

**Libya: One year after resolution 56/16, the human rights
situation remains dire and domestic accountability
efforts inadequate**



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Published in September 2025

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This report was made possible with the support of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the ICJ and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the FDFA.



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September 2025

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Acronyms and presentation of the main Libyan actors

GNS	Government of National Stability	<p>Rival government to the GNU, appointed by the HoR in March 2022 and supported by the LAAF</p> <p>Based in Benghazi (East), led by Prime Minister Osama Hammad</p>
GNU	Government of National Unity	<p>Internationally-recognized government, established by the 2021 UN-led Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), sharing the executive authority with the PC</p> <p>Based in Tripoli (West), led by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh</p> <p>Previously called the Government of National Accord (GNA)</p>
HoR	House of Representatives	<p>Legislative body elected in 2014</p> <p>Based in Tobruk (East), led by Speaker Aguila Saleh</p>
ISA	Internal Security Agency	<p>Militia operating in the whole country but aligning with either the LAAF in the East or the PC in the West</p> <p>Present in both the East and the West, led by Osama Mohammed Al-Darsi in the East and Mustafa Al-Wahishi in the West</p>
LAAF	Libyan Arab Armed Forces	<p>Coalition of militias</p> <p>Based in Benghazi (East), led by Khalifa Haftar, <i>de facto</i> leader of the East</p> <p>Previously called the Libyan National Army (LNA)</p>

PC	Presidential Council	<p>Internationally-recognized, established by the 2021 UN-led Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), sharing the executive authority with the GNU</p> <p>Based in Tripoli (West), led by Mohamed Al-Menfi, who is the Head of State</p>
SDF	Special Deterrence Forces, or Radaa	<p>Militia</p> <p>Based in east Tripoli (West), led by Abdel Raouf Kara</p>
SSA	Stabilization Support Authority	<p>Militia aligned with the PC</p> <p>Based in south-west Tripoli (West), formerly led by Abdelghani Al-Kikli (also known as “Ghaniwa”)</p>

Introduction

On 22 June 2020, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council's (HRC or "the Council") created an Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya (FFM), under HRC's agenda Item 10, with Libya's consent.¹ The FFM's mandate was to "establish the facts and circumstances of the situation of human rights throughout Libya, and to collect and review relevant information, to document alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by all parties in Libya since the beginning of 2016".² On 4 July 2022, after two temporal extensions,³ the HRC extended the mandate of the FFM for a final non-extendable period of nine months.⁴

In its final report of March 2023, the FFM called on the HRC to establish "an independent, international investigation mechanism", and on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to "establish a distinct and autonomous mechanism with an ongoing mandate to monitor and report on gross human rights violations in Libya".⁵ Libyan and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) echoed such call.⁶

During the HRC's 52nd session, in April 2023, following the presentation of the FFM's final report and recommendations, Member States did not establish a follow-up mechanism but, through the adoption of HRC resolution 52/41, merely requested OHCHR to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to Libya with a view to ensuring accountability for and preventing violations and abuses of human rights.⁷ At that time, and ever since, the Libyan authorities, whose consent is required for such an Item 10 resolution, opposed the establishment of a new mechanism, arguing that they could and would themselves ensure accountability and respect for human rights and, therefore, did not need the international community's support beyond technical assistance and capacity-building.

¹ Resolutions adopted under agenda Item 10, on technical assistance and capacity-building, require the consent of the State concerned, i.e., Libya.

² HRC, Resolution adopted on 22 June 2020, [Technical assistance and capacity-building to improve human rights in Libya](#), UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/43/39, 6 July 2020, para. 43(a).

³ HRC, Resolution adopted on 6 October 2020, [Technical assistance and capacity-building to improve human rights in Libya](#), UN Doc. A/HRC/DEC/45/113, 12 October 2020, para. 13; HRC, Resolution adopted on 11 October 2021, [Technical assistance and capacity-building to improve human rights in Libya](#), UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/48/25, 13 October 2021, para. 40.

⁴ HRC, Resolution adopted on 8 July 2022, [Technical assistance and capacity-building to improve human rights in Libya](#), UN Doc. A/HRC/50/L.23, 14 July 2022, para. 1.

