Feb 15, 2019
The ICJ has published an overview of international standards on judges’ and prosecutors’ freedoms of expression, association and assembly, in a submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers.The document responds to the Special Rapporteur’s call for input for an upcoming report to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.
The submission outlines the relevant international standards and key regional jurisprudence and standards, as well as illustrative national cases and practice and several academic sources.
The ICJ concludes, among other things, that:
- Judges and prosecutors are like other citizens entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, subject only to necessary and proportionate restrictions for valid purposes.
- In principle any such restrictions that are specifically related to their judicial functions, should be established by the judiciary itself or another independent body with majority membership of judges.
- Any proceedings against a judge or prosecutor related to their exercise of these freedoms should comply fully with international human rights law and standards in terms of the grounds and procedures, including as set out in standards on independence of the judiciary and prosecutors.
- Judges and prosecutors should be required to recuse themselves from any case where they have previously exercised these freedoms in a way that would give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in their subsequent conduct of the case.
- At the same time, the above considerations do not mean that a judge or prosecutor can never engage in expression, association or assemblies that touch on issues or parties that could speculatively come before the courts at some future point. Total isolation from the community and society is neither realistic nor desirable.
- In general, involvement in or comment on matters of party politics carry particularly high risks of giving rise to perceptions of lack of independence and there is relatively wide scope to enact restrictions on this ground.
- It is particularly important that judges (and prosecutors) can exercise their freedoms of expression, association and assembly in order to address: threats to the independence of the judiciary; threats to judicial integrity; fundamental aspects of the administration of justice; or to otherwise promote and protect universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. As such, there is very limited scope for any authority to restrict exercise of these freedoms for these purposes.
- The relevant standards and principles apply to online forms of expression and association (including social media) in an equal or analogous manner to their application to offline forms. However, judges and prosecutors should be aware of and take into account practical aspects of online forms of expression and association.
The full submission can be downloaded in PDF format here: Universal-SRIJL Judges-Advocacy-non legal submission-2019-ENG
Feb 13, 2019
Today, the ICJ and the Human Rights Joint Platform (IHOP) published a briefing paper on the system of Turkish Criminal Peace Judgeships and its compliance with international law.
Since their creation in 2014, the Turkish criminal peace judgeships have been the focus of much criticism with regard to violations of human rights, as they are at the forefront of the authorisation or judicial review of decisions restricting the right to liberty and other human rights.
This briefing paper assesses the institution of the criminal peace judgeships in Turkey, established in 2014, and its compliance with the obligations undertaken by Turkey under international human rights law.
The ICJ-IHOP briefing paper concludes that the system of the criminal peace judges in Turkey does not meet international standards for independent and impartial review of detention, and suggests a set of detailed constitutional and legislative reforms to put the system back in line with Turkey’s human rights obligations.
The publication in English here.
The publication in Turkish here.
Feb 12, 2019 | Comunicados de prensa, Noticias
Según comienza el juicio a los doce líderes separatistas catalanes ante el Tribunal Supremo de España hoy en Madrid, la CIJ advierte que el juicio en base a la amplia definición de delitos como la rebelión y, posiblemente, la sedición restringen excesivamente los derechos a la libertad expresión, asamblea y asociación.
Los doce líderes políticos – incluyendo altos cargos del Gobierno catalán – han sido acusados en conexión a su participación en un referéndum sobre la independencia de Cataluña que tuvo lugar el 1 de octubre de 2017. Este referéndum se llevó a cabo a pesar de haber sido declarado ilegal por el Tribunal Constitucional.
El proceso de votación durante el referéndum fue parcialmente reprimido por la policía, según informes fidedignos de uso innecesario y desproporcionado de la fuerza suponiendo una violación de las obligaciones de derecho internacional de España.
A la CIJ le preocupa que la Fiscalía, y el Tribunal Supremo, admitiendo la imputación en el caso, han atribuido un significado excesivamente amplio al delito de rebelión bajo el artículo 472 del Código Penal. Según este artículo, el delito requiere de una insurrección violenta para derogar, suspender o modificar el orden constitucional.
