Joint judicial colloquium on gender equality and women’s access to justice in Southeast Asia

Joint judicial colloquium on gender equality and women’s access to justice in Southeast Asia

The ICJ collaborated on this judicial colloquium with the UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women and the Thailand Office of the Judiciary.

The Judicial Colloquium on Gender Equality Jurisprudence and the Role of the Judiciary in Promoting Women’s Access to Justice was held from 4 to 5 September 2013 in Bangkok, Thailand.

Judges from eight Southeast Asian countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor Leste, and Thailand) came to the colloquium to discuss the role of judges in the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

Representatives from the eight countries’ judicial training institutions and civil society organizations joined them in this colloquium.  All eight participating countries are parties to the CEDAW.

The judicial colloquium is part of the work of the ICJ in engaging various actors, including judges, lawyers, and human rights defenders, to explore ways to address the range of obstacles that persistently reduce women’s access to justice and legal protection.

Sam Zarifi, ICJ’s Regional Director for Asia and the Pacific, also noted the importance of this colloquium in the context of the development of a regional human rights mechanism in the ASEAN. He observed during his opening speech that the ASEAN is in the midst of setting standards and emphasized “it is important for judges to be aware of international standards of this issue so that they can substantially contribute to the discourse in setting up a regional mechanism.”

At the end of the colloquium, the participating judges, representatives from judicial training institutes and civil society organizations adopted a statement which noted, among other things, the uneven progress in the implementation of CEDAW in domestic laws and that judges should strive to interpret domestic law in consonance with the CEDAW.

They also agreed on recommendations, one of which is to encourage the formation of a regional network of judges to promote continuing dialogue, knowledge and information sharing regarding the application of CEDAW and other international human rights treaties in judicial systems.

Contact:

Emerlynne Gil, International Legal Advisor, tel. no. +66 6198477 ext. 206 or emerlynne.gil(a)icj.org

 

 

 

Vietnam: ICJ calls for release of human rights lawyer Le Quoc Quan after trial postponed indefinitely

Vietnam: ICJ calls for release of human rights lawyer Le Quoc Quan after trial postponed indefinitely

The ICJ today called for the immediate release of Le Quoc Quan, after the People’s Court of Hanoi announced on 8 July 2013 the postponement of his trial, without setting any new dates for the case. The reason given for the hastily informed adjournment was that the judge had suddenly taken ill.

The ICJ considers that Le Quoc Quan’s continued detention is in violation of Vietnam’s penal law and the State’s international legal obligations.

Le Quoc Quan, a lawyer and human rights defender, was arrested on 27 December 2012 and charged for tax evasion under article 161 of Vietnam’s 1999 Penal Code.

The postponement of the trial appears to signal that Le Quoc Quan will continue to remain in jail. Since his arrest last year, he has already been detained for more than six months.

“The continued detention of Le Quoc Quan is akin to him being punished even before the trial has commenced. This is a clear violation of his right to being presumed innocent,” said Andrew Khoo from the Malaysian Bar Council, an expert appointed by the ICJ, who had traveled to Hanoi to observe Le Quoc Quan’s trial.

On 29 December, two days after Le Quoc Quan’s arrest, his wife filed an application for bail to the police and procurator. She had also applied for release on his own recognizance. There are no specific detailed procedures spelled out in law governing bail procedures. Under article 92 of the Criminal Procedure Code, only family members are permitted to act as guarantors. To date, neither the police nor the procurator have replied to her applications.

Under article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Vietnam is a party, it should not be the general rule that persons are detained while awaiting trial, and release pending trial may only be subject to conditions to ensure appearance at the trial.

“There is no reason to believe that if released Le Quoc Quan would not appear for trial, and in any event his family has made representations to act as guarantors”, said Emerlynne Gil, the ICJ’s International Legal Adviser on Southeast Asia, who was also in Hanoi to observe the trial. “The People’s Court of Hanoi must order Le Quoc Quan’s release either on bail or his own recognizance.”

The ICJ notes that the postponement also violates Le Quoc Quan’s right to a speedy trial. Under international law, including ICCPR article 14, an accused has the right to be tried without undue delay and within a reasonable period of time. This prevents any unnecessary continuing deprivation of liberty and ensures that the interest of justice is properly served.

“We would expect that the People’s Court of Hanoi will notify promptly the public of the next date of Le Quac Quan’s trial and ensure that his right to a fair and public trial is upheld,” said Emerlynne Gil.

The ICJ looks forward to returning to Vietnam to continue monitoring this case and ensuring that the rights of Le Quoc Quan, including his right to liberty and to a fair trial, are fully respected and protected.