⁵ FFM, [Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya](#), UN Doc. A/HRC/52/83, 20 March 2023, para. 103(a).

⁶ See for example, ICJ, [HRC52: ICJ calls on the Human Rights Council to establish a follow-up accountability mechanism on the human rights situation in Libya](#), 3 April 2023; Lawyers for Justice in Libya (LFJL), [UN Human Rights Council Should Ensure Meaningful Follow-Up on the Human Rights Situation in Libya](#), 6 March 2023.

⁷ HRC, Resolution adopted on 4 April 2023, [Technical assistance and capacity-building to improve human rights in Libya](#), UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/52/41, 11 April 2023, para. 1.

At the HRC's 56th session, in July 2024, Libyan and international NGOs reiterated their call for the establishment of an independent international investigative mechanism.⁸ Instead, with resolution 56/16 of 11 July 2024, the HRC only renewed its previous April 2023 resolution on technical assistance and capacity-building.⁹

However, the dire human rights situation since July 2024 has not improved, and the Libyan authorities have shown limited interest in taking any genuine step to combat impunity for serious crimes under international law in the country.

1. Gross human rights violations and abuses

Notwithstanding the adoption of the April 2023 resolution under item 10 and its renewal in July 2024, and despite OHCHR providing technical assistance and capacity-building, as directed by the Council's resolutions, a litany of gross human rights violations and abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary arrests and detentions, continue to be perpetrated with impunity.

1.1. Discovery of unidentified bodies

This section describes one of the most concerning episodes attesting to the dire human rights situation in the country. In May 2025, the Stabilization Support Authority (SSA) – a militia allegedly implicated in gross human rights violations¹⁰ – lost control of the Abu Salim area of the capital, Tripoli, in the West of the country. After militias affiliated with the Government of National Unity (GNU)¹¹ gained control of Abu Salim, the General Authority for the Search and Identification of Missing Persons – a body established in 2018 to clarify the fate and whereabouts of missing persons in Libya – announced, on 15 May 2025, that they had received information about the presence of mass graves in the Abu Salim zoo, where the SSA had previously established its headquarters and controlled an unofficial detention center. On 19 May 2025, the remains of 67 unidentified individuals were also discovered in refrigerators at the Abu Salim and Al-Khadra hospitals.¹²

⁸ ICJ, LFJL, and Libya Crimes Watch (LCW), *Libya: the Human Rights Council must establish an independent international investigative mechanism*, 9 July 2024.

⁹ HRC, Resolution adopted on 11 July 2024, *Technical assistance and capacity-building to improve human rights in Libya*, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/56/16, 19 August 2024, para. 1.

¹⁰ FFM, *Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya*, UN Doc. A/HRC/50/63, 27 June 2022, paras 39 and 74. For an explanation of what the SSA is and to whom it is affiliated, see above Acronyms and presentation of the main Libyan actors.

¹¹ For an explanation of what the GNU is and to whom it is affiliated, see above Acronyms and presentation of the main Libyan actors.

¹² ICJ, *Libya: Investigate unidentified bodies and reported mass graves in Abu Salim*, 27 May 2025; OHCHR, *Libya: Sites of gross human rights violations must be sealed and impartially investigated – Türk*, 4 June 2025.

1.2. Deaths in custody in disputed circumstances

Since the HRC's adoption of resolution 56/16 on 11 July 2024, several detainees have died in disputed circumstances while in custody,¹³ and the Libyan authorities have continuously failed to effectively investigate such cases. For example, on 13 July 2024, Ahmed Abdel Moneim Al-Zawi died in the custody of the Internal Security Agency (ISA)¹⁴ in the city of Ajdabiya, in the East. The ISA claimed that Mr Al-Zawi had hanged himself, but, according to his family, he had a bruise on the back of his head, consistent with having been subjected to physical violence. Mr Al-Zawi had been arbitrarily detained on 10 July 2024 after being summoned by the ISA to pick up his brother.¹⁵

