South Sudan: Extend UN Investigations Amid Deteriorating Human Rights Crisis

To the Permanent Representatives of Member and Observer States of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (Geneva, Switzerland)

19 February 2026

South Sudan: Extend UN investigations, stand ready to respond to any further deterioration of the human rights situation 

 

Your Excellencies,

Ahead of the UN Human Rights Coun­cil’s (hereafter “HRC” or “Coun­­cil”) 61^st regular session (23 Feb­­ruary – 31 March 2026), we, the undersigned non-governmental orga­nisa­tions, write to urge your de­legation to sup­port the development and adoption of a strong resolution on the human rights situ­a­tion in South Sudan.

The resolution should extend the man­date of the UN Com­mis­­sion on Human Rights in South Sudan (CHRSS). It should also make clear that the Council stands ready to respond to any further dete­rio­ration of the human rights situation in the country, including on the basis of expert analyses of risk factors for atrocity crimes.

In April 2025, the Council adopted resolution 58/1,[1] which extended the CHRSS’s mandate with an un­pre­cedented majority (24 votes in favour, 6 against). This outcome was in line with the expectations civil society outlined in a joint letter[2] and reflected growing international concerns over South Sudan’s human rights situation. It also reflected a sense of urgency as to the gravity of the violations reported, including by the CHRSS, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the Office of the UN High Com­mis­sio­ner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and other independent actors. Resolution 58/1 was hailed as a vital step allowing the CHRSS to pursue its work as some actors warned that South Sudan faced a “risk of relapse into large-scale civil war.”[3]

One year on, South Sudan’s human rights situation has deteriorated further. All the concerns outlined in civil society’s 2025 letter have grown larger. South Sudan’s “multiple crises” continue to trans­­late in­to at­ro­city cri­mes, violence and violations and abuses of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.”[4]

Violent clashes, including between armed ethnic-based “self-defence groups” and parties to the non-inter­national armed conflict that broke out in December 2013, fuelled by incendiary speech, remain perva­sive in parts of Central, Eastern and Western Equatoria States, Greater Jonglei, Unity, War­rap, Upper Nile, La­kes State, Western Bahr el Ghazal, as well as in the admi­nis­trative regions of Abyei and Pibor.

Furthermore, fighting has been ongoing between government forces (the South Sudan Peo­ple’s Defence Forces, SSPDF), hold­out groups that did not sign the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), and defec­ting factions. Reporting to the UN Ge­neral Assembly, in October 2025, the CHRSS indicated that from March to October 2025, fighting intensified, displacing over 370,000 civilians internally and driving many more to neigh­bouring countries. The Com­mission warned that South Sudan’s “political tran­si­tion [was] falling apart” as the country faced a “rene­wed slide into full-scale conflict unless urgent international action is taken.” It added: “The cea­se­fire is not holding, political detentions have become a tool of re­pression, the peace agreement’s key pro­visions are being systematically violated, and the Government forces are using aerial bombardments in civilian areas. All indicators point to a slide back to­ward another deadly war.”[5]

In its last quarterly publication, UNMISS also reported a “continued deterioration in the political and se­curity situation.”[6] UNMISS recorded an increase in abduct­ions and sexual violence.[7] From 29 December 2025 to 9 Ja­nuary 2026 alone, fighting, including airstrikes, has displaced over 100,000 people, mainly wo­men, children and older persons, in Jonglei State.[8] On 25 January 2026, UNMISS and the CHRSS expressed grave alarm at recent inflam­ma­tory rhetoric by senior military figures and reports of forced mo­bi­li­sation in Jonglei, war­ning that such rhetoric is further escalating the risk of violence and atrocities.[9]

The violence has been accompanied by grave abuses against civilians, including killings, abductions, and acts of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) committed by mem­­bers of va­rious defence and security forces, including the SSPDF.[10] Since late June 2025, security forces have “conducted sweeping arrests of boys, young men and women under the guise of a crackdown on criminals. […] Young women were sexu­ally assaulted, some young men and boys were forcibly conscripted, and some have not been seen since.”[11]

Reports point to a situation in which gross violations and abuses of human rights and international huma­ni­tarian law remain per­va­sive and are committed in a context of widespread impunity. Vio­lations and abu­ses inc­lude extra­ju­di­cial executions and other unlawful killings, serious vio­lations of international hu­ma­­nitarian law that may amount to cri­mes under inter­na­tional law, including war crimes, recruitment and use of child soldiers, politi­cally instigated and sup­por­ted violence between com­mu­nity-based militias and “self-defence groups,” forced displacement of civilians, egre­gious violations of women’s and girls’ rights, inclu­ding SGBV and rape, gang rape, sexual sla­very, abductions and forced marriages in the context of conflict-re­lated sexual violence (CRSV), arbi­trary arrests, enforced disappearances, and torture.[12]