Sin embargo, no se acusa a los organizadores del referéndum de utilizar o fomentar la violencia. Se les está juzgando en base a que deberían haber previsto el riesgo de intervención y uso de la fuerza por parte de la policía.
Por lo tanto, se presume que los acusados son penalmente responsables de la violencia que resultó de su decisión de seguir adelante con el referéndum, a pesar de haber sido declarado ilegal.
“La muy amplia definición del delito de rebelión que se está aplicando en este caso amenaza con interferir de forma innecesaria y desproporcionada con los derechos a la libertad expresión, asamblea y asociación,” dijo Róisín Pillay, Directora de la CIJ para Europa y Asia Central.
“La interferencia con la protesta y expresión política pacífica debe estar justificada como estrictamente necesaria y proporcionada según el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos. Cuando manifestaciones pacíficas o acciones políticas, aunque hayan sido declaradas como ilegales por las autoridades, provocan una respuesta excesiva de la policía, lo únicos responsables por el uso de la violencia son la policía y otras autoridades estatales”.
“Es crucial que el Tribunal Supremo, en su consideración de estos cargos, tome plenamente en cuenta las obligaciones de España bajo el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos,” añadió.
A pesar de que el Tribunal Supremo ha sostenido que el uso de la fuerza de las autoridades policiales durante la represión del referéndum del 1 de octubre de 2017 fue “legítima y, por tanto proporcionada”, observadores internacionales han concluido que dicho uso de la fuerza fue excesiva y desproporcionada.
De acuerdo con el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, el mero hecho de que el uso de la fuerza sea considerado legal bajo la legislación nacional, no significa que por sí mismo pueda ser considerado como necesario o proporcionado.
El Tribunal Supremo ha aceptado también que, si los supuestos presentados por la Fiscalía son probados, podría incluirse el delito de sedición, el cual es cometido por aquellos que se alcen pública y tumultuariamente por la fuerza o fuera de las vías legales, para impedir la aplicación de las leyes y resoluciones gubernativas y judiciales.
“Delitos como sedición o rebelión definidos de una manera ambigua y amplia pueden suponer una violación del principio de legalidad, así como una interferencia arbitraria y desproporcionada con los derechos humanos,” dijo Róisín Pillay.
“En un caso altamente sensible y politizado, tal y como es el referéndum catalán, podría sentar un peligroso precedente de persecución a movimientos pacíficos de independencia y disidencia política, no sólo en España sino a nivel internacional,” añadió.
Varios de los acusados han sido retenidos en prisión preventiva durante largos periodos de tiempo, agravando aún más la interferencia con los derechos a la libertad de expresión, asociación y asamblea, y poniendo en duda la proporcionalidad de la respuesta.
Antecedentes
Las doce personas que están siendo juzgadas en conexión con el referéndum de Octubre de 2017: Oriol Junqueras, ex-vicepresidente de la Generalitat catalana; Carme Forcadell, ex-presidenta del Parlament catalán; ocho ex-consejeros del Gobierno catalán – Jordi Turull, Raül Romeva, Joaquim Forn, Santi Vila, Meritxel Borràs, Dolors Bassa, Josep Rull, Carles Mundó -; Jordi Sànchez, ex-líder de la Asamblea Nacional Catalana (ANC), y Jordi Cuixart, ex-líder de la organización independentista Òmnium Cultural.
El juicio, que comienza el 12 de febrero en el Tribunal Supremo de Madrid, se espera que dure varios meses.