Additionally, between November 2024 and April 2025, at least five detainees arrested on charges of practising “witchcraft” and/or “sorcery”¹⁶ by the General Directorate for Security Operations – affiliated with the Ministry of Interior of the Government of National Stability¹⁷ – have died in custody in circumstances that are disputed.¹⁸ Among them, Khamis Mohammed Al-Aqab died on 19 February 2025 while in custody at Garnada prison, some 250 km from Benghazi, in the East.¹⁹ A month earlier, leaked videos had shown detainees from that prison being severely beaten and forced into stress positions.²⁰

Abdel Moneim Rajab Al-Marimi's death is an example of a death in which there is credible evidence of State involvement, analogous to a custodial death in disputed circumstances. On 30 June 2025, the western ISA arrested Mr Rajab Al-Marimi, a political activist in Surman, west of Tripoli. The ISA detained him until 3 July when they handed him over to the Attorney General, Al-Siddiq Al-Sour, despite article 26 of Libyan Code of Criminal Procedure according to which judicial police officers shall refer the accused to the Attorney General within 48 hours of arrest. Following reports of Mr Rajab Al-Marimi's death on 4 July, the

¹³ See the death of Adel Abdel Salam Muftah Al-Werfali: LCW, [Report: Human Rights Violations in Libya during December 2024](#), 5 January 2025; and Faisal Awad Ibshish: LCW, [Facebook post of 8 May 2025](#).

¹⁴ For an explanation of what the ISA is and to whom it is affiliated, see above Acronyms and presentation of the main Libyan actors.

¹⁵ Amnesty International, [Libya: Internal Security Agency must be held accountable for deaths in custody, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention](#), 10 September 2024 ; LCW, [Report: Human Rights Violations in Libya during July 2024](#), 5 August 2024.

¹⁶ See [Law No. 6 of 2024 on the Criminalization of Witchcraft, Sorcery, Divination, and Related Practices](#), 15 May 2024.

¹⁷ For an explanation of what the Government of National Stability is and to whom it is affiliated, see above Acronyms and presentation of the main Libyan actors.

¹⁸ LCW, [Report: Human Rights Violations in Libya during November 2024](#), 5 December 2024; LCW, [Facebook post of 26 February 2025](#); LCW, [Report: Human Rights Violations In Libya During April 2025](#), 5 May 2025. See also, LCW, [Statement: LCW condemns extrajudicial killings inside an unofficial prison in Benghazi](#), 29 November 2024.

¹⁹ LCW, [Facebook post of 26 February 2025](#).

²⁰ LCW, [Facebook post of 13 January 2025](#); Libyan Observer, [UN calls for investigation into torture videos from Libyan prison](#), 16 January 2025.

Attorney General stated that, after interrogating Mr Rajab Al-Marimi, he had released him on 3 July. On 6 July, the Attorney General released soundless CCTV footage from 3 July showing Mr Rajab Al-Marimi seemingly waving goodbye and intentionally jumping down the staircase of the Attorney General's Office.²¹ He died of his injuries while in hospital the following day. The circumstances surrounding his death – including his jumping down the staircase – remain suspicious.²² On 6 July, the Attorney General also announced the opening of an investigation into Mr Rajab Al-Marimi's death,²³ but, at the time of writing, the outcome of this investigation has not been made public.

1.3. Revelation of torture of forcibly disappeared member of Parliament Ibrahim Al-Dersi

On 5 May 2025, a video showing Ibrahim Al-Dersi, a member of the House of Representatives (HoR),²⁴ was leaked on social media. In the video, deemed authentic by the International Criminal Court's (ICC) Office of the Prosecutor's (OTP), Mr Al-Dersi is seen shackled, with a heavy chain around his neck, dressed in his underpants only, and bearing signs consistent with torture.²⁵ By then, Mr Al-Dersi in Benghazi had been missing for almost a year: on 16 May 2024, unidentified gunmen had abducted him in Benghazi. His car was later found with traces of blood inside.²⁶

The video – featuring apparent signs of torture and the humiliation of a member of Parliament hailing from a powerful tribe – particularly shocked Libyans. Despite Mr Al-Dersi by then having been missing for almost a year, the Attorney General announced the launch of an investigation into his disappearance only after the video went viral, on 12 May 2025.²⁷

²¹ Attorney General's Office, [Facebook post of 6 July 2025](#) (in Arabic only).

