definition used by Transparency International, the leading international anti-corruption NGO: "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain".69

The *UN Convention against Corruption* does not directly define "corruption" or "integrity", either in relation to judges under article 11 or more generally. However, the Convention requires States to criminalize a series of specific acts that are implicitly treated as forms of corruption, among which are:

- bribery ("solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties");70 and

- embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official.71

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69 Ibid para. 16.
70 UN Convention against Corruption ("UNCAC"), 2349 UNTS 41, article 15(2); see also article 16.
71 UNCAC, article 17.
The Convention also requires States to consider criminalizing additional acts, including abuse of functions or position ("the performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity"). 72

The ICJ's Policy Framework for Preventing and Eliminating Corruption and Ensuring the Impartiality of the Judicial System states:

The judicial system is corrupted when any act or omission results or is intended to result in the loss of impartiality of the judiciary.

Specifically, corruption occurs whenever a judge or court officer seeks or receives a benefit of any kind or promise of a benefit of any kind in respect of an exercise of power or other action. Such acts usually constitute criminal offences under national law. Examples of corrupt criminal conduct are:

- bribery;
- fraud;
- utilisation of public resources for private gain;
- deliberate loss of court records; and
- deliberate alteration of court records.

Corruption also occurs when instead of procedures being determined on the basis of evidence and the law, they are decided on the basis of improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats, or interferences, directly or indirectly, from any quarter or for any reason including those arising from:

- a conflict of interest;
- nepotism;
- favouritism to friends;
- consideration of promotional prospects;
- consideration of post retirement placements;
- improper socialisation with members of the legal profession, the executive, or the legislature;
- socialisation with litigants, or prospective litigants;
- predetermination of an issue involved in the litigation;

72 UNCAC, article 19.
Judicial officers, like any other citizens, are subject to the same legal constraints and restrictions when it comes to financial propriety. As such the provisions of Chapter VI of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] apply to judicial officers.

Section 165 of the Constitution sets out the principles that should guide a judicial officer in the conduct of their duties. The section reiterates the importance of the role played by the courts in safeguarding human rights and freedoms and the rule of law, reminding members of the judiciary, individually and collectively, to respect and honour their judicial office as a public trust and to strive to enhance their independence in order to maintain public confidence in the judicial system. Section 165 also places restrictions on the abilities of members of the judiciary to take part in political activities. Judicial officers cannot engage in any political activities, hold office in or be members of any political organisation, solicit funds for or contribute towards any political organisation, or attend political meetings. Section 165(5) prohibits judicial officers from soliciting or accepting any gift, bequest, loan or favour that may influence their judicial conduct or give the appearance of judicial impropriety.

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The two Judicial Codes of Ethics in Zimbabwe do not make express reference to corruption. However, both have a number of provisions that address the scourge. For instance, the Judicial Code of Ethics (2012) has the following:

- Sub-part B deals with issues of integrity. The section provides very little guidance on what conduct is proscribed. It merely directs or encourages judicial officers to evaluate what conduct might reasonably be said to go against the principles of integrity.

- The part on propriety is more instructive. Section 8(1) directs that no judicial officer, nor any family member or associate of that judicial officer, shall solicit or accept any gift, bequest, loan or favour in relation to anything in connection with the performance of judicial duties. Subsection 2 makes it a requirement on the part of the judicial officer to disclose where any such gift, bequest, loan or favour has been made.

- Section 9(2) warns judicial officers against receiving honorariums which may be perceived by a fair minded person as intended to influence the judicial office in the conduct or his/her work;

- Section 10 deals extensively with business and financial dealings of judicial officers. It sets out initially in subsection 1 roles that cannot be assumed by a judicial officer, which include acting as an executor or administrator of a deceased estate, or guardian, unless they are doing so for a member of their family. A judicial officer is instructed to refrain from financial and business dealings that—
a. reflect adversely on the judicial officer’s impartiality; or
b. interfere with the proper performance of the judicial officer’s judicial duties; or
c. exploit, or give the appearance of exploiting, the judicial officer’s judicial position; or
d. involve the judicial officer in frequent transactions or continuing business relationships with legal practitioners or other persons likely to come before the court on which the judicial officer serves.

Judicial officers are also prohibited from practicing law (section 11) and joining associations that do not further the interest of the judiciary (section 12). Similar provisions as above are in the Magistrates’ Code of Ethics (2019).

Abuse of public office is criminalised under section 174 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23]. Judicial officers are public officers, in terms of the Constitution. As such, the offence equally attaches to judges and magistrates. In terms of section 275 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, as read with the Fourth Schedule, (Permissible Verdicts) a person charged with the offence under section 174 can be convicted of the competent verdicts of bribery, theft, extortion or any competent verdict that attaches to the offence bribery.

Other forms of judicial misconduct, and ordinary crimes

The main focus of this Guide on accountability mechanisms and procedures is on human rights violations and corruption connected to a judge’s exercise or refusal to exercise his or her authority. However, the range of conduct for which judges may be held accountable is somewhat broader. For instance, from a rule of law point of view, judges should also be accountable for
ordinary offences entirely unconnected to their judicial authority, as would be any other person in the country.\textsuperscript{74}

Furthermore, international, regional and national standards address a wide range of ethical or professional conduct issues, beyond human rights violations and corruption \textit{per se}. The general term "judicial integrity" is often understood in light of the \textit{Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct}. The Bangalore Principles were developed by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity ("Judicial Integrity Group"), a group of Chief Justices and Superior Court Judges from around the world, and have subsequently been repeatedly endorsed by United Nations bodies.\textsuperscript{75} Clearly, judicial corruption or complicity in human rights violations would breach various principles of the Bangalore Principles, but the Principles also address a wider range of behaviour. The text of the Bangalore Principles is reproduced as Annex 1b to this Guide.

The mechanisms and procedures set out in this Guide, although developed with human rights violations and corruption in mind, may well be useful in addressing other forms of judicial misconduct and ordinary crimes.

\textbf{Accountable to whom?}

In considering different forms of accountability mechanisms and procedures it is useful to consider the persons to whom the

\textsuperscript{74} See e.g. Judicial Integrity Group, Measures for the Effective Implementation of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct ("Bangalore Implementation Measures") (2010) (excerpts reproduced in Annex 1c of this Guide), para. 9.1.

\textsuperscript{75} ECOSOC resolution 2006/23 (27 July 2006) on Strengthening Basic Principles of Judicial Conduct. See also e.g. resolutions of the Human Rights Council: resolution 29/6 (2015) on Independence and impartiality of the judiciary, jurors and assessors, and the independence of lawyers, Preamble; resolution 30/7 (2015) on Human rights in the administration of justice, including juvenile justice, Preamble; resolution 31/2 (2016) on Integrity of the judicial system, Preamble.
judiciary as a whole, and individual judges, should ultimately be accountable.

At the broadest level, the judiciary as an institution should be accountable to the society it serves. However, in a democratic society ruled by law the obligation that the judiciary owes to society is limited to applying the law in an independent and impartial way, with integrity and free of corruption.

The judiciary is emphatically not bound to adopt only those decisions with which a majority of society may agree, nor should individual judges be at any risk of removal simply because a majority of society may disagree with particular judgments. In this sense, the judiciary's accountability to society is made operative first and foremost by ensuring that judges are accountable to the law: that they explain their decisions based on the application of legal rules, through legal reasoning and findings of fact that are based on evidence and analysis, and that their decisions can be reviewed and if necessary corrected by the judicial hierarchy through a system of appeals. Societal opinions are relevant to the accountability of the judiciary only to the extent that such opinions are expressed through duly adopted laws that are compliant with the constitution of the State and international legal obligations.

The judiciary as an institution is accountable to society to ensure that all judicial decisions are in fact made independently and impartially, with integrity and free of corruption, and to this end society reasonably expects the judiciary to take action against individual judges who engage in misconduct that compromises these values.

Individuals who are affected by particular judicial misconduct should also be able to expect that the judge will be held accountable for the wrongdoing and that any damage will be

remedied. Such persons should have access to complaints procedures capable of resulting in disciplinary proceedings for judicial misconduct. However, given the need to ensure judicial independence and impartiality, individuals who have the right to a remedy aimed at achieving accountability may not always have the right to directly pursue certain kinds of remedy or punishment against individual judges: it is common for the right to seek civil compensation, for instance, to be available only against the State as a whole and not the individual judge, and in this case it is the State that is accountable for the acts or omissions of the individual judge; and while individuals should be able to file complaints, usually it is an independent and impartial body that actually decides whether to open disciplinary proceedings against an individual judge. While States may adopt different modalities of delivering accountability to individual victims of judicial misconduct in order to respect judicial independence, such victims must in all cases have access to an effective remedy and reparation, if not from the individual judge then from the State as a whole.

Under international law, the judiciary like other organs of the State is not only responsible for applying internal law of the State, but also for upholding internationally protected human rights and international humanitarian law. This is an obligation for which the judiciary is effectively accountable to the population of the State of which it is a part, to individuals and other entities affected by any exercise of jurisdiction beyond the ordinary territory of its State, and through the State's responsibility to other States under international law.

77 See e.g. Bangalore Implementation Measures, para. 15.2.
78 See e.g. Bangalore Implementation Measures, para. 15.3 and footnote 10.
The judiciary is accountable to the other branches of government - legislative or executive - in the same sense as it is accountable to society more generally: as an institution, it must be able to demonstrate that judicial decisions are based on legal rules and reasoning, and fact-finding based on evidence, in an independent and impartial way free from corruption and other improper influences. The principle of judicial independence precludes, on the other hand, any claim that the judiciary should be accountable to the executive or legislature in the sense of "responsible" or "subordinate" to those branches of government.\(^{79}\)

Judicial accountability is first and foremost infused through the requirement in section 196(3)(c) of the Constitution that public officers must be accountable to the public for decisions and actions. Transparency, justice, accountability and responsiveness are listed as founding values under section 3(2)(g) of the Constitution. Section 9 on good governance requires that the State must adopt and implement policies and legislation to develop efficiency, competence, accountability, transparency, personal integrity and financial probity in all institutions and agencies of government at every level and in every public institution, including measures to expose, combat and eradicate all forms of corruption and abuse of power by those holding political and public offices.

The Constitution vests judicial authority in the courts, deriving such authority from the people in terms of section 162. Section 164 (1) states that the courts are subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially, expeditiously and without fear, favour or prejudice.

\(^{79}\) CCJE, Opinion No. 18, \textit{supra} note 27, paras 20-38; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, UN Doc CCPR/CO/72/PRK, para. 8.
Judges and magistrates operate under the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). Under section 190(2) of the Constitution, the JSC must promote and facilitate the independence and accountability of the judiciary and the efficient, effective and transparent administration of justice in Zimbabwe, and has all the powers needed for this purpose. The JSC itself is required in section 191 to conduct its business in a just, fair and transparent manner.

The Constitution recognises appeal to a higher court as a right. Under section 70(5), any person who has been tried and convicted of an offence has the right, subject to reasonable restrictions that may be prescribed by law, to have the case reviewed by a higher court or to appeal to a higher court against the conviction and sentence. This also applies to civil matters, and a litigant has the right to appeal or seek review with a higher court.

Under section 23(2) of the Judicial Service (Magistrate’s Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2019, subject to the Constitution, the Judicial Service Act [Chapter 7:18], any other enactment and the Code, judicial officers shall not be accountable or answerable to any other State or non-State organ, entity or authority. A similar provision is in section 25(2) of the Judicial Service (Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2012.

**Forms of judicial accountability**

**Remedy and reparation for victims**

International law provides that victims of human rights violations, and serious violations of international humanitarian law, have the right to an effective remedy and reparation for
the violations.\textsuperscript{80} The right of victims to remedy and reparation is no less applicable to violations perpetrated by or with complicity of judicial officials, than for other officials of the State.\textsuperscript{81}

The \textit{UN Convention against Corruption} similarly provides for persons who have suffered damage as a result of corruption to have the right to bring legal proceedings for compensation, for the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of criminal proceedings against offenders, and for measures more generally to address the consequences of corruption through "any other remedial action."\textsuperscript{82} The UNODC Guide on implementation of article 11 of the \textit{UN Convention against Corruption} additionally refers to the provision of "effective remedies" in this context.\textsuperscript{83}

International standards on the administration of justice and independence of judiciary also contemplate that victims will have access to an appropriate procedure for making complaints against a judge in his or her judicial and professional capacity, and that any such complaints must be processed expeditiously and fairly.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{80} Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 8; ICCPR, article 2(3); Convention against Torture and other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, articles 13 and 14; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, article 6; Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 39; American Convention on Human Rights, articles 25 and 63(1); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, article 7(1)(a); Arab Charter on Human Rights, articles 12 and 13; European Convention on Human Rights, articles 5 (5), 13 and 41; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, article 47; Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, article 27; UNBP Remedy.

\textsuperscript{81} UNSRIJL, Report on judicial accountability, \textit{supra} note 7, paras 97-105, 130.

\textsuperscript{82} UNCAC, articles 32(5), 34, 35.

\textsuperscript{83} UNODC Guide, \textit{supra} note 11, para. 78.

\textsuperscript{84} UNBP Judiciary, article 17; Bangalore Implementation Measures, article 15.2; African Fair Trial Principles, article A.4(r); Consultative Council of European Judges, Opinion No. 3, on the Principles and rules governing judges’ professional conduct, in particular ethics, incompatible behaviour and impartiality (2002), para. 67; European Charter for the Statute of Judges, article 5.3; Conference of Chief Justices and Senior Justices of the Asian Region, Istanbul Declaration on
Under these standards, States have a duty to ensure: that anyone who alleges to have been a victim of judicial violations has access to an appropriate procedure for seeking a remedy; that the procedure investigates alleged violations effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially; and that the procedure is empowered to, and does in practice, provide victims with "adequate, effective and prompt" substantive reparation if the violation is ultimately established. The reparation should be appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case.  

The elements of adequate and effective reparation under international human rights law and standards, include among others:

- **Restitution**, restoring the victim to the original situation before the violations in so far as is possible, for instance, restoration of liberty for someone who has been wrongly imprisoned;

- **Compensation** for economically assessable damage of any kind, including not only financial losses but, for instance, moral damage;

- **Rehabilitation** (which could include medical and psychological care as well as legal and social services);

- **Satisfaction**, such as: full and public disclosure of the truth; an official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victim; public apology, including acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility; judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the violations;

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• **Guarantees of non-repetition** such as implementing measures to ensure that all civilian and military proceedings abide by international standards of due process, fairness and impartiality; to strengthen the independence of the judiciary; to promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in particular international standards, and reviewing and reforming any laws that contribute to such violations.\(^{86}\)

Victims of certain kinds of violations also should be able to expect that the State will fulfil its obligation under international law to hold the individuals responsible to account personally. As the *UN Basic Principles on the Right to Remedy and Reparation* put it: "In cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law constituting crimes under international law, States have the duty to investigate and, if there is sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to prosecution the person allegedly responsible for the violations and, if found guilty, the duty to punish her or him."\(^{87}\)

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\(^{86}\) UNBP Remedy, articles 18-23; Human Rights Committee, GC 31, *supra* note 12, para. 16.

\(^{87}\) UNBP Remedy, article 4; Human Rights Committee, GC 31, *supra* note 12, para. 18.
Section 85 of the Constitution provides that victims of human rights violations, or various classes of persons acting on their behalf, may approach a court, and a court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights and an award of compensation. This extends to violations perpetrated by or with complicity of judicial officials. Section 45 of the Constitution provides that the Declaration of Rights binds the State and all executive, legislative and judicial institutions and agencies of government at every level.

Additionally, compensation is expressly provided for, for wrongful arrest and detention in section 50(9) of the Constitution:

“Any person who has been illegally arrested or detained is entitled to compensation from the person responsible for the arrest or detention, but a law may protect the following persons from liability under this section –

a. a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity reasonably and in good faith;

b. any other public officer acting reasonably and in good faith and without culpable ignorance or negligence”.

Specific to constitutional matters, section 175(6) of the Constitution empowers a court with jurisdiction to declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency and to make any order that is just and equitable.

It is possible for a victim to claim directly from the judge or magistrate implicated in a violation.

Section 24(3)(b) of the Judicial Code of Ethics provides that nothing shall affect the right of the Prosecutor-General or any other person to institute criminal or civil proceedings against the judicial officer concerned, arising out of misconduct. This includes misconduct that violates the rights of an individual.
The responsibility of the State

As was mentioned earlier, it is clear as a matter of international law that the State is responsible for all acts and omissions of judicial officials that are carried out in the judge's judicial capacity, whether the wrongful act exceeded the person's authority or was lawful under the State's domestic law.\textsuperscript{88}

Aspects of the State's responsibility include all the elements of an effective remedy and reparation noted above (including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition).

International standards on the judiciary generally provide that while judges should have "personal immunity from civil suits for monetary damages for improper acts or omissions in the exercise of their judicial functions" as a safeguard of judicial independence, this does not lessen the responsibility of the State to provide compensation to victims of judicial misconduct.\textsuperscript{89} Indeed, this is merely a specific manifestation of the more general rule that no form of judicial immunity under national law can affect the State's responsibility under international law to provide a victim of human rights violations with all of the various forms of reparation necessary for the harm the victim has suffered.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{88} Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN General Assembly resolution 56/83 (2001), articles 1-4 and 7; Human Rights Committee, GC 31, supra note 12, para. 4; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 27.

\textsuperscript{89} E.g. UNBP Judiciary article 16; Bangalore Implementation Measures, paras 9.2 and 9.4; European Charter on the Statute for Judges, article 5.2; CCJE, Opinion No. 3, supra note 35, paras 55-57, 76; Council of Europe (Committee of Ministers), Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)12 on Judges: Independence, efficiency and responsibilities, articles 66-71; African Fair Trial Principles, article A.4(n); Beijing Statement, para. 32; UNODC Guide, supra note 11, paras 78 and 80. See also article 11(a) of the Campeche Declaration ("como regla general que los jueces no responderán civilmente de manera personal por sus decisiones, con la única excepción de los casos de dolo.")

\textsuperscript{90} Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in a provision that also reflects customary international law, provides in part that, "A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
International standards differ on the issue of whether the State can, having paid compensation to a victim of judicial wrongdoing, in turn claim reimbursement from the individual judge responsible.\(^9\) Whatever position a State adopts more generally on this question, the ICJ is of the view that it should be possible for individual judges to be required, through fair legal proceedings, to make reimbursement for compensation paid to victims of human rights violations perpetrated by or with complicity of the judge, or victims of judicial corruption.

Where the judicial misconduct is of a character to trigger criminal or disciplinary proceedings against the judge, the State is also responsible for ensuring such proceedings take place, in a manner that fully respects the rights both of the judge and of any victim.\(^9\) While this is a responsibility of the State as a whole, even if in a given State it would ordinarily be officials within the executive government that would pursue such criminal or disciplinary proceedings against State officials, in the case of proceedings against judges this should normally be discharged by a judicial council or similar body which is independent of the executive and legislature (but still a "State organ" for purposes of international law). The responsibility of the State as a whole to ensure appropriate proceedings are taken against individual judges, cannot normally justify interference by the executive or legislative branches of perform a treaty." See also the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, General Assembly resolution 40/34 (29 November 1985), article 11: "Where public officials or other agents acting in an official or quasi-official capacity have violated national criminal laws, the victims should receive restitution from the State whose officials or agents were responsible for the harm inflicted. In cases where the Government under whose authority the victimizing act or omission occurred is no longer in existence, the State or Government successor in title should provide restitution to the victims."

\(^9\) See e.g.: Council of Europe CM/Rec(2010)12, supra note 40, para. 67 (State may seek to establish the civil liability of a judge through court action in the event that it has had to award compensation); European Charter for the Statute of Judges, article 5.2 (only with permission of the independent judicial authority); Bangalore Implementation Measures, para. 9.4 (no recourse by State against the individual judge); CCJE Opinion No. 3, supra note 35, para. 57 and Magna Carta of Judges article 22 (no liability to reimburse, except in case of wilful default).

\(^9\) UNBP Remedy, article 4; Human Rights Committee, GC 31, supra note 12 para. 18.
government in the functioning of judicial accountability mechanisms, in a way that would undermine independence of the judiciary as a whole.

There is no explicit statutory provision in Zimbabwean law for the State to pay compensation in respect of the violation of human rights, corruption or misconduct of a judge or magistrate. However, this is permissible under the common law of vicarious liability, also codified under under section 2 and 3 of the State Liabilities Act [Chapter 8:14], since judges act for the State.

Removal from office, disciplinary sanctions, and other administrative measures

International standards uniformly recognize that individual judges are subject to disciplinary proceedings and penalties, up to and including removal from office, for sufficiently serious misconduct. 93

A fundamental element of the independence of the judiciary is that individual judges have security of tenure, i.e. are normally not subject to removal from office during their term of appointment. 94

93 UNBP Judiciary, articles 17-20; African Fair Trial Principles, articles A.4(p)(q) and (r); Beijing Statement, articles 22-28; Bangalore Implementation Measures, articles 15 and 16.
94 UNBP Judiciary, article 12; UNSRIJL, Report on guarantees of judicial independence, UN Doc A/HRC/11/41 (2009), paras 57, 98; Bangalore Implementation Measures, article 13.2; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial ("GC 32"), UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), para. 19; Human Rights Council, resolution 29/6 (2015), para. 3; Council of Europe, CM/Rec(2010)12, supra note 40, para. 49; African Fair Trial Principles, article A.4(l); Beijing Statement, article 18; Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles on the Three Branches of Government (2003), article IV(b); Statute of the Ibero-American Judge (Ibero-American Summit of Presidents of Supreme Courts and Tribunals of Justice, 2001), article 14; Campeche Declaration, articles 2, 7(b)(b.1) and
The threshold of misconduct capable of justifying removal of a judge from office is accordingly universally set at a very high level, although it is expressed in slightly different terms in different standards:

- "incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their duties";\(^{95}\)
- "serious grounds of misconduct or incompetence";\(^{96}\)
- "gross misconduct incompatible with judicial office, or for physical or mental incapacity that prevents them from undertaking their judicial duties";\(^{97}\)
- "inability to perform judicial duties" or "serious misconduct";\(^{98}\)
- "incapacity, conviction of a crime, or conduct that makes the judge unfit to be a judge";\(^{99}\)
- "incapacity, conviction of a serious crime, gross incompetence, or conduct that is manifestly contrary to the independence, impartiality and integrity of the judiciary".\(^{100}\)

In whatever manner the threshold is formulated, it is clear that at a minimum judicial perpetration or complicity in gross human rights violations, war crimes, crimes against humanity and other crimes under international law, or serious judicial corruption, would meet the threshold for removal from office.\(^{101}\)

\(^{95}\) UNBP Judiciary, article 18; Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles on the Three Branches of Government (2003), article IV.
\(^{96}\) Human Rights Committee, GC 32, supra note 45, para. 20.
\(^{97}\) African Fair Trial Principles, article A.4(p).
\(^{99}\) Beijing Statement, article 22.
\(^{100}\) Bangalore Implementation Measures, article 16.1.
\(^{101}\) Regarding corruption, see UNODC Guide, supra note 11, para. 75.
By contrast, judges should not be subject to removal or punishment for bona fide (good faith) errors or for disagreeing with a particular interpretation of the law.\textsuperscript{102}

The Human Rights Committee has stressed that article 14 of the ICCPR requires, among other things, that States "take specific measures guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, protecting judges from any form of political influence in their decision-making through the constitution or adoption of laws establishing clear procedures and objective criteria for the appointment, remuneration, tenure, promotion, suspension and dismissal of the members of the judiciary and disciplinary sanctions taken against them."\textsuperscript{103} The "clear procedures" for removal or discipline are discussed in Chapter 4 below. In terms of "objective criteria", article 19 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary provides that, "All disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct."\textsuperscript{104}

Although "established standards of judicial conduct" should reflect international standards such as the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, a number of international standards affirm that disciplinary offences should be clearly defined, whether in a written code of professional conduct or other legal instrument,

\textsuperscript{103} Human Rights Committee, GC 32, \textit{supra} note 45, para. 19.
\textsuperscript{104} See similarly, Bangalore Implementation Measures, article 15.5; Beijing Statement, article 27.
developed by judges and adopted at the national level.\textsuperscript{105} This has also consistently been a key recommendation of the ICJ, based on its longstanding and global experience.

Some international standards affirm that any codification of disciplinary offences, and the machinery for their enforcement, must be strictly separate from codes of judicial ethics and bodies responsible for the interpretation of ethical standards.\textsuperscript{106} It appears, however, that in practice many jurisdictions have a single instrument that addresses issues of judicial ethics and professional conduct without drawing clear distinctions between the two, and this approach does not necessarily seem to be uniformly prohibited by international standards.

Depending on national legislation and facts of the particular case, the types of sanctions potentially to be imposed through disciplinary proceedings could range from a simple finding of improper conduct through to removal from office. It is important that the national legal framework requires that sanctions be proportionate to the seriousness, degree of fault and impact of misconduct, and that this requirement be respected in practice.\textsuperscript{107} This applies in both directions: sanctions must not


\textsuperscript{106} E.g. CCJE, Opinion No. 3, supra note 35, paras 49, 60-62; CCJE Magna Carta of Judges, para. 18. See also Bangalore Implementation Measures, paragraph 2.2 and footnote 3 and paragraph 15.1 footnote 9.

\textsuperscript{107} UN SRIJL, Report on guarantees of judicial independence, supra note 45, paras 58, 98; Bangalore Implementation Measures, article 15.8; Council of Europe, CM/Rec(2010)12, supra note 40, para. 69; CCJE Opinion No. 3, supra
be disproportionately harsh vis-à-vis the gravity of the offence, but neither may they be unduly lenient.

In terms of other administrative measures, the failure of a judge to meet standards for integrity, including by committing or being complicit in human rights violations, or by engaging in judicial corruption, should weigh heavily against any promotion.\(^\text{108}\)

On the other hand, the administrative transfer of a judge to a different geographic jurisdiction as a form of punishment for serious misconduct is generally inappropriate. First, the lack of fair and formal procedures leave such measures open to abuse, i.e. punishing judges for the content of their decisions rather than for actual misconduct.\(^\text{109}\) This is why several international standards provide that judges should in principle not be transferred without their consent.\(^\text{110}\) Second, if a judge has engaged in misconduct serious enough to warrant sanction, then simply transferring the judge to continue his or her functions in another place without any formal finding of wrongdoing does not fulfil the obligations of the State to ensure transparency, individual responsibility, and effective remedy.

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\(^\text{108}\) See UNBP Judiciary, article 13; African Fair Trial Principles article A.4(o).

\(^\text{109}\) The ICJ frequently receives reports or observes transfers highly suggestive of punishment for judgments that have displeased executive authorities. See also, for example, UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, Report on Mission to Uruguay, UN Doc A/HRC/27/56/Add.2 (28 August 2014), para. 24; and Laura-Stella Eposi Enonchong, "Judicial Independence and Accountability in Cameroon: Balancing a Tenuous Relationship" 5 African Journal of Legal Studies 313 (2012), p. 322.

(The latter includes measures to prevent re-occurrence of the misconduct, which might otherwise simply be repeated in the new location).

The removal process for judges in Zimbabwe is set out in section 187 of the Constitution. Subsection 187(1) sets out a closed list of grounds upon which a judge can be removed. The Constitution specifies that a judge may be removed from office for inability to perform the functions of his or her office, due to mental or physical incapacity; gross incompetence; or gross misconduct. The section concludes by making it clear that a judge cannot be removed from office except in accordance with the section.

Criminal responsibility

To safeguard judicial independence, judges should in principle be immune from criminal proceedings in relation to the content of their orders and judgments (i.e. the interpretation of the law, assessment of facts, or weighing of evidence), and the due discharge of their judicial duties more generally. On the other

111 UNSRIJL, Report on guarantees of judicial independence, supra note 45, paras 66, 98; UNSRIJL, Report on judicial accountability, supra note 7, paras 52, 84, 87; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, UN Doc CCPR/CO/72/PRK (2001), para. 8 (Criminal Code provision subjecting judges to criminal liability for "unjust judgements" seriously endangering the impartiality and independence of the judiciary); Bangalore Implementation Measures, article 9.3 (by implication excluding other remedies for such errors); African Fair Trial Principles, article A.4(n)(1); Council of Europe, CM/Rec (2010)12, supra note 40, para. 68 (excepting cases of malice); CCJE, Magna Carta of Judges, article 20; CCJE Opinion No. 3, supra note 35, para. 75(ii); CCJE Opinion No. 18, supra note 27, para. 37. See also ICJ, Legal Commentary to the ICJ Geneva Declaration (Geneva, 2011), p. 213: "Judges should enjoy 'limited functional immunity' which should cover arrest, detention and 'other criminal proceedings that interfere with the workings of the court'. A wider immunity, however, would not be justifiable."
hand, international standards contemplate that judges should remain liable for ordinary crimes not related to the content of their orders and judgments,\textsuperscript{112} although as a safeguard against abuse of such proceedings, the permission of an independent authority such as a judicial council may need to be obtained before any arrest or charge.\textsuperscript{113} (Additionally, of course, the law creating the offence in question, its application to the particular conduct of the judge, and any arrest, detention, search or other measures, must otherwise fully comply with the requirements of international human rights law.)

Exceptions to criminal immunity should be made for judicial perpetration of or complicity in gross human rights violations, judicial corruption, war crimes, crimes against humanity and other crimes under international law, subject to appropriate thresholds and procedural protections.

For instance, the Human Rights Committee has said that under the ICCPR, where public officials have committed particularly serious "violations recognized as criminal under either domestic or international law", States "may not relieve perpetrators from personal responsibility, as has occurred with certain amnesties and prior legal immunities and indemnities" and that, "no official

\textsuperscript{112} See e.g. Bangalore Implementation Measures, article 9.1; Council of Europe, CM/Rec (2010)12, supra note 40, paras 68, 71; CCJE Opinion No. 3, supra note 35, paras 52-53, 75(i); CCJE, Magna Carta of Judges, article 20. See also Campeche Declaration, articles 11(d) ("Tanto la acción civil dirigida contra un juez, cuando sea admitida, como la acción penal, y en su caso la detención, deberán ser ejercidas en condiciones que no puedan tener como objetivo ninguna influencia sobre su actividad jurisdiccional") and 12 ("No habrá inmunidades judiciales que puedan significar privilegio de los jueces, pero estos tendrán un régimen especial dirigido a resguardar que la tramitación de acciones judiciales en su contra no puedan ser utilizadas para tornarlos funcionalmente dependientes de cualquier otro Poder del Estado o de la sociedad y a impedir las represalias arbitrarias o el bloqueo del ejercicio de sus funciones. De esta manera los jueces dispondrán de un fuero propio y de limitaciones a su detención o prisión anticipada, salvo por flagrante delito, con nmediata presentación ante el Tribunal competente").

\textsuperscript{113} UNSRIJL, Report on judicial accountability, supra note 7, para. 52. See also CCJE Opinion No. 3, supra note 35, para. 54, 75(i), and Campeche Declaration, articles 11(d) and 12.
status justifies persons who may be accused of responsibility for such violations being held immune from legal responsibility."

As regards corruption offences, article 30(2) of the *UN Convention against Corruption* states:

> Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish or maintain, in accordance with its legal system and constitutional principles, an appropriate balance between any immunities or jurisdictional privileges accorded to its public officials for the performance of their functions and the possibility, when necessary, of effectively investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating offences established in accordance with this Convention.

The UN Special Rapporteur has specifically stated that any criminal immunity of judges should be lifted in relation to cases of corruption and similar serious crimes.\(^{115}\)

Leaving judges vulnerable to criminal proceedings for the content of their judgments, in circumstances other than judicial complicity in human rights violations or corruption, undermines their independence and impartiality by creating the possibility for "inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process".\(^{116}\)

There are numerous examples of prosecution of judges for corruption. Although rare, examples of criminal prosecution of

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\(^{114}\) Human Rights Committee, GC 31, *supra* note 12, para. 18. See also paras 22 and 27(c) of the Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity ("UN Impunity Principles"), UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (2005). The Principles are referenced in, for example, Human Rights Council resolution 9/11 (2008) and General Assembly resolution 68/165 (2013), on the right to truth.


\(^{116}\) See e.g. UNBP Judiciary, articles 1, 2 and 4; African Fair Trial Principles, article A.4(n).
judges for perpetration or complicity in human rights violations also exist.\textsuperscript{117}

The Constitution does not provide for any general immunity for judicial officers. The only express allowance for immunity provision is in section 50(9). The provision grants a person who has been illegally arrested or detained the right to compensation from the person responsible for the arrest or detention. The provision states that a law may protect from liability a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity reasonably and in good faith.

This was not the case with the previous Constitution. The 1979 Constitution of Zimbabwe provided in Section 79B that "\textit{In the exercise of his judicial authority, a member of the judiciary shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority, except to the extent that a written law may place him under the direction or control of another member of the judiciary.}"

This provision read together with section 87 (which dealt with the procedure for the removal from office of a judge) was the subject of two conflicting judgments by Sandura JA and Malaba JA (as they were then) in the matter Paradza v Minister of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and Others [2003] ZWSC 46, on what should be accorded primacy, the procedure for the removal of a judge from office for criminal misconduct or the institution of criminal proceedings.

Judge Sandura took the view that judges should be dealt with in terms of section 87 of the Constitution before criminal proceedings were instituted against them. This means a tribunal must be set up to investigate the conduct of the judge before the judge can subjected to criminal proceedings.

