Judicial independence is founded on public trust and, to maintain that trust, judges must uphold the highest standards of independence, impartiality and integrity, and must be accountable to those standards.
The guarantee of judicial decisions by independent tribunals means that judges must be free to “decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of the facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason”.[1] Thus, both state actors and non-state actors alike must respect the independence of the judiciary and refrain from action aimed at improperly influencing members of the judiciary, undermining their independence and impartiality. While respecting the hierarchy between the courts of first instance and higher courts international standards clarify that other judges, must also respect the independence of their colleagues within the scope of the exercise of judicial functions: “No one must give or attempt to give the judge orders or instructions of any kind, that may influence the judicial decisions of the judge, except, where applicable, the opinion in a particular case given on appeal by the higher courts.”[2]
In the course of the exercise of judicial functions, judges must be impartial, and be seen to be impartial. Judges “must not allow their judgment to be influenced by personal bias or prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the particular case before them, nor act in ways that improperly promote the interests of one of the parties to the detriment of the other.” Further, even where an individual judge might arguably in fact be able to ignore a personal relationship to one of the parties to a case, he or she should step aside from the case to protect against an apprehension of bias: “the tribunal must also appear to a reasonable observer to be impartial.”[3]
Judges must also ensure that their conduct is above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer. They must avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. Their behaviour must reinforce the people’s confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.[4]
A judicial code of conduct, drafted primarily by judges and members of the legal profession and consistent with international standards,[5] can help to safeguard judicial integrity and protect against conflicts of interest.[6] Pursuant to international standards, such a judicial code of conduct, which should be enshrined in the law, should serve as the basis for the determination of cases of alleged judicial misconduct within a fair disciplinary system.[7]
Complaints about judicial misconduct must be processed expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure that is subject to independent review.[8] The judge in question has the right to a fair hearing[9] before an independent and impartial body. The body responsible for discipline of judges should be independent of the executive,[10] plural and composed mainly (if not solely) of judges and members of the legal profession.[11] The judge’s rights to a fair proceeding, including to notice of the accusations against him or her, to adequate time and facilities to prepare and present a defence including through counsel,[12] to challenge the evidence against him or her and present witnesses must be respected.Decisions must be based on established standards of judicial conduct, and sanctions must be proportionate. Decisions to suspend or remove a judge must be limited to cases in which the incapacity or behaviour of a judge renders the individual unfit to discharge his or her judicial duties. Decisions and sanctions in disciplinary proceedings should be subject to independent judicial review (although this may not apply to decisions of the highest court or the legislature in impeachment proceedings).[13]
In order to safeguard the independence of the judiciary, individual judges should also enjoy personal immunity from civil suits for monetary damages for improper acts or omissions in the exercise of their judicial functions.[14]
In Swaziland, during the tenure of Chief Justice Richard Banda, a code of judicial conduct was drafted.[15] It was not subsequently taken forward. The Leadership Code of Conduct[16] will apply to judges, once adopted, but concerns have been expressed that this Code falls short of a proper judicial code of conduct.[17]
There have been concerns about the independence of procedures related to judicial accountability in Swaziland and judges upholding the integrity of their office.
The Constitution provides for the removal of a justice of the Superior Court only in cases of stated serious misbehaviour or “inability to perform the functions of office arising from infirmity of body or mind”.[18]
If the King, acting on the advice of an ad hoc committee in case of the Chief Justice (made up of the minister responsible for justice, the chairman of the Civil Service Commission and the President of the Law Society) or acting on the advice of the Chief Justice in other cases, considers the question of removal ought to be investigated, he refers the matter for investigation to the Judicial Service Commission, which is reconstituted for the purpose as may be appropriate, subject to principles of fairness and natural justice. The Commission inquires into the matter and makes a recommendation to the King, who “shall act in each case on the recommendation of the Commission”.[19] The procedure does not appear to provide for an independent review of the decision of the Commission in relation to any level of judiciary.
The Judicial Service Commission has not performed this function impartially. In 2011 it removed Justice Thomas Masuku, one of the country’s few independent judges, from office for allegedly criticizing the King. Due process safeguards were not observed in the case and the proceedings were not transparent, impartial or fair.