²² See [Statement by the Co-Chairs of the International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Working Group \(UNSMIL, the Netherlands, and Switzerland\)](#), 24 July 2025.

²³ Attorney General's Office, [Facebook post of 6 July 2025](#) (in Arabic only).

²⁴ For an explanation of what the HoR is and to whom it is affiliated, see above Acronyms and presentation of the main Libyan actors.

²⁵ ICC, OTP, [Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Libya, pursuant to Resolution 1970 \(2011\)](#), 15 May 2025.

²⁶ LCW, [Report: Human Rights Violations in Libya during May 2024](#), 5 June 2024.

²⁷ Amnesty International, [Urgent Action: Libyan MP Disappeared for Over a Year](#), 10 June 2025.

2. Rule of law

Since the HRC's adoption of resolution 56/16 on 11 July 2024, the Libyan authorities have continued to disregard the rule of law in their crackdown on civil society actors (CSAs). On 2 April 2025, the western ISA announced the “closure of the headquarters” of 10 international (NGOs) supporting migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, without any due process. The ISA claimed the NGOs were involved in “hostile activities” and accused them of conspiring to “settle illegal migrants of African origin in Libya”, a plan it labelled “a hostile act aimed at altering the country’s demographic composition and posing a threat to Libyan society.”²⁸

On 16 July 2025, in a letter addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Attorney General clarified that he had not issued any decision prohibiting the NGOs from operating, and requested to be consulted on decisions about the NGOs’ operations, effectively confirming that no regular process had been followed by the ISA.²⁹ Nonetheless, according to information available to the ICJ, these reputable NGOs, including Doctors Without Borders and the Danish Refugee Council, at the time of writing, had not been allowed to resume activities, leaving migrants, refugees and asylum seekers without critical services aimed at safeguarding their right to life, food, housing and health, which the Libyan authorities continue to struggle to guarantee.

Political activism is also targeted through arbitrary arrests. For example, on 6 January 2025, armed men believed to belong to the SSA in Tripoli arbitrarily arrested Khaled Mohammed Al-Tabib, a political activist. He was detained without formal charge, before being released three days later.³⁰ Prior to his arrest and detention, Mr Al-Tabib had published posts critical of the GNU on his personal Facebook page.

A series of attacks by armed groups against the judiciary are another example of the ongoing rule of law encroachment in the country. On 15 July 2025, armed men on board three vehicles surrounded the Abu Salim Personal Status Court, in Tripoli. The assailants opened fired on the court building, while at least one of them entered the premises, firing live ammunition and assaulting a police officer.³¹

²⁸ ICJ and others, [Libya: Stop the crackdown on NGOs supporting migrants, refugees and asylum seekers](#), 17 April 2025; ISA, [Facebook post of 2 April 2025](#) (in Arabic only).

²⁹ Attorney General’s Office, [Facebook post of 20 July 2025](#) (in Arabic only).

³⁰ LCW, [Report: Human Rights Violations in Libya During January 2025](#), 5 February 2025.

³¹ Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, [Libya: Armed Attack on Tripoli Court Underscores Urgency of Restoring Rule of Law](#), 18 July 2025. For more on attacks against the judiciary, see Adala for All, [Adala for All association supports the International Criminal Court's efforts to end impunity in Libya](#), 19 May 2025.

3. Lack of accountability

3.1. Domestic accountability proceedings

At the domestic level, an almost complete lack of accountability for crimes under international law has persisted since the HRC's adoption of resolution 56/16 on 11 July 2024. While the Libyan authorities have tried to present the trial of Abdullah Senussi – the former head of the Military Intelligence during the Gadhafi's era – arising from the 1996 Abu Salim prison massacre,³² or the Tarhuna case (see below) as examples of their commitment to justice, the criminal proceedings in either case have thus far failed to ensure accountability for serious crimes under international law.

The trial of Abdullah Senussi has been ongoing since March 2014. In March 2024, the Supreme Court transferred the case to a military court. Since then, the case keeps being endlessly postponed, often without any reason being provided.³³ In any event, no substantive hearings took place since the Supreme Court's decision. Meanwhile, Abdullah Senussi remains in prolonged pre-trial detention.