España tiene obligación de proteger la libertad de expresión, incluyendo la expresión política, bajo el artículo 10 de la Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos (ECHR, por sus siglas en inglés) y el artículo 19 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (ICCPR, por sus siglas en inglés), y la libertad de asamblea y asociación pacíficas bajo el artículo 11 de ECHR y los artículos 21 y 22 de ICCPR. El Comentario General sobre libertad de expresión del Comité de Derechos Humanos afirma que Los Estados partes deben procurar con el mayor cuidado que las leyes sobre traición y las disposiciones similares que se refieren a la seguridad nacional, tanto si se califican de leyes sobre secretos de Estado o sobre sedición, o de otra manera, estén redactadas y se apliquen de conformidad con las condiciones estrictas del párrafo 3 del artículo 19 del ICCPR, lo cual requiere que las restricciones en la libertad de expresión estén legisladas y que sean necesarias en base a propósito legítimo, como la seguridad nacional o el orden público. El derecho a participar en la vida pública está protegido bajo el artículo 25 de ICCPR.
Feb 4, 2019 | News
The ICJ is concerned that the dismissal of 17 judges and prosecutors by Turkey’s Council of Judges and Prosecutors on 10 January, for alleged membership of or connections with the “Fetullahist Terrorist Organisation” (FETÖ) did not respect their right to a fair trial.
The decision by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP) is particularly problematic because it lacks any reasoning on the individual situation of each judge and prosecutor.
The ICJ points out that international law provides that judges may be dismissed only through a fair hearing before an independent authority. The lack of individual reasoning in dismissal decisions strikes at the heart of the right to a fair hearing.
Furthermore, the ICJ recalls its conclusions in the 2018 report Justice Suspended that, within the current constitutional framework, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP) is not provided with the guarantees necessary to ensure its institutional independence.
Despite the state of emergency having been lifted since last July 2018, extraordinary powers given to the Council of Judges and Prosecutors to dismiss judges and prosecutors during the State of Emergency were extended for 3 years by Law no. 7145. It is unacceptable in a State governed by the rule of law that judges and prosecutors – whatever charges may be against them – be dismissed without respect for the right to a fair procedure, in disregard of international standards.
Considering that the Council of State has not delivered a single decision about dismissed judges and prosecutors during the state of emergency, in more than two years now, it seems likely that it would take at least two years before the recent decision of the CJP is reviewed by an independent judicial authority. Until then, absent further action by the CJP, the reasons for the dismissals will not be known by the purged judges and prosecutors, or by the general public.
The ICJ calls on the CJP to revoke its order and re-examine the cases under the ordinary dismissal procedures and on the Turkish Government and Parliament to modify the constitutional rules on the CJP to ensure its full independence.
Finally, the ICJ expresses concern at the conviction of the former head of the judges’ organisation YARSAV, Mr Murat Arslan, for alleged membership of FETÖ. There are credible reports of violations of the right to a fair trial in the proceedings, including four changes of judges during the proceedings, often without reasons given and without re-examination of witnesses, significant limitations to the defence access to evidence before trial and use of witnesses with undisclosed identity. The ICJ considers that these allegations of violations of the right to a fair trial should be thoroughly re-examined in appeal before an independent court and in full respect of Mr Arslan’s fair trial rights.
Background
On 10 January, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors made use for the first time of special powers to dismiss judges and prosecutors without complying with the ordinary procedure, invoking extraordinary powers enacted by Law No 7145 of 31.07.2018. This legislation inserted into ordinary law several powers that had previously existed under the state of emergency legislation.
One of the amendments made by Law No 7145 of 31.07.2018 was to the Decree Law No 375 dated 1989. A Temporary Article (Article 35) was added to the Decree. On the basis of this article, the General Assembly of the Constitutional Court, the Presidency Councils of Court of Appeal, the Council of State, the General Assembly of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, a Commission set up by the Ministry of National Security, and the Presidency of the Court of Audit, were each authorised to take dismissal decisions for public officials/judges and prosecutors under their mandate for three years from the date of the endorsement of the law No 7145.
Based on this amendment, on 10 January 2019 the Council of Judges and Prosecutors took its first decision (Decision No. 2019/1) by dismissing 17 judges and prosecutors (6 Public prosecutors, 3 Members of Administrative Court, 7 judges of of Tax Court) based on the allegation of membership to FETÖ.
International law and standards provide that disciplinary proceedings should be conducted by an independent authority or a court with all the guarantees of a fair trial and provide the judge with the right to challenge the decision and sanction. Disciplinary sanctions should be proportionate.