Judge Malaba was of the contrary view, and held that the provisions of section 76(4)(a) of the 1979 Constitution which conferred upon the Attorney-General the power to institute criminal proceedings in any case in which s/he thinks desirable to do so, meant the Attorney-General could institute criminal proceedings against a sitting judge.

The majority of the bench concurred with Judge Malaba’s judgment. The law therefore was that judicial independence did not confer immunity from criminal proceedings. This position was codified in section 24 (3)(b) of Judicial Service (Code of Ethics), 2012, which expressly states that “Nothing contained in this Code shall be construed as taking away or derogating from the right of the Prosecutor-General or any other person to institute criminal or civil proceedings against the judicial officer concerned, arising out of the conduct complained of.”

**The right to truth**

Victims have a right to the truth as part of the “satisfaction” element of reparation. Article 22(b) of the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation, for instance, states that satisfaction should include, where applicable: “Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth to the extent that such disclosure does not cause further harm or threaten the safety and interests of the victim, the victim’s relatives, witnesses, or persons who have intervened to assist the victim or prevent the occurrence
of further violations". The right to truth has also been recognized by international human rights courts and the UN Human Rights Council.\(^{118}\)

The United Nations *Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity* ("UN Impunity Principles") and other international and regional standards and jurisprudence recognize the "right to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes and about the circumstances and reasons that led, through massive or systematic violations, to the perpetration of those crimes". The right to truth includes both the rights of particular victims and their families to know the circumstances of the violations that have affected them, and the right of the broader society to know and remember its history, including as a vital safeguard against the recurrence of such violations in the future.\(^{119}\)

The Impunity Principles affirm that the process of fact-finding by an independent and effective judiciary in the course of legal proceedings to provide victims with remedy and reparation and to hold perpetrators responsible, is an essential part of realization of the right of victims and society to know the truth. At the same time, the role of the judiciary may be complemented (but never replaced) by non-judicial processes. For instance, "Societies that have experienced heinous crimes perpetrated on a massive or systematic basis may benefit in particular from the creation of a truth commission or other commission of inquiry to establish the facts surrounding those violations so that the truth may be ascertained and to prevent the disappearance of evidence."\(^{120}\)


\(^{119}\) UN Impunity Principles, *supra* note 65, Principles 2-4.

\(^{120}\) UN Impunity Principles, Principle 5.
All accountability processes described in Chapters 3 and 4 that result in public findings of fact contribute to some extent to realization of the right to the truth. The specific application of truth commissions in situations of transition is addressed separately in Chapter 5.

The Declaration of Rights in the Constitution does not expressly provide for the “right to truth”. The Constitution does however provide a framework under which victims or their families and the society as a whole can seek the truth about the circumstances surrounding serious violations of human rights. For instance, the right to the truth is linked to the State’s duty to protect and guarantee human rights. This is enshrined in sections 11 and 44 of the Constitution.

Section 50(7)(a) provides the procedural instrument of habeas corpus. This serves to implement the right to the truth. The right to the truth is also deduced from the freedom from torture provided for in section 53 of the Constitution. Courts at national and regional levels have held that the State’s failure to inform the victims’ relatives about the fate and whereabouts of a victim of a disappearance amounts to torture or other ill-treatment.

The right to truth in Zimbabwe is also discernible from the freedom of expression, freedom of the media, and the right to access information enshrined in sections 61 and 62 of the Constitution. These sections can be used to speak and disseminate the truth, and to compel the State to divulge information which it has and which is required “for the exercise or protection of a right” (the individual dimension of the right to truth) and/or “in the interests of public accountability” (the collective dimension of the right to truth).
The Freedom of Information Act [Chapter 10:33] is the legislation enacted to give effect to this right.

Close links are also discernible between the right to truth and the right to legal and judicial protection, the right to an effective investigation, and the right to a hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal which are all provided for in sections 50, 68, 69 and 70 of the Constitution.

Outside the Declaration of Rights, the Constitution in section 251 establishes the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC). To give effect to this Commission, Parliament in 2018 passed the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission Act [Chapter 10:32]. The functions of the Commission set out section 252 of the Constitution include ensuring post–conflict justice, healing and reconciliation, and to bring about national reconciliation by encouraging people to tell the truth about the past and facilitating the making of amends and provisions of justice.

The NPRC thus has a truth seeking mandate, and it is one of the avenues through which the right to truth can be pursued.
4. Accountability bodies

Introduction

The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, which mainly set out substantive principles, include a short section on "Implementation" that states: "By reason of the nature of judicial office, effective measures shall be adopted by national judiciaries to provide mechanisms to implement these principles if such mechanisms are not already in existence in their jurisdictions." This provision was elaborated on in 2010, when the Judicial Integrity Group, the body responsible for the Bangalore Principles, adopted Measures for the effective implementation of Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (the "Bangalore Implementation Measures").

The Bangalore Principles, the Bangalore Implementation Measures, and other international and regional standards and jurisprudence stress the need for judicial accountability bodies themselves to be independent and impartial, in order to safeguard the independence of individual judges and the judiciary as a whole.\(^\text{121}\)

The mechanisms discussed in this Chapter include

- Review of decisions through appeal or judicial review
- Judicial councils
- Civil and criminal trials before the courts
- Parliamentary procedures

• Ad hoc tribunals
• Anti-corruption bodies
• Civil society monitoring and reporting
• National human rights institutions
• Professional associations
• International accountability mechanisms

International and regional standards recognize that the Executive should not have any role, aside perhaps from at most a purely formal and symbolic function and certainly no substantive role, in regard to judicial removals or other forms of judicial discipline.¹²²

**Review of decisions through appeal or judicial review**

Where a person has suffered damage as a result of a judicial decision that was wrong but was made in good faith, the primary accountability mechanism is for a higher court to overturn the decision on review, or where the decision is of the highest court, for the court to reverse its earlier decision.¹²³ This does not preclude an obligation on the State to deliver additional measures, such as compensation, to fully implement the victim's right to remedy and reparation, in certain cases.¹²⁴

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¹²² Commonwealth Study, *supra* note 53, p. 88; Human Rights Committee, GC 32, *supra* note 45, para. 20; IBA Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, article 4(a). The UNODC Guide (*supra* note 11) recommends States consider vesting the power to remove a judge from office in an independent body, but notes that if the Head of State or legislature has power to remove judges, "good practice has indicated that such power should be exercised only after a recommendation to that effect of the independent body vested with power to discipline judges" (para. 76).

¹²³ Bangalore Implementation Measures, para. 9.3; CCJE Opinion No. 18, *supra* note 27, paras 23 and 37; CCJE, Magna Carta of Judges, article 21.

¹²⁴ For example, in addition to the general provision for effective remedies under article 2 of the ICCPR, article 9(5) specifically provides, "Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation", and article 14(6) specifically provides for compensation in cases of miscarriage of justice.
The rights of appeal and to the review of proceedings are established at law in Zimbabwe. The Constitution in section 70(5)(a) & (b) provides for the right of all convicted persons to review and appeal, respectively.

Statutory law provides extensively for review proceedings. Section 3(c) of the High Court Act [Chapter 7:06] provides that the High Court shall be duly constituted for the purpose of exercising its powers to review the proceedings or decision of any inferior court, tribunal or administrative authority, if it consists of one or more judges of the High Court. Section 26 confers upon the High Court the “power, jurisdiction and authority to review all proceedings and decisions of all inferior courts of justice, tribunals and administrative authorities within Zimbabwe.” The Act also provides for the Grounds for review (section 27), powers on review of civil proceedings and decisions (section 28) and powers on review of criminal proceedings (section 29). Part VI that follows deals with civil appeals and Part VII thereafter is concerned with criminal appeals.

The Magistrates Courts Act [Chapter 7:10] also makes provision for reviews and appeals in both civil and criminal proceedings. Section 57 sets out the law as it pertains to judicial review. Appeals in civil matters are provided for in section 40 of the Magistrates Courts Act. Sections 60 through to 64 address different aspects of criminal appeals.
Judicial councils

While most international standards do not outright preclude the possibility of other accountability mechanisms, many assert that independent judicial councils or similarly constituted bodies should have the primary if not exclusive role in holding judges accountable.

The Preamble to the Bangalore Principles states that the Principles "presuppose that judges are accountable for their conduct to appropriate institutions established to maintain judicial standards, which are themselves independent and impartial".\(^{125}\)

The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has said that bodies responsible for holding judges to account for judicial corruption and other wrongdoing should be composed either entirely or with a majority of judges, with the possibility of additional minority representation of the legal profession or legal academics, but with the absolute exclusion of any representatives of the political branches of government (executive and legislative).\(^{126}\)

Numerous other international and regional standards similarly refer to an independent body with (at minimum) a majority of judges (or, in some cases, "substantial representation" of judges), who have been chosen democratically by other judges, with no participation in disciplinary proceedings by any political authorities (including the Head of State, Minister of Justice or

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\(^{126}\) UNSRIJL, Report on judicial corruption, supra note 19, paras 88, 113(k); Report on judicial accountability, supra note 7, paras 93, 126; Report on Guarantees of Judicial Independence, supra note 45, paras 60, 98; Report on Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc A/HRC/8/4/Add.2 (2008), para. 75.
any other representative of the Executive or Legislative branches of government). The ICJ has frequently recommended the establishment or maintenance of such mechanisms in countries around the world, based on its longstanding global experience.

The European Court of Human Rights has held in relation to disciplinary proceedings before judicial councils, that "where at least half of the membership of a tribunal is composed of judges, including the chairman with a casting vote, this will be a strong indicator of impartiality." Conversely, it has held the following situations not to be compatible with the requirements of independence and impartiality under the European Convention:

- where the vast majority of the body hearing the proceedings is made up of non-judicial staff appointed directly by the executive and legislative authorities;

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127 Bangalore Implementation Measures, para. 15.4; CCJE Opinion No. 3, supra note 35, paras 71 and 77; CCJE, Opinion No. 10, on the Council for the Judiciary at the service of society (2007), paras 15-24, 63; Council of Europe CM/Rec(2010)12, supra note 40, para. 27; European Charter for the Statute of Judges, article 5.1; CCJE, Magna Carta of Judges, (2010), article 13; Campeche Declaration, article 5(b); Venice Commission, Report on the Independence of the Judicial System - Part One The Independence of Judges, supra note 61, paras 32, 43, 82(4) and (6); OSCE Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia (2010), paras 7, 9, 26; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Guarantees for the independence of justice operators (2013), paras 241, 244-246, 249 (recommendation 26); IBA, Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, article 31 (although the IBA standards also contemplate involvement of the Legislature in disciplinary decisions as an alternative); ICJ, CIL Policy Framework for Preventing and Eliminating Corruption and Ensuring Impartiality of the Judicial System, supra note 24, Annex, p. 133. See also the more qualified positions set out in the International Association of Judges, Universal Charter of the Judge, article 11; in the African Fair Trial Principles, article A.4(u); and in the Beijing Statement, article 25.

where half of the members are required to be judges, but most of the judges (and the non-judge representatives) are still appointed by executive and legislative authorities;

- where the head of the Prosecution service, and Minister of Justice, are included in the body *ex officio*. 129

Inclusion in the judicial council of persons who are not judges, while perhaps not essential, can add valuable perspectives from other stakeholders, and help reassure the public of the independence and impartiality of the accountability process. 130

It is important that these people not be members or representatives of the executive or legislative branches of government. 131

The Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) has recommended that non-judge members should be appointed by non-political authorities, and has affirmed that they should never be appointed by the executive; if they are however elected by the Parliament, the CCJE has said that their election should require "a qualified majority necessitating significant opposition support", and the persons selected should ensure that the overall membership is a diverse representation of society. 132

The European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe, in relation to constitutional amendments on the judiciary in Albania, noted that that international standards did not prescribe a particular

132 CCJE Opinion No. 10, *supra* note 78, para. 32.
threshold for the "qualified majority" (e.g. 3/5, 2/3 or 3/4 support) and this was essentially for each State to decide. The Venice Commission stressed however the importance of the process of nomination of candidate non-judicial members of the council, where Parliament makes the appointment: a "transparent and open nomination process, at the initiative of autonomous nominating bodies (universities, NGOs, bar associations, etc.) and completed by the Judicial Appointments Council, which is composed of the members of the judiciary." The nomination process should seek to ensure, through such means, "that the Parliament has to make a selection amongst the most qualified candidates, and not political appointees."\(^{133}\)

To further guarantee its independence and impartiality in operation, the body responsible for judicial accountability should manage its own budget and have adequate human and financial resources for its functions.\(^{134}\)

Certain standards provide that unless a standing disciplinary court has been established by the judicial council, any disciplinary procedures should be dealt with by a disciplinary commission composed of a substantial representation of judges elected by their peers, that are different from the members of the council itself.\(^{135}\)

A number of standards suggest that a separate body or person be made responsible for receiving complaints, for obtaining a response from the judge and for considering whether or not there is a sufficient case to refer the complaint onwards to the disciplinary body.\(^{136}\) This initial screening is intended to ensure

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\(^{134}\) SRIJL, Report on judicial accountability, supra note 7, paras 93 and 126.

\(^{135}\) CCJE Opinion No. 3, supra note 35, para. 68; Bangalore Implementation Measures, para. 15.3 and footnote 10; Beijing Statement, article 25; UNODC Guide, supra note 11, para. 70. In Oleksandr Volvov v. Ukraine, App. No. 21722/11 (9 January 2013), para. 115, the ECtHR found that the impartiality of the hearing on the merits was tainted by a reasonable perception of bias when judicial council members who had participated in preliminary inquiries into the case also participated in the decision on the merits.
that judges do not face disciplinary proceedings that are of a vexatious or completely unfounded character.

To ensure that the judicial council or similar body is in fact representative and has the expertise and perspectives required, States should implement proactive measures to improve, for instance the proportion of women or persons from minority or marginalized groups (whether judges or laypersons) among its members, if for instance there are reasonable concerns that such persons would otherwise be under-represented, and the selection or election procedures incorporate other criteria for competence and impartiality.\(^{137}\)

States should also consider a means of ensuring representation of judicial officers from across all levels of the judiciary and at all stages of their career, for instance by reserving some seats for election by and from within particular levels of court or age groups. The inclusion of more junior or younger judges can help promote a sense of engagement with and relevance of the mechanism throughout all levels of the judiciary, and junior and younger members can also bring fresh perspectives to the work of the body which complement the experience and acquired wisdom of more senior members. Ensuring inclusion of more junior members can be particularly important in situations of transition, where the more senior ranks of the judiciary may be heavily populated by individuals who closely identify with the prior authoritarian regime.

In some cases, the final decision of a judicial council or other disciplinary bodies takes the form of a recommendation to the Head of State (or similar high official of the executive or legislative branches), who remains charged with formal competence to actually remove the judge. Often it is explained that constitutional conventions or other informal expectations mean that the Head of State will in fact automatically implement

the recommendation of the disciplinary body. This might not be problematic in practice where for instance an enforceable Constitutional provision makes clear that the executive or legislative official has no discretion and is involved simply to formally execute the decision. Nevertheless, to any extent that such a system relies on legally unenforceable practices or customs it retains a risk of executive control over the removal of judges, whether in terms of the Head of State ultimately refusing to remove a judge who has been fairly found to have been corrupt or complicit in violations, or ultimately removing a judge when the disciplinary body has recommended against. Indeed, there are examples of such contrary decisions by the head of State - the concern is not simply theoretical.138 As such, in the view of the ICJ, the independence and accountability of the judiciary is better ensured by systems that do not rely on a political body to implement the final decision, at least where such a body has any discretion in the matter, whether in theory or in practice.

The organ tasked to attend to accountability of judges is the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), which is created in terms of section 189 of the Constitution, and whose functions are spelt out in section 190. The JSC is made up of the Chief Justice and the Deputy; the Judge President of the High Court; one judge nominated by the judges of all the superior courts combined; the Attorney-General; the chief magistrate; the chairperson of the Civil Service Commission; three practising lawyers of at least seven years' experience designated by the Law Society of Zimbabwe; one professor or senior lecturer of law designated by the law teaching professional body, or in the absence of such a body, appointed by the President; one person who for at least seven years has practised in Zimbabwe as a public accountant or auditor, and who is designated by their professional association; and one person with at least seven years' experience in human resources management, appointed by the President.

The JSC has various functions, which include tendering advice to the Government on any matter relating to the judiciary or the administration of justice; to promote and facilitate the independence and accountability of the judiciary and the efficient, effective and transparent administration of justice in Zimbabwe; and with the approval of the Minister of Justice, to make regulations for any purpose set out in section 190 of the Constitution. The Judicial Service Commission Act, along with the Judicial Service (Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2012, and the Judicial Service (Magistrate’s Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2019 confer upon the JSC functions in connection with the employment, discipline and conditions of service of persons employed in the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the High Court, the Labour Court, the Administrative Court and other courts. On the whole, the JSC is mandated with overseeing the day-to-day administrative and accountability issues within the judiciary.
Disciplining of a judge or magistrate

The Judicial Code of Ethics (2012) in section 21 creates a Disciplinary Committee to look into the conduct of judicial officers. In terms of subsection 21(1), if in the opinion of the Chief Justice, a judicial officer has conducted himself or herself in a manner that appears to violate any provision of the Code, the Chief Justice shall appoint a disciplinary committee, to investigate the acts or omissions allegedly constituting the violation and submit its findings and recommendations for consideration by the Chief Justice. Section 21(2) provides that the disciplinary committee shall:

- be appointed on an *ad hoc* basis;
- be composed of three members who are sitting or retired judicial officers from Zimbabwe or any other country in which the common law is Roman-Dutch or English and English is an official language;
- consist of at least two Zimbabweans, and at least one member must be a sitting judicial officer serving in Zimbabwe, other than the Chief Justice.

The procedure for the committee is set out in section 23 of the Code. Subsections 3 and 4 respectively direct the Committee’s conduct in its treatment of the judicial officers being investigated. The disciplinary committee is required during its proceedings to ensure that the judicial officer is afforded protection from vexatious or unsubstantiated accusations, and to endeavour to expeditiously conduct and finalise its investigation. Notwithstanding the recommendations of a disciplinary committee, the final decision as to what disciplinary measure to take is within the exclusive discretion of the Chief Justice.
The Judicial Service (Magistrate’s Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2019 confer upon the JSC functions in connection with the discipline of magistrates. In terms of section 23(4), where a complaint against a magistrate is made and it appears to have merit, the head of the province concerned refers the complaint to the Chief Magistrate, who shall in turn, consider whether the complaint merits being determined in terms of Part X of the Judicial Service Regulations, 2013. A disciplinary committee is then constituted to determine the complaint.

Removal of judge or magistrate from office

The JSC has a special mandate given to it by section 187 of the Constitution when it comes to the removal of judges from office. Section 187 sets out two ways in which the removal proceedings against a judge can be initiated:

- If the President considers that the question of removing the Chief Justice from office ought to be investigated, the President must appoint a tribunal to inquire into the matter. (Section 187(2))
- If the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) advises the President that the question of removing any judge, including the Chief Justice, from office ought to be investigated, the President must appoint a tribunal to inquire into the matter. (Section 187(3))

The removal of the Chief Justice can either be initiated by the President or the JSC. However, for all the other judges, their removal is exclusively at the instance of the JSC. The process for removal in both cases is by a tribunal appointed by the President. The tribunal must be made up three people (section 187 (4)) and of these three, one must have served as a judge of the High or Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, or has served or serves as a judge in a court with unlimited jurisdiction from a jurisdiction with a similar legal culture.
At least one must be chosen from a list of at least three lawyers of a minimum of seven years’ experience nominated by the Law Society of Zimbabwe. The President appoints one of the members as Chair of the tribunal. The Constitution does not require the members of the tribunal to be of greater or equal seniority to the judge being investigated.

Accordingly, while the JSC sometimes plays a role in initiating the process, the actual appointment and conduct of the tribunal is more in the nature of an ad hoc tribunal, discussed in a later section below.

The tribunal must then conduct investigations, come up with findings, and communicate the findings and its recommendations to the President.

If the question of removing a judge from office has been referred to a tribunal, the judge is suspended from office until the President, on the recommendation of the tribunal, revokes the suspension or removes the judge from office. In terms of subsection 187(7), once the tribunal has concluded its inquiry it must report back to the President with its recommendations on whether or not to remove the judge. The President is obliged to act upon the tribunal’s recommendations in terms of subsection 187(8).

Subsection 187(11) of the Constitution empowers the JSC through the Judicial Service Act, or a tribunal appointed in terms of section 187 to require any judge to submit to a medical examination by a medical board established for that purpose, in order to ascertain his or her physical or mental health.
The ordinary courts

To respect the right to fair trial and equality before the law under international law, any judicial proceedings must be conducted before a competent, independent and impartial ordinary court. In general, victims of judicial human rights violations or judicial corruption should also be able to bring civil proceedings before the ordinary courts seeking compensation and other forms of remedy and reparation, although as noted earlier in some national systems it may be only possible for such proceedings to be brought against the State and not the individual judge.

In order to prevent abuse of the criminal or civil legal processes to unjustifiably interfere with, intimidate, or harass individual judges, national laws may require prior authorization from judicial councils or other similar independent bodies before criminal or civil proceedings may be initiated by the prosecutor or private parties. 139

In some States, the Supreme Court or other higher courts may also be mandated to conduct disciplinary or dismissal proceedings in respect of lower court judges. While a number of standards refer to courts as possible disciplinary bodies, it must not be conclusively assumed that the fact a court rather than an executive or legislature conducts the proceeding necessarily guarantees its independence, impartiality and fairness. For instance, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that the Supreme Court of Honduras had failed to meet the requirements of impartiality in relation to dismissal proceedings it conducted concerning lower-court judges. The grounds for dismissal of the judges relied on their alleged participation in a demonstration opposing a coup against the former President, and other lawful anti-coup activities, while the Inter-American

139 UNSRIJL, Report on judicial accountability, supra note 7, para. 52. See also CCJE Opinion No. 3, supra note 35, para. 54, 75(i). See also Campeche Declaration, articles 11(d) and 12.
Court found that the Supreme Court had effectively participated in or endorsed the coup, and so could not be seen as impartial.\textsuperscript{140} As a study for the International Bar Association on judicial independence and accountability in Latin America recently observed, giving a Supreme Court such disciplinary roles can also reproduce any institutional bias that may exist in the judiciary, and may be externally perceived as contributing to "judicial corporatism" whereby the judiciary is seen to be protecting its members.\textsuperscript{141}

**Parliamentary procedures**

Numerous international standards recognize that, in practice, some States give Parliamentary bodies responsibility for removal of senior judges.

The requirement of Parliamentary approval for removal of judges has a long history in some countries, where it was originally adopted to limit an otherwise unchecked executive discretion to dismiss judges.\textsuperscript{142} However, many of these same standards also recognize that, today, the political character of Parliamentary bodies itself creates a risk of abuse and that other mechanisms (such as independent judicial councils or disciplinary tribunals) may more effectively secure judicial independence. There is a certain theoretical dissonance to the idea that elected political bodies could be capable of acting as an "independent and impartial tribunal" in judging judges, and the real-world track record of such proceedings bears out the concerns in practice.\textsuperscript{143} Further, even if in a particular country

\textsuperscript{140} IA\textsc{m}ChR, \textit{López Lone and others v. Honduras}, Series C No. 302 (5 October 2015), paras 229-234.

\textsuperscript{141} Jessica Walsh, "A Double-Edged Sword: Judicial Independence and Accountability in Latin America" (International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute Thematic Paper No. 5, April 2016), p. 15.

\textsuperscript{142} Commonwealth Study, \textit{supra} note 53, p. 105.

\textsuperscript{143} See for example, IC\textsc{j}, "Sri Lanka: judges around the world condemn impeachment of Chief Justice Dr Shirani Bandaranayake" (23 January 2013); "Ukraine: dismissal and criminal prosecution of judges undermine independence
there is no recent history of abuse by Parliament of such powers, the political situation can change rapidly and future parliamentarians may be more willing to exercise the powers for ulterior motives.

The European Court of Human Rights, examining a disciplinary dismissal process that involved an initial hearing and findings by a judicial council, followed by a hearing and findings by a Parliamentary Committee and then a vote of the Parliament in plenary meeting, and finally review by a Higher Administrative Court, commented as follows with respect to the plenary meeting of Parliament:

On the whole, the facts of the present case suggest that the procedure at the plenary meeting was not an appropriate forum for examining issues of fact and law, assessing evidence and making a legal characterisation of the facts. The role of the politicians sitting in Parliament, who were not required to have any legal or judicial experience in determining complex issues of fact and law in an individual disciplinary case, has not been sufficiently clarified by the Government and has not been justified as being compatible with the requirements of independence and impartiality of a tribunal under Article 6 of the Convention.  

For these reasons, some international standards oppose any substantive role of Parliamentary procedures in deciding whether to remove judges. Others provide that Parliamentary

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144 ECtHR, Oleksandr Volvov v. Ukraine, App. No. 21722/11 (9 January 2013), para. 122. The Court separately found breaches of procedural fairness due to Parliamentarians using the electronic voting system to cast votes on behalf of colleagues who were not present (paras 141-147).  
145 For instance, the UN Human Rights Committee, applying the ICCPR, has expressed concern where the procedure for the removal of judges under the
procedures should only be permitted if an independent judicial council or similar body has already recommended removal after a full investigation and fair hearing.146

Recognizing that in many parliamentary systems, the party or other political grouping that controls the executive also controls a majority in the legislative body, some standards further indicate that a qualified majority vote - often two-thirds or three-quarters - be required for judicial removal, and/or if there are two chambers of the parliament, requiring the vote of both.147

The UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary specifically address proceedings in the legislature only to state that the principle of independent review may not apply to such proceedings.148 (See, however, pp. 67-69 below: more recent standards and jurisprudence now affirm the need for review in such cases.) The other provisions of the Basic Principles are

Constitution and other laws of a State allowed Parliament "to exercise considerable control over the procedure for removal of judges", and it recommended that the State "should strengthen the independence of the judiciary by providing for judicial, rather than parliamentary, supervision and discipline of judicial conduct": Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka, UN Doc CCPR/CO/79/LKA (2003), para. 16. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, citing the structural concerns and a history of abuses, recommends the gradual elimination of parliamentary impeachment procedures across the Americas: Guarantees for the independence of justice operators (2013), paras 202-205. European regional standards generally provide that disciplinary proceedings, including for removal, should only take place before "an independent authority or a court" (e.g. Council of Europe, CM/Rec(2010)12, supra note 40, article 69), implicitly rejecting processes in which the parliament substantively or unilaterally decides on removal. The Beijing Statement does not explicitly reject parliamentary procedures, but notes that in some societies "that procedure is unsuitable; it is not appropriate for dealing with some grounds for removal; it is rarely, if ever, used; and its use other than for the most serious of reasons is apt to lead to misuse" (article 23).

146 E.g. Bangalore Implementation Measures, article 16.2; Istanbul Declaration, Principle 15; Singhvi Declaration, supra note 61, article 26(b); UNODC Guide, supra note 11, para. 76. See also Commonwealth Study, supra note 53, pp. 105-111.
147 See Commonwealth Study, supra note 53, pp. 110-111
148 UNBP Judiciary, article 20.
clearly applicable to any suspension or removal proceeding in the legislature, including the requirement of a fair proceeding and hearing, the prohibition of suspension or removal other than for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders the judge unfit to discharge their duties, and the requirement that the proceedings be determined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct.  

Based on its longstanding experience monitoring and analysing judicial independence and integrity around the world, the ICJ is of the view that while Parliamentary bodies may have some role in legislating the grounds and procedures for removal, in consultation with the judiciary and other relevant actors, neither Parliaments nor Parliamentary Committees should play any substantive role in individual removal proceedings.

Parliament, which consists of the National Assembly and the Senate, does not have a direct role in the accountability of judges. Neither is Parliament represented on the Judicial Service Commission. Parliament is however mandated by the Constitution to:

a) Create divisions in existing courts, and establish and mandate additional courts (sections 162(h) 163, 171 (3) and 174);

b) Vest additional functions on a judicial officer (section 164 (4));

c) Define jurisdictional issues (sections 166 (3), 167 (4), 169 (2 & 3), 171 (1 & 2), 172 (2 & 3), 173 (2 & 3));

d) Provide for the appointment of magistrates (section 182) and the oath they are to take (section 185 (3));

e) Define conditions of service for judges (section 188 (2));

and

\[149\] UNBP Judiciary, article 17-19. See also e.g. IAmCtHR, Constitutional Court v. Peru, Series C No. 71 (31 January 2001), paras 77-85.
f) Confer on the Judicial Service Commission functions in connection with the employment, discipline and conditions of service of persons employed in the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the High Court, the Labour Court, the Administrative Court and other courts (section 190 (4)).

Parliament has the powers under section 117 of the Constitution to amend the Constitution and to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of Zimbabwe, and to confer subordinate legislative powers upon another body or authority. These laws include laws that affect the accountability of judges and the operations of the judiciary, including conferring and modelling the powers given to the JSC.

Funds allocated to the JSC for its general and accountability functions are allocated through appropriations to the Consolidated Revenue Fund done by Parliament through an Act of Parliament, in terms of section 20 of the Judicial Service Act and section 322 of the Constitution.

Additionally, the JSC is required in terms of section 323 of the Constitution to submit to Parliament, through the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, an annual report describing fully its operations and activities, not later than the end of March in the year following the year to which the report relates.
Ad hoc tribunals

A 2015 study of practices in Commonwealth jurisdictions found that the most popular mechanisms for judicial removals were ad hoc tribunals, formed on an as-needed basis, to inquire into alleged grounds for dismissal and make a recommendation which is either immediately binding on the executive, or subject to further consideration by a court. They are almost always entirely judicial bodies consisting of serving or retired judges, sometimes brought from other Commonwealth jurisdictions. The flexibility in selecting members of ad hoc tribunals can help ensure a certain neutrality in sensitive situations, if the individuals appointed are impartial and have no connection to anyone involved in the case or any particular branch of the government; on the other hand, this same flexibility in composition creates a risk of manipulation and bias, particularly if the executive is given the power to select the members or otherwise control the process.  

Based on its research, and relevant jurisprudence, the Commonwealth Study recommended that before an ad hoc tribunal is established in any particular case, the judge should have a preliminary opportunity to address a response to the allegations to a person or body with the capacity to make an initial assessment of the facts and law (for instance, a Judicial Service Commission), which should then be entrusted with the decision whether to convene a tribunal. The study underscored the risk of abuse inherent in allowing the executive to initiate and appoint the members of an ad hoc tribunal. For this reason, and based on its own observations of such processes around the world over many years, the ICJ considers it inappropriate in all circumstances for the executive to play such a role in constituting or controlling ad hoc tribunals.

The Commonwealth Study also noted that in many cases no advance provision is made defining the specific procedures to be followed by the ad hoc tribunal in conducting its work; as a

150 Commonwealth Study, supra note 53, pp. 91-102.
151 Ibid p. 95.
152 Ibid pp. 96-97.
safeguard against abuse or arbitrariness, and guarantee that the requirements of fairness will be fully met (see pp. 62-73 below), it is recommended that generally-applicable standing rules of procedure be adopted in advance for such tribunals, incorporating full fair-trial guarantees and a requirement that the tribunal provide reasons for its decision.\textsuperscript{153} Similarly any ad hoc tribunals should, like other accountability mechanisms, be subject to appeal to a court or other forms of independent review, both on questions of fact and questions of law (see pp. 67-69 below).\textsuperscript{154}

\begin{quote}
The Constitution of Zimbabwe empowers the President to establish a tribunal to investigate the question of removing any judge in section 187(3) and (4). This procedure is more in the nature of ad hoc tribunal than a judicial council procedure.

The role of the President in this procedure is incompatible with international and regional standards. The procedure poses risks of manipulation and bias considering the role of the President in exclusively appointing of members of the trinunal.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid pp. 98-100.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid pp. 100-102.
Anti-corruption bodies

Article 36 of the UN Convention against Corruption provides:

Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies or persons specialized in combating corruption through law enforcement. Such body or bodies or persons shall be granted the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the State Party, to be able to carry out their functions effectively and without any undue influence. Such persons or staff of such body or bodies should have the appropriate training and resources to carry out their tasks.\textsuperscript{155}

In 2000 the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, reporting on a mission to Guatemala, recommended that to address judicial corruption, an independent anti-corruption agency with powers to investigate complaints, including against the judiciary, and to initiate prosecutions, be established. He stressed that the agency “should be a separate entity, independent of all government departments”.\textsuperscript{156}

As with prosecution for other kinds of crimes, any proceedings against judges by specialized anti-corruption units within the police or prosecution or initiated by an anti-corruption commission, must fully meet international fair trial standards and otherwise respect the particular protections to be accorded to judges in order to secure their independence. This could include, for example, a requirement to obtain permission from a judicial council or chief justice before opening an investigation or before filing formal charges or otherwise commencing the legal process.

\textsuperscript{155} See also the requirement in article 6 to establish a preventive anti-corruption body, which may, but need not be, the same as the body under article 36.

The Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) is the constitutional body created with a mandate to combat corruption. It is created in terms of section 254 of the Constitution, with its functions enumerated in section 255. These functions are to:

a. investigate and expose cases of corruption in the public and private sectors;

b. combat corruption, theft, misappropriation, abuse of power and other improper conduct in the public and private sectors;

c. promote honesty, financial discipline and transparency in the public and private sectors;

d. receive and consider complaints from the public and to take such action in regard to the complaints as it considers appropriate;

e. direct the Commissioner-General of Police to investigate cases of suspected corruption and to report to the Commission on the results of any such investigation;

f. refer matters to the National Prosecuting Authority for prosecution;

g. require assistance from members of the Police Service and other investigative agencies of the State; and

h. make recommendations to the Government and other persons on measures to enhance integrity and accountability and prevent improper conduct in the public and private sectors.

The Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission has the powers through the Anti-Corruption Act [Chapter 9:22] to recommend the arrest and secure the prosecution of persons reasonably suspected of corruption, abuse of power and other improper conduct which falls within the Commission's jurisdiction. The Commission, however, has no powers to prosecute, and cases for prosecution are referred to the National Prosecuting Authority, created in terms of section 258 of the Constitution, and operationalised through the National Prosecuting Authority Act [Chapter 7:20].
Civil society monitoring and reporting

Civil society, including media, non-governmental organizations, bar associations, and other individual and institutional commentators, have the right publicly to report and comment on the work of individual judges and the judiciary as a whole as an aspect of freedom of expression.¹⁵⁷ In practice, however, journalists and other civil society organisations often face arbitrary restrictions or retaliation for exercising these rights, such as proceedings for contempt of court, restraining orders, or defamation suits. Undue restrictions on civil society monitoring, reporting and comment do not only violate the

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¹⁵⁷ See e.g. UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion, Thulani Maseko v. Swaziland, UN Doc A/HRC/WGAD/2015/6 (2015), paras 26-30, 36; UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Declaration on Human Rights Defenders”), articles 6, 9(3)(b), 12; ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Morice v. France, App. No. 29369/10 (23 April 2015); ECtHR, July and SARL Libération v. France, App. No. 20893/03 (14 February 2008); ECtHR, Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v. Turkey, App. Nos 346/04 and 39779/04 (27 May 2014).
rights of the individuals involved, they undermine judicial accountability. As the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has pointed out, "public scrutiny of and comment on the work of judges through the media, civil society and other commentators" plays an "invaluable role" as a form of judicial accountability.\(^{158}\)

The Measures for the Effective Implementation of the Bangalore Principles similarly affirm that "legitimate public criticism of judicial performance is a means of ensuring accountability" and accordingly, "a judge should generally avoid the use of the criminal law and contempt proceedings to restrict such criticism of the courts".\(^{159}\) Commonwealth standards also affirm that, "Legitimate public criticism of judicial performance is a means of ensuring accountability" and that, "The criminal law and contempt proceedings should not be used to restrict legitimate criticism of the performance of judicial functions".\(^{160}\)

The Human Rights Committee has similarly held that "the mere fact that forms of expression are considered to be insulting to a public figure is not sufficient to justify the imposition of penalties", and that "all public figures" and institutions are "legitimately subject to criticism", and has accordingly expressed concern about laws on "the protection of the honour of public officials".\(^{161}\) While encouraging States to completely decriminalize all defamation, the Committee has emphasized that in any event all defamation laws of any character should include the defences of truth and public interest, and should not

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\(^{158}\) UNSRIJL, Report on judicial accountability, supra note 7, paras 55, 73, 89. See also, UN Development Programme ("UNDP"), A Transparent and Accountable Judiciary to Deliver Justice for All (2016), Chapter 5.


\(^{161}\) Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011), para. 38.
be applicable to forms of expression that are not, by their nature, subject to verification, and that "the application of the criminal law should only be countenanced in the most serious of cases" and "imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty.\textsuperscript{162} The ICJ is of the view that all States should fully decriminalize all forms of defamation.

Enabling civil society to monitor, assess, and report and comment on judicial integrity also depends in part on certain positive obligations to which States are already more generally subject, such as:

- the obligation to ensure that all civil and criminal hearings are, in general, open to the media and the public, and that all judgments be made public, subject only to limited exceptions; this enables media, civil society organizations, academics, and other interested persons to monitor particular trials and to organize systematic monitoring and analysis of the judicial system as a whole;\textsuperscript{163}

- the right of everyone to freedom of expression, including freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, or through any other media of his choice; this enables the media, civil society organisations, and academics to obtain information from the authorities and each other about the judiciary and its work, to share and compare information for analysis, and to communicate their findings and recommendations to government authorities and to broader audiences;\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid para. 47, where the Committee also states that, "At least with regard to comments about public figures, consideration should be given to avoiding penalizing or otherwise rendering unlawful untrue statements that have been published in error but without malice".

\textsuperscript{163} See e.g. ICCPR, article 14(1).

\textsuperscript{164} See e.g. ICCPR, article 19(2), and Human Rights Committee, GC 34, \textit{supra} note 112, paras 18-19, on the right of access to information; UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Best practices to counter the negative impact
• the right of everyone to freedom of association, which enables civil society to create organizations, whether formal or informal, to increase the scale and effectiveness of monitoring, analysis, and advocacy.\textsuperscript{165}

The burden is on the State to justify any restriction of civil society rights to report and comment on the judiciary and particular judges; to be valid, such restrictions must meet a series of criteria, including: that the restriction be “provided by law” in precise and publicly accessible form that does not confer unfettered discretion; that the restriction is imposed for a legitimate purpose (i.e. in the case of contempt-of-court type restrictions, the need to maintain orderly proceedings); and that the particular restriction meets strict tests of necessity and proportionality in relation to the specific threat it is meant to respond to, and in relation to the restriction's impact.\textsuperscript{166} Measures that aim to prevent civil society from legitimate public reporting on and criticism of judicial corruption or judicial complicity in human rights violations, or have a disproportionate or otherwise unjustified effect in that regard, would be incompatible with these requirements.

As an example, while the European Convention on Human Rights explicitly provides that freedom of expression may be subject to restrictions necessary "for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary", a Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has held:

\begin{quote}
Nevertheless – save in the case of gravely damaging attacks that are essentially unfounded – bearing in mind that judges
\end{quote}

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of corruption on the enjoyment of all human rights", UN Doc A/HRC/32/22 (15 April 2016) para. 131; Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, \textit{supra} note 108, articles 6, 9(3)(b), 12.\textsuperscript{165} See e.g. ICCPR, article 22(1).\textsuperscript{166} See ICCPR article 14(1) on exceptions to media and public access to hearings; Human Rights Committee, GC 34, \textit{supra} note 112, paras 22, 31, 33-35 (see also para. 47 regarding "defamation"-type restrictions); Human Rights Committee, \textit{Dissanayake v. Sri Lanka}, UN Doc CCPR/C/93/D/1373/2005 (2008), and \textit{Galina Youbko v. Belarus}, UN Doc CCPR/C/110/D/1903/2009 (2014), paras 9.3 and 9.5.
\end{flushleft}
form part of a fundamental institution of the State, they may as such be subject to personal criticism within the permissible limits, and not only in a theoretical and general manner. When acting in their official capacity they may thus be subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism than ordinary citizens.\textsuperscript{167}

The European Court has accordingly found the punishment of (for instance) journalists,\textsuperscript{168} lawyers,\textsuperscript{169} and law professors (as well as their editors and publishers),\textsuperscript{170} for reporting on or criticism of the judicial system or individual judges, to have violated their freedom of expression under the European Convention.

In a case where a person was refused permission by local authorities to display posters "calling for justice during a picket that was aimed at drawing public attention to the need for the judiciary to respect both the Constitution and international treaties ratified by the State party when adjudicating civil and criminal cases", the Human Rights Committee found the refusal of permission to constitute a restriction of "her right to impart her opinions regarding the administration of justice in the State party and to participate in a peaceful assembly, together with others". It noted that the refusal was purportedly "based on the grounds that the purpose of the picket was seen by the authorities as an attempt to question court decisions, and, therefore, to influence court rulings in specific civil and criminal cases". The Committee, finding that the local authorities had "not explained how, in practice, criticism of a general nature regarding the administration of justice would jeopardize the court rulings at issue, for the purposes of one of the legitimate aims set out in [the ICCPR]", that is, "for respect of the rights

\textsuperscript{167} EChHR (Grand Chamber), \textit{Morice v. France}, App. No. 29369/10 (23 April 2015), para. 131.
\textsuperscript{168} EChHR, \textit{July and SARL Libération v. France}, App. No. 20893/03 (14 February 2008).
\textsuperscript{169} EChHR (Grand Chamber), \textit{Morice v. France}, App. No. 29369/10 (23 April 2015).
\textsuperscript{170} EChHR, \textit{Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v. Turkey}, App. Nos 346/04 and 39779/04 (27 May 2014).
or reputations of others, for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals", the Committee found a violation of the person’s freedom of expression under the ICCPR.\textsuperscript{171}

There is no legal bar to the ability of civil society to monitor and report on judicial decisions and processes. The Constitution in section 69 provides for the right to a public trial in criminal matters, and to a public hearing in the determination of civil rights and obligations. Limitations to this are however provided in various statutes. For instance, section 5(5) of the Children’s Act [Chapter 5:06] limit public access during proceedings involving children. Children who are involved in court proceedings, either as complainants or accused, should not be identified either by name, or by anything that would lead to the identity of the child being revealed.

Sections 195-197 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] restrict access during proceedings in which minors and vulnerable witnesses are testifying. Section 3 of the Courts and Adjudicating Authorities (Publicity Restriction) Act [Chapter 7:04] is a general provision that empowers courts and presiding officers to prohibit access to court during proceedings and to prohibit publication of certain information before the courts.

National human rights institutions

Independent national human rights institutions (NHRIs) typically have a variety of mandates that could be relevant for judicial accountability, including: monitoring the situation of human rights, including in relation to the administration of justice, in the country; reporting to other organs of government, to the public and the press, and to international human rights bodies, its views on the situation for human rights in the country, including as regards laws, policies, and practices, violations; and promoting harmonization of national laws, policies and practices with international human rights standards. Some NHRIs also have a mandate to receive, make findings on, and sometimes order remedies for, individual complaints of violations.

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has observed:

> Courts and the judiciary are generally exempt from oversight by NHRIs. Courts, and the judges that serve on them, have an independence that is essential for ensuring full respect of the rule of law. Respect for the rule of law demands that administrative bodies should not sit in appeal or review of the courts. This does not, however, prevent monitoring and reporting on court activities, and making independent recommendations meant to improve the application of human rights principles in the court setting or to remove undue delay in judicial proceedings.  
> ...  
> It may be that the judiciary is weak and not as independent as one would wish in some countries. Where this is so, efforts should be made to strengthen it and its independence as a separate issue. It is not appropriate to give an NHRI an oversight role over the courts as a means to these ends. Some countries have established mechanisms such as judicial oversight bodies, usually themselves formed of judges, to deal with problems relating to the conduct of judges, including bias. Judicial oversight is not an NHRI function.\(^{172}\)

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At the same time, the OHCHR suggests that NHRIs can, in addition to monitoring and reporting on court activities, engage in reform and strengthening of judicial institutions through analysis and recommendations on, for instance: institutional monitoring and accountability mechanisms within the judicial system; the overall independence of the judiciary and its capacity to adjudicate cases fairly and competently; analysing national practices in relation to national and international human rights standards; and ensuring that the administration of justice conforms to human rights standards and provides effective remedies particularly to minorities and to the most vulnerable groups in society.173

National human rights institutions are encouraged by the UN to contribute to the review by international human rights mechanisms of the situation for human rights in their country (including treaty bodies, the Universal Periodic Review and other proceedings of the Human Rights Council, and special procedures, see pp. 56-59 below); in such processes, NHRIs can be a particularly important source of objective information concerning the degree to which national law and other national mechanisms do or do not secure judicial integrity and accountability in practice.174

Chapter 12 of the Constitution creates five independent Commissions supporting democracy with various mandates. These are the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, Zimbabwe Gender Commission, Zimbabwe Media Commission and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission.

173 Ibid p. 128. See also UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Best practices to counter the negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of all human rights", UN Doc A/HRC/32/22 (15 April 2016), para. 134.
174 OHCHR, National Human Rights Institutions, supra note 123, pp. 132-133.
In terms of section 235 of the Constitution, independent Commissions:

- are independent and are not subject to the direction or control of anyone;
- must act in accordance with this Constitution; and
- must exercise their functions without fear, favour or prejudice.

They are accountable to Parliament for the efficient performance of their functions, and no person may interfere with their functions. The State and all institutions and agencies of government at every level are mandated, through legislative and other measures, to assist the independent Commissions and must protect their independence, impartiality, integrity and effectiveness. In addition to their specific objectives, these institutions are given the following objectives under section 233 of the Constitution:

| a. to support and entrench human rights and democracy; |
| b. to protect the sovereignty and interests of the people; |
| c. to promote constitutionalism; |
| d. to promote transparency and accountability in public institutions; |
| e. to secure the observance of democratic values and principles by the State and all institutions and agencies of government, and government-controlled entities; and |
| f. to ensure that injustices are remedied. |

Under section 236(1) of the Constitution, members of the Commissions must not, in the exercise of their functions act in a partisan manner; further the interests of any political party or cause; prejudice the lawful interests of any political party or cause; or violate the fundamental rights or freedoms of any person.
Section 237 of the Constitution stipulates the appointment and removal procedures of members of the Commissions. The President appoints Commissioners after an elaborate process that involves Parliament’s Committee on Standing Rules and Orders advertising vacancies, inviting the public to make nominations; conducting public interviews of prospective candidates; and preparing and submitting a list of the appropriate number of nominees for appointment to the President. This appointment procedure infuses transparency and accountability, and helps to ensure that Commissioners are truly independent.

The procedures of removal of Commissioners from office follow the procedure for the removal of judges from office, provided for under section 187 of the Constitution. A member of an independent Commission may be removed from office only on the ground that the member concerned –

1. is unable to perform the functions of his or her office because of physical or mental incapacity;
2. has been grossly incompetent;
3. has been guilty of gross misconduct; or
4. has become ineligible for appointment to the Commission concerned.

The Commissions are funded by government from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, through appropriations made by Parliament in terms of section 322 of the Constitution. In terms of section 323 of the Constitution, each Commission is required to submit to Parliament, through the responsible Minister, an annual report describing fully its operations and activities, the report being submitted not later than the end of March in the year following the year to which the report relates. This is in addition to any other reports that the enabling legislation for each Commission may prescribe.
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC)

The ZEC is created under section 238 of the Constitution, and its mandate is given under section 239, to manage elections and electoral processes in the country. ZEC is operationalised through, and implements the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13].

Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC)

The ZHRC is created under section 242 of the Constitution, and operationalised through the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act [Chapter 10:30]. The ZHRC plays a dual role of investigating human rights complaints and recommending remedial action, and the role of an ombudsman through receiving complaints of public maladministration, investigating and recommending remedial action. These functions are provided in section 243 of the Constitution. The Commission is given the powers to direct the Commissioner-General of Police to investigate cases of suspected criminal violations of human rights or freedoms and to report to the Commission on the results of any such investigation. The Commission can recommend to Parliament effective measures to promote human rights and freedoms.

Section 244 empowers the Commission to require any person, institution or agency, State or otherwise to inform the Commission of measures they have taken to give effect to the human rights and freedoms set out in the Declaration of Rights; and to provide the Commission with information it needs to prepare any report required to be submitted to any regional or international body under any human rights convention, treaty or agreement to which Zimbabwe is a party. In addition to the report it is required to submit in terms of section 323, the ZHRC may, through the appropriate Minister, submit reports to Parliament on particular matters relating to human rights and freedoms which, in the Commission's opinion, should be brought to the attention of Parliament.
Zimbabwe Gender Commission (ZGC)

The ZGC is created under section 245 of the Constitution and is mandated in terms of section 246 to receive and investigate complaints on gender-related human rights abuses and infringements, and to make recommendations. The Commission also researches into issues relating to gender and social justice, and recommends changes to laws and practices which lead to discrimination based on gender. In terms of section 247, the Commission, in addition to the report it is required to submit in terms of section 323, may through the appropriate Minister, submit reports to Parliament on particular matters relating to gender issues which in the Commission's opinion should be brought to the attention of Parliament. The Commission operates in terms of the Zimbabwe Gender Commission Act [Chapter 10:31].

Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC)

The ZMC is created under section 248 of the Constitution, and given its functions in section 249 to advance media rights and freedoms, through among others, receiving and considering complaints from the public and, where appropriate, to take action against journalists and other persons employed in the media or broadcasting who are found to have breached any law or any code of conduct applicable to them.

National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC)

The NPRC is created in section 251 of the Constitution as the only time-bound constitutional commission in Zimbabwe, with a 10-year life-span. The functions of the Commission are provided under section 252 of the Constitution, which are to deal with the past and bring truth-telling, healing and reconciliation to Zimbabwe. The Commission is operationalised through the National Peace and Reconciliation Act [Chapter 10:32].
Section 253 of the Constitution provides that in addition to the report it is required to submit in terms of section 323, the NPRC may, through the appropriate Minister, submit reports to Parliament on particular matters relating to national peace and reconciliation which, in the Commission's opinion, should be brought to the attention of Parliament.

The Constitution and the legislation operationalising these Commissions do not provide for an express role for any of the Commissions to advance judicial accountability. However, their broad human rights protection mandates entail that they are empowered and mandated to ensure human rights compliance and accountability in and out of the courts, and by judicial officers in the discharge of their duties.

Professional associations

The right to freedom of association, including for judges, is protected under international law, including under article 22 of the ICCPR. Article 9 of the *UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary* expressly recognizes that, "Judges shall be free to form and join associations of judges or other organizations to represent their interests, to promote their professional training and to protect their judicial independence."

Many such professional associations exist at the national level, complemented by additional organisations at the regional and global level.

Professional associations of judges already contribute to judicial accountability efforts in a variety of ways. Particularly where a system of ethical standards and mechanisms for advice or response to complaints of ethical breaches exists separately from the formal disciplinary system (see pp. 25-26 above), the development of the ethical standards and mechanisms in relation to them may be based in the professional association. Professional associations may also set standards for membership aimed at excluding judges who fail to meet
appropriate measures of judicial integrity. International and regional associations may similarly inquire into or regularly review the independence and integrity of national judiciaries and consider taking action to suspend or end the membership of a national association if serious problems are found.\footnote{175} Professional associations also make a major contribution to efforts to develop standards, and guidance on implementation and best practices, at the regional and global levels. They may also make public statements of concern about the situation of judiciaries in other countries, when judicial independence or integrity has been particularly gravely undermined.\footnote{176}

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\footnote{175}{See for instance, under the Statute of the International Association of Judges, Constitution articles 4, 5(1), 6, and Regulations under the Constitution, articles 12 and 13, http://www.iaj-uim.org/statute/ .}
\footnote{176}{Regarding the freedom of expression of judges and judicial associations, see UNBP Judiciary, article 8: "In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, members of the judiciary are like other citizens entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly; provided, however, that in exercising such rights, judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of their office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary." As with civil society more generally, national, regional or international professional associations of lawyers and prosecutors may also undertake activities to promote the independence and integrity of the judiciary. Article 24 of the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (1990) and endorsed by General Assembly resolution 45/166 (1990), recognizes the right of lawyers to form professional associations, and article 23 affirms the right of lawyers to "take part in public discussion of matters concerning the law, the administration of justice and the promotion and protection of human rights".}
\end{footnotes}
There is no legal provision barring or limiting the right of judges and magistrates to form and belong to professional associations. Section 165(6) of the Constitution requires that members of the judiciary must give precedence to their judicial duties over all other activities, and must not engage in any activities which interfere with or compromise their judicial duties. This means any association of members of the judiciary must be to advance the members’ judicial work, rather than subtract from it.

Section 12 of the Judicial Service (Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2012, and section 12 of the Judicial Service (Magistrates Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2019, both provide that “A judicial officer may form or join an association of judicial officers or participate in other legally recognised organisations representing the interests of judicial officers to promote professional training and to protect judicial independence, so long, however, as any such activities undertaken in connection with such association or organisation do not interfere with the proper performance of the judicial officer’s duties”.

There exists a Zimbabwe Association of Women Judges (ZAWJ), which is affiliated to the International Association of Women Judges (IAWJ). At Magistrates level, there is the Magistrates’ Association of Zimbabwe (MAZ). Both the ZAWJ and the IAWJ have no publicly available information regarding their membership and operations.

**International accountability mechanisms**

Aside from the trial of a few judges at Nuremberg following World War Two, there do not appear to have been any

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177 United States of America v. Alstötter et al ("The Nuremberg Justice Case"), 3 T.W.C. 1 (1948) and commentary in Matthew Lippman, "The White Rose:
international criminal trials of judges for involvement in human rights violations. Judges can certainly through exercise of their powers commit or be complicit in war crimes, for instance wilfully depriving a person protected by the Geneva Conventions of their right to a fair trial, or in crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{178} As such, in appropriate cases there may be a role for the International Criminal Court or other international criminal tribunals to hold individual judges directly responsible for such crimes under international law.

There is a range of other mechanisms, of a non-criminal character, operating at the global and regional levels, which have the potential to deliver some measure of accountability for judicial complicity and corruption.\textsuperscript{179}

Global UN treaty bodies including the Human Rights Committee (acting under the ICCPR), and the Committee against Torture (acting under the \textit{UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment}), have commented on the involvement of judges in violations of their

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\textsuperscript{178} See for example Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, article 130; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, article 147; 1977 Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, article 85(4)(e); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 8(2)(a)(vi).

\end{footnotesize}
respective treaties, both in decisions on individual complaints (or "communications" as they are called within the UN system), and in their periodic review of the situation in State parties. \(^\text{180}\) Other treaty bodies, such as the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (acting under the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*) and the relatively recently-established Committee on Enforced Disappearances (acting under the *International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance*), have a similar mandate. These bodies can prescribe, although not order, remedies for victims or consequences for governments or perpetrators; their findings contribute to public acknowledgement of judicial wrongdoing, and can lead to impact at the national level. \(^\text{181}\)

A number of independent experts appointed by the Human Rights Council, known as Special Procedures, publicly and officially report on allegations of, and in some case make findings on, human rights violations, and can highlight any relevant responsibility of judges. \(^\text{182}\) The Special Rapporteur on

\(^{180}\) See for example Human Rights Committee, *Anthony Fernando v. Sri Lanka*, UN Doc CCPR/C/83/D/1189/2003 (2005), para. 9.2 (imposition by court of one year of "rigorous imprisonment" for contempt of court, on basis victim had filed repetitious motions and had once "raised his voice" in the presence of the court and refused to apologize"; Committee finds the court's "imposition of a draconian penalty without adequate explanation and without independent procedural safeguards" to have violated the right to liberty of the victim); Committee against Torture, *Imed Abdelli v. Tunisia*, UN Doc CAT/C/31/D/188/2001 (2003), paras 10.5-10.8 (refusal of various State officials, including judges, to respond to the victim's credible allegations of torture and requests for judicial orders and other measures to investigate and protect him against further torture).

\(^{181}\) Further information on treaty bodies, see: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx . For information on how to file a complaint, see: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/IndividualCommunications.aspx .

\(^{182}\) For further information on Special Procedures, see: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx . For information on how to file a complaint to Special Procedures, see: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Communications.aspx .
the independence of judges and lawyers is one example,\textsuperscript{183} but many other mandates have commented on judicial involvement in violations that fall within their mandates. A striking example is a recent decision by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, making findings regarding violations of the right of freedom of expression, fair trial rights, and right to liberty, of a lawyer, which were perpetrated by members of the Swaziland judiciary.\textsuperscript{184}

The Universal Periodic Review process of the Human Rights Council, in which the situation of human rights in every country in the world is periodically subject to a form of public peer commentary by other countries, is also an avenue for highlighting judicial wrongdoing, albeit mention of individual cases is somewhat rare and the focus tends to be on more institutional questions. Depending on the country, issue and timing, other activities of the Human Rights Council may also provide opportunities for advocacy.\textsuperscript{185}

Certain regions also feature regional human rights courts (European Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights), and/or commissions (African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights), which can review the overall situation of judicial conduct and accountability in a country, and issue decisions on individual complaints of violations perpetrated by or with complicity of judges.

In respect of criminal violations of international human rights or international humanitarian law, as well as offences established under the \textit{UN Convention against Corruption}, States can (and under the terms of some treaties, must) establish criminal and/or civil jurisdiction for crimes committed outside of their

territory. Usually (though not always) this involves some link to the State potentially asserting jurisdiction (for instance, the victims were nationals of the prosecuting country, or the alleged perpetrator enters the territory of the prosecuting country). This is a further potential avenue for international accountability.
5. Procedural issues

Necessary powers

Depending on the character of the proceeding, the bodies responsible for receiving complaints, investigating allegations, and conducting hearings, require certain powers to collect evidence and to manage the proceedings. These could for instance potentially include authority to compel the production of testimony or documents from various persons or organizations, to intercept communications, or to require the attendance of the judge or other witnesses.

The exercise of these authorities by the accountability body may need to be adjusted to comply with the fundamental principles of the separation of powers, and the special protections accorded to the work of the judiciary to preserve its independence, impartiality, and dignity. For instance, article 15 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary provides:

The judiciary shall be bound by professional secrecy with regard to their deliberations and to confidential information acquired in the course of their duties other than in public proceedings, and shall not be compelled to testify on such matters.

To ensure respect for the separation of powers and independence of the judiciary and judicial function, it may be appropriate to require any non-judicial investigating body to obtain prior authorization from a judicial council, a higher court judge, a chief justice, or other such independent offices, before exercising these powers. Or for instance, the principle of professional secrecy means it will generally not be possible for the body to require a judge to provide testimony or other information about discussions between the judges that formed part of the deliberations in a case.

From a practical point of view, sometimes an otherwise independent judicial council or similar body is expected to rely on seconded or shared staff from an executive body, such as
staff of the Ministry of Justice or generalist police or prosecutorial offices, to actually carry out the investigations. Such arrangements raise further questions about compatibility with the separation of powers.

At the same time, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated, the more general principle should be recalled that:

...in cases of violations of human rights, the State authorities cannot resort to mechanisms such as official secret or confidentiality of the information, or reasons of public interest or national security, to refuse to supply the information required by the judicial or administrative authorities in charge of the ongoing investigation or pending procedures. Moreover, when it comes to the investigation of punishable facts, the decision to qualify the information as secretive or to refuse to hand it over cannot stem solely from a State organ whose members are charged with committing the wrongful acts. In the same sense, the final decision on the existence of the requested documentation cannot be left to its discretion.186

For all these reasons, it is generally necessary that investigation personnel be both employed by and report to an investigative unit or entity that is functionally independent of the executive; and it is also strongly preferable that they report to a unit or entity that is functionally independent of the accountability body (such as an independent judicial inspectorate), or at least to an organ of the accountability body other than the organ that will ultimately decide the case.

**Tribunal to consider removal of judge from office**

Section 187(9) of the Constitution provides that a tribunal appointed to consider the question of removal of a judge from office has the same rights and powers as commissioners under the Commissions of Inquiry Act [Chapter 10:07]. The Commissions of Inquiry Act in sections 10-17 provide for procedures and powers in conducting inquires. These include the power to regulate own proceedings; powers similar to those of a magistrate to summon witnesses, to cause the oath to be administered to them, to examine them and to call for the production of books, plans and documents; and the power to hold witnesses in contempt of tribunal. Witnesses failing to attend or refusing to be sworn or to give evidence, and witnesses giving false evidence, are guilty of contempt and perjury, respectively, and are liable to penalties stipulated in the Act. Section 18 empowers the tribunal to detail police officers to attend upon members of the tribunal to preserve order during the proceedings of the tribunal, and to serve summonses on witnesses and to perform such duties as the members of the tribunal may direct.

Section 187(11) of the Constitution allows an Act of Parliament to empower the Judicial Service Commission or a tribunal appointed under section 187 to require any judge to submit to a medical examination by a medical board established for that purpose, in order to ascertain his or her physical or mental health.

Members of the tribunal are protected from liability to any action or suit for any matter or thing done by such member of the tribunal (section 16, Commissions of Inquiry Act).
Judicial disciplinary committees

The Judicial Service (Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2012 (Judges Code) and the Judicial Service (Magistrate’s Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2019 (Magistrates Code) provide for disciplinary committees to inquire into complaints lodged against judges and magistrates respectively.

Under the Judges Code, section 22 provides for the procedure of the disciplinary committee. The provision empowers the committee to set its own rules of procedure. However, it provides that regard must be had to the principles of natural justice, and proceeds to list general principles which a committee must adhere to. These are that a disciplinary committee shall conduct its proceedings in confidence and be transparent in its procedures so as to strengthen public confidence in the judiciary and thereby reinforce judicial independence. Section 22(3) of the Code states that by reason of the nature of judicial office, a disciplinary committee shall at all times during its proceedings take care to ensure that the judicial officer is afforded protection from vexatious or unsubstantiated accusations. Section 22(2) states that a disciplinary committee shall use its best endeavours to expeditiously conduct and finalise its investigation. Under section 22(5), a disciplinary committee shall submit its findings and recommendations to the Chief Justice within a period of ninety (90) days from the date when the committee is constituted, unless it communicates to the Chief Justice that exceptional circumstances make it impossible to meet this deadline, in which event the Chief Justice may at his or her discretion grant an extension of time not exceeding a further period of sixty (60) days within which the committee can submit its findings and recommendations.

The Magistrates Code provides for the procedure of disciplinary committees in relation to magistrates, incorporating similar procedures and powers provided for under Parts X and XI of the Judicial Service Regulations, Statutory Instrument 30 of 2015.
National human rights institutions

There are no limitations which bar judges from being summoned before any of the independent constitutional commissions.

The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) has the powers under section 243(1)(h) of the Constitution to direct the Commissioner-General of Police to investigate cases of suspected criminal violations of human rights or freedoms and to report to the Commission on the results of any such investigation. The Commissioner-General of Police is mandated to comply with any directive given to him or her by the ZHRC in terms of section 243(2).

Section 12(1) of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act [Chapter 10:30] gives the Commission powers. Subject to considerations concerning non-disclosure of certain evidence, the Commission may in its discretion conduct an investigation in the form of a public or closed hearing, with the powers:

(a) to issue summons to any authority or person or the principal officer thereof to attend before the Commission and to produce any document or record relevant to any investigation by the Commission; and
(b) to put any questions to any authority or person or the principal officer which the Commission considers will assist its investigation of the complaint in question; and
(c) to require any person questioned by it to answer such questions and to disclose any information within such person’s knowledge which the Commission considers relevant to any investigation by it; and
(d) to request the assistance of the police during an investigation.
Under section 12(2) of the Act, the Commission shall not be bound by the strict rules of evidence, and it may ascertain any relevant fact by any means which it thinks fit and which is not unfair or unjust to any party. In terms of section 12(8), witnesses who have been summoned and fail to attend without just cause, or who willingly and deliberately give false testimony, will be guilty of contempt and perjury, respectively, and liable to penalties stipulated in the statute. Section 12(9) provides that law relating to the competence or compellability of any person on the grounds of privilege to give evidence, answer any questions or produce any book or document before the Commission, shall apply.

Similar powers granted to the ZHRC are granted to the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission under sections 10-13 of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission Act [Chapter 10:32]. The Commission has the powers during an investigation, to request the assistance of the Zimbabwe Republic Police Officer-in-Charge of a police station for the relevant area and such Officer-in-Charge shall be obliged to assist upon such request being made.

**Procedural rights of the judge**

International standards recognize that disciplinary or removal proceedings against a judge must include legal guarantees of procedural fairness and in actual practice be conducted in a manner that ensures that the procedure is fair.\(^{187}\)

The requirements of procedural fairness have been elaborated in greater detail under, for instance, articles 10 and 11 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, Article 14 of the ICCPR, and related standards and jurisprudence at the global, regional and national level.\(^{188}\) Key elements in all types of judicial accountability proceedings include:

- there must not be any discrimination in the procedural rights afforded to the judge on grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status;\(^ {189}\)

- "equality of arms", meaning "the same procedural rights are to be provided to all the parties unless distinctions are based on law and can be justified on objective and reasonable grounds, not entailing actual disadvantage or

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\(^{189}\) See e.g. ICCPR articles 2(1), 14(1), 25(c), 26; Human Rights Committee, GC 32, *supra* note 45, paras 64-65.
other unfairness to the defendant" and that "each side be given the opportunity to contest all the arguments and evidence adduced by the other party";\(^{190}\) this also implies that the judge has the right to know in advance the specific allegations of fact and law on which the case against him or her is based, and access to and copies of any evidence;\(^{191}\)

- The right to legal assistance and representation by a lawyer or possibly another judge, and adequate time to prepare the defence;\(^{192}\)

- expeditiousness, i.e. that the proceedings progress without undue delay;\(^{193}\)

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\(^{190}\) See e.g. Human Rights Committee, GC 32, supra note 45, para. 13; ECTHR, Olujić v. Croatia, App. No. 22330/05 (5 February 2009), paras 77-85 (judicial council refused to receive any witness on behalf of the judge, while accepting all witnesses for the Government seeking his dismissal).

\(^{191}\) See e.g. Human Rights Committee, Soratha Bandaranayake v. Sri Lanka, UN Doc CCPR/C/93/D/1376/2005 (2008), paras 7.2 and 7.3; IAmCHR, Constitutional Court v. Peru, Series C No. 71 (31 January 2001), para. 83, Chocón Chocón v. Venezuela, Series C No. 227 (1 July 2011), paras 120-121, and Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al) v. Ecuador, Series C No. 266 (23 August 2013), paras 168-169; UNODC Guide, supra note 11, para. 69. In criminal proceedings, article 14(3) of the ICCPR specifically guarantees the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature and cause of the charges, and the right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against the judge, and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on the judge's behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against the judge, and similar rights apply in disciplinary and other such proceedings.

