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John Doe et al. v. Regional School Unit 26, No. 7455/2001, Decision 2014 ME 11

On 30/01/2014 in

Year: 2014 (Date of Decision: 30 January, 2014)

Forum, Country: Supreme Court; United States of America

Standards, Rights: Non-discrimination and equal protection of the law; Right to education; Rights to water and sanitation; LGBTI

Summary Background: Susan Doe is a transgender girl. Her identity as a girl is accepted by all parties and the diagnosis of her gender dysphoria is not disputed. The issue of her use of communal girl’s bathroom was not raised until September 2007, her fifth-grade year, when pressure started to come from other students and their families. As a response to this pressure, the school terminated Susan’s use of the girls’ bathroom and required her to use the single-stall, unisex staff bathroom. In her sixth-grade year at Orono Middle School, she was also denied use of the girl’s bathroom and instead required to use a separate, single-stall bathroom.

Holding: This case is an appeal by John and Jane Doe, the parents of Susan Doe, of a summary judgement from the Superior Court that was in favour of the Regional School Unit 26 against the Doe family. The family argued that the school’s decision to discontinue Susan’s use of a communal bathroom consistent with her gender identity was a violation of the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation and gender identity under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) as amended in 2005. The Regional School Unit 26, for its part, argued that the nondiscrimination provision of the MHRA conflicts with the provisions regulating sanitary facilities in schools entailed in the Maine Revised Statute (20-A M.R.S. section 6501).

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court thus considered two issues: whether there was a conflict between the provisions of the two statutes; and whether the exclusion of Susan Doe from communal girl’s bathroom violated the Maine Human Rights Act.

In particular, the Court looked into the Public Accommodation section in the Maine Human Rights Act (section

The opportunity for every individual to have equal access to places of public accommodation without discrimination because of race, color, sex, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, religion, ancestry or national origin is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.
and the Sanitary Facilities provision in Maine Revised Statute (20-A M.R.S. §6501). The former prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Court held that an elementary school is a place of public accommodation. The latter required a “school administrative unit shall provide clean toilets in all school buildings, which shall be…separated according to sex and accessible only by separate entrances and exits.” [paras. 14, 16 and 17 ].

The Court held that these statutes served different purposes and they were reconcilable by adopting a consistent reading. The public-accommodations and educational-opportunities provisions of the MHRA aimed to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and to ensure equal enjoyment of and access to educational opportunities and public accommodations and facilities. The sanitary facilities provision on the other hand aimed to establish cleanliness and maintenance requirements for school bathrooms. It did not purport to establish guidelines for the use of school bathrooms and offered no guidance concerning how gender identity relates to the use of sex-separated facilities. It was the responsibility of each school to make its own policies concerning how to use these public accommodations and to ensure such policies comply with the MHRA [para. 19].

The Court held that the ban on Susan’s use of the girls’ bathroom constituted discrimination based on her sexual orientation. The Court refuted the defence of the School that it had to comply with the provision for sex segregation in sanitary facilities under the M.R.S. The Court asserted that the decision of the school to discontinue the use by Susan of the girl’s bathroom was not based on a change of her status, but solely on complaints by others. The decision was adversely affecting Susan’s psychological wellbeing and educational success. The Court established that this discrimination based on Susan’s sexual orientation violated the MHRA [para. 22].

Link to Full Case: http://www.maine.gov/mhrc/doe.pdf

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Dorothy Ann Finch and others v. Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, Case No. SJC-11025 (MA S. Jud. Ct., Jan. 5, 2012)

On 06/01/2012 in

Year: 2012 (Date of Decision: 6 January 2012)

Forum, Country: Supreme Court; United States of America

Standards, Rights: Non-discrimination and equal protection of the law; Right to health; Right to social security; Migrants

Summary Background: This case involves a legislative decision of the State of Massachusetts that denied State subsidies (provided under the Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Program) to lawful non-citizen immigrants living in the United States for less than five years. Plaintiffs sought a declaration from the Court that this exclusion from the program was unconstitutional.

Holding: The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, applying strict scrutiny, decided that excluding the said category of lawful, non-citizen immigrants from the aforementioned health insurance program was in violation of the equal protection clause of the Massachusetts Constitution. It was held that the exclusively fiscal concerns, which had motivated the exclusion could never constitute a compelling government interest in a strict scrutiny review [pp. 237-242]. Further, the Court found that the State had made no attempt to meet the rigorous procedural requirements designed to ensure that the legislation was narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest [pp. 242-249]. “Narrow tailoring requires ‘serious, good faith consideration’ of ‘workable’ nondiscriminatory alternatives that will achieve the Legislature’s goals.” Those requirements were not met in this case [p. 242].

In its conclusion the Court states “[m]inorities rely on the independence of the courts to secure their constitutional rights against incursions of the majority….If the plaintiffs’ right to equal protection of the laws has been violated…then it is our duty to say so” [p. 249].

Additional Comments: Since the case was determined on State constitutional grounds, there could be no further appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, so this judgement stands as the final judgement on this aspect of the case.