The humanitarian situation remains characterised by high levels of hunger and food insecurity, which are compounded by drops in international aid and severe cuts to funding for UN agencies and non-profit or­ga­nisations. The cross-border impact of the war in Sudan continues to exacerbate tensions and drivers of conflict in South Sudan. As of 30 November 2025, there were 598,467 registered refugees in South Sudan, including 567,801 from Sudan. These figures do not include South Sudanese returnees from Sudan.[13]

Impunity for past and ongoing violations remains widespread. It is near-complete at the command respon­si­bility level and for higher eche­lons of the state’s administrative and military hierarchy.

Despite the bills establishing two of the three transitional justice mechanisms envisioned in Chap­ter V of the R-ARCSS, namely the Commission for Truth, Recon­ci­liation and Hea­l­ing (CT­RH) and the Com­pen­sation and Reparation Authority (CRA), having been passed by the Transitional National Legis­la­tive As­sem­­bly in 2024,  the bodies are yet to be operationalised. Since November 2025, South Sudan’s Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and the African Union, in partnership with the Government and the UN, started recruiting national and non-South Sudanese Commissioners for the CTRH. At the time of writing, this process was yet to conclude.[14] Further, the establishment of the third mechanism, the Hy­brid Court for South Sudan (HC­SS), con­ti­nues to be para­lysed due to lack of political will.[15] We reiterate that the Re­vi­talized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) and the African Union (AU) Com­mis­sion should take urgent steps to establish, fund, and operationalise the HCSS as a matter of priority. The AU has the authority to establish the Court even without the South Sudanese Government’s involve­ment and should move to finalise, adopt and publicise the Court’s legal instruments.[16]

Civic space remains severely curtailed. Organised forces, including the army, police, National Security Service (NSS), and military intelligence, routinely arrest and detain perceived critics.[17] The NSS, in particular, an agency directly under the authority and supervision of the Pre­si­dent and that serves as a tool of repression of independent and op­po­sition voices, continues to enjoy un­checked arbitrary powers (some of them unconstitutional), including to arrest people with or with­out a warrant on the basis of vaguely-defined national security offences. Its surveillance, search and intimi­dation activities have speci­fically tar­geted political opponents, as well as human rights defenders (HRDs), activists, journalists and media workers, and civil so­ciety organisations.[18] The NSS’s influence is particularly worrying as it has the po­ten­tial to further undermine human rights before, during, and after the elections scheduled to be held in 2026.[19]

Against this backdrop of ongoing violations, repression, and impunity, risk factors of violations, including atrocity crimes, multiply.

After the tran­si­tional period was extended until February 2027, national elections were postponed and are now due for Dec­ember 2026. Government officials have brushed off observers’ fears of a potential collapse of the R-ARCSS, asserting that elections will proceed as scheduled.[20]

But as tensions are growing, including as a result of the arrest of members of the opposition,[21] the house arrest, indictment, and trial of First Vice-President Dr. Riek Machar by a special court,[22] South Sudan needs close international monitoring. If elections do hap­pen in December 2026, they will happen in the context of widespread violations of the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and of the right to political participation, with major risks of further violations and violence.

~     ~     ~

The CHRSS remains the only mechanism tasked with col­lec­ting and preserving evidence of vio­la­tions of in­ter­­­na­tional law with a view to ensuring ac­coun­t­a­bility and ad­dres­sing human rights issues in South Sudan from a holistic perspective. As civil society highlighted in its previous letters, the conditions that promp­ted the HRC to establish the CHRSS, in 2016, have not fundamentally chan­ged and grave violations, violence and impunity remained pervasive in the country.

Over a decade after the onset of South Sudan’s armed conflict, which claimed more than 400,000 lives and dis­­pla­ced mil­lions, justice remains elusive for victims and survivors. The continuation of CHRSS-led investi­gations, together with the guidance the Commission provides on transitional justice, is the best means to safeguard future accountability in the absence of contemporary criminal prosecutions and at least until the HCSS is fully operational and functional.