\(^{192}\) See in particular African Fair Trial Principles, article A.4(q); Commonwealth (Latimer House) Guidelines on Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial Independence (1998), article VI(1)(a)(i) (addressing proceedings in which there is a risk of removal); European Charter for the Statute of Judges, article 5.1; IAmCHR, Constitutional Court v. Peru, Series C No. 71 (31 January 2001), paras 80-83. In criminal proceedings, article 14(3) of the ICCPR specifically guarantees the right be tried in one's presence, and to defend oneself in person or through counsel of choice, as well as adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence and to communicate with counsel of choice, and similar rights apply in disciplinary and other such proceedings.

\(^{193}\) Expeditiousness is expressly mentioned in UNBP Judiciary article 17. See also Human Rights Committee, GC 32, supra note 45, para. 27. In ECTHR, Olujić v. Croatia, App. No. 22330/05 (5 February 2009), paras 86-91, after the judicial
- Presumption of innocence and the right not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.  

Members of the disciplinary body hearing the proceedings must not be biased in relation to the case or the parties, and must also ensure they do not make statements or otherwise act in a way that would give rise to a reasonable perception that they are biased (even if there is no evidence that they are in fact biased). If statements, conduct, or relationships would give rise to such perceptions of bias, the person should recuse themselves from hearing the matter. Indeed, the formal provision of a procedure for members to withdraw in such cases may in itself be seen as a necessary guarantee of impartiality.

Illustrative examples of perceived or real bias that have been found to render disciplinary proceedings unfair include the following:

- Statements made by members of a judicial council after the council has adopted its initial decision, for instance, but before a court appeal or review has been finally disposed of (thus leaving open the potential for later re-

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194 These rights are specifically provided for in criminal proceedings by ICCPR articles 14(2) and (3), and similar rights apply in disciplinary and other such proceedings.

195 See for example: Human Rights Committee, Busyo, Wongodi, Matubuka et al v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/933/2000 (2003), para. 5.2 (statements by the President of the Court, before the case was heard, supporting the dismissals); IAmCHR, López Lone and others v. Honduras, Series C No. 302 (5 October 2015), paras 229-234 (Court which had previously endorsed overthrow of previous President could not be seen as impartial in disciplinary proceedings against judges for protesting against the overthrow); ECHR, Olujić v. Croatia, App. No. 22330/05 (5 February 2009), paras 56-68, Kudeshkina v. Russia, App. No. 29492/05 (26 February 2009), para. 97, and Harabin v. Slovakia, App. No. 58688/11 (30 November 2012), paras 130-142.  

196 ECHR, Oleksandr Volvov v. Ukraine, App. No. 21722/11 (9 January 2013), para. 120.
hearing by the judicial council), can give rise to perceptions of bias in violation of the right to a fair hearing;\textsuperscript{197}

- Participation in the vote on the final decision on the case, by a member of the judicial council who had initially made the complaint against the judge, and then served as de facto prosecutor in the hearing of the complaint by a sub-commission of the judicial council (even though that person was only one of fifteen members of the council);\textsuperscript{198}

- The presence of the Minister of Justice, as a member of the executive, on the disciplinary body (even as only one of fifteen members on the body, with eight members being judges elected by judges in secret ballot), and with the decision to dismiss being adopted unanimously.\textsuperscript{199}

International standards also highlight the need for judges to have access to an appeal or independent review of decisions (whether interim or final) in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings. Article 20 of the \textit{UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary}, for instance, provide as follows:

Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an independent review. This principle may not apply to the decisions of the highest court and those of the legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings.

\textsuperscript{197} ECHR, \textit{Olujić v. Croatia}, App. No. 22330/05 (5 February 2009), paras 56-68 (members of the judicial council made prejudicial statements to press following initial hearing but prior to re-hearing eventually ordered by Constitutional Court).


\textsuperscript{199} ECHR, \textit{Popčevska v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia}, App. No. 48783/07 (7 January 2016), paras 53-56.
The right to appeal to a court or to similar forms of independent review is also affirmed by a range of other international and regional standards.  

Subsequent to adoption of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, the qualification in relation to "the decisions of the highest court and those of the legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings" has gradually faded in importance. Article 15.6 of the Measures for Implementation of the Bangalore Principles, for instance, simply provides:

There should be an appeal from the disciplinary authority to a court.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights found, in a case where the initial decision to dismiss certain judges was taken by the Supreme Court, and review of that decision was performed by the judicial council, that the judicial council was not itself independent as within the national institutional framework the council was effectively subsidiary to the Supreme Court. Consequently, the failure to have provided for review of the original decision by an independent body constituted a violation of the right to fair hearing.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has emphasized that, "In cases of dismissal by political bodies, it is even more important that their decision be subject to judicial review." The rule of law and separation of powers require that the legislative and executive branches must act in accordance with the law, and that the judiciary is responsible for ensuring they do so, and it would be deeply damaging to both the rule of law and separation of powers if the political

200 See also Council of Europe, CM/Rec (2010)12, supra note 40, para. 69; African Fair Trial Principles, article A.4(q); Venice Commission, Report on the Independence of the Judicial System - Part One The Independence of Judges, supra note 61, para. 43 (referring specifically to appeal to a court); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Guarantees for the independence of justice operators (2013), para. 249 recommendation 25.

201 López Lone and others v. Honduras, Series C No. 302 (5 October 2015), paras 217-221.

202 UNSRJUL, Report on guarantees of judicial independence, supra note 45, para. 61.
branches could remove judges in a flagrantly unlawful manner knowing the judge has no recourse to any judicial body to at least publicly declare, if not remedy, the unlawfulness of the proceedings or the removal.

The European Court of Human Rights held that review by an administrative court of a dismissal decision initially taken by a judicial council and then voted by Parliament was insufficient in so far as it had only the power to declare decisions unlawful, and no power actually to quash or change the decision itself. (This is because the judge would not automatically have been reinstated to his post on the basis of a finding by the reviewing court as it had no power to attach specific legal consequences to a finding that his dismissal was unlawful). The fact that judges of the administrative court were themselves generally subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the judicial council whose decision the administrative court was reviewing, presented a further obstacle to demonstrating the court's independence and impartiality.203

Constitutional protections apply to a judge who is before a disciplinary tribunal or a tribunal considering the question of removal from office of the judge. Section 46(1) of the Constitution provides that when interpreting the Declaration of Rights, a court, tribunal, forum or body-

a. must give full effect to the rights and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter;

b. must promote the values and principles that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom, and in particular, the values and principles set out in section 3;

c. must take into account international law and all treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a party;

d. must pay due regard to all the provisions of this Constitution, in particular the principles and objectives set out in Chapter 2; and

e. may consider relevant foreign law.

Section 46(2) states that when interpreting an enactment, and when developing the common law and customary law, every court, tribunal, forum or body must promote and be guided by the spirit and objectives of the Declaration of Rights. Insofar as customary international law is concerned, section 326(2) of the Constitution provides that when interpreting legislation, every court and tribunal must adopt any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with customary international law applicable in Zimbabwe, in preference to an alternative interpretation inconsistent with that law. The import of sections 46 and 326 of the Constitution is that a tribunal is required to apply these human rights and international law standards in the conduct of the inquiry.
Section 69 of the Constitution on the right to a fair hearing provides that every person accused of an offence has the right to a fair and public trial within a reasonable time before an independent and impartial court, and in the determination of civil rights and obligations, every person has a right to a fair, speedy and public hearing within a reasonable time before an independent and impartial court, tribunal or other forum established by law.

Further, every person has the right of access to the courts, or to some other tribunal or forum established by law for the resolution of any dispute, and every person has a right, at their own expense, to choose and be represented by a legal practitioner before any court, tribunal or forum.

This means a judicial officer is entitled to access and appear before a tribunal considering his or her case, has the right to have legal representation of their choice, and has the right to a fair and speedy hearing within a reasonable time.

Under section 187(9) of the Constitution, a tribunal appointed to consider the question of removal of a judge from office has the same rights and powers as commissioners under the Commissions of Inquiry Act [Chapter 10:07]. The Commissions of Inquiry Act in sections 9-17 provide for procedural protections which include that the judge has the right to have legal representation.

Section 12(3) of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act [Chapter 10:30], provides that the Commission shall afford the authority or person or the principal officer thereof, who is alleged to be responsible for the human rights violation, an adequate opportunity to respond to such allegations.
Section 12(4) of the Act allows any person appearing before the Commission to be represented by a legal practitioner, and section 12(5) provides that information obtained by the Commission or any member of its staff at a closed hearing shall not be disclosed to any person except—

(a) without disclosing the identity of any person who gave the information in confidence, for the purposes of the investigation and for any report to be made thereon; or
(b) for the purposes of any proceedings for perjury alleged to have been committed in the course of an investigation.

Section 12(9) provides that law relating to the competence or compellability of any person on the grounds of privilege to give evidence, answer any questions or produce any book or document before the Commission, shall apply.

Similar protections are afforded to persons appearing before the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission under section 10-13 of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission Act [Chapter 10:32].

### Procedural rights of complainants and victims

Under international standards, complainants who allege they have been victims of human rights violations perpetrated by a judge or with a judge's complicity also have procedural rights in relation to proceedings against the judge, as part of their right of access to an effective remedy and access to justice. Articles 3(c) and (d) of the *UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation* refer to the obligation of the State to:

- Provide those who claim to be victims of a human rights or humanitarian law violation with equal and effective access to
Justice ... irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the violation; and

Provide effective remedies to victims, including reparation ...

In this regard, the Principles and Guidelines provide among other things that:

- Victims have the right to "access to relevant information concerning violations and reparation mechanisms" (art. 11);

- States should "take measures to minimize the inconvenience to victims and their representatives, protect against unlawful interference with their privacy as appropriate and ensure their safety from intimidation and retaliation, as well as that of their families and witnesses, before, during and after judicial, administrative, or other proceedings that affect the interests of victims" (art. 12(b));

- Victims and their representatives should be entitled to seek and obtain information on the causes leading to their victimization and on the causes and conditions pertaining to the gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law and to learn the truth in regard to these violations (art. 24).

The earlier UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power also provides, in relation to victims of crime, including criminal abuse of power:

5. Judicial and administrative mechanisms should be established and strengthened where necessary to enable victims to obtain redress through formal or informal procedures that are expeditious, fair, inexpensive and accessible. Victims should be informed of their rights in seeking redress through such mechanisms.

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204 UN General Assembly resolution 40/34 (29 November 1985), Annex.
6. The responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes to the needs of victims should be facilitated by:

(a) Informing victims of their role and the scope, timing and progress of the proceedings and of the disposition of their cases, especially where serious crimes are involved and where they have requested such information;

(b) Allowing the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of the proceedings where their personal interests are affected, without prejudice to the accused and consistent with the relevant national criminal justice system;

(c) Providing proper assistance to victims throughout the legal process;

(d) Taking measures to minimize inconvenience to victims, protect their privacy, when necessary, and ensure their safety, as well as that of their families and witnesses on their behalf, from intimidation and retaliation;

(e) Avoiding unnecessary delay in the disposition of cases and the execution of orders or decrees granting awards to victims.

Additional detailed standards are set out in the *European Union Directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime*,\(^{205}\) including for instance:

- victims must receive written acknowledgement of their complaint, stating its basic elements (art. 5(1));

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\(^{205}\) EU Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (25 October 2012), establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime. The Directive creates legal obligations for members of the European Union, and elements of the Directive can be seen as reflecting more global norms, or as best practices for consideration elsewhere. To the extent that some of the articles of the Directive refer specifically to criminal proceedings, these also can be seen as possible best practices for other kinds of proceedings related to the crime (such as disciplinary proceedings).
• victims have the right to receive information about relevant criminal proceedings, including any decision not to proceed further with the case, information about the outcome of the case, and information about the state of the proceedings (except where this may adversely affect the handling of the case) (art. 6);

• victims have the right to be heard and to provide evidence in the criminal proceedings (art. 10);

• victims have the right to review of a decision not to prosecute (art. 11); and

• measures must be available to protect victims from intimidation and retaliation, including, when necessary, the physical protection of victims and their family members (art. 18).

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has similarly held that as a general rule, "States have the obligation to guarantee the right of the victims or their family to take part in all stages of the respective proceedings, so that they can make proposals, receive information, provide evidence, formulate arguments and, in brief, assert their interests and rights". 206

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206 See for instance González Medina and family v. Dominican Republic, Series C No. 240 (27 February 2012), para. 251. The Court further stated at para. 253, in the context of the particular case: "Although the Court has considered it admissible that, in certain cases, the measures taken during the preliminary investigation in the criminal proceedings may be kept confidential in order to ensure the effectiveness of the administration of justice, this confidentiality may never be invoked to prevent the victim from having access to the file of a criminal case. The State’s powers to avoid the dissemination of the content of the proceedings, if appropriate, must be guaranteed by taking measures that are compatible with the exercise of the victim’s procedural rights." See also article 24(2) of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance: "Each victim has the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of the enforced disappearance, the progress and results of the investigation and the fate of the disappeared person. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures in this regard." (emphasis added).
UNODC has noted, in the specific context of proceedings relating to judicial corruption, the need to ensure protection of complainants and witnesses against intimidation, undue influence and blackmail. 207 The UN Convention against Corruption provides, among other things, that:

- States must provide effective protection from potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses (including victims) and experts who give testimony, and, as appropriate, for their relatives and other persons close to them (art. 32(1)); and

- States should enable the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of criminal proceedings against offenders in a manner not prejudicial to the rights of the defence (art. 32(5)).

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, reporting on relevant "best practices" at the request of the Human Rights Council, has highlighted the view that while traditional anti-corruption efforts have tended to focus on the perpetrator, individual criminal responsibility and suppression, this should be complemented by a "human rights-based approach" "focused on the victim, on State responsibility and on prevention and redress".208

In all cases, the complainant should be informed of the outcome of any accountability processes arising from his or her complaint.209

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208 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Best practices to counter the negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of all human rights", UN Doc A/HRC/32/22 (15 April 2016), para. 130.
There is currently no Victim and Witness Protection law in Zimbabwe. Victim and witness protection is derived from the protection currently available across various statutes, including procedural safeguards both in the Constitution and in statutes.

Section 69 of the Constitution on the right to a fair hearing provides that every person accused of an offence has the right to a fair and public trial within a reasonable time before an independent and impartial court, and in the determination of civil rights and obligations, every person has a right to a fair, speedy and public hearing within a reasonable time before an independent and impartial court, tribunal or other forum established by law. Further, every person has the right of access to the courts, or to some other tribunal or forum established by law for the resolution of any dispute, and every person has a right, at their own expense, to choose and be represented by a legal practitioner before any court, tribunal or forum.

This means a complainant is entitled to access and appear before a tribunal considering his or her case, has the right to have legal representation of their choice, and has the right to a fair and speedy hearing within a reasonable time. So a person who complains about judicial conduct, is able to participate in hearings in disciplinary proceedings against the judge or magistrate.

A broad and permissive locus standi regime is employed when it comes to approaching courts for relief for human rights violations under section 85(1) of the Constitution. One needs not be personally or directly affected to approach a court for relief. The fact that a person has contravened a law does not debar them from approaching a court for relief under section 85(2)).
The Constitution demands in section 85(3) that the rules of procedure in every court must ensure that-

- a. the right to approach the court under subsection (1) is fully facilitated;
- b. formalities relating to the proceedings, including their commencement, are kept to a minimum;
- c. the court, while observing the rules of natural justice, is not unreasonably restricted by procedural technicalities; and
- d. a person with particular expertise may, with the leave of the court, appear as a friend of the court.

Both the Judges Code of Ethics and the Magistrate’s Code of Ethics, provide for disciplinary committees to inquire into complaints lodged against judges and magistrates respectively. Under the Judges Code, section 22 provides for the procedure of the disciplinary committee. The Magistrates Code provides for the procedure of disciplinary committees in relation to magistrates, incorporating similar procedures and powers provided for under Parts X and XI of the Judicial Service Regulations, Statutory Instrument 30 of 2015. These provide for, among others, speedy and timely consideration and resolution of complaints. A person who complains about judicial conduct, is able to participate in hearings in disciplinary proceedings against the judge or magistrate.
Publicity and transparency

A further question arises as to the transparency to the public of judicial accountability procedures.

Article 17 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary provides in relation to the processing of any "charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and professional capacity" that "[t]he examination of the matter at its initial stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested by the judge." The purpose of this provision is to protect the reputation of the individual judge, and that of the judicial system as whole, from unwarranted damage in cases where the charge or complaint is ultimately found to have been without foundation.

This principle of confidentiality (subject to waiver by the judge) necessarily applies to the initial investigation (whether criminal or disciplinary in character), as well as any preliminary procedural step aimed at determining whether the complaint or charge is sufficiently well grounded to warrant a full hearing. However, the principle of confidentiality will not necessarily automatically apply to a disciplinary hearing on the merits, where other important interests in respect of the administration of justice and the rights of the complainant must be taken into consideration. As will be discussed below, there is also a strong presumption of publicity of criminal and civil proceedings before tribunals.

Presumably the principle of confidentiality applies to the bodies responsible for conducting the proceedings but not necessarily to the complainant in so far as he or she may make public statements about the allegations or the fact of having made the complaint. Restricting the right of an alleged victim of human rights violations or corruption to express himself or herself publicly about the violations or the fact of having made the complaint, or punishing the person for having done so, would seem difficult to justify in relation to the person's freedom of expression.
The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has further noted the potential for corruption proceedings to undermine the credibility and public trust in a judge before the judge has actually been proved to have committed wrongdoing, and that "investigations preferably should take place confidentiality". 210

On the other hand, if the judge facing the proceedings positively requests that the hearing be open to the public, the onus is on the body conducting the hearing not merely to assert the necessity of exclusion of the public (whether to protect the judge's dignity or that of the judiciary as a whole), but to demonstrate that exclusion from each part of the hearing is actually justified in the specific circumstances of that part of the hearing. 211 This onus arises from the recognition in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the ICCPR, and international and regional human rights treaties and standards, of the right to a "public hearing". Article 14(1) of the ICCPR, for instance, provides in relevant part:

In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.

A number of standards recommend that final decisions in disciplinary proceedings be made public. 212 Publication, when

210 UNSRIJL, Report on judicial corruption, supra note 19, para. 86.
211 ECtHR, Olujić v. Croatia, App. No. 22330/05 (5 February 2009), paras 69-76.
212 UNSRIJL, Report on guarantees of judicial independence, supra note 45, paras 63, 98; Bangalore Implementation Measures, article 15.7; CCJE Opinion No. 10, supra note 78, para. 95; Beijing Statement, article 28; Istanbul Declaration, Principle 15; UNODC Guide, supra note 11, para. 72. It is not
the decision is formal and final, can "inform, not only the whole of the judiciary, but also the general public of the way in which the proceedings have been conducted and to show that the judiciary does not seek to cover up reprehensible actions of its members."²¹³

Final judgments in all civil or criminal court proceedings relating to judicial violations of human rights or judicial corruption must also be made public as part of the general obligation of States to make all judgments public.²¹⁴

Inquiries into disciplinary conduct of judges and magistrates, and inquiries into their removal from office, is done confidentially. Section 22(2) of the Judicial Service (Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2012, states that a disciplinary committee shall conduct its proceedings in confidence. Section 187(9) of the Constitution as read together with section 9 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act [Chapter 10:07] allow for a tribunal inquiring into the removal of a judge from office to conduct its proceedings in confidence.

entirely clear whether the formula used in the Bangalore Implementation Measures, Istanbul Declaration and UNODC Guide ("the final decision in any proceedings instituted against a judge involving a sanction against such judge") is intended to require publication of all decisions in proceedings in which a sanction could have been imposed, or only of decisions actually imposing a sanction (the latter seems more likely); in any event, as the Istanbul Declaration specifies, in all cases the complainant should be informed of the outcome.

²¹³ CCJE Opinion No. 10, supra note 78, para. 95.

²¹⁴ E.g. Article 14(1) of the ICCPR states in part that "any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children."
Procedures for lifting judicial immunity

As previously explained (see pp. 21-22, 27-30 above), judges should in principle be immune from criminal or civil proceedings relating to their official functions. However, certain exceptions should be made in respect of judicial corruption or judicial complicity in human rights violations.

The possibility of exceptions to immunity raises the question of who should decide whether or not immunity applies in a particular case, and through which procedure.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has underscored that "such procedures must be legislated in great detail" and should aim at reinforcing the independence of the judiciary; accordingly, the Rapporteur maintains, the decision to lift immunity must not solely depend on the discretion of a body of the executive branch, as this "may expose judges to political pressure and jeopardize their
independence". Indeed, prosecution of a judge should, the Rapporteur has stated, be permitted "only with the authorization of an appropriate judicial authority".

Similarly, the Singhvi Declaration states: "Judges shall be protected from the harassment of personal litigation against them in respect of their judicial functions and shall not be sued or prosecuted except under an authorization of an appropriate judicial authority". The Consultative Council of European Judges has said, "in countries where a criminal investigation or proceedings can be started at the instigation of a private individual, there should be a mechanism for preventing or stopping such investigation or proceedings against a judge relating to the purported performance of his or her office where there is no proper case for suggesting that any criminal liability exists on the part of the judge."

Opinions published by the Council of Europe Venice Commission have addressed mechanisms for lifting judicial immunity in a variety of countries, though their context-specific character makes it sometimes difficult to extract general principles from the various opinions.

In a 2015 opinion commenting on proposed changes in Ukraine, for instance, the Venice Commission welcomed as "clearly preferable" the shifting of the power to lift judges' immunity from a "political organ" (Parliament) to the judicial council (even while noting that further amendments to the composition of the judicial council were needed to secure the full independence of the judicial council).

215 UNSRJI, Report on guarantees of judicial independence, supra note 45, paras 67, 98.
216 UNSRJI, Report on judicial accountability, supra note 7, para. 52.
217 Singhvi Declaration, supra note 61, article 20. See also Campeche Declaration, article 12.
218 CCJE Opinion No. 3, supra note 35, para. 54.
In a March 2013 opinion, the Venice Commission considered amendments to the law of judicial immunities in Moldova, which before the amendments had included a requirement for the independent judicial council's consent before any filing of a criminal proceeding against a judge (or the judge's detention or arrest). The amendments removed the requirement for council consent in relation to two specific corruption offences, or when the judge was caught in flagrante delicto (in the midst of committing any criminal act), but otherwise left the council's role intact in relation to other crimes. The Venice Commission found, on the one hand, that it was appropriate (though not necessarily mandatory under international standards) to require the consent of the judicial council in relation to ordinary crimes. It affirmed that in countries where individual judges may be in a weak position in relation to prosecutors, such a requirement could be an appropriate means to protect judges against improper interference. Ultimately, however, citing the scale of the problem of judicial corruption in Moldova, the narrow scope of the amendment, and the particular characteristics of corruption offences, the Venice Commission concluded that the removal of the requirement for the judicial council's consent in relation to such offences did "not seem to contradict international standards".

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221 Ibid paras 27, 52.
222 Ibid para. 53. For the ICJ’s contemporaneous views on the reform, cited in the Venice Commission opinion, see *Reforming the Judiciary in Moldova: Prospects and Challenges* (2013), pp. 30-32 and 41, concluding, "The removal of the requirement for the SCM’s authorisation of any prosecution of a judge, in regard to crimes of judicial corruption, is likely to assist in re-establishing the credibility of the judiciary, and to convince the public of its integrity, by making clear beyond doubt that judges are subject to the Rule of Law in the same way as any other citizen. The consent of the SCM is however, a real safeguard against abuse, which must not be removed without some compensating safeguards or review. Given the concerns with the measure, the first years of its operation, and any prosecutions of judges on corruption charges under the new law, must be carefully monitored and scrutinised".
In an opinion subsequently issued in October 2013 concerning constitutional amendments in Bulgaria, the Venice Commission considered changes to a Constitutional provision that originally provided that the criminal immunity of a judge could be lifted by the Supreme Judicial Council only in the circumstances established by law.  

The amendments retained the requirement of judicial council approval for criminal accusations, detentions or arrests, but altered the means by which a request for the council's approval could be initiated. The Venice Commission expressed concern that a member of the Council could both request a decision on lifting the immunity, and then participate in the decision itself, concluding: "It would seem preferable that any such move should, as was recommended in relation to the removal of judges, require to be approved by a small expert body composed solely of judges who would give an opinion in relation to whether immunity should be lifted." It further reiterated recommendations it had made to Bulgaria on a previous occasion, to the effect that "an expert body be instituted to investigate cases and to provide its opinion on the lifting of immunity to the Supreme Judicial Council before the latter take a vote on this issue and to ensure that anyone who makes a proposal on the lifting on immunity cannot vote this same proposal."
The Constitution does not provide for any general immunity for judicial officers. The only express provision is in section 50(9), which grants a person who has been illegally arrested or detained the right to compensation from the person responsible for the arrest or detention. The provision states that a law may protect from liability a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity reasonably and in good faith.

Section 16 of the Judicial Services Act [Chapter 7:18] sets out the rights of judicial officers who may be faced with criminal proceedings. It creates immunity from arrest in chambers and within the precincts of a court for all judicial officers (section 16(a)). Similar restrictions apply to search, with the exception that the accused judicial officer can grant consent for the search to be conducted (section 16(b)). However, section 24 (3)(b) of Judicial Service (Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2012, expressly states that “Nothing contained in this Code shall be construed as taking away or derogating from the right of the Prosecutor-General or any other person to institute criminal or civil proceedings against the judicial officer concerned, arising out of the conduct complained of”.

There is no requirement that the Prosecutor-General must seek the authority of the Chief Justice, Judicial Service Commission or any authority before instituting criminal proceedings against a judge. There is thus no procedure for lifting judicial immunity.

**Temporary suspension during proceedings**

The suspension of a judge pending the outcome of investigations and any proceedings may appear warranted, if justified by the facts of a particular case, to prevent the further perpetration of injustice to those involved in cases before the judge. Article 36(a) of the UN Impunity Principles, for instance, states in part that, "Persons formally charged with individual responsibility for serious crimes under international law shall be
suspended from official duties during the criminal or disciplinary proceeding."

At the same time, any such temporary suspension itself presents a risk to the independence of the judiciary. As such, those proceedings should follow procedures complying with articles 17 to 20 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers (with the evidentiary thresholds and procedures appropriate to an interim, as opposed to final, measure). A prompt and expeditious right of appeal or other independent review should be available in relation any such temporary suspension.\footnote{UNBP Judiciary, articles 17-20; UNSRIJL, Annual Report 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/52 (2006), para. 55.}

If the question of removing a judge from office has been referred to a tribunal in terms of section 187 of the Constitution, section 187(1) requires that the judge be suspended from office until the President, on the recommendation of the tribunal, revokes the suspension or removes the judge from office. This facilitates for the conducting of inquiries without any hindrances.

**Selective enforcement for improper purposes**

The ICJ has observed on numerous occasions, the apparent selective enforcement of judicial accountability for improper purposes. In a context where all or most judges in a country or region are involved in some low-level corruption or misuse of funds, or other forms of potential misconduct whether minor or major, the executive may be aware and tolerate this misconduct unless and until an individual judge exercises his or her independence to issue a judgement unfavourable to the executive. At that point, as a form of reprisal, the executive
initiates disciplinary, removal, or criminal proceedings against the individual judge on the basis of conduct that deliberately remains unpunished among his or her peers who have not displeased the executive.227

In such situations, measures which should be strengthening the independence and integrity of the judiciary are instead exploited to further undermine these values.

From the point of view of equal treatment and prevention of misuse of accountability measures in this way, the only available "remedy" for selective enforcement in an individual case may seem to be to allow an individual judge who has in fact engaged in misconduct, to escape responsibility. In relation to human rights violations and corruption that has seriously impacted private individuals, this is obviously a less than satisfactory solution. It is therefore incumbent on those acting within accountability mechanisms to resist all outside influence on their decision about which cases to pursue, and cases must be selected on the basis of objective considerations applied equally to all. Efforts by the executive or other powerful entities to improperly influence should be exposed, condemned and punished. More fundamentally, the problem of selective enforcement only further underscores the crucial need for accountability mechanisms to be independent not only in theory but in practice (and for such mechanisms to be in some way, themselves publicly accountable).

227 See for instance ICJ, "Bulgaria: ICJ raises concern at dismissal of Judge Todorova" (27 August 2012), http://www.icj.org/bulgaria-icj-raises-concern-at-dismissal-of-judge-todorova/ (long delays were endemic in the Bulgarian justice system, and the delay in the cases handled by the judge were not unusual for the country; she was suddenly subjected to disciplinary proceedings for her removal on the basis of such delays, after she made public comments highlighting problems in the Bulgarian judicial system and threats to independence of the judiciary. It should be noted that the ICJ has not taken a position on whether the conduct in question could, under other circumstances, justify disciplinary action; the ICJ’s concerns in the case have focussed on selectivity, disproportionate sanctions, and possible procedural unfairness).
6. Exceptional circumstances

Although this is not immediately applicable to Zimbabwe’s context. The prospects of some transitional justice process has been envisaged since the signing of the Global Political Agreement in 2008. The principles set out below may be of some relevance in the future.

States have sometimes taken recourse to other accountability mechanisms in highly exceptional circumstances of transition, particularly where an undemocratic or authoritarian regime that has perpetrated widespread and systematic human rights violations through or with complicity of the judiciary, is replaced by a new government which is implementing reforms within a framework aimed at greater respect for human rights and the rule of law. Such mechanisms are often framed by broader constitutional or legal reform with restructuring of a country’s justice system and thus changes in jurisdictional arrangements and judicial assignment.

Typical examples of these kinds of mechanisms include truth commissions, vetting, and mass removal with possibility of re-application. The use of such mechanisms in lieu of the normally-applicable mechanisms described in Chapter 3 inherently carries a risk of "abuse and settlement of scores", and the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has emphasized that the State must do everything possible to avoid such manipulation of the processes.\(^\text{228}\)

The starting point should always be the fundamental presumption that the ordinary mechanisms and procedures of judicial accountability will continue to be respected, even in times of crisis. The \textit{ICJ Geneva Declaration on Upholding the

Rule of Law and the Role of Judges and Lawyers in Times of Crisis\(^{229}\) sets out a number of principles that follow from the foundation that, "The role of the judiciary and legal profession is paramount in safeguarding human rights and the Rule of Law in times of crisis, including declared states of emergency" (article 1). Article 5 states:

In times of crisis the stability and continuity of the judiciary is essential. Judges should not be subject to arbitrary removal, individually or collectively, by the executive, legislative or judicial branches. Judges may only be removed, by means of fair and transparent proceedings, for serious misconduct incompatible with judicial office, criminal offence or incapacity that renders them unable to discharge their functions.

At the same time, the Declaration also affirms the importance of maintaining the integrity of the judicial system in times of crisis (article 12), and that, "Judges in times of crisis are under a special duty to resist actions which would undermine their independence and the Rule of Law" (article 13).\(^{230}\)

To justify any exceptional departure from the ordinary mechanisms and procedures for removal or suspension of judges, the State must demonstrate that that the judiciary has been compromised to such an extreme scale and depth that the ordinary mechanisms of judicial accountability cannot possibly secure the independence, impartiality and integrity of judges. Not every situation of transition or emergency can justify such exceptional measures: a particularly high threshold must be applied in order to respect the fundamental principle of the independence of the judiciary, and the specific measures adopted must be strictly necessary and proportionate to the


\(^{230}\) See also ICJ, Legal Commentary to the ICJ Geneva Declaration (Geneva, 2011), pp. 77-90, 197-227.
specific factual situation in the country concerned, and appropriately limited in time.\textsuperscript{231}

**Truth commissions**

Truth commissions are "official, temporary, non-judicial fact-finding bodies that investigate a pattern of abuses of human rights or humanitarian law, usually committed over a number of years."\textsuperscript{232} As was mentioned in the discussion in Chapter 2, their work aims to realize the public interest in and the right of victims to the truth. By establishing a credible official narrative of past violations, truth commissions also seek to prevent the recurrence of similar violations in the future. Such processes must be complementary to, and not a substitute for, other forms of remedy and reparation for victims, including judicial remedies, or for justice by ensuring those responsible for the past violations face criminal proceedings.

A number of final reports of truth commissions have addressed the role of the judiciary in complicity in or perpetration of violations by the former regime.\textsuperscript{233} This in itself is relatively

\textsuperscript{231} See e.g. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency (article 4 ICCPR), UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), paras 4 and 5; GC 32, supra note 45, para. 6; Busyo, Wongodi, Matubuka et al v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/933/2000 (2003), para. 5.2; CCJE, Situation report on the judiciary and judges in the Council of Europe member States, CCJE(2015)3, para. 27. It may also be noted that some have argued that in undertaking reform of judicial institutions, including judicial accountability mechanisms, in countries in early stages of transition where there has not yet been a change of judicial culture or composition, imposing or adopting mechanisms that seek immediately to maximize independence and autonomy of the judiciary, sometimes may have the unintended consequence of further entrenching the power of senior judges implicated in the wrongs of the previous regime: see for example, Michal Bobek and David Kosař, "Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe (2014), 15 German L.J. 1257.

\textsuperscript{232} UN Impunity Principles, Definitions (D).

uncontroversial: a truth commission would arguably not fully realize its purpose without addressing the extent to which the judiciary was complicit in the violations or independently resisted them, and making recommendations aimed at avoiding recurrence, and so such matters should in principle always be included in the mandates of truth commissions.