Link to Full Case: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/461/461mass232.html

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South Fork Band Council and others v. United States Department of the Interior

On 03/12/2009 in

Year: 2009 (Date of Decision: 3 December, 2009)

Forum, Country: Court of Appeals, United States of America

Standards, Rights: Right to free exercise of religion; Rights to water and sanitation; Right to adequate housing; Right to health; Indigenous people

Summary Background: The plaintiff appellants comprised the South Fork Band Council of Western Shoshone Nevada and other tribes and organizations (“the Tribes”). The Tribes sought an emergency injunction regarding the approval of a gold mining project by the US Department of Interior and its Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) located in a sacred site. The project involved ten years of mining and up to three years of ore processing, and would allegedly create a “substantial burden to the exercise of religion.” Domestic law prohibits governmental entities from imposing such burdens unless the government can show that the practice is in furtherance of a “compelling governmental interest” and is the “least restrictive means” of furthering that interest (US Code §2000bb-1). The injunction was denied by the Federal District Court. The appellants alleged violations of the Federal Land Policy Management Act (“FLPMA”) and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and sought an injunction to be granted on appeal.

Holding: To be granted injunctive relief, the Court required that the appellants demonstrate they were likely to “suffer irreparable harm” if a preliminary injunction were denied, that the balance of equities tipped in their favour and that an injunction was in the public interest [para. 14]. In addition, it was necessary to show the BLM’s actions were either arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law [p. 15828].

While the Court declined to find that the appellants had demonstrated the likelihood of success for their FLPMA claims given the in-depth Environmental Impact Statement undertaken by the respondents in consultation with the Tribes and public over a two-year period, it did grant an injunction regarding the NEPA actions to allow a study that adequately considered the environmental impact of “millions of tons of refractory ore,” the adverse impact on local springs and streams, and the extent of fine particulate emissions [pp. 15828 and 15831-15840].

Additional Comments: This case is relevant to the broader framework of issues raised by international human rights bodies condemning the failure of US federal policy to protect Indian land rights and environmental law (see, for instance, the western Shoshone petition to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2006) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2002).)

Link to Full Case: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2009/12/03/09-15230.pdf

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Correa v. Hospital San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184 (1st Cir. App. 1995)

On 31/10/1995 in

Year: 1995 (Date of Decision: 31 October, 1995)

Forum, Country: Court of Appeals, United States of America

Standards, Rights: Negligence; Right to health

Summary Background: The deceased patient’s children and grandchildren brought this case against the hospital for medical malpractice and violations of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).

Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower Court’s decisions in favor of the plaintiff. The lower Court held that the defendant’s failure to provide appropriate screening to the decedent and assigning her a number when she told the hospital she had chest pains demonstrated a lack of justification that amounted to an effective denial of a screening examination [p. 1193].

Additional Comments: Jury awarded the family $200,000 damages for pain and suffering, which the Court of Appeals affirmed [p. 1197|. The Hospital argued that the jury award was excessive, but the Court held that the damages were not excessive as the record supported the evidence presented regarding emotional suffering [p. 1197-98]. Further, the hospital’s negligence in addressing the deceased plaintiff’s medical problems led the jury to hand out a reasonable amount of damages [p. 1198].

Link to Full Case: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-1st-circuit/1014686.html

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Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288 (N.Y. 1978)

On 02/05/1978 in

Year: 1978 (Date of Decision: 2 May, 1978)

Forum, Country: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, United States of America

Standards, Rights: Reasonableness; Right to adequate housing; Right to health

SummaryBackground: This case involves the property law right of the “implied warranty of habitability”, which guarantees a tenant a liveable home environment. The landlord is responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of a property, and cannot allow for conditions that would affect the health and safety of the tenant. In this case, tenants of this building withheld their rent to protest the interruption of extensive garbage removal and janitorial services which affected the health and safety of the tenants. The janitorial staff had gone on strike, causing many services and amenities to stop. This caused the building to turn into an environment where rats, roaches and other vermin flourished. Routine maintenance was not completed and trash incinerators were wired shut.

Holding: The Court determined that anything detrimental to life, health, and safety is considered a breach of the warranty of habitability and violates a tenant’s rights as guaranteed by the housing code. The ruling described a residential lease as a sale of shelter and needs to encompass services, which render the premises suitable for which they are leased. While the premises need not be perfect, they must not perpetuate conditions that can adversely affect the tenant’s health and safety [p. 1294-95]. Further, the overarching test for determining whether a property is liveable is based on a reasonable person standard. If a reasonable person would not find a place habitable, then the implied warranty of habitability has been breached [p. 1295].

This would also be a violation of the Right to Housing.

Additional Comments: Damages should be awarded through a balancing test in which the fact finder must weight the severity of the violation, the duration of the conditions, and the steps taken by the landlord to remedy the situation. In this case, the judge awarded 10 per cent deduction on the rent due to the severity of the conditions and the meagre attempts by the landlord to remedy the situation [p. 1295].

Link to Full Case: http://www.leagle.com/decision/197936347NY2d316_1327.xml/PARK%20W.%20MGT%20v.%20MITCHELL

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