Concerns about the independence and integrity of the disciplinary process were evident in when also in 2011, the Chief Justice presided over proceedings pertaining to himself that were initiated pursuant to a complaint filed by the Law Society, summarily dismissing the case for lack of evidence.[20]
Concerns have been raised, including by the ICJ about the manner in which the quest for supremacy in the Basotho judiciary has been carried out in Lesotho between Chief Justice Ramodibedi, who also serves not only as CJ in Swaziland but also as President of the Court of Appeal in Lesotho, against the (now former) Chief Justice of Lesotho, Mahapela Lehohla.[21]
- 1. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Principle 2;
The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
A judicial body shall base its decision only on objective evidence, arguments and facts
presented before it. Judicial officers shall decide matters before them without any
restrictions, improper influence, inducements, pressure, threats or interference, direct or
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.1. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.
2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
3. The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law.
4. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law.
5. Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals.
6. The principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are respected.
7. It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly perform its functions.
2. Judges individually shall be free, and it shall be their duty, to decide matters before them impartially in accordance with their assessment of the facts and their understanding of law without any restrictions, influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
3. In the decision-making process, judges shall be independent vis à-vis their judicial colleagues and superiors. Any hierarchical organization of the judiciary and any difference in grade or rank shall, in no way, interfere with the right of the judge to pronounce his judgment freely. Judges, on their part, individually and collectively, shall exercise their functions with full responsibility of the discipline of law in their legal system.
4. The Judiciary shall be independent of the Executive and Legislature.
5. (a) The judiciary shall have jurisdiction, directly or by way of review, over all issues of a judicial nature, including issues of its own jurisdiction and competence.
(b) No ad hoc tribunals shall be established to displace jurisdiction properly vested in the courts.
(c) Everyone shall have the right to be tried with all due expedition and without undue delay by the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals under law subject to review by the courts.
(d) Some derogations may be permitted in times of grave public emergency which threatens the life of the nation but only under conditions prescribed by law, only to the extent strictly consistent with internationally recognized minimum standards and subject to review by the courts.
(e) In such times of emergency, the State shall endeavour to provide that civilians charged with criminal offences of any kind shall be tried by ordinary civilian courts, and, detention of persons administratively without charge shall be subject to review by courts or other independent authority by way of habeas corpus or similar procedures so as to ensure that the detention is lawful and to inquire into any allegations of ill-treatment.
(f) The jurisdiction of military tribunals shall be confined to military offences. There shall always be a right of appeal from such tribunals to a legally qualified appellate court or tribunal or a remedy by way of an application for annulment.
(g) No power shall be so exercised as to interfere with the judicial process.
(h) The Executive shall not have control over the judicial functions of the courts in the administration of justice.
(i) The Executive shall not have the power to close down or suspend the operation of the courts.
(j) The Executive shall refrain from any act or omission which preempts the judicial resolution of a dispute or frustrates the proper execution of a court decision.
6. No legislation or executive decree shall attempt retroactively to reverse specific court decisions or to change the composition of the court to affect its decisionmaking.
7. Judges shall be entitled to take collective action to protect their judicial independence.
8. Judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity and responsibilities of their office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. Subject to this principle, judges shall be entitled to freedom of thought, belief, speech, expression, professional association, assembly and movement.
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.Universal Charter of the Judge, Approved by the International Association of Judges on 17 November 1999, Article 1-4.Art.1
IndependenceJudges shall in all their work ensure the rights of everyone to a fair trial. They shall promote the right of individuals to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, in the determination of their civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against them.
The independence of the judge is indispensable to impartial justice under the law. It is indivisible. All institutions and authorities, whether national or international, must respect, protect and defend that independence.
Art.2
StatusJudicial independence must be ensured by law creating and protecting judicial office that is genuinely and effectively independent from other state powers. The judge, as holder of judicial office, must be able to exercise judicial powers free from social, economic and political pressure, and independently from other judges and the administration of the judiciary.
Art.3
Submission to the lawIn the performance of the judicial duties the judge is subject only to the law and must consider only the law.
Art.4
Personal autonomyNo one must give or attempt to give the judge orders or instructions of any kind, that may influence the judicial decisions of the judge, except, where applicable, the opinion in a particular case given on appeal by the higher courts.
- 2. Universal Charter of the Judge, Approved by the International Association of Judges on 17 November 1999, Article 4;
No one must give or attempt to give the judge orders or instructions of any kind, that may influence the judicial decisions of the judge, except, where applicable, the opinion in a particular case given on appeal by the higher courts.
There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process nor shall decisions by judicial bodies be subject to revision except through judicial review, or the mitigation or commutation of sentence by competent authorities, in accordance with the law;
A judicial official may not consult a higher official authority before rendering a decision in
order to ensure that his or her decision will be upheld. - 3. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), ”para.