Until then, in line with its prevention mandate and its responsibility to address gross and systematic vio­lations of human rights, the HRC must ensure the renewal of the CHRSS’s mandate to secure the col­lec­tion and pre­ser­vation of evidence of serious crimes committed since 2013, with a view to transferring such documentation to independent and competent judicial authorities in the future. In this regard, we stress that all elements of the CH­RSS’s mandate should be preserved.

International scrutiny of South Sudan’s human rights situation remains vital. The Human Rights Coun­­cil should continue to closely monitor the situation and allow the CHRSS to pursue its work in support of accounta­bility and justice until the rea­sons that led it to establish the CHRSS have been ad­dress­ed in a meaningful manner.

The Council should therefore extend the mandate of the CHRSS in full. In light of risk fac­tors of further violations and atrocity crimes and of ongoing widespread impunity, the Council should also make clear that it stands ready to respond to any further deterioration of the human rights situation, including on the basis of expert ana­lyses. At this critical time, it should enhance its level of attention to South Sudan by reinstating enhanced interactive dialogues previously held at its September ses­sions.

At its 61^st session, the Council should adopt a resolution that:

• Extends the mandate of the CHRSS in full;
• Requests the CHRSS to present a comprehensive written report on the situation of human rights in South Sudan to the Council at its 64^th session, to be followed by an interactive dialogue;
• Requests the CHRSS to present an oral update to the Council at its 63^rd session, to be followed by an enhanced interactive dialogue;
• Encourages the CHRSS to continue its practice of determining the presence of risk factors for atro­city crimes, as outlined in the UN Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes. This ap­p­roach, consistently reflected in previous reports and statements,[23] remains critical to accu­ra­tely assess­ing the risks and guiding international responses;
• Requests the CHRSS to share its reports and recommendations with relevant bodies and me­cha­nisms of the Afri­can Union and all relevant organs of the United Nations, and to sub­mit a comprehensive re­port to the General Assembly at its 81^st session, to be followed by an interactive dia­logue; and
• Makes clear that the Council stands ready to enhance its action on South Sudan, in line with its pre­vention man­date, to prevent further violations and abuses and ensure accountability for past and on­going vio­la­tions of international law.

 

We thank you for your attention to these pressing issues and stand ready to provide your delegation with further information as required.

Sincerely,

 