In October 2024, a military court reportedly convicted and sentenced 16 individuals to the death penalty in relation to the crimes committed in Tarhuna under the Kaniyat.³⁴ By 2015, the Al-Kani family/Al-Kaniyat militia fully controlled the city of Tarhuna, some 100 km south-east of Tripoli. They “ruled through a campaign of terror and intimidation” until 2020, when the Government of National Accord – the GNU's predecessor³⁵ – ousted them from Tarhuna. The FFM found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Al-Kaniyat committed the crimes against humanity of murder, extermination, imprisonment, torture, persecution on political grounds, enforced disappearance and other inhumane acts, and war crimes.³⁶

The October 2024 proceedings lacked transparency: neither the charges and the identity of ten of the defendants, nor the dates and duration of the trial were disclosed.³⁷ Meanwhile, two suspects, among those who had been charged in connection with the crimes committed

³² In June 1996, security forces killed an estimated 1,200 prisoners following a riot at the Abu Salim prison. See, Human Rights Watch, *Libya: June 1996 Killings at Abu Salim Prison*, 2003.

³³ See Libya Observer, *Abdullah Al-Senussi's trial postponed to 2025*, 2 December 2024; Libya Observer, *Abu Salim massacre hearing postponed to next month*, 13 January 2025; Libya Observer, *Abu Salim prison massacre case postponed to next May*, 23 April 2025.

³⁴ Libya Observer, *Libyan military court issues death sentences in Tarhuna mass graves case*, 3 October 2024.

³⁵ For an explanation of what the Government of National Accord and the GNU are and to whom they are affiliated, see above Acronyms and presentation of the main Libyan actors.

³⁶ FFM, *Conference room paper of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya*, UN Doc. A/HRC/50/CRP.3, 1 July 2022.

³⁷ Libya Observer, *Libyan military court issues death sentences in Tarhuna mass graves case*, 3 October 2024.

in Tarhuna, escaped during the May 2025 hostilities between GNU-affiliated and rival militias in Tripoli.³⁸

On 30 May 2025, the Attorney General created two committees mandated with investigating crimes committed by the SSA, and crimes against protestors and deaths in custody in disputed circumstances, respectively.³⁹ On 9 June, the Attorney General announced the issuance of 141 arrest warrants against members of the SSA and affiliated militias suspected of having committed murder, torture, kidnappings and being responsible for arbitrary detentions.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, on 4 June 2025, the Presidential Council (PC)⁴¹ announced the establishment of a temporary committee in charge of monitoring the conditions in detention centers.⁴²

While the ICJ welcomes the creation of these committees, as well as the investigations into and the arrest warrants against members of the SSA – given the militia’s alleged involvement in gross human rights violations⁴³ – the organization is concerned that, as for the prosecution of perpetrators in the Abu Salim and Tarhuna cases, the proceedings will likely fail to conform with international human rights law and standards, including by lacking transparency. For those announcements to be truly consequential, the Libyan authorities need to take all feasible measures to ensure that suspects be arrested, that trials be conducted in compliance with international human rights law, and that victims and survivors be allowed to meaningfully participate.

3.2. Transitional justice

A legal committee appointed by the PC prepared a Draft Reconciliation Law, which it finalized at the beginning of 2024. In June 2024, the ICJ issued an analysis of the Draft Law in light of international human rights law and standards.⁴⁴ Despite some concerns regarding the lack of concrete safeguards to ensure the institutional independence of the transitional justice mechanism that the Draft Law would establish, the version of the draft legislation

³⁸ Libyan News Agency, [رابطة ضحايا ترهونة تؤكد فرار مطلوبين في قضايا المقابر الجماعية خلال اشتباكات طرابلس](#), 23 May 2025 (in Arabic only).

³⁹ Libyan News Agency, [The Attorney General forms two committees to investigate security violations and violence during the Tripoli demonstrations](#), 30 May 2025.

⁴⁰ Attorney General’s Office, [Facebook post of 9 June 2025](#) (in Arabic only).

⁴¹ For an explanation of what the PC is and to whom it is affiliated, see above Acronyms and presentation of the main Libyan actors.