The requirement of impartiality has two aspects. First, judges must not allow their judgement to be influenced by personal bias or prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the particular case before them, nor act in ways that improperly promote the interests of one of the parties to the detriment of the other. Second, the tribunal must also appear to a reasonable observer to be impartial. For instance, a trial substantially affected by the participation of a judge who, under domestic statutes, should have been disqualified cannot normally be considered to be impartial.
The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.Draft Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (also known as the Singhvi Declaration), ”ArticleA judge shall not sit in a case where a reasonable apprehension of bias on his part or conflict of interest of incompatibility of functions may arise.
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
Propriety, and the appearance of propriety, are essential to the performance of all of the activities of a judge.
Impartiality and restraint. In the performance of the judicial duties the judge must be impartial and must so be seen. The judge must perform his or her duties with restraint and attention to the dignity of the court and of all persons involved.
The impartiality of a judicial body would be undermined when:
1. a former public prosecutor or legal representative sits as a judicial officer in a case in which he or she prosecuted or represented a party;
2. a judicial official secretly participated in the investigation of a case;
3. a judicial official has some connection with the case or a party to the case;
4. a judicial official sits as member of an appeal tribunal in a case which he or she decided or participated in a lower judicial body.In any of these circumstances, a judicial official would be under an obligation to step
down. - 4. Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, Adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, as revised at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, 25-26 November 2002, ”Value
Integrity is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office.
Propriety, and the appearance of propriety, are essential to the performance of all of the activities of a judge.
Art.5. Impartiality and restraint.
In the performance of the judicial duties the judge must be impartial and must so be seen. The judge must perform his or her duties with restraint and attention to the dignity of the court and of all persons involved.
Art.6. Efficiency.
The judge must diligently and efficiently perform his or her duties without any undue delays.
Art.7 Outside activity.
The judge must not carry out any other function, whether public or private, paid or unpaid, that is not fully compatible with the duties and status of a judge. The judge must not be subject to outside appointments without his or her consent.
- 5. Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct; International Bar Association, Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, para. 35-42.↵
- 6. Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, Preamble and ‘Implementation’.↵
- 7. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, ”Principle
All disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct.
- 8. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, ”Principle
A charge or complaint made against a judge in his-her judicial and professional capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure. The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing. The examination of the matter at its initial stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested by the judge.
Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an independent review. This principle may not apply to the decisions of the highest court and those of the legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings.
The procedures for complaints against and discipline of judicial officials shall be prescribed by law. Complaints against judicial officers shall be processed promptly, expeditiously and fairly.
The proceedings for discipline of judges shall ensure fairness to the judge and the opportunity of a full hearing.
- 9. Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, Adopted by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Article A.4(q).
Judicial officials facing disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be entitled to guarantees of a fair hearing including the right to be represented by a legal representative of their choice and to an independent review of decisions of disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings.
- 10. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan, UN Doc. CCPR/C/AZE/CO/3 (2009), ”para.
The Committee remains concerned that, despite the reforms undertaken and the progress made during the reporting period, through, inter alia, the amendments in the Judges Act, the adoption of the Judicial Council Act, the establishment of the statute of the Judges’ Selection Committee, the Code of Ethics for Judges, the State party’s judiciary does not appear to be fully independent from the executive branch or from political pressure. The Committee is also concerned about reports that corruption within the judiciary remains a problem (art. 14).
The State party should strengthen its efforts to ensure a fully independent judiciary. Given the important prerogatives of the Judicial Council, in particular regarding selection, promotion, and disciplining of members of the judiciary, the State party should ensure that the Judicial Council, in its composition and work, is fully independent from the executive so as to create conditions ensuring full independence of the judiciary. The State party should increase efforts to combat corruption, in particular within its judiciary, by investigating promptly and thoroughly all incidents of suspected corruption. If corruption is established, the officials concerned should face criminal and not only disciplinary sanctions.
The Committee notes the State party’s implementation of selection procedures for judges in accordance with the Judicial Council Act. It is concerned, however, at the failure to establish an independent body to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and to supervise the appointment, promotion and regulation of the profession (article 14 of the Covenant).
The State party should take effective action to safeguard the independence of the judiciary, including the prompt establishment of an independent body to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and to supervise the appointment, promotion and regulation of the profession.