1. Abyei Information and Radio Service (AIRS)
2. Action 54 (South Sudan)
3. Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture – Burundi (ACAT-Burundi)
4. Action for Community Education and Development (ACEDO) – South Sudan
5. Action for Community Initiative (ACI) – South Sudan
6. Action for Community Transformation Initiative (ACTI) – South Sudan
7. AfricanDefenders (Pan-African Human Rights Defenders Network)
8. Amahoro Development International Center (ADIC)
9. Amnesty International
10. Ana Taban Arts Initiative
11. ANIKA Women Association
12. Association for Sustainable Development INKINGI (ASD-INKINGI)
13. Association Panafricaine pour la Protection des Droits Humains et des Personnes Détenues (APRODH ASBL)
14. Aweil Civic Engagement Center (ACEC)
15. Ayod County Civil Society Network (ACCN)
16. Bentiu Youth Peace Initiative
17. Burkinabè Human Rights Defenders Coalition (CBDDH)
18. Burundian Human Rights Defenders Coalition (CBDDH)
19. Burundian Human Rights League Iteka
20. Burundian Union of Journalists (UBJ)
21. Center for Innovation and Creativity – South Sudan
22. Central African Network of Human Rights Defenders (REDHAC)
23. Centre for Democracy and Development (CEDED) – South Sudan
24. Centre for Inclusive Governance, Peace and Justice (CIGPJ) – South Sudan
25. Centre for Innovation and Creativity – ICT Solutions (South Sudan)
26. Centre for Legal Aid and Governance (CLAG) – South Sudan
27. Centre for Legal Aid and Justice (CLAJ) – South Sudan
28. Centre for Peace and Advocacy (CPA) – South Sudan
29. Centre pour le Renforcement de l’Éducation et du Développement de la Jeunesse (CREDEJ) – Burundi
30. Centre for Transformation and Development – South Sudan
31. Change Agents Organization (South Sudan)
32. Child Pearl – South Sudan
33. Christian Aid South Sudan
34. CIVICUS
35. Civil Rights Defenders
36. Coalition of Human Rights Defenders-Benin (CDDH-Bénin)
37. Coalition of Human Rights Defenders / Living in Refugee Camps (CDH/VICAR)
38. Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO)
39. Community and Environmental Support Agency (CESA)
40. Community Initiative for Good Governance (South Sudan)
41. Community Organization for Peer Educators (COPE) – South Sudan
42. The Community of Practice Against Mass Atrocities
43. Connection e.V.
44. DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)
45. Dialogue and Research Institute (DRI) – South Sudan
46. The Eastern Africa Child Rights Network (EACRN)
47. Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR)
48. Empower the Girl Child Initiative
49. Fellowship of Reconciliation Zimbabwe
50. Fondation Rester Debout pour la Paix (FOREDEPA)
51. Forestry Conservers Association of South Sudan (FCA-SS)
52. Forum des Organisations Nationales Humanitaires et de Développement (FONAHD) – DRC
53. Forum pour le Renforcement de la Société Civile (FORSC) – Burundi
54. Foyer de Développement pour l’Autopromotion des Personnes Indigentes et en Détresse (FDAPID)
55. Geneva for Human Rights – Global Training & Policy Studies
56. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P)
57. Global Rights
58. HAKI ZANGU Inclusive Aid for Humanity – DRC
59. Humanitarian Development Organization (HDO) – South Sudan
60. Human Rights Watch
61. Impact Generation Centre
62. INAMAHORO Movement – Women and Girls for Peace and Security (Burundi)
63. International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI)
64. International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)
65. International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
66. INTREPID South Sudan
67. Iteka Initiative
68. Itkwa Women Empowerment Organization (IWEO) – South Sudan
69. Jonglei Civil Society Network (JCSN)
70. Junub Center for Human Rights
71. Justice for Refugees Network Organization – Uganda
72. King Umurundi Freedom (KUF-ASBL)
73. Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada
74. Ligue des Droits de la Personne dans la Région des Grands-Lacs (LDGL)
75. Lomore Development Organization (LDO)
76. Markaz al Salam (South Sudan)
77. Mobile Humanitarian Agency – South Sudan
78. Movement of Women and Girls for Peace and Security in Burundi (MFFPS)
79. Movimento Internazionale della Riconciliazione – MIR Italy
80. National Press Club South Sudan (NPCSS)
81. National Women Empowerment and Rehabilitation Organization (NWERO) – South Sudan
82. Natural Justice and Human Rights for Women (NJHRW) – South Sudan
83. Network of Human Rights Journalists (NHRJ) – The Gambia
84. Network of the Independent Commission for Human Rights in North Africa (CIDH AFRICA)
85. Nile Centre for Human Rights and Transitional Justice (NCHRTJ)
86. Nile Initiative for Development (NID)
87. Nile Sisters Development Initiative Organization (NSDIO)
88. Nonviolent Peaceforce
89. Opportunity Hub South Sudan (OHSS)
90. Pan-African Peacemakers Alliance (PAPA Africa) – South Sudan
91. Partenariat pour la Protection Intégrée (PPI)
92. Passion for the Needy
93. Peoples Demand Organization (PEDO) – South Sudan
94. Rape is a Crime
95. Rede Caboverdiana dos Defensores de Direitos Humanos (RECADDH)
96. Refugee Rights Action Organization (RRAO)
97. Regional Centre for Training and Development of Civil Society (RCDCS)
98. Réseau des Citoyens Probes (RCP) – Burundi
99. Resilient Women Organization – South Sudan
100. Rights Realization Centre (RRC)
101. Ruba Education Initiative for Greater Yei
102. Rural Development Initiative – South Sudan
103. Rural and Urban Development Agency (RUDA) – South Sudan
104. Safe Orphans Charity Organization – South Sudan
105. Soro Lo Jukudu Initiative (Uganda)
106. SOS-Torture / Burundi
107. South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA)
108. South Sudan Community-Based Organization (SSCBO)
109. South Sudan Human Rights Defenders Network (SSHRDN)
110. South Sudan Land Alliance
111. South Sudan Society of Public Relations Officers
112. Standard Action Liaison Force
113. Support Peace Initiative Development Organization (SPIDO) – South Sudan
114. Synergie Ukingo Wetu (SUWE)
115. Tournons La Page Burundi
116. Transitional Justice Working Group (South Sudan)
117. Union of Journalists of South Sudan (UJOSS)
118. Voice of Women Organization (VOW)
119. Volunteers Welfare for Community Based Care of Zambia (VOWAZA)
120. War Widows and Orphans Association (WWOA) – South Sudan
121. Women Ambassadors for Peacebuilding – South Sudan
122. Women Coalition for Peace and Justice – South Sudan
123. Women with Impairment Organization (WWIO) – South Sudan
124. Women Peace Forum (South Sudan)
125. Women Training and Promotion (WOTAP) – South Sudan
126. Yei Women Development Agency (YWDA)
127. Yei Youth Initiative for Human Rights and Development (YYIHRD)
128. Youth for Democracy South Sudan
129. Youth Vision South Sudan (YVSS)