More contested is the question whether a truth commission should be able to exercise coercive powers to force judges to provide evidence. Indeed, some question whether judges should be allowed to give evidence even voluntarily, given judicial obligations of confidentiality and the need to preserve institutional independence and impartiality of the judiciary.

These questions were perhaps most sharply posed in relation to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process in South Africa. The TRC had a unit empowered with police powers of search and seizure to facilitate investigations. The TRC also had the power to subpoena unwilling witnesses to appear before it to give testimony.²³⁴

Among its many proceedings, the TRC convened a number of hearings that focused on particular professions or institutions: one such hearing was the Legal Hearing. The TRC invited all actors within the apartheid legal system to make written and oral submissions to the Legal Hearing. A memorandum sent to the TRC by the then-Chief Justice of South Africa not only sought to defend the judicial record under apartheid, it also explicitly rejected any suggestion that judges should be held accountable

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by the TRC for their conduct.\textsuperscript{235} A few judges made written submissions, while others were openly disdainful of the invitation. Ultimately, no judge was willing to appear in person before the TRC,\textsuperscript{236} and, despite urging from some quarters, the TRC did not issue subpoenas to any judges.\textsuperscript{237}

In its final report, the TRC expressed "great regret that judges refused to appear before the Commission on the basis that this would negatively affect their independence and would harm the institution of the judiciary", and disagreed with the judges' assessment in this regard.\textsuperscript{238} Their absence did not prevent the TRC from making important findings and recommendations about the role of the judiciary in the violations of the apartheid regime, and judicial reforms to prevent recurrence.\textsuperscript{239} At the same time, there can be little doubt that the TRC would have had a fuller range of evidence to draw upon, had the judges chosen to take up its invitation to engage fully with its processes. Their absence has been the subject of considerable criticism.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, following a mission to South Africa in 2001, however, stated that he regretted the findings of the TRC on the failure of the judges to appear before it when requested to do so, expressing concern for the precedent he felt it would have set to call judges to account before such an institution.\textsuperscript{240}

Hakeem Yusuf, in his work examining judicial accountability and transitional mechanisms in Nigeria, and the possible roles of truth and reconciliation commissions in judicial accountability more globally, condemns the failure of Nigerian truth-seeking processes to engage with the role the judiciary played during

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{235} Ibid p. 37.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Ibid p. 30.
\item \textsuperscript{237} Ibid p. 138.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Vol. 5, Chapter 6, p. 201.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotes}
the periods of authoritarian military rule in Nigeria. He reviews various potential contributions that a truth commission can make in relation to judicial accountability: credibly documenting the truth of what happened is, of course, a primary aim, but truth commissions can also help to identify particular judicial officials who should be criminally investigated; can help to ensure that judicial reforms are based on a proper factual basis and analysis and accordingly increase the likelihood of success of such reforms in avoiding continuation or recurrence of abuses; can help to clarify whether vetting processes are warranted and if so what their particular focus should be; and can provide a foundation for other forms of remedy and reparation to victims. Yusuf highlights that undertaking a truth commission process while excluding any deep examination of the role of the judiciary creates a "critical gap" that can undermine the broader project of transition to a democratic, rights-respecting system of government. He concludes that the judiciary, not only in Nigeria but in other such situations of transition, should "be made to give an account of its role in governance in the period of authoritarian rule through a truth-seeking process as part of transitional justice measures." Based on his contextual analysis of Nigeria and other transitional situations, Yusuf argues that the judiciary should not be allowed to avoid engagement with truth commissions in reliance on doctrines of institutional independence or immunity. Indeed, he suggests that a failure to require the judiciary to engage with such processes in transition is ultimately likely to undermine the independence, integrity, and effectiveness of the judiciary over the longer term.²⁴¹

In a 2014 report on a mission to Uruguay, the UN Special Rapporteur on truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, noted the lack of attention that had been given to the apparent implication of judicial officials in serious human rights violations under the military regime of the 1970s and 1980s. He urged "the Government, and the relevant authorities of the State, including the Supreme Court of Justice" to, among

other things, "Carry out a process of deep reflection on the responsibility of various State authorities in the commission of human rights violations under the dictatorship, including the armed forces, the judiciary and medical personnel", and stressed the importance of including civil society organisations in the relevant processes.²⁴²

**Vetting**

The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence has highlighted a number of measures in relation to the judiciary as essential elements of guarantees of non-recurrence in situations of transition where judges have been complicit in abuses by the prior regime, or did not adequately respond to such abuses. In addition to measures to strengthen judicial independence and competencies, such measures should, he says, include screening of judicial personnel through a vetting process (which in particular contexts may also be referred to as part of "lustration").²⁴³ He has defined vetting as follows:

Vetting can, in fact, make an important contribution to transitions, provided that it is meaningfully differentiated from purges. Vetting, as the term has come to be used, far from being the name for massive dismissals on the basis, for example, of mere membership in a party or organization or, even less of ascriptive factors, denotes a formal process to screen the behaviour of individuals and assess their integrity.

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²⁴³ Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, Report on Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, UN Doc A/HRC/30/42 (7 September 2015), paras 52-61 and 107-109. Vetting is sometimes referred to as a form of "lustration", particularly in relation to law and processes adopted in the former communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe. "Lustration" seems however to be a broader concept than "vetting", as some of those practices may have been closer to mass removals or purges and it could also be understood to include for instance criminal trials.
on the basis of objective criteria, so as to determine their suitability for continued or prospective public employment.\textsuperscript{244}

The Special Rapporteur notes that vetting is partly preventive and not punitive in nature, and that it should not be seen as relieving the State of its obligations to bring those responsible to justice through criminal proceedings. Nonetheless, he also points out that where, as a matter of fact, it is unlikely that all those responsible for human rights violations will face criminal punishment, "vetting is a means for addressing part of the 'impunity gap'".\textsuperscript{245} At the same time, he warns of the relatively high risk of political manipulation of vetting processes,\textsuperscript{246} as well as their possible resource-intensity, recommending that the number of criteria to be applied be limited, and that "vetting should aim primarily at removing those individuals who have committed the most serious violations and at ensuring at least minimum levels of integrity of the personnel concerned."\textsuperscript{247}

The Special Rapporteur has also emphasized that any vetting procedures must respect the separation of powers, judicial autonomy, due process guarantees and the general principle of the irremovability of judges.\textsuperscript{248}

The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has similarly recognized that in certain situations of transition where there has been systematic judicial complicity in

\textsuperscript{244} Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, Report on Vetting, UN doc A/70/438 (21 October 2015), para. 18.
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid paras 19, 23.
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid paras 25-27, 58.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid para. 62. See also Federico Andreu-Guzmán, "Due Process and Vetting", Chapter 11 in Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff (eds), Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies (Social Science Research Council, 2007), p. 456: "The conduct targeted by vetting measures should be circumscribed to gross human rights violations and crimes under international law, as well as acts criminalized under domestic criminal legislation."
\textsuperscript{248} Report on Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, \textit{supra} note 194, paras 55 and 107. See also, generally, Federico Andreu-Guzmán, ibid.
violations by a prior undemocratic or authoritarian regime, processes of vetting may represent a valid means for excluding judges who have been the most implicated. The Special Rapporteur stressed the need for individualized case-by-case analysis with procedures in compliance with the *UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary*, and always including the possibility to appeal the decision for independent review.\(^{249}\) The Special Rapporteur has also stressed that in all such processes "there exists the possibility of abuse and settlement of scores, and the State must do everything possible to avoid them."\(^{250}\)

Article 36 of the UN Impunity Principles provides in part as follows:

> States must take all necessary measures, including legislative and administrative reforms, to ensure that public institutions are organized in a manner that ensures respect for the rule of law and protection of human rights. At a minimum, States should undertake the following measures:

(a) Public officials and employees who are personally responsible for gross violations of human rights, in particular those involved in military, security, police, intelligence and judicial sectors, shall not continue to serve in State institutions. Their removal shall comply with the requirements of due process of law and the principle of non-discrimination...

The UN Impunity Principles further recognize that the rule of irremovability of judges should not be allowed to be abused to foster or contribute to impunity in situations of transition,\(^{251}\) and Article 30 specifically provides:

> The principle of irremovability, as the basic guarantee of the independence of judges, must be observed in respect of judges


\(^{251}\) UN Impunity Principles, Principle 22.
who have been appointed in conformity with the requirements of the rule of law. Conversely, judges unlawfully appointed or who derive their judicial power from an act of allegiance may be relieved of their functions by law in accordance with the principle of parallelism. They must be provided an opportunity to challenge their dismissal in proceedings that meet the criteria of independence and impartiality with a view toward seeking reinstatement.

The Consultative Council of European Judges in a 2015 report referred to "the exercise of lustration which is an extreme measure used historically after a change of the system from a totalitarian regime (e.g. communism) to democracy" and has expressed concern that such practices "have now been applied to other circumstances" in Europe. It added that, "Except in extreme circumstances, these procedures are always in conflict with the principle of permanent tenure of office, which is an important element of the independence of judges."\(^{252}\)

Some authorities, for instance opinions of the Council of Europe Venice Commission, suggest that vetting might also be justified in situations of extremely widespread and deep judicial corruption.\(^{253}\) The Venice Commission has at the same time warned that "such a radical solution would be ill-advised in normal conditions, since it creates enormous tensions within the judiciary, destabilises its work, augments public distrust in the judiciary, diverts the judges' attention from their normal tasks, and, as every extraordinary measure, creates a risk of the capture of the judiciary by the political force which controls the process."\(^{254}\)

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\(^{252}\) CCJE, Situation report on the judiciary and judges in the Council of Europe member States, CCJE (2015)3, para. 27. See note 194 above regarding the term "lustration".


Among the minimum procedural and fairness protections necessary in any process of vetting judges are the following:\textsuperscript{255}

- The right to prior and detailed notice of the allegations or conduct attributed to the person in question;

- The right to respond and defend oneself from the allegations and attribution of conduct, in keeping with the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings, which implies: having the time and facilities needed to prepare one’s arguments; access to the documents needed for this purpose; the opportunity to present one’s own evidence; and the right to be assisted by counsel;

- The right to the presumption of innocence;

- The right to a public hearing;

- The right to have the procedure conducted in a sufficiently and reasonably expeditious manner;

- The right to review of a decision to remove or dismiss by a body independent of the organ in charge of the appointment;

- The right to appeal an adverse decision to a court;

- The body in charge of the procedure must satisfy the fullest conditions and guarantees of independence and impartiality, and should in cases of vetting of judges, be

\textsuperscript{255} See Federico Andreu-Guzmán, \textit{supra} note 198, pp. 469-470; UN Secretary-General, \textit{Report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies}, UN Doc S/2004/616 (2004), paras 52-53; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1096 (1996) on measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems, paras 12 and 13, together with the Council of Europe "Guidelines to ensure that lustration laws and similar administrative measures comply with the requirements of a state based on the rule of law" (Guidelines included in Doc. 7568, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights), particularly Guideline M. See also Commonwealth Study, \textit{supra} note 53, pp. 61-63.
judicial, or predominantly judicial, in character, so as to guarantee the principle of separation of powers;

- The judge that is subject to the vetting procedure should have the right to challenge the independence and impartiality of the members or the body in charge of the procedure;

- The stage of investigation and verification of conduct attributed to a public servant should be ensured by a body or officials different from the body that rules on any dismissal;

- The officials in charge of the investigation and the members of the vetting body should be chosen for their impartiality, competence, and personal independence.

It should also in principle be possible for the alleged victims of the acts attributed to the judge, or members of their families, as well as any person who has a legitimate interest, to present their points of view and to produce documents or evidence in the procedure.\(^{256}\)

Vetting and other such transitional or exceptional measures should be limited in time. The specific period will depend on a variety of factors including the number of judges to be vetted. As an example, in reviewing proposed Constitutional and legislative amendments to establish an anti-corruption vetting process in Albania, the Council of Europe Venice Commission found an eleven year lifespan for special institutions and processes to vet all judges and prosecutors too long, and recommended the anticipated length of the temporary measures be reduced to three to five years.\(^{257}\) In a case before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, structural reforms to the Venezuelan judiciary had been on-going for twelve years, with key elements such as disciplinary tribunals remaining

\(^{256}\) Andreu-Guzmán, supra note 198, p. 470.

\(^{257}\) Regarding time, see, e.g. Venice Commission, Final Opinion on the Revised Draft Constitutional Amendments on the Judiciary of Albania, CDL-AD(2016)009 (2016) paras 54-56, see also Interim Opinion, CDL-AD(2015)045, para. 102
unimplemented. In the meantime, the judicial system was staffed through a system of widespread arbitrary appointment and removal of provisional judges. The Court held that the cumulative impact of this situation not only violated the rights of the particular judges affected, it also violated the State’s broader obligation to the population as a whole to ensure availability of an independent judiciary. The Court accordingly ordered Venezuela to complete the implementation of a new, rights-compliant regime, within a reasonable time.  

The procedures for appointment of the bodies that will oversee and conduct the vetting are also of key importance, to ensure the credibility, independence and impartiality of the processes and that they are not exploited or compromised by the executive or legislative branches, or other centres of power or corrupting influences. The principle of separation of powers should preclude vetting mechanisms and processes for the judiciary from being conducted or subsumed in a more general vetting body or process: specific procedures and mechanisms must be established for the judiciary. Selection procedures similar to those recommended more generally for selection of members of judicial councils, may be suitable.

The right of an appeal or independent review by a court should be respected for judges who are dismissed through a vetting process. Even if a specialized court is created to hear appeals generally from judges affected by the vetting procedure, this should not preclude judges from bringing complaints to

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258 IAmCtHR, Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, Series C No. 227 (1 July 2011), paras 140-142, 162-163.
260 Andreu-Guzmán, supra note 198, pp. 455, 467.
constitutional courts or Supreme courts about violations of fundamental rights within the vetting or appeal process.\textsuperscript{262}

International observers, including for instance experienced lawyers who are not nationals of the country in question, and are qualified to be judges in their own country, can be given a formal role within the vetting process as a further safeguard against abuses or manipulation of the vetting process for ulterior motives.\textsuperscript{263}

The vetting of judges undertaken by Kenya between 2011 and 2016, following a period of crisis and transition and rampant judicial corruption, though it was not free from flaws, included a number of positive elements.

Legislation, enacted pursuant to a Constitutional mandate, set out the mechanisms and procedures for vetting of all judges and magistrates in office at the entry into force of the law in 2010, to be overseen by an independent vetting board.\textsuperscript{264}

The statute prescribed the criteria for membership. The Board has nine members, six of whom had to be citizens of Kenya (with three of these required to be lawyers), and three of whom had to be non-citizens. Necessary qualifications for Kenyan members included a university degree, fifteen years of distinguished experience in their field of study, and certain integrity requirements. The chairperson and deputy required twenty years’ experience as a judge, legal academic, judicial officer or other legal practitioner. Members of Parliament, local authorities, executive organs of political parties, or persons who were serving as a judge at the time the statute came into effect,


\textsuperscript{264} The summary in this and the following paragraphs is based on the Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act, Laws of Kenya, Chapter 8B; the Kenya Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board, Interim Report September 2011-February 2013; and the published announcements of the Board.
were ineligible. The non-Kenyan members were to be serving or retired judges, having served as a Chief Justice or judge of a superior court in the Commonwealth.

Appointments were made by the President in consultation with the Prime Minister and with the approval of the National Assembly. A public call for applications was issued, and the process managed by the Public Service Commission. A selection committee with a mixture of representatives of the executive, Public Service Commission, Judicial Service Commission and Law Society selected a list of candidates from which the President would choose the appointees. (The overall degree of executive involvement throughout the appointment process may, however, have exceeded what is contemplated by international standards and best practices.) There was a requirement that the membership reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of Kenya and that not more than two-thirds of the members be of the same gender.

Once the vetting board was established, it made public calls to receive information and complaints from individuals as well as from institutions and NGOs, following which the board made an analysis of the complaints to decide which to dismiss and which to pursue. The Board treated information received as confidential, subject to the necessary degree of disclosure to affected judges.

In its interim report, the Board remarked that despite having statutory powers to compel production of documents and information, it had struggled to obtain key evidence. Many potential witnesses and complainants were reluctant to formally provide information, some explicitly citing fears of retribution. Officials within relevant government offices and court registries, and, for instance, telephone companies (whose phone records were sought), resisted requests for documents and information. The Board struggled to obtain access to personnel files, or in some cases, even court records. Despite their being specifically named in the statute, and proactively invited to provide information, relatively little input was received from professional bodies. The Board noted that its Statute did not provide for any form of witness protection or even limited immunity, which
could have encouraged further disclosure on the part of witnesses and complainants.

In cases where the information gave reasons to consider a response was required, the judge was informed accordingly, with a summary of the relevant complaints, and requested to respond and to provide additional background and financial information (usually within ten days from receipt, though extensions were granted by the Board). The file would then be assigned to a panel responsible for interviewing the judge (in private, unless the judge requested a public hearing), and based on all information available it sent findings and recommendations to the vetting board, which was ultimately responsible for taking the decision on the suitability on unsuitability of the judge. The statute set out in detail a wide range of factors for the Board to take into account in reaching its decisions (again, potentially much broader than contemplated by international standards and best practices).

Judges dissatisfied with the Board's determination had the right to request review, and some judges challenged the Board's decisions or jurisdiction before the courts. Decisions of the Board were required by the statute to be made public. The Board published the last of its decisions in March 2016 and, at the time of writing of this Guide, is still drafting its final report.

**Mass removal and re-application**

While vetting processes are being conducted, judges remain in office and are only subject to removal after an individualized assessment and procedure. An even more severe measure that has occasionally been implemented by States is to simultaneously remove all or a large number of judges, leaving their posts vacant, and require them to re-apply for the former posts (usually alongside new applicants).

Whatever its stated purposes, any process that gives the appearance of imposing collective, rather than individualized, penalties for wrongful conduct requires particularly close scrutiny for its consistency with the rule of law and human
rights. Mass removal and re-application is not appropriate for typical situations of transition. If such a technique is acceptable it all, it could only be in the most extreme cases, such as total and deliberate collusion of the judiciary, in its entirety, with a profoundly undemocratic or authoritarian regime, with the judiciary being directly responsible for very grave impacts on the human rights of a significant proportion of the population (or a minority targeted in a discriminatory way).

The Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has suggested that in only in the most extreme situations where mass removal and re-application appears to be "the only course of action left" to deal with widespread and systematic involvement of the judiciary in the violations of a previous regime, might this option be a valid alternative to individualized vetting of judges. If mass removal and re-application is used, the Special Rapporteur has said, it should only be undertaken "through an independent mechanism made up of qualified persons of recognized moral authority and, if possible, with the support of an international institution supervising the proceedings."265

In a 2003 decision on a case against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the UN Human Rights Committee found mass dismissal of some 315 judges, by Presidential decree, to violate the ICCPR.266

The law in the DRC provided that the President could dismiss a judge only upon proposal of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary (CSM), following an individualized and fair process. The CSM was not involved in the process dismissing the 315 judges, who had no prior notice of the President's decree. The only stated basis for dismissal in the decree was that, "reports by the various commissions which were set up by the Ministry of Justice and covered the whole country show that the above-

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mentioned judges are immoral, corrupt, deserters or recognized to be incompetent, contrary to their obligations as judges and to the honour and dignity of their functions", that "the conduct in question has discredited the judiciary, tarnished the image of the system of justice and hampered its functioning", and that the President was acting on the basis of "urgency, necessity and appropriateness". The Government claimed that the President had issued the Decree "in response to a crisis situation characterized by war, partial territorial occupation and the need to intervene as a matter of urgency in order to combat impunity" in which "it was materially impossible for the authorities to follow the ordinary disciplinary procedure and that the urgency of the situation, the collapse of the judiciary and action to combat impunity were incompatible with any decision to suspend the punishment of the judges concerned." The affected judges were further unable to challenge the Decree before the Supreme Court, as would have been possible for individual dismissals, since the Court ruled the Decree implemented a general political policy and so was beyond control by administrative law.

The Human Rights Committee rejected any contention that the circumstances referred to in the Decree could justify a departure from the ordinary procedures for dismissal, noting that the government had failed to demonstrate that the measures were "strictly required". The failure to follow the ordinary process in the absence of such a detailed demonstrable justification, as well as evidence of bias on the part of the Supreme Court even had the ordinary process theoretically been followed (the President of the Court publicly, before the case had been heard, supported the dismissals), and the denial of any effective appeal or review by the Supreme Court, led the Committee to find that the dismissals violated various provisions of the ICCPR. \(^\text{267}\)

Also relevant is article 16.3 of the Bangalore Implementation Measures:

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\text{The abolition of a court of which a judge is a member should not be accepted as a reason or an occasion for the removal of}\]

\(^{267}\) Ibid, para. 5.2.
the judge. Where a court is abolished or restructured, all existing members of that court should be re-appointed to its replacement or appointed to another judicial office of equivalent status and tenure. Where there is no such judicial office of equivalent status or tenure, the judge concerned should be provided with full compensation for loss of office.  

The High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (an international functionary created in 1995 to oversee the Dayton Agreement which had ended the war) in 2002 declared all judicial posts in the country vacant, and all incumbent judges were required to reapply for appointment (in competition with non-incumbent applicants) in processes conducted by newly-formed High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils. A Supreme Court judge was refused re-appointment and, after unsuccessfully requesting reconsideration by the judicial council, challenged the decision in a complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee. While there had been complaints about several of his judgments, the final decision was taken on the basis of a complex rating system, which took into account a number of factors, including the following appointment criteria which were prescribed by law:

- professional knowledge and performance;
- proven capacity through academic written works and activities within professional associations;
- proven professional ability based on previous career results, including participation in training;
- work capability and capacity for analysing legal problems;

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268 Beijing Statement, article 30, is virtually identical. See also Human Rights Committee, Pastukhov v. Belarus UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/814/1998 (2003). The forthcoming judgment of the ECtHR (Grand Chamber) in Baka v. Hungary, App. No. 20261/12 may also be relevant (judgment announced for 23 June 2016, but not available at the time of writing).

• ability to perform the duties of office impartially, conscientiously, diligently, decisively and responsibly;

• communication abilities;

• relations with colleagues, conduct out of office, integrity and reputation; and

• managerial experience and qualifications.

At the Committee, the judge alleged among other things that his non-renewal constituted interference with his independence as a judge, and that the absence of an appeal from its decision violated his right to an effective remedy. The Committee rejected the first argument as inadmissible on the basis that the judge had failed to substantiate that his non-appointment was exclusively based on the controversial judgments, and not on the other objective criteria in the ranking system. As he had failed to establish any violation in the judicial council process, the Committee found his complaint of lack of appeal also inadmissible.270

In a case that came before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, during a period of political instability in Ecuador the Congress removed all judges of the Supreme Court, the Electoral Tribunal and the Constitutional Tribunal, within a period of 14 days.271 The judges were not provided with any opportunity to challenge the decision, collectively or individually, whether prior to or after the mass dismissal. The only grounds presented were "accusations of alleged acts of corruption or the alleged politicization of the judges" which were

270 Ibid, paras 7.6-7.8. The question of lack of appeal had apparently been argued by the complainant, and so was treated by the Committee, only in relation to "right to effective remedy" under article 2 of the ICCPR, and not guarantees of judicial independence more generally; as such the Committee's inadmissibility decision cannot necessarily be taken to address the right to appeal under other articles, or other standards, such as the UNBP Judiciary.

271 See IAmCtHR, Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al) v. Ecuador, Series C No. 266 (23 August 2013), paras 156-180; and Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al) v. Ecuador, Series C No. 268 (28 August 2013), paras 170-222.
presented "in a broad and generic manner". The Inter-American Court found the Congressional resolution to have been "the result of a political alliance that was intended to create a Supreme Court sympathetic to the political majority existing at that time and to impede criminal proceedings against the acting president and a former president." It emphasized that the dismissal resolution was not based "on an exclusive assessment of specific factual evidence". The Inter-American Court therefore found the "mass and arbitrary" dismissal of the judges to constitute "an attack on judicial independence". For all these reasons, the Court held, the measure violated the American Convention on Human Rights.
7. Particular challenges in relation to developing countries

Introduction

As was mentioned in the Introduction to this Guide, all countries, whatever their circumstances, need to have effective judicial accountability mechanisms, consistent with the requirements of judicial independence. Judicial human rights violations and judicial corruption are present in countries in all regions of the world. At the same time, implementation of judicial accountability mechanisms in any given country, to be effective, should be sensitive to that country's particular circumstances.

This chapter presents some examples of the particular challenges faced in relation to judicial accountability in certain developing countries, and various strategies States have adopted in response. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these examples also further illustrate some of the challenges in holding the judiciary accountable for human rights violations or corruption already described in earlier sections. They illustrate how widespread judicial corruption is not an isolated phenomenon but rather occurs in the context of broader corruption, usually marked by weak accountability mechanisms across the board.

The examples presented in this Chapter are intended to facilitate the sharing of knowledge between practitioners in different developing countries. They may also be of interest to

272 The research on which this Chapter is based focussed primarily on Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Chad, Kenya, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Rwanda. In this Guide, the use of the term "developing country" is not intended to imply value statements about the direction that States may choose to take in terms of economic, social or other policies, nor to suggest that all countries with broadly similar economic conditions are necessarily similar in other ways. In this Guide, the term is used in a limited sense to refer to the countries classified as such in economic terms by, for instance, the United Nations, World Economic Situation and Prospects 2016, Statistical Annex, Country Classifications, Table C.
practitioners in other countries, who are considering the transnational aspects of corruption (a considerable part of corruption that impacts in developing countries is facilitated, if not initiated, by actors in developed countries) or who are involved in providing development assistance in justice reform processes.273

The context for judicial accountability

For many developing countries, a more general failure to effectively respond to criminal activity fosters an environment where crime and corruption are widespread; this eventually results in the population coming to view corruption a part of the system, and contributes to a chronic distrust in the judicial system. Judicial staff are frequently not sufficiently qualified and are poorly paid, and staffing levels may not be nearly enough to deal with the number of cases before the courts. Courts may operate in rundown buildings and without basic equipment. These factors create enormous backlogs that reinforce the general belief that the judicial system is not only corrupt but also inefficient.

Judicial corruption tends to have a particularly deep and widespread impact in developing countries. It frequently either constitutes or leads directly to human rights violations, and it undermines the rule of law. Where corruption takes the form of bribes, it effectively discriminates against the poor in that it deprives them of legal services or access to justice because they cannot afford to pay bribes. Moreover, where judicial corruption is widespread in a country it can have effects across and beyond the legal system as a whole. A corrupt judiciary lacks the independence and impartiality required to administer justice fairly. This reduces the ability of most individuals to rely on the legal system to enforce their rights and to hold public and

273 See also, among others, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), A Transparent and Accountable Judiciary to Deliver Justice for All (2016), and Linn Hammergren, Justice Reform and Development: Rethinking Donor Assistance to Developing and Transitional Countries (Routledge, 2014).
private institutions accountable. In the long run, a lack of public trust in the judiciary can lead most of the population to shun State institutions and instead have recourse to alternative means of resolving disputes or seeking justice. This in turn can have negative impacts on stability, on the fair distribution of the benefits (and costs) of development, on democracy, on the protection of the human rights, and on the rule of law.\textsuperscript{274}

Indeed, many come to see widespread corruption as a 'normal' part of everyday life and part of a country’s culture.\textsuperscript{275} The public, lawyers, judges and other actors may simply adjust their individual expectations and cost-calculations, rather than investing energy and resources in establishing and implementing effective measures to end the problem.

Pervasive judicial corruption often affects developing countries that suffer more generally from corruption impacting all aspects of governance.\textsuperscript{276} In such circumstances, corruption in the justice system is not limited to the judiciary but also affects other actors in the legal system - court clerks, lawyers, prosecutors – with the corruption of one group fostering corruption in the others. Clerks may extort money to provide information to the accused or to process basic steps in a lawsuit; lawyers may in turn elicit bribes from defendants and plaintiffs, a portion of which goes to pay judges to delay or accelerate

\textsuperscript{274} SRIJL, Report on Judicial Corruption, supra note 19, paras 29-39.
\textsuperscript{276} Of the examples under consideration in this chapter, for instance, most ranked in the top 30 of the world’s most corrupted countries according to the 2014 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index Afghanistan ranked 12th, Myanmar 21st, Chad 22nd, Central African Republic 24th, Kenya and Bangladesh ranked 25th, Pakistan and Nepal 29th, and Rwanda 49th. See http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results.
cases or appeals. The spread of corruption among actors within the system may happen as a kind of ripple effect, or it may involve deliberate collusion. As such, in any particular national context, corruption of judges cannot be fully understood or addressed in isolation. Efforts to combat judicial corruption should take into account the overall situation and be implemented alongside measures targeting corruption among other actors in the legal system, and beyond.

Corruption in the justice sector in developing countries, as in other countries, primarily takes two forms. The first is the bribing of judges by private parties (which may involve cash, or land or goods, or services, including sexual services). The second is political interference, usually involving pressure from executive or the legislative authorities to force judges to take decisions favourable to those powers. In practice, the experiences in the countries examined for this chapter tend to suggest that the two forms frequently, but do not always, co-exist.

Although bribes and political interference may be the most common forms of interference with judicial independence, they are by no means the only ones. In some countries other forms

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of undue influence on judges also occur. Among the most extreme is when the lives and physical integrity of judges and their families are directly threatened. This has been the case in Afghanistan where judges are threatened, intimidated and killed by the Taliban.\textsuperscript{280} This level of interference with judges’ personal safety necessarily affects their judicial decisions and how they perform their tasks. Judges who allow personal relationships or connections to particular economic, political, social, cultural or religious organisations and networks to influence their decision-making without disclosing the influence may also be engaging in a form of corruption of justice.

In Pakistan, interference with judicial independence can be seen in both these forms, particularly in cases related to blasphemy.\textsuperscript{281} Often, members of extremist religious groups use threats and intimidation to coerce or pressure judges to decide against the accused, even in the absence of any evidence supporting conviction. On other occasions, judges display bias against the defendants, giving the strong appearance that a judge's personal religious views have determined the outcome of the proceedings.\textsuperscript{282}

Heavy caseloads, unethical practices, absent or ineffective accountability mechanisms, insecurity of tenure and lack of capacity building have all been put forward as factors that contribute to judicial corruption. But the most commonly identified cause in developing countries is low salaries.\textsuperscript{283} This factor is a particular challenge for governments and legislatures

\textsuperscript{281} Under section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, "defaming the Prophet Muhammad" carries a mandatory death penalty.
\textsuperscript{282} ICJ, \textit{On Trial: the implementation of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws} (November 2015), Section 5.3.
in developing countries, where increases to judges’ salaries may present a significant budgetary and public-perception challenge especially when considered relative to the immediate impact of budget increases or decreases in other sectors.

In the countries particularly studied for this Chapter, low salaries are often cited as a source of discontentment among judges. In Afghanistan, 90 per cent of judges say that they are dissatisfied with their salary284 and in Bangladesh the salary of a district judge has been considered inadequate to support the lifestyle of a judge.285 In Myanmar lawyers specifically identified low salaries as one of the causes of judicial corruption.286 In Nepal, a former Nepalese prime minister said that officials who receive a meagre salary are compelled to look for alternatives to compensate their costs.287 In the Central African Republic in 2009 there were severe delays in payment of judicial salaries.288

On the other hand, judges in developing countries can sometimes be amongst the most economically secure people in their country, especially relative to other public officials and the general public, and may leverage their power not to redress insufficient salaries but rather to further consolidate already considerable relative wealth.289

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289 In 2010, for instance, UNODC reported that half of all large bribes ($1000 or more) in Afghanistan are received by enforcement officers, especially judges.
The nexus of political interference and private corruption can have a mutually reinforcing and amplifying effect. Senior judges and members of the legislative and executive branches may have little incentive to take effective measures against judicial bribery and corruption more generally, if the broader context of bribery and corruption facilitates those same actors’ interference with judges’ decisions in cases involving the government's interests. A large percentage of judges may be involved in corrupt practices in a country, particularly if it is generally seen as "normal" for judges to supplement their income with other advantages gained through corruption from private parties, but this makes all such judges vulnerable to any unspoken threat that the authorities will expose individual judges who issue decisions contrary to the vested interests of the other branches of government or political leaders. Indeed, the ICJ has often encountered governments that selectively prosecute or impeach on grounds of corruption, only those judges who have fallen out of favour with the political leadership, while taking no action to disrupt widespread similar behaviour by other judges who do not challenge the government's aims or interests (see also pp. 80-81 above).

Interference may begin at the very early stages of the judicial career by ensuring that the persons appointed as judges are individuals who are loyal or sympathetic to the policies of the rulers. Controlling the selection and appointment process of judges allows power holders to choose candidates who favour government’s policies and to instil in judges a feeling of debt that needs to be repaid. In return for being appointed, judges are expected to act in line with the objectives of the political authorities. One way to control the appointment process is to set up a legal framework that in itself facilitates political appointments. There is a particular risk of conditions conducive to such corruption if Parliament and Executive have a wide exclusive discretion to make judicial appointments, or if any ...

and prosecutors, and that the amounts paid in bribes differ by the category of public official: on the lower end (less than US$100 per bribe) are teachers, doctors and nurses, whereas judges, prosecutors, members of the Government and customs officers are at the higher end of the scale (average bribes higher than US$200). See UNODC, "Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims", January 2010, supra note 235, pp. 4, 9-10.
procedures for independent appointments are compromised or ignored.