CONTACT:

Ms. Emerlynne Gil, International Legal Adviser for Southeast Asia, tel. no. +662 6198477; email: emerlynne.gil(a)icj.org

 

 

Thailand: look beyond the troubled South in lifting security laws

Thailand: look beyond the troubled South in lifting security laws

An opinion piece by Benjamin Zawacki, Senior Legal Adviser for Southeast Asia at the International Commission of Jurists.

Thailand’s government recently passed up an opportunity for a new approach to the deep South, by declining to replace the Emergency Decree, which violates international standards on human rights, with the somewhat less heavy-handed Internal Security Act (ISA).

Equally concerning is why the government has not looked beyond the South in reconsidering the use of its other extraordinary security legislation: no fewer than 31 of Thailand’s 77 provinces are at least partially under Martial Law.

International law is clear that the extraordinary powers under security laws like the Emergency Decree and Martial Law may only be invoked under a strict set of circumstances, none of which is even arguably applicable in Thailand outside of the southern insurgency (four of the 31 provinces).

Martial Law may be invoked in Thailand “when a situation arises that makes it necessary to maintain law and order and to defend against the danger of attack”, or “when there is an outbreak of war or unrest”. All of Thailand’s provinces that are situated on one of the country’s four international borders are under Martial Law in whole or in part (including the 27 not in the deep South). Among them is Phitsanulok, whose shared border with Laos is roughly only 50km.

This province featured in Thailand’s last war, a three-month affair with Laos that ended in 1988.

Otherwise, Thailand’s border challenges are well-known: trafficking in persons, drugs, and weapons; landmines; refugees and migrants; smuggling of logs, oil, and other contraband; demarcation disputes. While doubtless all of these call for robust law enforcement, only the dispute with Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple even arguably involves defending against the danger of armed attack.

Several minor but deadly skirmishes with Cambodian forces, as well as considerable mutual saber-rattling, have occurred in several districts of Si Sa Ket province since 2009. It is not credible to claim that Thailand needs to impose Martial Law because of external threats.

A more likely explanation is that Martial Law’s expansive application in Thailand is due to what is common to most security legislation around the region, namely vague language that lends itself to broad interpretation and granting wide powers to the military.

The Martial Law term “law and order”, in addition to more typically applying to civilian law enforcement agencies than to the military, could apply to any situation in which a law is implicated – which is nearly all situations. “Order” and “unrest” are particularly ill-defined.

Moreover, “maintain” suggests law and order need only be threatened to invoke Martial Law, rather than be lost and in need of being restored.

What constitutes an “attack” and the likelihood of such required for Thailand to be in “danger” are also essentially judgment calls. And when is an attack (or a series of attacks) tantamount to an “outbreak of war”?

A second and related reason that Martial Law is so pervasive in Thailand is the large number of military personnel empowered to invoke the law, coupled with, inversely, the difficulty in revoking it later.

While order by royal decree is required for invoking Martial Law on the first set of grounds, even local military commanders can invoke Martial Law in the area under their control on the second set (“when there is an outbreak of war or unrest”), affording them enormous discretion and authority.

In contrast, any and all revocations of the law require order by royal decree, a level of involvement as centralized and bureaucratic as a district military commander’s invocation is local and simple.

Martial Law’s use in Thailand historically supports the analysis that imprecise grounds combined with bureaucratic inertia account for the wide geographical application of the law.

Twice in the past 22 years, orders by royal decree referencing “law and order” have imposed Martial Law on the whole of Thailand, both times via coups d’état in 1991 and 2006.

On only three occasions after the 1991 coup (twice later the same year and once in 1998) was Martial Law lifted in some but not all of Thailand’s provinces. On the eve of the 2006 coup, it was still in effect in all or part of 18 provinces.

Similarly, following the blanket invocation of Martial Law on the whole country in 2006, on only two occasions since (in January 2007 and 2008, respectively) has an order by royal decree revoked the law in 46 of Thailand’s 77 provinces. Why not everywhere?

International law requires that extraordinary security legislation be invoked only in response to an exceptional situation.

Powers granted to security forces and any derogation from human rights must be strictly necessary and proportionate to the situation, and must have a time limitation attached to them.

None of these elements is met in the case of Thailand’s application of Martial Law to its international borders.

Indeed, Martial Law in Thailand allows security forces to arrest people without a warrant, and to detain them for seven days prior to charging them.

Critically, it does not require that detainees be promptly brought before a judge, in flagrant violation of Thailand’s legal obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

This leaves detainees particularly vulnerable to torture or other ill-treatment at the hands of the security forces, which Thailand has also agreed to prevent and punish as a party to the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture.

In cases under Martial Law of alleged misconduct by security forces, victims are unable to institute a criminal prosecution (though they may initiate a civil action) or to choose their own lawyer; only a military prosecutor is entitled to institute a criminal charge. No appeal can be lodged against judgments or orders of military courts during this period.