⁴² PC, [Decree 35 of 2025 on the establishment of a human rights committee to follow-up on the conditions in prisons and detention centers](#), 4 June 2025 (in Arabic only).

⁴³ FFM, [Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya](#), UN Doc. A/HRC/50/63, 27 June 2022, paras 39 and 74.

⁴⁴ ICJ, [An opportunity for accountability and justice](#), June 2024.

reviewed by the ICJ, if enacted, would bring about significant progress compared with Libya's current transitional justice framework.⁴⁵

In January 2025, the spokesperson of the HoR announced that the HoR had adopted a national reconciliation and transitional justice law.⁴⁶ According to information available to the ICJ, however, this law has not yet been signed by the Speaker of the HoR. Additionally, it significantly departs from the draft that had been agreed upon under the auspices of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) through sustained efforts to build consensus on a draft that combines the PC's legal committee's draft with competing HoR versions,⁴⁷ and does not provide for accountability and reparations.

With different Libyan and international stakeholders promoting alternative drafts or initiatives,⁴⁸ and the failure to reach consensus on the composition of an independent truth and reconciliation commission, the establishment of a comprehensive, inclusive, rights-based and victim-centred transitional justice process that guarantees the rights to truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition is compromised.

3.3. Cooperation with the International Criminal Court

While at least three suspects against whom the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants have been in custody of the Libyan authorities,⁴⁹ none had been handed over to the Court at the time of writing. When Osama Elmasry Njeem – against whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Mitiga prison, in Tripoli – was arrested in Italy, Libya's Attorney General sent a letter to Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting his repatriation to Libya.⁵⁰ Since Mr Elmasry Njeem's return to Libya, both the Attorney General and the GNU Ministry of Justice declared they

⁴⁵ On an analysis of [Law No. 29 of 2013 on Transitional Justice](#), see ICJ, *Impunity No More*, July 2020.

⁴⁶ Reuters, [Libya's eastern parliament approves transitional justice law in unity move, MPs say](#), 8 January 2025.

⁴⁷ UNSMIL, [With UNSMIL Facilitation, Legislators and Legal Experts Come Together to Unify Approach to Drafting a Reconciliation Law](#), 2 May 2024; UNSMIL, [Towards a Comprehensive Draft Law on Transitional Justice and Reconciliation](#), 10 December 2024.

⁴⁸ See, for example, the African Union-supported Libyan Reconciliation Charter, which did not build on the previous work of the PC's legal committee and the HoR. AU, [African Union High-Level Ad Hoc Committee Meeting on Libyan National Reconciliation](#), 14 February 2025.

⁴⁹ Abdullah Al-Senussi, Mohamed Salheen, and at least one suspect from Tarhuna. See, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, [Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi](#), ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Red, 11 October 2013, para. 294; 444th Brigade, [Facebook post of 23 November 2024](#) (in Arabic only); ICC, OTP, [Twenty-Ninth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1970 \(2011\)](#), May 2025, para. 65. The 444th Brigade is a Tripoli-based militia affiliated with the GNU.

⁵⁰ [Letter from the Attorney General of Libya to Italy's Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation](#), 20 January 2025. See the original in Arabic [here](#). See also, ICC, OTP, [Twenty-Ninth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1970 \(2011\)](#), May 2025, para. 66.

would not hand him to the Court.⁵¹ The Attorney General explained that Mr Elmasry Njeem would be tried domestically. He announced the opening of an investigation against him, but, to date, has not issued an arrest warrant, and Mr Elmasry Njeem has not been arrested.⁵²

Although Libya accepted the Court's jurisdiction in May 2025,⁵³ the Libyan authorities still need to demonstrate their genuine commitment to international justice by taking concrete action to support the ICC OTP investigation, in particular by promptly arresting and transferring all the suspects subject to an ICC arrest warrant, including Mr Elmasry Njeem, to the Court and providing the OTP unrestricted access to crime scenes in all regions of the country.⁵⁴