Where formal constitutional safeguards exist for judicial independence, such as tenure for life, practical measures such as involuntary transfers may be inappropriately manipulated by the authorities to mete out retribution against judges whose decisions are contrary to the vested interests of those in power.\(^{290}\)

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Challenges to access to justice have manifested in the form of lack of courts in some districts, and under-staffing, which put pressure on the courts. While the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) is driving the decentralisation of the High Court, with the recent addition of the Mutare High Court which opened its doors in May 2018 as the fourth permanent High Court in the country after Harare, Bulawayo and Masvingo, and other High Court stations are mooted.

Out of over 60 administrative districts in the country, Zimbabwe has about 55 district courts (Magistrates Courts). Of these 55 courts, some courts serve districts that are expansive and have huge populations. Circuits courts are operational in some districts to reach out to people in need of justice.

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\(^{290}\) In Bangladesh, prosecutors threatened a judge with transfer if the judge did not grant bail to an accused. The judge sought protection from the Supreme Court, which has powers to punish those who interfere with a judge’s function, but instead of protecting the judge the Supreme Court agreed to the transfer (Transparency International, *Global Corruption Report 2007, Corruption in Judicial Systems*, p. 181). See also pp. 26-27 above.
According to the JSC Annual Report of 2018, although 60 new magistrates were appointed, bringing to a full complement the country’s magistrates for the first time; the magistrate-case ratios were still above recommended levels. As at 31 December 2018, there were 1,619 members of staff in the courts against an authorised established of 2,068 – thus the JSC was operating at only about 80% of its capacity, thereby compromising the quality of court operations.

Conditions of operation for judges have generally not been raised as a challenge. While salaries are eroded easily on account of the prevailing unstable economic conditions in the country, judges are normally cushioned through various forms of financial and material allowances, allowing for some fair measure of economic stability and security.

A current contested arena is judicial appointments. This process is an important gate-keeper, which if properly done, ensures that people of integrity are appointed to the judiciary. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 1) Act of 2017 amended sections 172, 173, 174, 180, 181 and the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (2013), and eliminated judicial interviews and a public process in the appointment of the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and Judge President of the High Court. This cut back from the significant developments introduced in the 2013 Constitution to ensure transparency, openness, accountability and broad participation in the judicial appointments process.
However, the Constitutional Court in the judgment Gonese & Anor v Parliament of Zimbabwe & 4 Others CCZ4/20, nullified the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.1) Act of 2017 on 25 March 2020. This was on the basis that the law’s passage by the Senate on 1 August 2017 was inconsistent with the provisions of section 328(5) of the Constitution, to the extent that the number of affirmative votes did not reach the minimum threshold of two-thirds of the membership of the House. The Court suspended the operation of the judgment for a period of 180 days in order to allow Senate to rectify the illegality.

In January 2020, a second amendment to the Constitution was proposed, Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 2) Bill, which seeks to further amend section 180 of the Constitution (2013). If passed, the amendment would see promotion of superior court judges from one superior court to another being elevated solely by the President, without the need for public interviews and without the requirement to abide by recommendations from the Judicial Service Commission. Further, the proposed amendments would allow for the President to grant one-year contracts for up to 5 years to judges who have reached retirement age, with the President renewing such contracts on his own accord, subject to a positive medical certificate in respect of the concerned judges. These proposals, if passed, would push the country back to the era of obscure processes and procedures in judicial appointments, which tend to erode confidence in the bench, and fuel perceptions of lack of independence and executive interference and control of the bench.

**Impunity as a key cause of judicial corruption**

Raising salaries and other measures aimed at lessening incentives to judicial corruption is not in itself enough to guarantee a corruption-free judiciary. Research shows that another major cause of judicial corruption is impunity: judges
are more likely to take bribes if they know they will not be punished either due to the failure of existing accountability mechanisms or lack of political will to hold them accountable. In fact, with the exception of Kenya and Rwanda, the countries studied for this chapter have not actually implemented specific measures to combat judicial corruption despite the fact their judiciaries are seen to be among the most corrupted in the world. These include countries that have strong legislation criminalizing corruption by public officials, including judges, and have accountability mechanisms in place, but fail to apply the law in practice.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan's Anti-Bribery and Corruption Law criminalizes corruption of public officials, including judges. Afghanistan also has two accountability mechanisms for judges: the Supreme Court, which is responsible for discipline of the judiciary, and the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, an anti-corruption body responsible for receiving complaints against judges and other officials. Despite this legal and institutional framework, there appears to have been no documented example of any judges in fact being held accountable for corruption in Afghanistan.

The culture of impunity of judges in Afghanistan has been attributed to a lack of political will to combat corruption and the inefficiency of the judicial hierarchy and the Supreme Court. The

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291 In 2002/2003, Kenya removed numerous judges under a so-called "radical surgery" reform programme to combat judicial corruption, which adopted controversial methods inconsistent with the standards and best practices set out in this Guide. Following criticisms of the "radical surgery" programme, both in terms of its lack of fairness or objectivity, and its perceived lack of success in addressing the problems with the judiciary, Kenya undertook a vetting process (see pp. 96-99 above) that, while not free of flaws, was designed to be more extensive, structured, systematic, objective, independent and fair than the "radical surgery" had been.

292 Rwanda dismissed all members of the judiciary in 2004, citing alleged corruption, in an exercise that was clearly inconsistent with the standards and best practices set out in this Guide.
lack of effective official State measures to fight impunity has led to a pilot project for non-governmental organizations to arrange and conduct trial monitoring. The reasoning behind this relatively low-cost attempt to monitor courts throughout the country is that greater scrutiny at the lower level will result in a decrease of corruption.  

Nepal

In Nepal, under the Constitution of 2015 Supreme Court judges (including the Chief Justice) are subject to impeachment by Parliament (with suspension during the proceedings, and removal if impeached) for, among other grounds, "misbehaviour". The Judicial Council is responsible for pursuing cases of corruption or abuse of office against judges other than those of the Supreme Court. Nepal also has a Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority with responsibility more generally to investigate allegations of corruption by those holding public office, which can bring proceedings against judges only after they have been removed from their office by Parliament or the Judicial Council, but it has apparently never attempted to exercise its powers vis-à-vis the judiciary. Judicial corruption is criminalized under the Anti-Corruption Act, but such acts have not historically been punished as a result of poor enforcement of existing legislation and lack of political will to combat corruption. The Nepalese Parliament’s power to impeach a Supreme Court justice for corruption, whether under the 2015 Constitution or its predecessors, has not been used in practice, and the Judicial Council has failed to act against many lower courts’ judges.

293 UNDP, A Transparent and Accountable Judiciary to Deliver Justice for All (2016), pp. 41-46.
296 2015 Constitution of Nepal, article 239(2).
297 Article 2(b) and article 3(1) of the Anti-Corruption Act
Bangladesh

In Bangladesh, the Constitution allows Parliament to impeach and remove judges “for proved misbehaviour” and the Penal Code criminalizes corruption by judges.\(^{299}\) In 2004 an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was created to investigate and frame charges against individuals.\(^{300}\) By 2007, it was reported that although the ACC had framed charges against hundreds of individuals, it had only achieved a few convictions, either due to interference by the executive or lack of merit of the cases.\(^{301}\) Disciplinary actions taken against judicial misconduct were considered inadequate up to 2011, although the judiciary reportedly remained extremely corrupt; judges not only accepted bribes but were also highly influenced by the executive in terms of appointments, administration and decision-making.\(^{302}\)

Pakistan

In Pakistan, the Constitution authorizes the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) to carry out inquiries into the capacity and conduct of Supreme Court and High Court judges. The Council consists of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, the two most senior judges of the Supreme Court and the two most senior chief justices of the high courts. Proceedings are initiated before the Council if there is information from “any source”, or if it is the opinion of the President of Pakistan that a judge from the superior judiciary is

\(^{299}\) Articles 96(5)(b) and 96(6) of the Constitution, which had allowed removal of judges for gross misconduct following an inquiry by the judicial council, was repealed by the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Amendment now provides that judges can only be removed by order of the President passed pursuant to a resolution of the Parliament supported by at least two thirds of the members of Parliament. The Bangladeshi Penal Code criminalizes corruption by public servants, including judges (articles 21(3) and 165).


incapable of performing his or her duties due to mental or physical incapacity or that he or she may be guilty of misconduct. An adjudication of guilt by the SJC is the only method by which a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a high court can be removed from office.  

However, the Supreme Judicial Council in Pakistan has been barely functional since its establishment. Furthermore, the proceedings before the SJC are not open to the public, and neither the number of references before the Council, nor the time taken to decide those references is disclosed. This has contributed to a public perception that the SJC is an ineffective and redundant body. The Chief Justice of Pakistan has also stated that because of the SJC’s inactivity, 90 per cent of the complaints before it have become fruitless, as the judges against whom the complaints were made subsequently retired.  

Effectiveness of accountability mechanisms

In the same way that judicial corruption rarely occurs in isolation, impunity of judges often is merely one part of a broader fabric of impunity in a country. Lack of accountability of judges usually takes place in a context of general impunity i.e. in settings in which as a whole there is no accountability for human rights violations, or crimes or misconduct. Developing countries undergoing transition or reform after a period of widespread or systematic violations of human rights, are particularly vulnerable to widespread impunity, because the courts tend to be particularly weak, if they are at all operational, when it comes to guaranteeing people’s rights. One such case is the Central African Republic, where a severe lack of funds for the justice system over a number of years has reportedly led to widespread corruption and impunity. 

305 Avocats Sans Frontières, "The state of justice in the Central African Republic", supra note 239.
If in some countries on-going conflict and severe lack of funds can help explain the lack of accountability of judges for corruption, other developing countries are more stable and have accountability mechanisms. No matter how flawed or under-resourced, those mechanisms have sufficient capabilities that should in principle allow them to achieve some degree of accountability. Apart from the judicial system itself, such mechanisms typically include anti-corruption commissions and disciplinary bodies for judges. The question in such situations is therefore not whether accountability mechanisms exist but whether they are operational and are effective.

The countries studied for this chapter all criminalize judicial corruption in their penal codes or in separate anti-corruption laws, so the possibility of the judicial system holding judges accountable exists, at least theoretically, in all of them.\(^{306}\) However, with the exception of Kenya\(^{307}\) and Rwanda\(^{308}\), there are no public reports of judges being prosecuted for corruption in any of these countries at the time of writing.

In addition to the possibility of pursuing criminal proceedings against corrupt judges, these countries each have a specific mechanism for dealing with discipline of judges. This is most

\(^{306}\) Articles 3(1), 12 and 13 of the Afghanistan Anti-Bribery Law criminalize corruption by government officers, including the judiciary and the Prosecution’s office, and articles 254 and 255 of the Penal Code criminalize corruption by “officials of public services”; articles 21(3) and 161 of the Bangladesh Penal Code criminalize corruption by public servants, including judges; article 315 of the Central African Republic Penal Code criminalizes corruption by “all public servants, administrative or judicial”; article 39(1) of the Kenya 2003 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act criminalizes corruption; article 3(e) of the Myanmar Anti-Corruption Law criminalizes bribery by employees “working in the legislation, executive and judiciary”; article 3 of the Nepal Anti-Corruption Act criminalizes corruption by public officials, while article 639 criminalizes corruption by judges and judicial system actors, and judicial corruption is also criminalized by article 13 of Law No. 23/2003 Related to the Punishment of Corruption and Related Offences.

\(^{307}\) See e.g. pp. 120-121 below, regarding the work of the Kenya Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission.

commonly a judicial council (those these are not constituted fully in line with the standards and best practices set out in this Guide) but can also be another organ such as the Supreme Court or an ad hoc tribunal. Myanmar and Nepal also provide for parliamentary impeachment of the Chief Justice and judges of the Supreme Court. The authority of these bodies ranges from making recommendations for consideration by other bodies, to effectively having the power directly to decide on appointments, transfers and promotions and discipline of judges.

The degree of specification of grounds for sanctions varies. Some of the judicial councils' constituent legal provisions give them responsibility for cases of “misconduct” or “misbehaviour” or even more generally simply for “discipline”. In countries where misconduct or misbehaviour results from serious violations of codes of conduct, the

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309 Article 22 of the Central African Republic Constitution provides for a judicial council which is headed by the President; article 146 of the Chad Constitution says that the President presides over the Superior Council of Magistrature and that the Minister of Justice is the First Vice-President, and article 149 says that "in disciplinary matters, the presidency of the Superior Council of Magistrature is assured by the President of the Supreme Court"; article 153 of the 2015 Nepal Constitution mandates the judicial council to conduct discipline for all judges other than Supreme Court justices (who are directly impeachable by Parliament); article 209 of the Pakistan Constitution provides for a Supreme Council of the Judiciary; as does article 157 of the Rwanda Constitution.

310 In Afghanistan, the organ responsible for discipline of judges is the Supreme Court (article 132 of the Afghan Constitution and article 24(8) of the Afghanistan Anti-Bribery Law).

311 Article 62(4) of the Kenya Constitution requires an ad hoc tribunal to decide on the removal of a High Court judge, and article 69 gives the Judicial Service Commission the power to exercise disciplinary control "over persons holding or acting in those offices”.

312 Articles 302-311 of the Myanmar Constitution; article 101 of the 2015 Nepal Constitution. In 2014, the Sixteenth Amendment to the Bangladesh Constitution removed responsibility for impeachment of judges from the judicial council and gave it to the Parliament.

313 Article 96(5)(b) of the Bangladesh Constitution.

314 Article 105(2) and 105(10) of the Myanmar Constitution.

315 Article 149 of the Chad Constitution. Similarly, article 69(1) of the Kenya Constitution says that the Judicial Service Commission has “the power to exercise disciplinary control”.
consequences can go as far as removal of judges from their position.\textsuperscript{316} The Afghanistan Constitution gives the disciplinary body, the Supreme Court, not only authority for the accountability of judges in general but also specifically provides that that the Supreme Court is responsible for considering cases of judges accused of crimes and deciding whether they should be dismissed in addition to any other punishment due under the law.\textsuperscript{317} Despite the powers granted to these disciplinary bodies, there is no public information available showing that these are being used for holding judges accountable for misconduct, be it corruption or other misfeasance.

In some of the countries examined for this Chapter, anti-corruption bodies with a more general mandate have the power to investigate and sometimes even to prosecute individuals for corruption. In 2014 the Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) reported having almost 3000 cases of corruption of all types under trial, but only 73 convictions.\textsuperscript{318} In Afghanistan, the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC) can receive complaints against judges\textsuperscript{319} but there are no reports of the HOOAC having acted on any such complaint. \textsuperscript{320} The President of Chad created a Commission to investigate and


\textsuperscript{317} Articles 132 and 133 of the Afghanistan Constitution; article 24(8) of the Afghanistan Anti-Bribery and Corruption Law.

\textsuperscript{318} ACC 2014 Annual report, p. 71 available at http://www.acc.org.bd/assets/acc_annual_report_-_2014.pdf . These numbers refer to overall number of cases of corruption. The ACC report does not provide specific numbers on judicial corruption.


\textsuperscript{320} Afghanistan’s 2013 report under the UNCAC refers to the establishment of an “Office on Monitoring and control of Judicial Affairs”, with a mandate including to “prevent and fight against corruption”, and that a Special Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office with the authority of investigation and prosecution of cases has been vested to the Attorney General’s Office. However, no public information seems to be available on the work of these offices. See Afghanistan 2013 UNCAC self-assessment report (p. 5) https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/SA-Report/2013_11_28_Afghanistan_SACL.pdf .
prosecute judicial personnel (CEPPAJ) in 2002 in the name of addressing judicial corruption, but it was dissolved in 2005 following criticism from the judiciary. CEPPAJ had jurisdiction over court personnel but not over judges, whose discipline falls under the judicial council.321 Finally, the Nepal Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority is responsible for conducting investigations of improper conduct and corruption by public officials, potentially including judges (but only once they have been removed from office by Parliamentary impeachment or by the Judicial Council).322 It has the power to investigate and prosecute.323 It is not known to have pursued any cases against former judges for wrongdoing during their time in judicial office.

In other countries, anti-corruption bodies report more activity to combat judicial corruption. The Kenya Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, which has the power to investigate corruption committed by public and private persons324 in recent years has reported on investigation of judicial corruption including alleged cases of bribes,325 irregular purchases of houses for judges,326 payment of rents by the judiciary in excess

321 ICJ, "Attacks on Justice 2005 – Republic of Chad", http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/48a928120.pdf . Among the countries considered for this Chapter, only one has not had an anti-corruption commission, Central African Republic. Myanmar has an Anti-Corruption Commission responsible for “forming and assigning the duties of preliminary scrutinizing team and investigation teams” (Art 16(a) Myanmar Anti-Corruption Law) but no information has been found on the results of the work of the Commission.

322 Article 239(2) of the 2015 Nepal Constitution.
323 Article 25 of the Nepal Anti-Corruption Act.
324 Articles 7(1), 38(1) and 39(3) of the Kenya 2003 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act.
of the rental agreement, and illegal procurement of judges’ residences by judicial officers.

Zimbabwe has no specific body created to address judicial corruption. However, this role is carried out by the judicial disciplinary committees under the Judicial Ethics Codes, the National Prosecuting Authority, the Judicial Service Commission, and the national human rights institutions that have all been discussed above.

Perceptions of judicial corruption and lack of independence abound. A number of perception surveys commissioned by various reputable entities have in the recent years reported high perceptions of corruption in the judiciary. Recently, the Magistrates Association of Zimbabwe (MAZ) strongly dismissed statements by various candidates to the Prosecutor-General post who stated in their interviews before the Judicial Service Commission that various magistrates “sell justice”.

The independence of the judiciary from executive interference has been a standing question since the turn of the millennium, with some describing the approach of the courts as “executive-minded”, characterising the court’s relationship with the executive as “incestuous”.

Economic cartels have also been feared to engage in corrupt activities, involving sections of the judiciary.

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In February 2020, the Prosecutor-General was reported in State media to have remarked that “What we have in Zimbabwe is the problem of cartels who affect every sector of the society. We have got sections in the judiciary, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, the National Prosecuting Authority and even the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) who are controlled by cartels and manipulate investigations and this is pulling the country’s economy down”. This fuels perceptions of corruption, both in the sense of bribery from corporates, cartels and individuals, and pressures emanating from the executive.

Opening the 2020 legal year in January, Chief Justice Luke Malaba announced the theme for the year as “Judicial Transparency and Accountability”, signalling the desire to maintain and enhance transparency and accountability in the judiciary, and recognising that “whilst an independent Judiciary is the essence of the rule of law, it is the same Judiciary which is required to act in a transparent and accountable manner in the exercise of judicial functions”.

In spite of the widespread perception of corruption, in recent years no judge has been brought before a tribunal for removal from office on account of corruption. Equally, no judge has been prosecuted on a corruption-related charge.

**Other measures to combat judicial corruption**

In 2002, in the name of responding to corruption and loss of public trust in the judicial system, Kenya carried out a reform programme that became known as “radical surgery”. The programme, which was undertaken by ad hoc tribunals, led to the removal of a former Chief Justice and the suspension of 23 other judges on the grounds of corruption. Many of the judges resigned or retired. The manner in which the processes were carried out was criticized by experts and stakeholders on many
aspects, including for not respecting the Constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Other criticisms included alleged failures to inform the judges of the proceedings, and violation of the obligation of keeping proceedings confidential at the initial stage. More recently, following the adoption of the 2010 Constitution, Kenya initiated a process to vet all judges, through institutions and procedures that, while not without their own flaws, were designed to be more independent, systematic, transparent and fair, and to apply a wider and more objective range of criteria.

Rwanda created a specific legal framework to be implemented by the Ombudsman. In 2004, all 503 members of the judiciary were dismissed for corruption and incompetence, giving rise to concern that the removals appeared not to have in fact been individually justified but may have instead been politically motivated. Similar concerns arose when the country’s Chief Justice announced in 2013 that in the previous two years ten judicial staff, including judges and court clerks, had been dismissed for corruption.

The experience of several developing countries with truth commission processes was noted in Chapter 5. In Kenya, for example, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission found that among the factors contributing to the commission of past gross violations of human rights was the use of repressive laws and policies by Presidents Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Moi, as well as the consolidation of powers in the President coupled with the deliberate erosion of the independence of the judiciary. The Commission found that, rather than upholding

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331 The New Times (Rwanda), "Judiciary sacks 10 over corruption", supra note 259.
332 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Report, Vol. I, p. ix. One of the measures adopted that affected the independence of the judiciary was
the rule of law in the face of these laws and policies, the judiciary had been an accomplice to torture and other violations; it had admitted as evidence information obtained through torture, it had unfairly conducted trials at night, and it had wrongfully refused bail to detainees.\footnote{Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Report, Vol I, p. xiii and Vol. IIA, p. 598, para. 30.}

In 2015, the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Anwar Zaheer Jamali, declared the new judicial year to have a focus on self-accountability through the reactivation of the Supreme Judicial Council. It remains to be seen whether the Chief Justice’s pronouncement yields any practical results.

The Supreme Court of Myanmar, in its Strategic Plan for 2015-2016, has cited “judicial independence and accountability” as one of its key areas for strategic development. As an initial step the Supreme Court is developing a Judicial Code of Conduct that aims to incorporate international standards and best practices to help increase the judiciary’s independence and accountability.\footnote{The ICJ is supporting the Supreme Court in its development of the Code of Conduct. See ICJ, “Myanmar’s Supreme Court engages in High Level Dialogue with the ICJ on Drafting and Implementing a New Judicial Code of Ethics”, 25 November 2015, http://www.icj.org/myanmars-supreme-court-engages-in-high-level-dialogue-with-the-icj-on-drafting-and-implementing-a-new-judicial-code-of-ethics/ .}

**Corruption in rural courts and resort to alternative justice systems**

Within countries with widespread judicial corruption, lower-level courts, and by implication rural areas, tend to be most deeply affected.\footnote{See for example, UNODC, "Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims" supra note 235, p. 26; Transparency International, *Global Corruption Report 2007, Corruption in Judicial Systems*, p. 238 on Nepal; The New Times (Rwanda), "Judiciary sacks 10 over corruption", supra note 259; ICJ,} The physical distance of these areas from central...
authorities brings with it an isolation that makes it difficult for victims to report corruption and for relevant centralized authorities to investigate and respond. Afghanistan, for instance, reports its highest levels of judicial corruption in rural areas, with justice institutions barely functional in some parts of the country. The on-going conflict combined with the sheer size of the territory makes it extremely difficult to promote accountability in those areas. The high levels of judicial corruption have been identified as one of the reasons why many in local populations opt for alternative justice systems in the form of tribal councils and village and religious leaders.\(^{336}\)

If judicial corruption particularly afflicts rural areas, to speak of judicial corruption in these places does at least imply the presence of some form of State judicial institutions in those areas. This is not however always the case. When the formal justice system is not present at all or too weak to provide basic services, alternative systems will proliferate even more quickly. In the case of the Central African Republic, the aftermath of the 2002/2003 conflict exacerbated the weaknesses of the formal judicial system, including lack of courts in some cities, leading to a tribalization of the judiciary and the establishment of parallel courts.\(^{337}\) Despite some improvements, by 2011 citizens continued to have difficulties accessing the formal justice system, including by having to travel up to 50 kilometres to the nearest courthouse. As a result, people continued to rely on traditional justice at the family and village level.\(^{338}\)

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In parallel, many factors contribute to a “rule of law vacuum” experienced by certain developing countries in transition, some directly linked to the judiciary and others that are not directly linked but that still affect the judicial system.\textsuperscript{339} In such circumstances, three main obstacles frequently prevent courts from functioning shortly after the conflict: lack of adequate buildings, shortage of qualified staff, and threats and assaults against judicial staff. In such circumstances, people may consider that informal mechanisms are the only realistic option for access to justice.

Public lack of trust in the judiciary due to corruption or perceived partiality, or a lack of practical access to formal justice processes, often lead people to look to informal justice mechanisms (i.e. traditional or customary courts). While informal justice systems tend to be more accessible and less costly to rural populations in practical terms, and may be less subject to popular perception as corrupt (in the narrow sense of involving payment of cash bribes to strangers), there is also considerable potential tension with international standards on judicial integrity and accountability, particularly as concerns human rights and the rule of law. Further, the methods of appointment (often hereditary) or removal (if any) in informal justice systems, and their procedures, often clash with international standards of independence, impartiality, merit and non-discrimination, and fairness, as well as concerns about discrimination against women, children and other further marginalized sub-groups.\textsuperscript{340}

\textsuperscript{339} The term “rule of law vacuum” was used by the UN Secretary-General in his report “The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies”, UN Doc S/2004/616 (23 August 2004), paras 27-33.

The lower courts, consisting of the magistrate’s courts and the local and community courts (traditional courts), are the fora in which the majority of the population interact with the judicial system. These are the courts closer to the people, and that deal with the majority of disputes that are taken before the courts for resolution. These are also courts over which there is lesser scrutiny, compared to the superior courts at High Court level upwards. Unsurprisingly, most allegations and perceptions of corruption have emanated from these courts. (see, e.g. The Herald ‘Lawyers bemoan sale of justice at lower courts’ 17 August 2017 https://www.herald.co.zw/lawyers-bemoan-sale-of-justice-at-lower-courts/ and DailyNews ‘Businessman, Magistrate In Corruption Storm’ 29 January 2020, https://dailynews.co.zw/businessman-magistrate-in-corruption-storm/)

While it is impossible to quantify the effects of this, some citizens have lost faith in the system, such that they would resort to alternative forms of dispute resolution. It is also conceivable that a number of people would not approach the courts for redress, with the individuals concerned believing that they would not get redress in the courts, for various reasons, including real or perceived corruption.
8. Analysis of consistency of judicial accountability frameworks in Zimbabwe with regional and international standards

Many aspects of the legal and policy framework for judicial accountability in Zimbabwe are consistent with regional and international frameworks. The Constitution provides a framework predicated on separation of powers, non-interference, and structural protection of judges, including mechanisms through which judges can be held accountable, within the judicial system. Statutory frameworks also operationalise the Constitution, giving it content and substance insofar as the accountability of judges is concerned.

Nevertheless, the relevant Zimbabwean legal and policy frameworks depart from regional and international standards on judicial independence and accountability in a number of important respects, including those detailed below, which should be considered for reform.

Judicial Appointments

Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 1) Act of 2017 amended sections 172, 173, 174, 180, 181 and the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (2013), and eliminated judicial interviews and a public process in the appointment of the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and Judge President of the High Court. This cut back from the significant developments introduced in the 2013 Constitution to ensure transparency, openness, accountability and broad participation in the judicial appointments process. However, the Constitutional Court in *Gonese & Anor v Parliament of Zimbabwe & 4 Others CCZ4/20*, nullified the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.1) Act of 2017 on 25 March 2020. This was on the basis that the law’s passage by the Senate on 1 August 2017 was inconsistent with the provisions of section 328(5) of the Constitution, to the
extent that the number of affirmative votes did not reach the minimum threshold of two-thirds of the membership of the House. The Court suspended the operation of the judgment for a period of 180 days in order to allow Senate to rectify the illegality.

In January 2020, the government gazetted Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 2) Bill, 2020, proposing to further amend section 180 of the Constitution (2013). If passed, the amendment would see promotion of superior court judges from one superior court to another being elevated solely by the President, without the need for public interviews and without the requirement to abide by recommendations from the Judicial Service Commission. Further, the proposed amendments would allow for the President to grant one-year contracts for up to 5 years to judges who have reached retirement age, with the President renewing such contracts on his own accord, subject to a positive medical certificate in respect of the concerned judges. These proposals, if passed, would return key judicial appointments to the era of obscure processes and procedures, inconsistent with international and regional standards, which could be expected to erode confidence in the independence and accountability of the judiciary.

**Presidential nomination of judicial candidates** - The President is allowed to nominate judicial candidates in terms of the Constitution. The President is ultimately the appointing authority, and allowing him to nominate candidates has been described as tantamount to the JSC “playing a metal ball”, i.e. that the JSC may end up simply rubberstamping predetermined choices of the President. The nomination of candidates by the President alone may bring to bear bias on the part of the Commissioners, especially those appointed to the Commission by the President, who might view presidential nominations in different light from the public nominations. This way the
President may have substantial influence on the process and ultimately on who is appointed.

**Recommendation**

Judicial appointment processes and mechanisms should be transparent, and must among other things guard against the possibility of appointments for improper motives in terms of article 10 of the *UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary*. Amendments cutting back from the 2013 Constitution in the appointment of the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice and the Judgment President of the High Court should be reversed.

The government should not amend the Constitution to allow the President to promote judges from one superior court to another without public interviews, and without abiding by the recommendations of the JSC. Article 4(h) of the *Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa* requires that “The process for appointments to judicial bodies shall be transparent and accountable and the establishment of an independent body for this purpose is encouraged. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard the independence and impartiality of the judiciary”.

The constitutional provision for presidential nominations of judicial candidates is potentially an architectural defect in the Constitution, and may need revisiting. Having an appointing authority being involved in the nomination process may potentially compromise the independence of the recommending authority. It may therefore be best for an appointing authority not to be involved in the nomination process. If the President does not deem suitable the candidates put forward by the JSC, he or she should simply refuse to appoint and ask the JSC to do another round of interviews, as allowed by the Constitution.
Role of the President in removal of judicial officers from office, disciplinary sanctions, and other administrative measures

When it comes to the processes of removal of a judge from office, the Constitution in section 187 provides that if the President considers that the question of removing the Chief Justice from office ought to be investigated, the President must appoint a tribunal to inquire into the matter. If the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) advises the President that the question of removing any judge, including the Chief Justice, from office ought to be investigated, the President must appoint a tribunal to inquire into the matter. The tribunal must be made up three people and of these three, one must have served as a judge of the High or Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, or has served or serves as a judge in a court with unlimited jurisdiction from a jurisdiction with a similar legal culture (section 187 (4)). The tribunal must inquire into the question of removing the judge concerned from office and after having done so, report its findings to the President and recommend whether or not the judge should be removed from office. The President must then act in accordance with the tribunal’s recommendations. The exclusive role and authority of the President in selecting the tribunal members is inconsistent with international and regional standards. The procedure poses risks of manipulation and bias, or the perception thereof, considering the role of the President in exclusively appointing of members of the tribunal. The international best practice is that the executive should not be involved at all, or at most in a purely formal and symbolic capacity, and should certainly not play such substantive and determinative roles, in the disciplining and removal of judges from office.

Recommendation
International and regional standards recognize that the Executive should not have any role in the discipline and removal of judges, aside perhaps from at most a purely formal and symbolic function and certainly no substantive role, in regard to judicial removals or other forms of judicial discipline. The President should not play a prominent and definitive role in the removal of judges from office. The powers of the President to unilaterally select the members of a tribunal to inquire into the question of removal from office of a judge, and his powers to initiate the process in respect of the Chief Justice, is susceptible to abuse and to bringing to bear undue influence on the part of the tribunal so appointed. This is addressed in instruments that include the Human Rights Committee General Comment 32; *International Bar Association Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence*, article 4(a), and the UNODC *United Nations Convention against Corruption: Implementation Guide and Evaluative Framework for Article 11* (2015) which recommends that States consider vesting the power to remove a judge from office in an independent body, but notes that if the Head of State or legislature has power to remove judges, "good practice has indicated that such power should be exercised only after a recommendation to that effect of the independent body vested with power to discipline judges". The 2015 study of practices in Commonwealth jurisdictions, found that flexibility in composition of an ad hoc tribunal for removal of judges creates a risk of manipulation and bias, particularly if the executive is given the power to select the members or otherwise control the process. (See Chapter 4 ‘International accountability mechanisms’).

341 Para 76.
Independence of the Judicial Service Commission

The Judicial Service Commission as constituted under the Constitution (2013) ushered in a marked departure from the 1979 Constitution as it is significantly representative, with members representing the judiciary, the practising profession, the law teaching profession, the Civil Service Commission, as well as professionals in human resources management and auditing. The Constitution gives the JSC a more prominent and central role in judicial appointments. While the JSC has no politicians and members of Parliament per international standards, the body consists of many Presidential appointees, rendering the body susceptible to Presidential and political manipulations or the perception thereof. This composition means that the international and regional standards of a majority of judges at minimum (or, in some cases, "substantial representation" of judges), in the JSC is not met.

Recommendation

The composition of the JSC should be reviewed, if necessary through amending the constitutional composition. The number of presidential appointees should be reduced, and more judges should sit of the Commission. This ensures independence of the JSC, in line with the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct which state in the Preamble that the Principles "presuppose that judges are accountable for their conduct to appropriate institutions established to maintain judicial standards, which are themselves independent and impartial". This is in line with the requirement in various intentional instruments and regional standards that refer to an independent body with (at minimum) a majority of judges (or, in some cases, "substantial representation" of judges), who have been chosen democratically by other judges, with no participation in disciplinary proceedings by any political authorities (including
the Head of State, Minister of Justice or any other representative of the Executive or Legislative branches of government. (See *Measures for the Effective Implementation of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct*, para. 15.4; *Magna Carta of Judges*, (2010), article 13; *International Bar Association Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence*, article 31; *Universal Charter of the Judge*, article 11; and the *African Fair Trial Principles*, article A.4(u)) (See Chapter 4, ‘Judicial councils’).