The UN Basic Principles on the independence of the judiciary set out international standards for discipline, suspension and removal of judges, including in order to ensure impartiality and independence of courts and tribunals as required by international law (including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights). The Basic Principles state that a:
“charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and professional capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure. The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing. The examination of the matter at its initial stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested by the judge. …
The Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) adds that “a Head of State, Minister of Justice or any other representative of political authorities cannot take part in the disciplinary body.”
Contact
Massimo Frigo, ICJ Senior Legal Adviser for the Europe and Central Asia Programme, t: +41 22 979 3805, e: massimo.frigo(a)icj.org
Jan 16, 2019
The trial of civilians by military courts is a glaring surrender of human rights and fundamental freedoms, found the ICJ in its Briefing Paper Military Injustice in Pakistan released today.
The Pakistani Government must not extend the tenure of military courts to try civilians for terrorism-related offences, the ICJ said.
“Military trials of civilians have been a disaster for human rights in Pakistan,” said Frederick Rawski, ICJ’s Asia Director.
“As a recent judgment of the Peshawar High Court has confirmed, proceedings in these tribunals are secret, opaque, and violate the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal,” he added.
In the briefing paper, the ICJ has documented serious fair trials violations in the operation of military courts, including: denial of the right to counsel of choice; failure to disclose the charges against the accused; denial of a public hearing; failure to give convicts copies of a judgment with evidence and reasons for the verdict; and a very high number of convictions – more than 97 per cent – based on “confessions” without adequate safeguards against torture and ill treatment.
The ICJ has also demonstrated how military courts are being used to give legal cover to the practice of enforced disappearances.
The use of military courts to try civilians is inconsistent with international standards, the ICJ recalled.
According to the military, in the four years since military courts were empowered to try terrorism-related offences, they have convicted at least 641 people. Some 345 people have been sentenced to death and 296 people have been given prison sentences. Only five people have been acquitted. At least 56 people have been hanged.
An earlier law giving military courts authority to try civilians will lapse on 30 March 2019. Last week, the Cabinet approved a proposal to extend the tenure of military courts for another two years. The Government is currently in consultation with opposition parties to get consensus on the extension.
“Extending the tenure of military courts is an attempt to deflect attention from the real issue: the Government’s failure to enact reforms to strengthen the criminal justice system during the four years military courts have been in operation,” said Rawski.
“The Government must account for its failure to deliver on the promise of delivering justice for the victims of terrorism and other abuses in Pakistan instead of once again extending the “exceptional” use of military courts for civilian trials,” he added.
The ICJ fears that repeated extensions risk making the practice effectively permanent.
If the Government decides to table legislation to extend the tenure of military courts, the Parliament must take a stand in defense of the rights of all people in Pakistan, instead of once again extending a discredited and abusive process, the ICJ says.
Contact
Frederick Rawski (Bangkok), ICJ Asia Pacific Regional Director, e: frederick.rawski(a)icj.org
Reema Omer, ICJ International Legal Advisor (South Asia) t: +447889565691; e: reema.omer(a)icj.org
Additional Information
The National Assembly and Senate of Pakistan passed the 21st amendment to the Constitution in January 2015, authorizing military courts to try civilians for terrorism-related offences for a period of two years. The 21st amendment lapsed on 6 January 2017.
Despite earlier promises that military courts were only temporary and “exceptional”, after the expiration of the 21st Amendment, Parliament enacted on 30 March 2017 the 23rd Amendment and amendments to the Army Act to renew military courts’ jurisdiction over civilians. The amendments were given retrospective effect from 7 January 2017, and were due to lapse two years after their date of “commencement”.
According to the law ministry, the expanded jurisdiction of military courts will lapse on 30 March 2019. (Earlier reports had suggested the amendments expired on Jan 6, 2019 — two years after the date of “operation” of the 23rd Amendment.)
Pakistan-military courts-Advocacy-Analysis brief-2019-ENG (full briefing paper in PDF)