4. Political instability and division

As mentioned above,⁵⁵ on 12 May 2025, militias affiliated with the GNU launched a military operation against the SSA in Tripoli, resulting in the killing of Abdelghani Al-Kikli (also known as "Ghaniwa"), the commander of the SSA. On 13 May 2025, GNU-aligned militias clashed with other rival militias, including the Special Deterrence Forces (SDF),⁵⁶ the Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration (DCIM), the Judicial Security Apparatus (JSA), and remnants of the SSA. The clashes led to the death of at least 10 civilians and caused chaos and insecurity in the capital,⁵⁷ sparking public anger and protests demanding the fall of the GNU.⁵⁸

Also on 13 May 2025, the GNU dissolved the DCIM and the Department of Operations and Judicial Security of the JSA, and replaced the head of the Tripoli-based ISA.⁵⁹ On 14 May 2025, however, the PC suspended these decisions and, on 1 June 2025, appointed a new head to the SSA.⁶⁰

⁵¹ Attorney General's Office, [Facebook post of 9 July 2025](#) (in Arabic only); Alwasat Libya, [X post of 13 July 2025](#).

⁵² Attorney General's Office, [Facebook post of 9 July 2025](#) (in Arabic only).

⁵³ ICC, [Libya accepts ICC jurisdiction over alleged crimes from 2011 to the end of 2027](#), 15 May 2025.

⁵⁴ For more on the stakes and implications of Libya's acceptance of the ICC's jurisdiction, see ICJ, [Libya's acceptance of the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction: stakes and implications: Questions & Answers](#), August 2025.

⁵⁵ See 1.1 Discovery of unidentified bodies.

⁵⁶ For an explanation of what the SDF is and to whom it is affiliated, see above Acronyms and presentation of the main Libyan actors.

⁵⁷ LCW, [Statement: LCW Condemns Civilian Casualties and Calls for an End to Clashes in Tripoli](#), 15 May 2025.

⁵⁸ Le Monde, [Libyan militia battles in Tripoli spark public anger](#), 1 June 2025.

⁵⁹ GNU, [Decree No. 227 of 2025 amending the structure of the Ministry of Interior](#), 13 May 2025 (in Arabic only); GNU, [Decree No. 327 of 2025 concerning the organizational structure of the Judicial Police Authority](#), 13 May 2025 (in Arabic only). See also, Libya Herald, [Tripoli PM Aldabaiba appoints Mustafa Al-Wahishi as the new head of the Internal Security Agency](#), 14 May 2025.

⁶⁰ PC, [Decree No. 2 of 2025 concerning the consolidation of the ceasefire and the enforcement of security arrangements](#), 14 May 2025 (in Arabic only). See also, Libyan Observer, [New appointments for Stability Support Apparatus and Judicial Police Authority](#), 24 June 2025.

Although a ceasefire has been holding since mid-May 2025, tensions between the different parties remain high, illustrating the fragility of peace.⁶¹ On 9 July 2025, UNSMIL warned against the “military build-up in and around Tripoli”.⁶²

Conclusion

Since the HRC’s adoption of the resolution on technical assistance and capacity-building on 11 July 2024, the dire human rights situation in Libya has not improved. Despite the Libyan authorities’ claim that they could themselves fight impunity and uphold the rule of law, this last year has shown that they remain unable and/or unwilling to do so. The mid-May clashes this year underscored how fragmented Libya remains and how fragile the *status quo* is. Therefore, to ensure accountability and foster long-lasting stability, the ICJ urges Member States of the HRC to establish a follow-up mechanism to the FFM. The ICJ presented the different options available to the Member States in its joint position paper with Lawyers for Justice in Libya.⁶³ Cognizant of the current financial crisis at the HRC, the ICJ calls on Member States to prioritize establishing a Special Rapporteur on Libya.

⁶¹ See for example, New Lines Magazine, [A Power Grab Backfires in Tripoli](#), 28 May 2025.

⁶² UNSMIL, [X post of 9 July 2025](#). See also, EU delegation to Libya, [Joint Statement by the European Union Delegation and the diplomatic missions of EU Member States in Libya](#), 10 July 2025.

⁶³ ICJ and LFJL, [Stability Through Accountability: Why Libya Needs an International Human Rights Mechanism](#), March 2025.

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September 2025 (for an updated list, please visit www.icj.org/commission)

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