**Tenure of judges and magistrates**

Under section 186(2) of the Constitution, judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court hold office from the date of their assumption of office until they reach the age of seventy years, when they must retire. Section 186(3) however provides that “A person may be appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court for a fixed term”. This creates a two-track system, where normal appointments enjoy security of tenure but the judges appointed on fixed terms depend on periodic renewal by the appointment authority to maintain their office. The option allows for the appointing authority to appoint certain judges he or she dislikes for short fixed periods, and control their tenure through renewal possibilities. The Constitution is silent on whether such a fixed term is renewable.

Neither the Constitution nor the Magistrates Court Act guarantee the security of tenure for magistrates.

**Recommendation**

The proposed constitutional amendments to allow the President to give one year contracts to retired judges for up to 5 years, makes such judges beholden to the President and the executive, or the perception thereof. The proposed amendments should be dropped. Judicial appointment should be transparent, and must
guard against the possibility of appointments for improper motives in terms of article 10 of the *UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary*. Article A4(h) of the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa requires that “The process for appointments to judicial bodies shall be transparent and accountable and the establishment of an independent body for this purpose is encouraged. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard the independence and impartiality of the judiciary”.

Judges should all enjoy security of tenure under a unified tenure system. The provision for certain judges to be appointed for fixed terms, effectively without appropriate security of tenure, while others enjoy security of tenure until retirement, must be dropped. Security of tenure is a fundamental element of the independence of the judiciary. (See United National Basic Principles for the Independence of the Judiciary, article 12; Measures for the Effective Implementation of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, article 13.2; Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, article A.4(l); Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles on the Three Branches of Government, article IV(b)) (See Chapter 3 ‘Removal from office, disciplinary sanctions, and other administrative measures’).

**Discipline of judges**

The Judicial Service (Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2012 gives the Chief Justice the powers to initiate a disciplinary procedure for a judge. If, in the opinion of the Chief Justice, the judicial officer concerned has conducted himself or herself in a manner that appears to violate any provision of the Judicial Service (Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2012, the Chief Justice is required to appoint a disciplinary committee, which will investigate the
matter. 343 The committee reports its findings and recommendations to the Chief Justice. However, “Notwithstanding the recommendations of a disciplinary committee, the final decision as to what disciplinary measure to take shall be within the exclusive discretion of the Chief Justice.” 344 Furthermore, there is not a clear requirement that the Chief Justice provide reasons for departing from the committee’s recommendation. Allowing for the Chief Justice to derogate from the recommendations of the disciplinary committee as to the sanction weakens the internal independence of the disciplinary process and mechanisms, or the perception thereof. It is a standard without an inherent check and balance mechanism, making it susceptible to potential abuse. This is in spite of the provision in the Code that the disciplinary procedure does not derogate from the relevant constitutional powers of removal, or “the right of the Prosecutor-General or any other person to institute criminal or civil proceedings against the judicial officer concerned, arising out of the conduct complained of.” 345

**Recommendation**

The Chief Justice should not be given exclusive discretion to depart from recommendation of a disciplinary committee in deciding what action to take against a judge, particularly in the absence of any requirement to provide reasons for departing from the recommendation. It is a standard without an inherent check and balance mechanism, making it susceptible to potential abuse or the perception thereof. Under Article 15.4 of the *Measures for the Effective Implementation of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct*, “The power to discipline a judge

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343 Code of Ethics, section 21(1).
344 Code of Ethics, Section 23.
345 Code of Ethics, section 24(3).
should be vested in an authority or tribunal which is independent of the legislature and executive, and which is composed of serving or retired judges but which may include in its membership persons other than judges, provided that such other persons are not members of the legislature or the executive”.

Use of judicial discipline procedures

Judges and magistrates retain their rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly, subject to the necessary constraints of the office they hold.\(^\text{346}\) In Zimbabwe there have however been attempts to unduly hinder magistrates from speaking on matters validly of concern to the administration of justice, rule of law, and judicial independence. In January 2018, two magistrates were found guilty by the JSC of illegally communicating through the press without clearance to do so by the JSC.\(^\text{347}\) The two, were the chairperson and secretary general of the Magistrates Association of Zimbabwe (MAZ) respectively. They were found guilty of issuing a press statement on behalf of their association without permission from JSC Secretary. MAZ issued a press statement in September 2018 dismissing allegations made during public interviews for the post of Prosecutor-General, that the magistrates courts were infested with corruption. The JSC decided that the two magistrates violated the employer code of conduct which prohibited them


\(^{347}\) See “Magistrates found guilty of speaking out” The Standard 14 January 2018, https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2018/01/14/magistrates-found-guilty-speaking/
from speaking to the press without clearance from the secretary. Although the two magistrates acted on behalf of an association, they were disciplined in their personal capacities, and other members of the MAZ executive were not disciplined. Part of the judgment reads as follows:

"It is common cause that both members are employees of JSC as magistrates and this is what qualified them to join MAZ. The conduct of both members in relation to JSC is regulated by the Judicial Services Act and regulations thereto”.

The import of this is to subject the Magistrates Association to the control of the JSC, which defeats the purposes of freedom of association for magistrates, including as explicitly recognised in the UN Basic Principles on independence of the judiciary, “to represent their interests... and to protect their judicial independence”. The JSC’s requirement for “clearance from the secretary” for the Magistrates Association to publicly put out statements, in particular, is incompatible with international and regional standards.

**Recommendation**

Judicial discipline processes must not be invoked to unduly limit judicial independence, inducing free speech and other constitutional rights. Specifically, judges and magistrates’ associations should not be subject to the control and prior censorship of the Judicial Service Commission. Articles 8, 9 and 19 of the *UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary* reaffirm judges freedom of expression, association and assembly, endorse the purposes of independent associations of judges, and provide that, "All disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct" as with article 15.5 of the *Measures for the Effective Implementation of the Bangalore*
Principles of Judicial Conduct. Article 15.1 of the Measures for the Effective Implementation of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct states that “Disciplinary proceedings against a judge may be commenced only for serious misconduct. The law applicable to judges may define, as far as possible in specific terms, conduct that may give rise to disciplinary sanctions as well as the procedures to be followed”.

Perceptions of judicial corruption

Perceptions of judicial corruption and lack of independence abound. A number of perception surveys commissioned by various reputable entities, including the ICJ, have in recent years reported high perceptions of corruption in the judiciary. Recently, the Magistrates Association of Zimbabwe (MAZ) strongly dismissed statements by various candidates to the Prosecutor-General post who stated in their interviews before the Judicial Service Commission that various magistrates “sell justice”.

Economic cartels have also been feared to engage in corrupt activities involving sections of the judiciary. In February 2020, the Prosecutor-General was reported to have remarked that “What we have in Zimbabwe is the problem of cartels who affect every sector of the society. We have got sections in the judiciary, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, the National Prosecuting Authority and even the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) who are controlled by cartels and manipulate investigations and this is pulling the country’s economy down”. This fuels perceptions of corruption, both in the sense of bribery from corporates, cartels and individuals, and pressures emanating from the executive.

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maintain and enhance transparency and accountability in the judiciary, and recognising that “whilst an independent Judiciary is the essence of the rule of law, it is the same Judiciary which is required to act in a transparent and accountable manner in the exercise of judicial functions”.

In spite of the widespread perception of corruption, in recent years no judge has been brought before a tribunal for removal from office on account of corruption. Equally, no judge has been prosecuted on a corruption-related charge.

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While it is impossible to quantify the effects of this, some citizens have lost faith in the system, such that they would resort to alternative forms of dispute resolution. It is also conceivable that a number of people would not approach the courts for redress, with the individuals concerned believing that they would not get redress in the courts, for various reasons, including real or perceived corruption.

\textit{Recommendation}

Judicial corruption, real or perceived, erodes confidence in the judiciary. The Judicial Service Commission must act to ensure that all cases of judicial corruption are dealt with decisively, while respecting and upholding judicial independence. The question whether the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission has jurisdiction to investigate judicial corruption and refer cases for prosecution should be clarified in law and in consultation with the judiciary. If the Anti-Corruption Commission is to have such jurisdiction, further legislative and other reforms, again undertaken in consultation with and with the assent of the judiciary, may be necessary to ensure adequate guarantees for the independence of the judiciary, including as regards the scope of and procedures for removal of judicial immunities, the independence of the Anti-Corruption Commission from the executive, and other such matters. Similar aspects should also be discussed and addressed, again in consultation with and with the assent of the judiciary, as regards any other general jurisdiction of prosecutors to bring such cases against members of the judiciary. (See relevant Chapters above).

**Delivery of judgments**

A concern has been raised about judges who do not render judgments in time, and operative parts of judgments handed down, but without full reasons. This concern was noted by Chief Justice Luke Malaba in January 2020 in his remarks at the opening of the 2020 judicial year as follows:

“The Judiciary is alive to the public’s expectation of quality and timeous judgments from the courts. This is a requirement set out in section 164 of the Constitution, which provides that the courts must apply the law impartially, expeditiously and without fear, favour or prejudice. The Judicial Codes of Ethics for both Judges and magistrates stipulate timelines which every judicial
officer is expected to meet in relation to the delivery of judgments. In that regard, it has been impressed upon every judicial officer to comply with this obligation. I am aware of the concerns raised by some stakeholders and members of the public regarding some judgments that have taken unduly long periods to be delivered. These concerns are merited and I give my assurance that they will be attended to without further delay.

Allow me to further advise that I meet with the Judge President of the High Court, the Senior Judge of the Labour Court, and the Judge of the Administrative Court, and the Chief Magistrate at least once every month. These meetings assess the operations of the courts and discuss the challenges which militate against justice delivery. It is through such engagements with the heads of the courts that challenges, including the tardiness of judicial officers in handing down judgments, are addressed. Robust mechanisms to monitor the delivery of all reserved judgments were recently put in place to curb the practice of reserving judgments beyond the time limits provided for by the law”.

Recently on 21 July 2020 the Chief Justice issued a memorandum – amended after the original versions raised questions as to the independence of judges - seeking to address the issue of judgments. The memorandum was justified on the basis of “concerns raised about the manner in which judgments are handled after being handed down”.

According to the Judicial Service Commission, “The background to the memorandum is that the Judicial Service Commission has been receiving a lot of complaints for quite a while from litigants, legal practitioners and members of the public in general on the non-availability of judgments which would have been read in court by Judges. Following these complaints and subsequent investigations, it was revealed that there were instances where a judge would deliver a judgment or the operative part of a judgment in court or in chambers but, the Judge, for various reasons some of which were genuine, would not immediately avail the judgment for distribution and accessibility to the concerned parties and the public”.  

The Chief Justice directed that:

“2.i. No judgment should be handed down when it is not yet ready to be distributed.

ii. Once a judgment is handed down it shall not be withdrawn for any reason. Handing down of a judgment is evidence that the judgment is ready for access by the parties and members of the public.

iii. All judgments handed down must be immediately accessible to the Registrars, litigants and the public.

iv. The practice of issuing orders with the undertaking that reasons will follow is to be desisted from forthwith. Only the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court can issue such orders as they are courts with final jurisdiction. The only exception is when a Judge will be dealing with a point in limine. Such an order will be

appropriate as it enables the court to expeditiously finalise the main matter.

v. For the avoidance of doubt, it is proper for a Judge when dealing with a point in limine to give an order and advise that the reasons will be stated in the main judgment.

vi. Where a Judge decides to issue an order in an ex tempore judgment, he or she must ensure that the reasons given are comprehensive on the understanding that they will be accessible to the parties, the Registrar and members of the public.”

**Recommendation**

The practice of handing down rulings without full written reasons should be proscribed, except in exceptional circumstances. Further, timelines within which judgments should be handed down must be clearly communicated, including to litigants, and these timelines must be strictly complied with. The *Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa* in Principle A2i) provide that “The essential elements of a fair hearing include an entitlement to a determination of their rights and obligations without undue delay and with adequate notice of and reasons for the decisions”. Similarly, the principle applies to traditional courts under *Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa*, Principle Qb)(x) which provides that as a minimum, litigants before traditional courts are entitled “to a determination of their rights and obligations without undue delay and with adequate notice of and reasons for the decisions”. (See Chapter 3 ‘Accountable to whom?’ and ‘Review of decisions through appeal or judicial review’).

**Remedy and reparation for victims of judicial violation of rights**
While the Constitution under section 85, and the common law of vicarious liability as codified under the State Liabilities Act [Chapter 8:14] allows for victims of human rights abuses through judicial misconduct, to claim compensation from the State, an impediment is in section 5(2) of the State Liabilities Act. The provision states that “Subject to this section, no execution or attachment or process in the nature thereof shall be issued against the defendant or respondent in any action or proceedings referred to in section two or against any property of the State, but the nominal defendant or respondent may cause to be paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund such sum of money as may, by a judgment or order of the court, be awarded to the plaintiff, the applicant or the petitioner, as the case may be”. This provision is a stumbling stick to satisfaction of a court-sanctioned State obligation to pay compensation. The provision protects the State against attachment in satisfaction of a judgment debt. In the past, the State has defaulted on its obligations to pay, or has delayed when ordered to compensate by the courts. This has left litigants with no effective remedy. The provision in the statute is not in line with the Constitution to the extent that it limits access to an “effective remedy” to a litigant.

**Recommendation**

Parliament should repeal the offending section 5(2) of the State Liabilities Act [Chapter 8:14], at least as regards remedies for violation of constitutional and human rights, in order to allow litigants to attach from the State in satisfaction of judgment debts. Elsewhere in South Africa, section 3 of the South African State Liabilities Act 20 of 1957, which was similar to the Zimbabwean provision, was held unconstitutional by the South African Constitutional Court in *Nyathi v MEC for Department of Health, Gauteng and Another* 2008 (5) SA 94 (CC). The decision was on the basis that section 3 of the State Liability Act 20 of
1957, which prohibited the attachment, execution or like process against the state or any state property for the satisfaction of judgment debts sounding in money, failed to provide effectively for the satisfaction of those judgments. International law and standards require that States ensure the availability of effective remedies for human rights violations (as well as certain violations of international humanitarian law) and reparation for harm suffered. This is in instruments that include the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, article 8; *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, article 2(3); *UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law*, General Assembly resolution 60/147; and the *Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa*, section C. (See Chapter 3 ‘Right to effective remedy and reparation’).

**Procedural rights of complainants and victims**

There is currently no Victim and Witness Protection statute in Zimbabwe. Victim and witness protection is derived from the protection currently available across various statutes, including procedural safeguards both in the Constitution and in statutes. International best practice and human rights compliant practice stipulate that witnesses and whistle-blowers must be protected when they give information to the authorities. Not only is this to protect those who assist authorities to combat illegal activity, but it is also to encourage responsible citizenship by ensuring that citizens are vigilant and cooperate with authorities.

**Recommendation**

A comprehensive and effective Victim and Witness protection law should be passed by Parliament. This should include victims and witnesses who report and testify to judicial corruption,
judicial misconduct, and violation of rights by the judiciary. (See Chapter 5 ‘Procedural rights of complainants and victims’).

Article 12(b) of the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation refer to the obligation of the State to "take measures to minimize the inconvenience to victims and their representatives, protect against unlawful interference with their privacy as appropriate and ensure their safety from intimidation and retaliation, as well as that of their families and witnesses, before, during and after judicial, administrative, or other proceedings that affect the interests of victims". The earlier UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power UN General Assembly resolution 40/34 also provides in relation to victims of crime including criminal abuse of power, in article 6(d) that “[t]he responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes to the needs of victims should be facilitated by [t]aking measures to minimize inconvenience to victims, protect their privacy, when necessary, and ensure their safety, as well as that of their families and witnesses on their behalf, from intimidation and retaliation”. The UN Convention against Corruption in article 32(1) provides that States must provide effective protection from potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses (including victims) and experts who give testimony, and, as appropriate, for their relatives and other persons close to them.
Annex 1a: UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary


Whereas in the Charter of the United Nations the peoples of the world affirm, *inter alia*, their determination to establish conditions under which justice can be maintained to achieve international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination,

Whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines in particular the principles of equality before the law, of the presumption of innocence and of the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law,

Whereas the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights both guarantee the exercise of those rights, and in addition, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights further guarantees the right to be tried without undue delay,

Whereas frequently there still exists a gap between the vision underlying those principles and the actual situation,

Whereas the organization and administration of justice in every country should be inspired by those principles, and efforts should be undertaken to translate them fully into reality,

Whereas rules concerning the exercise of judicial office should aim at enabling judges to act in accordance with those principles,
Whereas judges are charged with the ultimate decision over life, freedoms, rights, duties and property of citizens,

Whereas the Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, by its resolution 16, called upon the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control to include among its priorities the elaboration of guidelines relating to the independence of judges and the selection, professional training and status of judges and prosecutors,

Whereas it is, therefore, appropriate that consideration be first given to the role of judges in relation to the system of justice and to the importance of their selection, training and conduct,

The following basic principles, formulated to assist Member States in their task of securing and promoting the independence of the judiciary should be taken into account and respected by Governments within the framework of their national legislation and practice and be brought to the attention of judges, lawyers, members of the executive and the legislature and the public in general. The principles have been formulated principally with professional judges in mind, but they apply equally, as appropriate, to lay judges, where they exist.

**Independence of the judiciary**

1. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.

2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

3. The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an
issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law.

4. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law.

5. Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals.

6. The principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are respected.

7. It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly perform its functions.

**Freedom of expression and association**

8. In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, members of the judiciary are like other citizens entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly; provided, however, that in exercising such rights, judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of their office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

9. Judges shall be free to form and join associations of judges or other organizations to represent their interests, to promote their professional training and to protect their judicial independence.

**Qualifications, selection and training**
10. Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.

**Conditions of service and tenure**

11. The term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law.

12. Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists.

13. Promotion of judges, wherever such a system exists, should be based on objective factors, in particular ability, integrity and experience.

14. The assignment of cases to judges within the court to which they belong is an internal matter of judicial administration.

**Professional secrecy and immunity**

15. The judiciary shall be bound by professional secrecy with regard to their deliberations and to confidential information acquired in the course of their duties other than in public proceedings, and shall not be compelled to testify on such matters.

16. Without prejudice to any disciplinary procedure or to any right of appeal or to compensation from the State, in accordance with national law, judges should enjoy personal immunity from civil suits for monetary damages for improper acts or omissions in the exercise of their judicial functions.
**Discipline, suspension and removal**

17. A charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and professional capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure. The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing. The examination of the matter at its initial stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested by the judge.

18. Judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their duties.

19. All disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct.

20. Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an independent review. This principle may not apply to the decisions of the highest court and those of the legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings.
Annex 1b: Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct

Adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity in 2001, as revised at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at The Hague, November 25-26, 2002, and subsequently endorsed by ECOSOC resolution 2006/23.

WHEREAS the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes as fundamental the principle that everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of rights and obligations and of any criminal charge,

WHEREAS the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that all persons shall be equal before the courts and that in the determination of any criminal charge or of rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled, without undue delay, to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law,

WHEREAS the foregoing fundamental principles and rights are also recognized or reflected in regional human rights instruments, in domestic constitutional, statutory and common law, and in judicial conventions and traditions,

WHEREAS the importance of a competent, independent and impartial judiciary to the protection of human rights is given emphasis by the fact that the implementation of all the other rights ultimately depends upon the proper administration of justice,

WHEREAS a competent, independent and impartial judiciary is likewise essential if the courts are to fulfil their role in upholding constitutionalism and the rule of law,

WHEREAS public confidence in the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the judiciary is of the utmost importance in a modern democratic society,
WHEREAS it is essential that judges, individually and collectively, respect and honour judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial system,

WHEREAS the primary responsibility for the promotion and maintenance of high standards of judicial conduct lies with the judiciary in each country,
AND WHEREAS the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary are designed to secure and promote the independence of the judiciary and are addressed primarily to States,

THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES are intended to establish standards for ethical conduct of judges. They are designed to provide guidance to judges and to afford the judiciary a framework for regulating judicial conduct. They are also intended to assist members of the executive and the legislature, and lawyers and the public in general, to better understand and support the judiciary. These principles presuppose that judges are accountable for their conduct to appropriate institutions established to maintain judicial standards, which are themselves independent and impartial, and are intended to supplement and not to derogate from existing rules of law and conduct that bind the judge.

**Value 1 Independence**

**Principle**

Judicial independence is a prerequisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.

**Application**

1.1. A judge shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of the judge’s assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats
or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

1.2. A judge shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a dispute that the judge has to adjudicate.

1.3. A judge shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to a reasonable observer to be free therefrom.

1.4. In performing judicial duties, a judge shall be independent of judicial colleagues in respect of decisions that the judge is obliged to make independently.

1.5. A judge shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.

1.6. A judge shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.

**Value 2 Impartiality**

**Principle**

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

**Application**

2.1. A judge shall perform his or her judicial duties without favour, bias or prejudice.

2.2. A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
2.3. A judge shall, as far as is reasonable, so conduct himself or herself as to minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for the judge to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

2.4. A judge shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before, the judge, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process, nor shall the judge make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.

2.5. A judge shall disqualify himself or herself from participating in any proceedings in which the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where:

(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy; or
(c) The judge, or a member of the judge’s family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy;

provided that disqualification of a judge shall not be required if no other tribunal can be constituted to deal with the case or, because of urgent circumstances, failure to act could lead to a serious miscarriage of justice.

**Value 3 Integrity**

**Principle**

Integrity is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office.
Application

3.1. A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct is above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer.

3.2. The behaviour and conduct of a judge must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

Value 4 Propriety

Principle

Propriety, and the appearance of propriety, are essential to the performance of all of the activities of a judge.

Application

4.1. A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities.

4.2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, a judge shall conduct himself or herself in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

4.3. A judge shall, in his or her personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practise regularly in the judge’s court, avoid situations that might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favouritism or partiality.

4.4. A judge shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of the judge’s family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.

4.5. A judge shall not allow the use of the judge’s residence by a member of the legal profession to receive clients or other members of the legal profession.
4.6. A judge, like any other citizen, is entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but, in exercising such rights, a judge shall always conduct himself or herself in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

4.7. A judge shall inform himself or herself about the judge’s personal and fiduciary financial interests and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of the judge’s family.

4.8. A judge shall not allow the judge’s family, social or other relationships improperly to influence the judge’s judicial conduct and judgement as a judge.

4.9. A judge shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge, a member of the judge’s family or of anyone else, nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties.

4.10. Confidential information acquired by a judge in the judge’s judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed by the judge for any other purpose not related to the judge’s judicial duties.

4.11. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, a judge may:

(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
(c) Serve as a member of an official body, or other government commission, committee or advisory body, if such membership is not inconsistent with the perceived impartiality and political neutrality of a judge; or
(d) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.

4.12. A judge shall not practise law while the holder of judicial office.

4.13. A judge may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations representing the interests of judges.

4.14. A judge and members of the judge’s family shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favour in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by the judge in connection with the performance of judicial duties.

4.15. A judge shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to the judge’s influence, direction or authority to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favour in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with his or her duties or functions.

4.16. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, a judge may receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.

Value 5 Equality

Principle

Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the judicial office.

Application

5.1. A judge shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising from various sources, including
but not limited to race, colour, sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and other like causes (“irrelevant grounds”).

5.2. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.

5.3. A judge shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.

5.4. A judge shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to the judge’s influence, direction or control to differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge, on any irrelevant ground.

5.5. A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy.

Value 6 Competence and diligence

Principle

Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.

Application

6.1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.

6.2. A judge shall devote the judge’s professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only the performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of
decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court’s operations.

6.3. A judge shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance the judge’s knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for that purpose of the training and other facilities that should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.

6.4. A judge shall keep himself or herself informed about relevant developments of international law, including international conventions and other instruments establishing human rights norms.

6.5. A judge shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

6.6. A judge shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. The judge shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to the judge’s influence, direction or control.

6.7. A judge shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial duties.

**Implementation**

By reason of the nature of judicial office, effective measures shall be adopted by national judiciaries to provide mechanisms to implement these principles if such mechanisms are not already in existence in their jurisdictions.

**Definitions**

In this statement of principles, unless the context otherwise permits or requires, the following meanings shall be attributed to the words used:
“Court staff” includes the personal staff of the judge, including law clerks;

“Judge” means any person exercising judicial power, however designated;

“Judge’s family” includes a judge’s spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law and any other close relative or person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household;

“Judge’s spouse” includes a domestic partner of the judge or any other person of either sex in a close personal relationship with the judge.
Annex 1c: Measures for the Effective Implementation of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (excerpts)

*Adopted by the Judicial Integrity Group at its Meeting held in Lusaka, Zambia, 21 and 22 January 2010*

**Part One: Responsibilities of the Judiciary**

1. **Formulation of a Statement of Principles of Judicial Conduct**

1.1 The judiciary should adopt a statement of principles of judicial conduct, taking into consideration the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct.

1.2 The judiciary should ensure that such statement of principles of judicial conduct is disseminated among judges and in the community.

1.3 The judiciary should ensure that judicial ethics, based on such statement of principles of judicial conduct, are an integral element in the initial and continuing training of judges.

2. **Application and Enforcement of Principles of Judicial Conduct**

2.1 The judiciary should consider establishing a judicial ethics advisory committee of sitting and/or retired judges to advise its members on the propriety of their contemplated or proposed future conduct.\(^{351}\)

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\(^{351}\) (Footnote numbered "2" in original). In many jurisdictions in which such committees have been established a judge may request an advisory opinion about the propriety of his or her own conduct. The committee may also issue opinions on its own initiative on matters of interest to the judiciary. Opinions address contemplated or proposed future conduct and not past or current conduct unless such conduct relates to future conduct or is continuing. Formal opinions set forth the facts upon which the opinion is based and provide advice only with regard to those facts. They cite the rules, cases and other authorities that bear upon the advice rendered and quote the applicable principles of judicial conduct. The original formal opinion is sent to the person requesting the opinion, while an edited version that omits the names of persons, courts, places and any
2.2 The judiciary should consider establishing a credible, independent judicial ethics review committee to receive, inquire into, resolve and determine complaints of unethical conduct of members of the judiciary, where no provision exists for the reference of such complaints to a court. The committee may consist of a majority of judges, but should preferably include sufficient lay representation to attract the confidence of the community. The committee should ensure, in accordance with law, that protection is accorded to complainants and witnesses, and that due process is secured to the judge against whom a complaint is made, with confidentiality in the preliminary stages of an inquiry if that is requested by the judge. To enable the committee to confer such privilege upon witnesses, etc., it may be necessary for the law to afford absolute or qualified privilege to the proceedings of the committee. The committee may refer sufficiently serious complaints to the body responsible for exercising disciplinary control over the judge.352

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9. Immunity of Judges

other information that might tend to identify the person making the request is sent to the judiciary, bar associations and law school libraries. All opinions are advisory only, and are not binding, but compliance with an advisory opinion may be considered to be evidence of good faith.  

352 (numbered "3" in original). In many jurisdictions in which such committees have been established, complaints into pending cases are not entertained, unless it is a complaint of undue delay. A complaint is required to be in writing and signed, and include the name of the judge, a detailed description of the alleged unethical conduct, the names of any witnesses, and the complainant’s address and telephone number. The judge is not notified of a complaint unless the committee determines that an ethics violation may have occurred. The identity of the person making the complaint is not disclosed to the judge unless the complainant consents. It may be necessary, however, for a complainant to testify as a witness in the event of a hearing. All matters before the committee are confidential. If it is determined that there may have been an ethics violation, the committee usually handles the matter informally by some form of counselling with the judge. If the committee issues a formal charge against the judge, it may conduct a hearing and, if it finds the charge to be well-founded, may reprimand the judge privately, or place the judge on a period of supervision subject to terms and conditions. Charges that the committee deems sufficiently serious to require the retirement, public censure or removal of the judge are referred to the body responsible for exercising disciplinary control over the judge.
9.1 A judge should be criminally liable under the general law for an offence of general application committed by him or her and cannot therefore claim immunity from ordinary criminal process.

9.2 A judge should enjoy personal immunity from civil suits for conduct in the exercise of a judicial function.

9.3 The remedy for judicial errors (whether in respect of jurisdiction, substance or procedure) should lie in an appropriate system of appeals or judicial review.

9.4 The remedy for injury incurred by reason of negligence or misuse of authority by a judge should lie only against the State without recourse by the State against the judge.

9.5 Since judicial independence does not render a judge free from public accountability, and legitimate public criticism of judicial performance is a means of ensuring accountability subject to law, a judge should generally avoid the use of the criminal law and contempt proceedings to restrict such criticism of the courts.

**Part Two: Responsibilities of the State**

10. **Constitutional Guarantee of Judicial Independence**

10.1 The principle of judicial independence requires the State to provide guarantees through constitutional or other means:

(a) that the judiciary shall be independent of the executive and the legislature, and that no power shall be exercised as to interfere with the judicial process;

(b) that everyone has the right to be tried with due expedition and without undue delay by the ordinary courts or tribunals established by law subject to appeal to, or review by, the courts;
(c) that no special ad hoc tribunals shall be established to displace the normal jurisdiction otherwise vested in the courts;

(d) that, in the decision-making process, judges are able to act without any restriction, improper influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason, and exercise unfettered freedom to decide cases impartially, in accordance with their conscience and the application of the law to the facts as they find them;

(e) that the judiciary shall have jurisdiction, directly or by way of review, over all issues of a judicial nature, and that no organ other than the court may decide conclusively its own jurisdiction and competence, as defined by law;

(f) that the executive shall refrain from any act or omission that pre-empts the judicial resolution of a dispute or frustrates the proper execution of a court decision;

(g) that a person exercising executive or legislative power shall not exercise, or attempt to exercise, any form of pressure on judges, whether overt or covert;

(h) that legislative or executive powers that may affect judges in their office, their remuneration, conditions of service or their resources, shall not be used with the object or consequence of threatening or bringing pressure upon a particular judge or judges;

(i) that the State shall ensure the security and physical protection of members of the judiciary and their families, especially in the event of threats being made against them; and

(j) that allegations of misconduct against a judge shall not be discussed in the legislature except on a substantive motion for the removal or censure of a judge of which prior notice has been given.
13. Tenure of Judges

13.2 A judge should have a constitutionally guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of a fixed term of office. A fixed term of office should not ordinarily be renewable unless procedures exist to ensure that the decision regarding re-appointment is made according to objective criteria and on merit.

13.5 Except pursuant to a system of regular rotation provided by law or formulated after due consideration by the judiciary, and applied only by the judiciary or by an independent body, a judge should not be transferred from one jurisdiction, function or location to another without his or her consent.\textsuperscript{353}

15. Discipline of Judges

15.1 Disciplinary proceedings against a judge may be commenced only for serious misconduct.\textsuperscript{354} The law applicable to judges may define, as far as possible in specific terms, conduct that may give rise to disciplinary sanctions as well as the procedures to be followed.

15.2 A person who alleges that he or she has suffered a wrong by reason of a judge’s serious misconduct should have the right

\textsuperscript{353} (numbered "8" in original) The transfer of judges has been addressed in several international instruments since transfer can be used to punish an independent and courageous judge, and to deter others from following his or her example.

\textsuperscript{354} (numbered "9" in original) Conduct that gives rise to disciplinary sanctions must be distinguished from a failure to observe professional standards. Professional standards represent best practice, which judges should aim to develop and towards which all judges should aspire. They should not be equated with conduct justifying disciplinary proceedings. However, the breach of professional standards may be of considerable relevance, where such breach is alleged to constitute conduct sufficient to justify and require disciplinary sanction.
to complain to the person or body responsible for initiating disciplinary action.

15.3 A specific body or person should be established by law with responsibility for receiving complaints, for obtaining the response of the judge and for considering in the light of such response whether or not there is a sufficient case against the judge to call for the initiation of disciplinary action. In the event of such a conclusion, the body or person should refer the matter to the disciplinary authority.\(^\text{355}\)

15.4 The power to discipline a judge should be vested in an authority or tribunal which is independent of the legislature and executive, and which is composed of serving or retired judges but which may include in its membership persons other than judges, provided that such other persons are not members of the legislature or the executive.

15.5 All disciplinary proceedings should be determined by reference to established standards of judicial conduct, and in accordance with a procedure guaranteeing full rights of defence.

15.6 There should be an appeal from the disciplinary authority to a court.

15.7 The final decision in any proceedings instituted against a judge involving a sanction against such judge, whether held in camera or in public, should be published.

15.8 Each jurisdiction should identify the sanctions permissible under its own disciplinary system, and ensure that such sanctions are, both in accordance with principle and in application, proportionate.

16. Removal of Judges from Office

\(^{355}\) (numbered "10" in original) Unless there is such a filter, judges could find themselves facing disciplinary proceedings brought at the instance of disappointed litigants.
16.1 A judge may be removed from office only for proved incapacity, conviction of a serious crime, gross incompetence, or conduct that is manifestly contrary to the independence, impartiality and integrity of the judiciary.

16.2 Where the legislature is vested with the power of removal of a judge, such power should be exercised only after a recommendation to that effect of the independent authority vested with power to discipline judges.

16.3 The abolition of a court of which a judge is a member should not be accepted as a reason or an occasion for the removal of the judge. Where a court is abolished or restructured, all existing members of that court should be re-appointed to its replacement or appointed to another judicial office of equivalent status and tenure. Where there is no such judicial office of equivalent status or tenure, the judge concerned should be provided with full compensation for loss of office.

... 

Definitions

In this statement of implementation measures, the following meanings shall be attributed to the words used:

... 