 

 

[1] HRC resolution 58/1, “Advancing human rights in South Sudan,” available at: https://docs.un.org/A/HRC/RES/58/1

[2] DefendDefenders et al., “South Sudan: Adopt a strong resolution extending UN investigations,” 13 February 2025, https://defenddefenders.org/south-sudan-adopt-strong-resolution-un-investigations/ (accessed on 13 January 2026).

[3] DefendDefenders, “South Sudan: UN investigations extended as the country faces relapse into chaos,” 2 April 2025, https://defenddefenders.org/south-sudan-un-investigations-extended-risk-of-chaos/ (accessed on 13 January 2026).

[4] For analysis of the uncertainty surrounding preparations for South Sudan’s first-ever national elec­tions (including type of election, political parties and voter registration issues, deli­nea­tion of constituencies, and mana­gement of electoral disputes), the absence of a critical mass of pre-requisites for elections, severe res­trictions on civic space, and risk factors of violence and violations asso­cia­ted with South Sudan’s inability to hold free, fair, secure, and credible elections, see DefendDefenders et al., “South Sudan: Adopt a strong resolution extending UN investigations,” op. cit.

For reports on international humanitarian law violations, see, for instance; MSF, “South Sudan: MSF strongly condemns the deliberate bombing of our hospital in Old Fangak, Jonglei State,” 4 May 2025, https://www.msf.org/msf-condemns-bombing-our-hospital-south-sudan; Human Rights Watch, “South Sudan: Incendiary Bombs Kill, Burn Civilians”, 9 April 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/04/09/south-sudan-incendiary-bombs-kill-burn-civilians (both accessed on 5 February 2026).

[5] “South Sudan at risk of return to war, UN investigators warn,” 29 October 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166218 (accessed on 14 January 2026).

[6] UNMISS Human Rights Division, “Brief on Violence Affecting Civilians, July – September 2025”, January 2026, https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/quarterly_brief_on_violence_affecting_civilians_july-september_2025.pdf (accessed on 21 January 2026).

[7] UN News, “South Sudan: Increase in abductions and sexual violence ‘unacceptable’, 9 January 2026, https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166734 (accessed on 5 February 2026).

[8] See UN News, “World News in Brief: Fighting intensifies in Syria’s Aleppo and South Sudan’s Jonglei state, acute hunger in Niger,” 9 January 2026, https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166727 (accessed on 14 January 2026).

[9] “UNMISS condemns threats of indiscriminate violence against civilians in South Sudan,” 25 January 2026; “South Sudan: UN Commission warns incitement and command failures risk mass atrocities, ethnic mobilisation and further unravelling of peace agreement,” 25 January 2026, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/south-sudan-un-commission-warns-incitement-and-command-failures-risk-mass (accessed on 28 January 2026).

[10] See DefendDefenders et al., “South Sudan: Adopt a strong resolution extending UN investigations,” op. cit.

[11] Human Rights Watch, “South Sudan: Abusive ‘Anti-Gang’ Crackdown”, 7 January 2026, https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/01/07/south-sudan-abusive-anti-gang-crackdown (accessed on 5 February 2026).

[12] See DefendDefenders et al., “South Sudan: Adopt a strong resolution extending UN investigations,” op. cit.  See also below regarding restrictions to civic space.

[13] See UNCHR, Operational Data Portal – South Sudan, data as of 30 November 2025, https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/ssd (accessed on 13 January 2026).

[14] In November 2025, the selection panel for CTRH commissioners issued a public advertisement for commissioners, calling for applications for seven commissioner positions (four South Sudanese and three international). In early December 2025, the selection panel released a short-list of 46 candidates and invited members of the public to provide feedback on them. At the time of writing this letter, the selection process was ongoing (see Eye Radio, “Truth commission panel unveils 46 shortlisted candidates, seeks public input,” 5 December 2025, https://www.eyeradio.org/truth-commission-panel-unveils-46-shortlisted-candidates-seeks-public-input/ (accessed on 13 January 2026)). On 22 December 2025, the civil society Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG) issued a statement expressing concerns about the lack of transparency and public participation in the selection process as required under the CTRH law. TJWG, “Transitional Justice Working Group Calls for Transparency in CTRH Commissioners Selection”, 22 December 2025 (on file with Amnesty International).