The Thai government should reconsider its decision to keep the Emergency Decree in place throughout most of the deep South.

At the same time, it should take the long overdue step of lifting an equally heavy-handed Martial Law everywhere else.

 

 

 

ICJ: Cambodian Bar Association must uphold lawyers’ freedom of expression

ICJ: Cambodian Bar Association must uphold lawyers’ freedom of expression

The ICJ urged the Cambodian Bar Association to make it clear that its new Code of Ethics, launched today, does not restrict the freedom of lawyers to express their opinions.

Article 17 of the new Code of Ethics states (in an informal translation by the ICJ) that “All interventions made publicly or through public media by lawyers in their capacity as lawyers may be permitted only within the framework of strict compliance with the duties of the legal profession. Such interventions require diligence.”

This language replaces Article 15 of the 1995 Code, which demanded all lawyers in Cambodia to “inform” or “consult” the Bar President before making media statements.

“The language of the new Article 17 is an improvement over the old Code, but it is ambiguous and raises fears that lawyers will not be able to exercise their right to express their opinions freely,” said Emerlynne Gil, ICJ’s International Legal Advisor on Southeast Asia. “The Cambodian Bar Association must clarify that under Article 17, lawyers, like all others, can address important legal and policy issues publicly and openly.”

The ICJ asserted that the Bar Association must clearly and publicly state that Article 17 shall not be construed to mean that lawyers must seek permission prior to engaging in public activities in their professional capacity.

The ICJ also expressed concern over the previous statements made by the Bar Association implying that lawyers could be sanctioned for expressing certain views of the country’s laws or legal reforms. During a press conference on 15 March 2013, the Bar Association said that the purpose of Article 17 was to prevent lawyers from misinterpreting the law and thus “making society chaotic”.

“The best means of increasing public awareness of the laws and strengthening the rule of law is to encourage greater public discussion,” said Emerlynne Gil. “Disagreements about the meaning of laws are part of the nature of the legal process and should be encouraged publicly.”

The ICJ recognizes the grave difficulties of facing the legal system in Cambodia, where fewer than 1000 active lawyers must provide services for a population of more than 14 million people. “We share the Cambodian Bar Association’s concerns about the need to uphold the professional competence and integrity of its members,” said Emerlynne Gil. “However, this concern should be addressed through efforts to improve legal education expertise rather than limiting the right of lawyers to freedom of expression.”

For questions and clarifications, please contact Ms. Emerlynne Gil, International Legal Adviser for Southeast Asia, tel. no. +662 619 8477, fax no. +662 6198479 or emerlynne.gil@icj.org

ICJ calls on Indonesia to abolish death penalty

ICJ calls on Indonesia to abolish death penalty

Indonesia’s resumption of the death penalty after a four-year moratorium is a major setback for the country’s human rights record, the ICJ said today.

Indonesia executed Adami Wilson Bin Adam on 15 March 2013. After the execution, Indonesia’s Attorney General Basrief Arief announced that the government was set to execute nine more convicts this year.

“The Indonesian government should immediately reverse its decision to proceed with more executions in defiance of global trends toward the abolition of the death penalty,” said Emerlynne Gil, ICJ’s International Legal Advisor for Southeast Asia in Bangkok. “At least 150 countries have now either abolished the death penalty or instituted an official or unofficial moratorium. There is a growing understanding around the world that the death penalty is an unacceptable assault on rights and dignity.”

Adami Wilson Bin Adam was convicted in 2004 for smuggling one kilogram of heroin into the country. In Indonesia, the law prescribes the penalty of death for trafficking narcotics.

During its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in 2012 at the UN Human Rights Council, Indonesia rejected recommendations to abolish the death penalty or establish a moratorium on executions.

In its reply, the Government of Indonesia said that death penalty is imposed “selectively only for serious crimes.” However, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, in his report, emphasized that “the death penalty should be eliminated for crimes such as economic crimes and drug-related offences.”

Indonesia last carried out executions four years ago. In 2008 it executed three men convicted of the 2002 Bali bombings.

“This execution undermines Indonesia’s repeated efforts to position itself as a regional human rights leader,” Gil added. “Its resumption of executions is indeed a very grave setback not only for Indonesia, but also for the region and ASEAN, the Association of South East Asia Nations.”

The ICJ says that use of the death penalty violates the right to life and the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

Last November 2012, the UN General Assembly issued a resolution calling on all Member States to establish a moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty.

The resolution was adopted by an overwhelming number of votes from Member States. Indonesia abstained from the vote.

The ICJ calls Indonesia to immediately ratify the 2nd Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which obligates State Parties to take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty.

In the immediate term, the country should implement a moratorium on the practice, the ICJ adds.

 

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