“judge” means any person exercising judicial power, however designated, and includes a magistrate and a member of an independent tribunal.
Annex 1d: Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (excerpts)

Adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 2003

The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights;
Recalling its mandate under Article 45(c) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Charter) “to formulate and lay down principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples’ rights and fundamental freedoms upon which African states may base their legislation”;

Recalling Articles 5, 6, 7 and 26 of the Charter, which contain provisions relevant to the right to a fair trial;

Recognising that it is necessary to formulate and lay down principles and rules to further strengthen and supplement the provisions relating to fair trial in the Charter and to reflect international standards;

Recalling the resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial adopted at its 11th ordinary session in March 1992, the resolution on the Respect and the Strengthening of the Independence of the Judiciary adopted at its 19th ordinary session in March 1996 and the resolution Urging States to Envisage a Moratorium on the Death Penalty adopted at its 26th ordinary session in November 1999;

Recalling also the resolution on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance, adopted at its 26th session held in November 1999, in which it decided to prepare general principles and guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal assistance under the African Charter;

Solemnly proclaims these Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa and urges that every effort is made so that they become generally known to everyone in Africa; are promoted and protected by civil society organisations, judges, lawyers, prosecutors, academics and their professional associations; are incorporated into their domestic legislation by State parties to the Charter and respected by them:
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO ALL LEGAL PROCEEDINGS:

1) Fair and Public Hearing

In the determination of any criminal charge against a person, or of a person’s rights and obligations, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a legally constituted competent, independent and impartial judicial body.

2) Fair Hearing

The essential elements of a fair hearing include:

a) equality of arms between the parties to proceedings, whether they be administrative, civil, criminal, or military;

b) equality of all persons before any judicial body without any distinction whatsoever as regards race, colour, ethnic origin, sex, gender, age, religion, creed, language, political or other convictions, national or social origin, means, disability, birth, status or other circumstances;

c) equality of access by women and men to judicial bodies and equality before the law in any legal proceedings;

d) respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, especially of women who participate in legal proceedings as complainants, witnesses, victims or accused;

e) adequate opportunity to prepare a case, present arguments and evidence and to challenge or respond to opposing arguments or evidence;

f) an entitlement to consult and be represented by a legal representative or other qualified persons chosen by the party at all stages of the proceedings;

g) an entitlement to the assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot understand or speak the language used in or by the judicial body;

h) an entitlement to have a party’s rights and obligations affected only by a decision based solely on evidence presented to the judicial body;

i) an entitlement to a determination of their rights and obligations without undue delay and with adequate notice of and reasons for the decisions; and
j) an entitlement to an appeal to a higher judicial body.

3) Public hearing:

a) All the necessary information about the sittings of judicial bodies shall be made available to the public by the judicial body;

b) A permanent venue for proceedings by judicial bodies shall be established by the State and widely publicised. In the case of ad-hoc judicial bodies, the venue designated for the duration of their proceedings should be made public.

c) Adequate facilities shall be provided for attendance by interested members of the public;

d) No limitations shall be placed by the judicial body on the category of people allowed to attend its hearings where the merits of a case are being examined;

e) Representatives of the media shall be entitled to be present at and report on judicial proceedings except that a judge may restrict or limit the use of cameras during the hearings;

f) The public and the media may not be excluded from hearings before judicial bodies except if it is determined to be

(i) in the interest of justice for the protection of children, witnesses or the identity of victims of sexual violence

(ii) for reasons of public order or national security in an open and democratic society that respects human rights and the rule of law.

g) Judicial bodies may take steps or order measures to be taken to protect the identity and dignity of victims of sexual violence, and the identity of witnesses and complainants who may be put at risk by reason of their participation in judicial proceedings.

h) Judicial bodies may take steps to protect the identity of accused persons, witnesses or complainants where it is in the best interest of a child.

i) Nothing in these Guidelines shall permit the use of anonymous witnesses where the judge and the defence is unaware of the witnesses’ identity at trial.
j) Any judgement rendered in legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal, shall be pronounced in public.

4) **Independent tribunal**

a) The independence of judicial bodies and judicial officers shall be guaranteed by the constitution and laws of the country and respected by the government, its agencies and authorities;

b) Judicial bodies shall be established by law to have adjudicative functions to determine matters within their competence on the basis of the rule of law and in accordance with proceedings conducted in the prescribed manner;

c) The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for decision is within the competence of a judicial body as defined by law;

d) A judicial body’s jurisdiction may be determined, inter alia, by considering where the events involved in the dispute or offence took place, where the property in dispute is located, the place of residence or domicile of the parties and the consent of the parties;

e) Military or other special tribunals that do not use the duly established procedure of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary judicial bodies;

f) There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process nor shall decisions by judicial bodies be subject to revision except through judicial review, or the mitigation or commutation of sentence by competent authorities, in accordance with the law;

g) All judicial bodies shall be independent from the executive branch.

h) The process for appointments to judicial bodies shall be transparent and accountable and the establishment of an independent body for this purpose is encouraged. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.
i) The sole criteria for appointment to judicial office shall be the suitability of a candidate for such office by reason of integrity, appropriate training or learning and ability.

j) Any person who meets the criteria shall be entitled to be considered for judicial office without discrimination on any grounds such as race, colour, ethnic origin, language, sex, gender, political or other opinion, religion, creed, disability, national or social origin, birth, economic or other status. However, it shall not be discriminatory for states to:
   (i) prescribe a minimum age or experience for candidates for judicial office;
   (ii) prescribe a maximum or retirement age or duration of service for judicial officers;
   (iii) prescribe that such maximum or retirement age or duration of service may vary with different level of judges, magistrates or other officers in the judiciary;
   (iv) require that only nationals of the state concerned shall be eligible for appointment to judicial office.

k) No person shall be appointed to judicial office unless they have the appropriate training or learning that enables them to adequately fulfil their functions.

l) Judges or members of judicial bodies shall have security of tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office.

m) The tenure, adequate remuneration, pension, housing, transport, conditions of physical and social security, age of retirement, disciplinary and recourse mechanisms and other conditions of service of judicial officers shall be prescribed and guaranteed by law.

n) Judicial officers shall not be:
   (i) liable in civil or criminal proceedings for improper acts or omissions in the exercise of their judicial functions;
   (ii) removed from office or subject to other disciplinary or administrative procedures by reason only that their decision has been overturned on appeal or review by a higher judicial body;
   (iii) appointed under a contract for a fixed term.
o) Promotion of judicial officials shall be based on objective factors, in particular ability, integrity and experience.

p) Judicial officials may only be removed or suspended from office for gross misconduct incompatible with judicial office, or for physical or mental incapacity that prevents them from undertaking their judicial duties.

q) Judicial officials facing disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be entitled to guarantees of a fair hearing including the right to be represented by a legal representative of their choice and to an independent review of decisions of disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings.

r) The procedures for complaints against and discipline of judicial officials shall be prescribed by law. Complaints against judicial officers shall be processed promptly, expeditiously and fairly.

s) Judicial officers are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly. In exercising these rights, they shall always conduct themselves in accordance with the law and the recognized standards and ethics of their profession.

t) Judicial officers shall be free to form and join professional associations or other organizations to represent their interests, to promote their professional training and to protect their status.

u) States may establish independent or administrative mechanisms for monitoring the performance of judicial officers and public reaction to the justice delivery processes of judicial bodies. Such mechanisms, which shall be constituted in equal part of members the judiciary and representatives of the Ministry responsible for judicial affairs, may include processes for judicial bodies receiving and processing complaints against its officers.

v) States shall endow judicial bodies with adequate resources for the performance of its their functions. The judiciary shall be consulted regarding the preparation of the budget and its implementation.

5) Impartial Tribunal
a) A judicial body shall base its decision only on objective evidence, arguments and facts presented before it. Judicial officers shall decide matters before them without any restrictions, improper influence, inducements, pressure, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

b) Any party to proceedings before a judicial body shall be entitled to challenge its impartiality on the basis of ascertainable facts that the fairness of the judge or judicial body appears to be in doubt.

c) The impartiality of a judicial body could be determined on the basis of three relevant facts:
   (i) that the position of the judicial officer allows him or her to play a crucial role in the proceedings;
   (ii) the judicial officer may have expressed an opinion which would influence the decisionmaking;
   (iii) the judicial official would have to rule on an action taken in a prior capacity.

d) The impartiality of a judicial body would be undermined when:
   (i) a former public prosecutor or legal representative sits as a judicial officer in a case in which he or she prosecuted or represented a party;
   (ii) a judicial official secretly participated in the investigation of a case;
   (iii) a judicial official has some connection with the case or a party to the case;
   (iv) a judicial official sits as member of an appeal tribunal in a case which he or she decided or participated in a lower judicial body.

In any of these circumstances, a judicial official would be under an obligation to step down.

e) A judicial official may not consult a higher official authority before rendering a decision in order to ensure that his or her decision will be upheld.

B. JUDICIAL TRAINING:

a) States shall ensure that judicial officials have appropriate education and training and should be made aware of the ideals and ethical duties of their office, of the
constitutional and statutory protections for the rights of accused persons, victims and other litigants and of human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by national and international law.

b) States shall establish, where they do not exist, specialised institutions for the education and training of judicial officials and encourage collaboration amongst such institutions in countries in the region and throughout Africa.

c) States shall ensure that judicial officials receive continuous training and education throughout their career including, where appropriate, in racial, cultural and gender sensitisation.

C. RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY:

a) Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by competent national tribunals for acts violating the rights granted by the constitution, by law or by the Charter, notwithstanding that the acts were committed by persons in an official capacity.

b) The right to an effective remedy includes:
   (i) access to justice;
   (ii) reparation for the harm suffered;
   (iii) access to the factual information concerning the violations.

c) Every State has an obligation to ensure that:
   (i) any person whose rights have been violated, including by persons acting in an official capacity, has an effective remedy by a competent judicial body;
   (ii) any person claiming a right to remedy shall have such a right determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities;
   (iii) any remedy granted shall be enforced by competent authorities;
   (iv) any state body against which a judicial order or other remedy has been granted shall comply fully with such an order or remedy.
d) The granting of amnesty to absolve perpetrators of human rights violations from accountability violates the right of victims to an effective remedy.

D. COURT RECORDS AND PUBLIC ACCESS:

a) All information regarding judicial proceedings shall be accessible to the public, except information or documents that have been specifically determined by judicial officials not to be made public.

b) States must ensure that proper systems exist for recording all proceedings before judicial bodies, storing such information and making it accessible to the public.

c) All decisions of judicial bodies must be published and available to everyone throughout the country.

d) The cost to the public of obtaining records of judicial proceedings or decisions should be kept to a minimum and should not be so high as to amount to a denial of access.

E. LOCUS STANDI:

States must ensure, through adoption of national legislation, that in regard to human rights violations, which are matters of public concern, any individual, group of individuals or nongovernmental organization is entitled to bring an issue before judicial bodies for determination.

F. ROLE OF PROSECUTORS:

[...]

k) Prosecutors shall give due attention to the prosecution of crimes committed by public officials, particularly corruption, abuse of power, grave violations of human rights and other crimes recognized by international law and, where authorized by law or consistent with local practice, the investigation of such offences.

l) When prosecutors come into possession of evidence against suspects that they know or believe on reasonable grounds was obtained through recourse to unlawful methods, which constitute a grave violation of the
suspect’s human rights, especially involving torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or other abuses of human rights, they shall refuse to use such evidence against anyone other than those who used such methods, or inform the judicial body accordingly, and shall take all necessary steps to ensure that those responsible for using such methods are brought to justice.

m) In order to ensure the fairness and effectiveness of prosecution, prosecutors shall strive to cooperate with the police, judicial bodies, the legal profession, paralegals, non-governmental organisations and other government agencies or institutions.

[...]

N. PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO CRIMINAL CHARGES:

1) Notification of charge:

a) Any person charged with a criminal offence shall be informed promptly, as soon as a charge is first made by a competent authority, in detail, and in a language, which he or she understands, of the nature and cause of the charge against him or her.

b) The information shall include details of the charge or applicable law and the alleged facts on which the charge is based sufficient to indicate the substance of the complaint against the accused.

c) The accused must be informed in a manner that would allow him or her to prepare a defence and to take immediate steps to secure his or her release.

2) Right to counsel:

a) The accused has the right to defend him or herself in person or through legal assistance of his or her own choosing. Legal representation is regarded as the best means of legal defence against infringements of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
b) The accused has the right to be informed, if he or she does not have legal assistance, of the right to defend him or herself through legal assistance of his or her own choosing.

c) This right applies during all stages of any criminal prosecution, including preliminary investigations in which evidence is taken, periods of administrative detention, trial and appeal proceedings.

d) The accused has the right to choose his or her own counsel freely. This right begins when the accused is first detained or charged. A judicial body may not assign counsel for the accused if a qualified lawyer of the accused's own choosing is available.

3) Right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of a defence:

a) The accused has the right to communicate with counsel and have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defence.

b) The accused may not be tried without his or her counsel being notified of the trial date and of the charges in time to allow adequate preparation of a defence.

c) The accused has a right to adequate time for the preparation of a defence appropriate to the nature of the proceedings and the factual circumstances of the case. Factors which may affect the adequacy of time for preparation of a defence include the complexity of the case, the defendant's access to evidence, the length of time provided by rules of procedure prior to particular proceedings, and prejudice to the defence.

d) The accused has a right to facilities which assist or may assist the accused in the preparation of his or her defence, including the right to communicate with defence counsel and the right to materials necessary to the preparation of a defence.

e) All arrested, detained or imprisoned persons shall be provided with adequate opportunities, time and facilities to be visited by and to communicate with a lawyer, without delay, interception or censorship and in full confidentiality.
(i) The right to confer privately with one's lawyer and exchange confidential information or instructions is a fundamental part of the preparation of a defence. Adequate facilities shall be provided that preserve the confidentiality of communications with counsel.

(ii) States shall recognize and respect that all communications and consultations between lawyers and their clients within their professional relationship are confidential.

(iii) The accused or the accused's defence counsel has a right to all relevant information held by the prosecution that could help the accused exonerate him or herself.

(iv) It is the duty of the competent authorities to ensure lawyers access to appropriate information, files and documents in their possession or control in sufficient time to enable lawyers to provide effective legal assistance to their clients. Such access should be provided at the earliest appropriate time.

(v) The accused has a right to consult legal materials reasonably necessary for the preparation of his or her defence.

(vi) Before judgement or sentence is rendered, the accused and his or her defence counsel shall have the right to know and challenge all the evidence which may be used to support the decision. All evidence submitted must be considered by the judicial body.

(vii) Following a trial and before any appellate proceeding, the accused or the defence counsel has a right of access to (or to consult) the evidence which the judicial body considered in making a decision and the judicial body’s reasoning in arriving at the judgement.

4) The right to an interpreter:
a) The accused has the right to the free assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot understand or speak the language used before the judicial body.

b) The right to an interpreter does not extend to the right to express oneself in the language of one's choice if the accused or the defence witness is sufficiently proficient in the language of the judicial body.

c) The right to an interpreter applies at all stages of the proceedings, including pre-trial proceedings.

d) The right to an interpreter applies to written as well as oral proceedings. The right extends to translation or interpretation of all documents or statements necessary for the defendant to understand the proceedings or assist in the preparation of a defence.

e) The interpretation or translation provided shall be adequate to permit the accused to understand the proceedings and for the judicial body to understand the testimony of the accused or defence witnesses.

f) The right to interpretation or translation cannot be qualified by a requirement that the accused pay for the costs of an interpreter or translator. Even if the accused is convicted, he or she cannot be required to pay for the costs of interpretation or translation.

5) Right to trial without undue delay:

a) Every person charged with a criminal offence has the right to a trial without undue delay.

b) The right to a trial without undue delay means the right to a trial which produces a final judgement and, if appropriate a sentence without undue delay.

c) Factors relevant to what constitutes undue delay include the complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties, the conduct of other relevant authorities, whether an accused is detained pending proceedings, and the interest of the person at stake in the proceedings.

6) Rights during a trial:
a) In criminal proceedings, the principle of equality of arms imposes procedural equality between the accused and the public prosecutor.
   (i) The prosecution and defence shall be allowed equal time to present evidence.
   (ii) Prosecution and defence witnesses shall be given equal treatment in all procedural matters.

b) The accused is entitled to a hearing in which his or her individual culpability is determined. Group trials in which many persons are involved may violate the person's right to a fair hearing.

c) In criminal proceedings, the accused has the right to be tried in his or her presence.
   (i) The accused has the right to appear in person before the judicial body.
   (ii) The accused may not be tried in absentia. If an accused is tried in absentia, the accused shall have the right to petition for a reopening of the proceedings upon a showing that inadequate notice was given, that the notice was not personally served on the accused, or that his or her failure to appear was for exigent reasons beyond his or her control. If the petition is granted, the accused is entitled to a fresh determination of the merits of the charge.
   (iii) The accused may voluntarily waive the right to appear at a hearing, but such a waiver shall be established in an unequivocal manner and preferably in writing.

d) The accused has the right not to be compelled to testify against him or herself or to confess guilt.
   (i) Any confession or other evidence obtained by any form of coercion or force may not be admitted as evidence or considered as probative of any fact at trial or in sentencing. Any confession or admission obtained during incommunicado detention shall be considered to have been obtained by coercion.
   (ii) Silence by the accused may not be used as evidence to prove guilt and no adverse
consequences may be drawn from the exercise of the right to remain silent.

e) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

(i) The presumption of innocence places the burden of proof during trial in any criminal case on the prosecution.

(ii) Public officials shall maintain a presumption of innocence. Public officials, including prosecutors, may inform the public about criminal investigations or charges, but shall not express a view as to the guilt of any suspect.

(iii) Legal presumptions of fact or law are permissible in a criminal case only if they are rebuttable, allowing a defendant to prove his or her innocence.

f) The accused has a right to examine, or have examined, witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her.

(i) The prosecution shall provide the defence with the names of the witnesses it intends to call at trial within a reasonable time prior to trial which allows the defendant sufficient time to prepare his or her defence.

(ii) The accused’s right to examine witnesses may be limited to those witnesses whose testimony is relevant and likely to assist in ascertaining the truth.

(iii) The accused has the right to be present during the testimony of a witness. This right may be limited only in exceptional circumstances such as when a witness reasonably fears reprisal by the defendant, when the accused engages in a course of conduct seriously disruptive of the proceedings, or when the accused repeatedly fails to appear for trivial reasons and after having been duly notified.
(iv) If the defendant is excluded or if the presence of the defendant cannot be ensured, the defendant's counsel shall always have the right to be present to preserve the defendant's right to examine the witness.

(v) If national law does not permit the accused to examine witnesses during pre-trial investigations, the defendant shall have the opportunity, personally or through defence counsel, to cross-examine the witness at trial. However, the right of a defendant to cross-examine witnesses personally may be limited in respect of victims of sexual violence and child witnesses, taking into consideration the defendant's right to a fair trial.

(vi) The testimony of anonymous witnesses during a trial will be allowed only in exceptional circumstances, taking into consideration the nature and the circumstances of the offence and the protection of the security of the witness and if it is determined to be in the interests of justice.

g) Evidence obtained by illegal means constituting a serious violation of internationally protected human rights shall not be used as evidence against the accused or against any other person in any proceeding, except in the prosecution of the perpetrators of the violations.

7) Right to benefit from a lighter sentence or administrative sanction

a) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit therefrom.
b) A lighter penalty created any time before an accused's sentence has been fully served should be applied to any offender serving a sentence under the previous penalty.

c) Administrative tribunals conducting disciplinary proceedings shall not impose a heavier penalty than the one that was applicable at the time when the offending conduct occurred. If, subsequent to the conduct, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the person disciplined shall benefit thereby.

8) **Second trial for same offence prohibited**

No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he or she has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.

9) **Sentencing and punishment**

a) Punishments constituting a deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform and social re-adaptation of the prisoners.

b) In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime.

c) Sentence of death shall not be imposed or carried out on expectant mothers and mothers of infants and young children.

d) States that maintain the death penalty are urged to establish a moratorium on executions, and to reflect on the possibility of abolishing capital punishment.

e) States shall provide special treatment to expectant mothers and to mothers of infants and young children who have been found guilty of infringing the penal law and shall in particular:

(i) ensure that a non-custodial sentence will always be first considered when sentencing such mothers;
(ii) establish and promote measures alternative to institutional confinement for the treatment of such mothers;
(iii) establish special alternative institutions for holding such mothers;
(iv) ensure that a mother shall not be imprisoned with her child;
(v) the essential aim of the penitentiary system will be the reformation, the integration of the mother to the family and social rehabilitation.

10) **Appeal**

a) Everyone convicted in a criminal proceeding shall have the right to review of his or her conviction and sentence by a higher tribunal.
   (i) The right to appeal shall provide a genuine and timely review of the case, including the facts and the law. If exculpatory evidence is discovered after a person is tried and convicted, the right to appeal or some other post-conviction procedure shall permit the possibility of correcting the verdict if the new evidence would have been likely to change the verdict, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to the accused.
   (ii) A judicial body shall stay execution of any sentence while the case is on appeal to a higher tribunal.

b) Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to appeal to a judicial body of higher jurisdiction, and States should take steps to ensure that such appeals become mandatory.

c) When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his or her conviction has been reversed or he or she has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law.
d) Every person convicted of a crime has a right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence. Clemency, commutation of sentence, amnesty or pardon may be granted in all cases of capital punishment.

P. VICTIMS OF CRIME AND ABUSE OF POWER

a) Victims should be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity. They are entitled to have access to the mechanisms of justice and to prompt redress, as provided for by national legislation and international law, for the harm that they have suffered.

b) States must ensure that women who are victims of crime, especially of a sexual nature, are interviewed by women police or judicial officials.

c) States shall take steps to ensure that women who are complainants, victims or witnesses are not subjected to any cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment.

d) Judicial and administrative mechanisms should be established and strengthened where necessary to enable victims to obtain redress through formal or informal procedures that are expeditious, fair, inexpensive and accessible. Victims should be informed of their rights in seeking redress through such mechanisms.

e) States are required to investigate and punish all complaints of violence against women, including domestic violence, whether those acts are perpetrated by the state, its officials or agents or by private persons. Fair and effective procedures and mechanisms must be established and be accessible to women who have been subjected to violence to enable them to file criminal complaints and to obtain other redress for the proper investigation of the violence suffered, to obtain restitution or reparation and to prevent further violence.

f) Judicial officers, prosecutors and lawyers, as appropriate, should facilitate the needs of victims by:

(i) Informing them of their role and the scope, timing and progress of the proceedings and the final outcome of their cases;  

(ii) Allowing their views and concerns to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of the
proceedings where their personal interests are affected, without prejudice to the accused and consistent with the relevant national criminal justice system;

(iii) Providing them with proper assistance throughout the legal process;

(iv) Taking measures to minimize inconvenience to them, protect their privacy, when necessary, and ensure their safety, as well as that of their families and witnesses on their behalf, from intimidation and retaliation;

(v) Avoiding unnecessary delay in the disposition of cases and the execution of orders or decrees granting awards to victims.

g) Informal mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, including mediation, arbitration and traditional or customary practices, should be utilized where appropriate to facilitate conciliation and redress for victims.

h) Offenders or third parties responsible for their behaviour should, where appropriate, make fair restitution to victims, their families or dependants. Such restitution should include the return of property or payment for the harm or loss suffered, reimbursement of expenses, the provision of services and the restoration of rights.

i) States should review their practices, regulations and laws to consider restitution as an available sentencing option in criminal cases, in addition to other criminal sanctions.

j) Where public officials or other agents acting in an official or quasi-official capacity have violated national criminal laws or international law, the victims should receive restitution from the State whose officials or agents were responsible for the harm inflicted.

k) When compensation is not fully available from the offender or other sources, States should endeavour to provide financial compensation to:

(i) Victims who have sustained significant bodily injury or impairment of physical or mental health as a result of serious crimes;
(ii) The family, in particular dependants of persons who have died or become physically or mentally incapacitated.

l) States are encouraged to establish, strengthen and expand national funds for compensation to victims.

m) States must ensure that:
   (i) Victims receive the necessary material, medical, psychological and social assistance through state, voluntary, non-governmental and community-based means.
   (ii) Victims are informed of the availability of health and social services and other relevant assistance and be readily afforded access to them.
   (iii) Police, justice, health, social service and other personnel concerned receive training to sensitize them to the needs of victims, and guidelines are adopted to ensure proper and prompt aid.

Q. TRADITIONAL COURTS

a) Traditional courts, where they exist, are required to respect international standards on the right to a fair trial.

b) The following provisions shall apply, as a minimum, to all proceedings before traditional courts:
   (i) equality of persons without any distinction whatsoever as regards race, colour, sex, gender, religion, creed, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, means, disability, birth, status or other circumstances;
   (ii) respect for the inherent dignity of human persons, including the right not to be subject to torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment;
   (iii) respect for the right to liberty and security of every person, in particular the right of every individual not to be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention;
   (iv) respect for the equality of women and men in all proceedings;
(v) respect for the inherent dignity of women, and their right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(vi) adequate opportunity to prepare a case, present arguments and evidence and to challenge or respond to opposing arguments or evidence;
(vii) an entitlement to the assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot understand or speak the language used in or by the traditional court;
(viii) an entitlement to seek the assistance of and be represented by a representative of the party’s choosing in all proceedings before the traditional court;
(ix) an entitlement to have a party’s rights and obligations affected only by a decision based solely on evidence presented to the traditional court;
(x) an entitlement to a determination of their rights and obligations without undue delay and with adequate notice of and reasons for the decisions;
(xi) an entitlement to an appeal to a higher traditional court, administrative authority or a judicial tribunal;
(xii) all hearings before traditional courts shall be held in public and its decisions shall be rendered in public, except where the interests of children require or where the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children;

c) The independence of traditional courts shall be guaranteed by the laws of the country and respected by the government, its agencies and authorities:
(i) they shall be independent from the executive branch;
(ii) there shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with proceedings before traditional courts.

d) States shall ensure the impartiality of traditional courts. In particular, members of traditional courts shall decide matters before them without any restrictions, improper
influence, inducements, pressure, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter.

(i) The impartiality of a traditional court would be undermined when one of its members has:
   (1) expressed an opinion which would influence the decision-making;
   (2) some connection or involvement with the case or a party to the case;
   (3) a pecuniary or other interest linked to the outcome of the case.

(ii) Any party to proceedings before a traditional court shall be entitled to challenge its impartiality on the basis of ascertainable facts that the fairness any of its members or the traditional court appears to be in doubt.

e) The procedures for complaints against and discipline of members of traditional courts shall be prescribed by law. Complaints against members of traditional courts shall be processed promptly and expeditiously, and with all the guarantees of a fair hearing, including the right to be represented by a legal representative of choice and to an independent review of decisions of disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings.

S. USE OF TERMS

For the purpose of these Principles and Guidelines:

a) “Arrest” means the act of apprehending a person for the alleged commission of an offence or by the action of an authority.

b) “Criminal charge” is defined by the nature of the offence and the nature and degree of severity of the penalty incurred. An accusation may constitute a criminal charge although the offence is not classified as criminal under national law.

c) “Detained person” or “detainee” means any individual deprived of personal liberty except as a result of conviction for an offence.

d) “Detention” means the condition of a detained person.
e) “Imprisoned person” or “prisoner” means any individual deprived of personal liberty as a result of conviction for an offence.

f) “Imprisonment” means the condition of imprisoned persons.

g) “Suspect” means a person who has been arrested but not arraigned or charged before a judicial body.

h) “Judicial body” means a dispute resolution or adjudication mechanism established and regulated by law and includes courts and other tribunals.

i) “Judicial office” means a position on a judicial body.

j) “Judicial officer” means a person who sits in adjudication as part of a judicial body.

k) “Legal proceeding“ means any proceeding before a judicial body brought in regard to a criminal charge or for the determination of rights or obligations of any person, natural or legal.

l) “Traditional court” means a body which, in a particular locality, is recognised as having the power to resolve disputes in accordance with local customs, cultural or ethnic values, religious norms or tradition.

m) “Habeas corpus”, “amparo” is a legal procedure brought before a judicial body to compel the detaining authorities to provide accurate and detailed information regarding the whereabouts and conditions of detention of a person or to produce a detainee before the judicial body.

n) “Victim” means persons who individually or collectively have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws or that do not yet constitute violations of national criminal laws but of internationally recognized norms relating to human rights. The term “victim” also includes, where appropriate, the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress.

Adopted by the 2nd session of the Assembly of the Union, Maputo, 11 July 2003

The Member States of the African Union:

[...]

Concerned about the negative effects of corruption and impunity on the political, economic, social and cultural stability of African States and its devastating effects on the economic and social development of the African peoples;

Acknowledging that corruption undermines accountability and transparency in the management of public affairs as well as socio-economic development on the continent;

[...]

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Definitions

1. For the purposes of this Convention;

[...]

“Public official” means any official or employee of the State or its agencies including those who have been selected, appointed or elected to perform activities or functions in the name of the State or in the service of the State at any level of its hierarchy;

[...]

Article 2

Objectives

The objectives of this Convention are to:
1. Promote and strengthen the development in Africa by each State Party, of mechanisms required to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and private sectors.

2. Promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation among the State Parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in Africa.

3. Coordinate and harmonize the policies and legislation between State Parties for the purposes of prevention, detection, punishment and eradication of corruption on the continent.

4. Promote socio-economic development by removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights.

5. Establish the necessary conditions to foster transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs.

**Article 3**

**Principles**

The State Parties to this Convention undertake to abide by the following principles:

1. Respect for democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, the rule of law and good governance.

2. Respect for human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.

3. Transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs.
4. Promotion of social justice to ensure balanced socio-economic development.

5. Condemnation and rejection of acts of corruption, related offences and impunity.

*Article 4*

**Scope of application**

1. This Convention is applicable to the following acts of corruption and related offences:

   (a) the solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a public official or any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions;

   (b) the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a public official or any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions;

   (c) any act or omission in the discharge of his or her duties by a public official or any other person for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or herself or for a third party;
(d) the diversion by a public official or any other person, for purposes unrelated to those for which they were intended, for his or her own benefit or that of a third party, of any property belonging to the State or its agencies, to an independent agency, or to an individual, that such official has received by virtue of his or her position;

(e) the offering or giving, promising, solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage to or by any person who directs or works for, in any capacity, a private sector entity, for himself or herself or for anyone else, for him or her to act, or refrain from acting, in breach of his or her duties;

(f) the offering, giving, solicitation or acceptance directly or indirectly, or promising of any undue advantage to or by any person who asserts or confirms that he or she is able to exert any improper influence over the decision making of any person performing functions in the public or private sector in consideration thereof, whether the undue advantage is for himself or herself or for anyone else, as well as the request, receipt or the acceptance of the offer or the promise of such an advantage, in consideration of that influence, whether or not the influence is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended result;

(g) illicit enrichment;
(h) the use or concealment of proceeds derived from any of the acts referred to in this Article; and

(i) participation as a principal, co-principal, agent, instigator, accomplice or accessory after the fact, or on any other manner in the commission or attempted commission of, in any collaboration or conspiracy to commit, any of the acts referred to in this article.

2. This Convention shall also be applicable by mutual agreement between or among two or more State Parties with respect to any other act or practice of corruption and related offences not described in this Convention.

Article 5

Legislative and other measures

For the purposes set-forth in Article 2 of this Convention, State Parties undertake to:

1. Adopt legislative and other measures that are required to establish as offences, the acts mentioned in Article 4 paragraph 1 of the present Convention.

2. Strengthen national control measures to ensure that the setting up and operations of foreign companies in the territory of a State Party shall be subject to the respect of the national legislation in force.

3. Establish, maintain and strengthen independent national anticorruption authorities or agencies.
4. Adopt legislative and other measures to create, maintain and strengthen internal accounting, auditing and follow-up systems, in particular, in the public income, custom and tax receipts, expenditures and procedures for hiring, procurement and management of public goods and services.

5. Adopt legislative and other measures to protect informants and witnesses in corruption and related offences, including protection of their identities.

6. Adopt measures that ensure citizens report instances of corruption without fear of consequent reprisals.

7. Adopt national legislative measures in order to punish those who make false and malicious reports against innocent persons in corruption and related offences.

8. Adopt and strengthen mechanisms for promoting the education of populations to respect the public good and public interest, and awareness in the fight against corruption and related offences, including school educational programmes and sensitization of the media, and the promotion of an enabling environment for the respect of ethics.

[...]

**Article 7**

**Fight against corruption and related offences in the public service**

In order to combat corruption and related offences in the public service, State Parties commit themselves to:

1. Require all or designated public officials to declare their assets at the time of assumption of office during and after their term of office in the public service.
2. Create an internal committee or a similar body mandated to establish a code of conduct and to monitor its implementation, and sensitize and train public officials on matters of ethics.

3. Develop disciplinary measures and investigation procedures in corruption and related offences with a view to keeping up with technology and increase the efficiency of those responsible in this regard.

4. Ensure transparency, equity and efficiency in the management of tendering and hiring procedures in the public service.

5. Subject to the provisions of domestic legislation, any immunity granted to public officials shall not be an obstacle to the investigation of allegations against and the prosecution of such officials.

[...]

**Article 14**

**Minimum guarantees of a fair trial**

Subject to domestic law, any person alleged to have committed acts of corruption and related offences shall receive a fair trial in criminal proceedings in accordance with the minimum guarantees contained in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and any other relevant international human rights instrument recognized by the concerned States Parties.

[...]

PRACTITIONERS GUIDE No. 13 ADAPTED FOR ZIMBABWE
Annex 2: Selected sources

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