See also Radio Tamazuj, “AU seeks applications for Truth Commission posts in South Sudan,” 3 November 2025, https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/au-seeks-applications-for-truth-commission-posts-in-south-sudan (accessed on 6 February 2026).

[15] Amnesty International, “South Sudan: African Union’s abandoned commitment to justice in Africa; The case of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan,” 23 November 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr65/6196/2022/en/  See also Amnesty International, “South Sudanese’s justice is delayed, denied for a decade,” 15 December 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/south-sudaneses-justice-is-delayed-denied-for-a-decade/; Human Rights Watch, “South Sudan Awaits Justice for Mayom Extrajudicial Killings,” 9 August 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/09/south-sudan-awaits-justice-mayom-extrajudicial-killings (all accessed on 13 January 2026).

[16] Human Rights Watch, “South Sudan: Parliament Approves Transitional Justice Laws,” op. cit. See also DefendDefenders et al., “South Sudan: Adopt a strong resolution extending UN investigations,” op. cit.

[17] See OHCHR, “South Sudan: Arbitrary arrests and detentions remain serious concern,” 18 December 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/12/south-sudan-arbitrary-arrests-and-detentions-remain-serious-concern (accessed on 6 February 2026).

[18] See “Entrenched repression: systematic curtailment of the democratic and civic space in South Sudan,” UN Doc. A/HRC/54/CRP.6, 5 October 2023, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-h-south-sudan/index, in particular paras. 62-177; South Sudan Human Rights Defenders Network (SSHRDN), “This Town will be too small for you: Repression of Civic Space in South Sudan”, September 2025 (on file with SSHRDN); Amnesty International, “South Sudan: President should send draconian National Security Service Bill back to parliament for review” (Index number: AFR 65/8317/2024), 11 July 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr65/8317/2024/en/ (accessed on 5 February 2026).

See also CIVICUS, Civic Space Monitor, South Sudan, https://monitor.civicus.org/country/south-sudan/

[19] See OHCHR, “South Sudan: extension of transitional government will compound dire human rights crisis if leaders do not change course – UN experts,” 25 September 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/09/south-sudan-extension-transitional-government-will-compound-dire-human (accessed on 14 January 2026); DefendDefenders et al., “South Sudan: Adopt a strong resolution extending UN investigations,” op. cit.

[20] Eye Radio, “Lomuro: peace deal ‘unshaken’, 2026 elections will proceed as planned,” 30 September 2025, https://www.eyeradio.org/lomuro-peace-deal-unshaken-2026-elections-will-proceed-as-planned/ (accessed on 13 January 2026).

[21] Human Rights Watch, “South Sudan: Opposition Leaders, Others Detained,” 13 March 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/13/south-sudan-opposition-leaders-others-detained; “South Sudan: Ensure Fair Trials, Due Process of Opposition,” 15 September 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/09/15/south-sudan-ensure-due-process-fair-trials-of-opposition (accessed on 6 February 2026).

[22] In March 2025, following clashes between the SSPDF in the “White army” in Nasir County (Upper Nile), Machar was placed under house arrest and de facto stripped of authority. In September, he was suspended from his post as First Vice President and charged with murder, treason, and crimes against humanity over the Nasir attack. The government also announced an investigation into Machar’s party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in Opposition (SPLM-IO). Their trial before a Special Court for National Crimes started on 22 September. As of early January 2026, Machar remains under house arrest, while seven of his co-accused have been detained at the NSS detention facility in Juba, commonly referred to as the “Blue House.” Their trial was ongoing behind closed doors. See, among others, France 24, “South Sudan charges Vice President Riek Machar with murder and treason,” 11 September 2025, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20250911-south-sudan-charges-vice-president-riek-machar-with-murder-and-treason; International Crisis Group, “A Trial for South Sudan’s Frail Peace,” 27 November 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/south-sudan/trial-south-sudans-frail-peace; Radio Tamazuj, “Judges close Machar trial to protect witness identities,” 12 January 2026, https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/judges-close-machar-trial-to-protect-witness-identities (all accessed on 13 January 2026).

[23] Such as A/HRC/52/CRP.3 (2023) and A/HRC/46/CRP.2 (2021).

 

FRENCH VERSION AVAILABLE HERE:

HRC61 – Civil society letter on SOUTH SUDAN (FRENCH)