The Committee is concerned about the absence of adequate guarantees for the independence of international judges and prosecutors. It is concerned about the low remuneration of local judges and prosecutors, the low representation of ethnic minorities in the judiciary, the excessive length of civil court proceedings and court backlogs and the frequent failure to enforce judgements (art. 14).
UNMIK, in cooperation with PISG as required, should establish independent procedures for the recruitment, appointment and discipline of international judges and prosecutors, ensure adequate terms and conditions for local judges and prosecutors whereby they are shielded from corruption, increase the representation of ethnic minorities in the judiciary, assign additional judges to courts with case backlogs and ensure enforcement of judgements without delay.
- 11. Leandro Despouy, Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Report to the Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/41 (2009), ”para.
28. The composition of this body matters greatly to judicial independence as it is required to act in an objective, fair and independent manner when selecting judges. While a genuinely plural composition of this body is recommended with legislators, lawyers, academicians and other interested parties being represented in a balanced way, in many cases it is important that judges constitute the majority of the body so as to avoid any political or other external interference. In the Special Rapporteur’s view, if the body is composed primarily of political representatives there is always a risk that these “independent bodies” might become merely formal or legal rubber-stamping organs behind which the Government exerts its influence indirectly.
29. In order to ensure that such a body is apt to select judges in an objective, fair and independent manner, the judiciary and other parties directly linked with the justice system must have a substantial say with respect to selecting and appointing the members of such a body. According to some regional standards, members of the independent body should be selected by the judiciary.
- 12. Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, Adopted by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Article A.4(q).
Judicial officials facing disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be entitled to guarantees of a fair hearing including the right to be represented by a legal representative of their choice and to an independent review of decisions of disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings.
- 13. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, ”Principle
17. A charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and professional capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure. The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing. The examination of the matter at its initial stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested by the judge.
18. Judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their duties.
19. All disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct.
20. Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an independent review. This principle may not apply to the decisions of the highest court and those of the legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings.
(p) Judicial officials may only be removed or suspended from office for gross misconduct
incompatible with judicial office, or for physical or mental incapacity that prevents them from undertaking their judicial duties.(q) Judicial officials facing disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be entitled to guarantees of a fair hearing including the right to be represented by a legal representative of their choice and to an independent review of decisions of disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings.
Security of office.
A judge cannot be transferred, suspended or removed from office unless it is provided for by law and then only by decision in the proper disciplinary procedure. A judge must be appointed for life or for such other period and conditions, that the judicial independence is not endangered. Any change to the judicial obligatory retirement age must not have retroactive effect.
Administration and disciplinary action.
The administration of the judiciary and disciplinary action towards judges must be organized in such a way, that it does not compromise the judges genuine independence, and that attention is only paid to considerations both objective and relevant. Where this is not ensured in other ways that are rooted in established and proven tradition, judicial administration and disciplinary action should be carried out by independent bodies, that include substantial judicial representation. Disciplinary action against a judge can only be taken when provided for by pre-existing law and in compliance with predetermined rules of procedure.
- 14. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, ”Principle
Without prejudice to any disciplinary procedure or to any right of appeal or to compensation from the State, in accordance with national law, judges should enjoy personal immunity from civil suits for monetary damages for improper acts or omissions in the exercise of their judicial functions
Judicial officers shall not be:
1. liable in civil or criminal proceedings for improper acts or omissions in the exercise of
their judicial functions;Judges shall be protected from the harassment of personal litigation against them in respect of their judicial functions and shall not be sued or prosecuted except under an authorization of an appropriate judicial authority
Civil and penal responsibility.
Civil action, in countries where this is permissible, and criminal action, including arrest, against a judge must only be allowed under circumstances ensuring that his or her independence cannot be influenced.
- 15. Swazi Times, CJ announces code of ethics for judges (20 January 2009). (Last accessed 9 June 2014.)↵
- 16. Constitution, Chapter XVI.↵
- 17. Maxine Langwenya, Swaziland: Justice Sector and Rule of Law. A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, March 2013, p. 92-93.↵
- 18. Constitution, S. 158(2).
A Justice of a superior court shall not be removed from office except for stated serious misbehaviour or inability to perform the functions of office arising from infirmity of body or mind.
- 19. Constitution, S. 158(5).
Notwithstanding any provision of this Constitution, the King shall in each case act on the recommendation of the Commission.
- 20. Law Society of Swaziland, Memorandum (30 August 2011).↵
- 21. International Commission of Jurists, The Crisis of Judicial Leadership in the Kingdom of Lesotho: Report of the High-Level Mission (September 2013).↵
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