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Honduras: Appointment and promotion of judges; Security of tenure

On 10/04/2015 in

Judges should be appointed through an open process on the basis of prescribed criteria based on merit and integrity, and without discrimination.[1] 

Only “individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law” should be eligible for appointment.[2] 

Steps should be taken to ensure the appointment of qualified women and members of minority communities.[3] 

An appropriate clearly-prescribed method of appointment of judges is a prerequisite for the independence of the judiciary,[4] and is a means of ensuring equal access to the profession. Whatever method of judicial selection is adopted must “safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives”.[5] In other words, election and appointment should be based on an objective assessment and determination of the applicant’s professional knowledge, merits and suitability.[6] Appointments and promotions should be decided by bodies that are independent from the executive,[7] that are plural and are composed mainly (if not solely) of judges and members of the legal profession;[8] and that apply transparent procedures.[9] 

Promotions within the judiciary must also be based on objective factors, particularly ability, integrity and experience.[10]

To guard against pressure from those who could otherwise influence or make decisions about the renewal of their terms of office, judges’ tenure must be guaranteed until a mandatory retirement age or expiry of the term of office.[11] Temporary appointments can put independence and impartiality at risk and so are disfavoured.[12] 

Judges may be removed from office only in exceptional, strictly limited and well-defined circumstances provided for by law, involving incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to carry out the duties of their office, and following a fair procedure.[13] 

 

Appointments, promotions and removals of judges in Honduras circumvent or ignore the existing legal framework. In discharging their professional duties, judges do not enjoy security of tenure, especially when perceived as challenging the structures in power.

Constitutional provisions specify that to be appointed to the Supreme Court, a person must be Honduran by birth; must be a citizen with full enjoyment of rights (i.e. not legally incompetent); must be registered as a lawyer in the Bar Association; must be more than 35 years of age; and must have either five years of experience as a judge, or 10 years of experience as a lawyer.

Appointments to and promotions within the Supreme Court of Justice are entrusted to the National Congress. The Constitution dictates that the parliament select the candidates on advice of a nomination board made up of members of the judiciary, representatives from the private sector, and civil society.[14] After appointment, the Supreme Court judges select the President of the Court, subject to approval by the National Congress. Supreme Court Judges hold a seven-year term of office, with possibility of renewal.

For appointments to first instance and appeal courts, under the 2011 Law on the Council of the Judiciary and Judicial Career Service, such appointments are entrusted to a newly-established body, the Council of the Judiciary and Judicial Career Service (assisted by a Selection Tribunal). Members of the new Council are still ultimately selected by the Congress. The Council therefore remains subject to political influence; further, there is no requirement that the majority of members of the Council be judges (or even lawyers), and at the moment the majority are not in fact judges or lawyers.[15]

Candidates for appointment to these courts must: be Honduran by birth; be citizens with full enjoyment of rights (i.e. not legally incompetent); and be registered lawyers. In addition, first instance judges have to be more than 25 years old and have five years of experience in any legal profession; and Court of Appeal judges have to be more than 35 years old, have at least 5 years of experience specifically in the judicial career, and not be representatives of any religious group.

The process of enacting legislative changes, particularly as regards the holding of consultations with civil society for Supreme Court seats, and the creation of a new body for appointments, promotions and discipline in lower courts, should have been an opportunity to increase independence and transparency of the judiciary in Honduras. However, many provisions in the law eventually adopted in 2011 have either not been applied in practice, or do not fully reflect international law and standards.

In a 2014 report the ICJ outlined challenges pertaining to the composition, role and independence of the Council of the Judiciary. The Council has five permanent members and two alternates. One of the members is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who the law specifies will also chair the Council. Two associations of judges put forward potential names for two positions on the Council (though not necessarily one position for each association); the Honduran Bar Association also puts forward a name or names, as does the National Association of Employees and Staff of the Judicial Branch. The candidates that each of these bodies nominates are referred to the National Congress, which elects the Council’s members by a qualified majority.

The ICJ considers that members of this body should preferably be elected by all judges in the country through confidential voting. Moreover, the ICJ suggested that it would be preferable in the Honduran context for the members of the Council of the Judiciary to elect from within their membership a President of the Council, rather than to have the President of the Supreme Court automatically be President of the Council as the law currently provides.[16]

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has also expressed concerns about the Council’s eligibility criteria and nomination procedures, and apparent politicization of the resulting membership.[17] Currently, there is no requirement in Honduran law that all, or even a majority, of the Council members be judges, or for that matter lawyers; in fact, currently the majority are neither judges nor lawyers. Further, in the most recent appointment process, from the nominees put forward by the two judges’ associations, the Congress filled both seats reserved for the judges’ associations with nominations from only one of the associations.

Moreover, in 2013, the Association of Judges for Democracy in Honduras raised concerns after the Supreme Court of Justice invited judges to voluntarily undertake the polygraph and toxicological exams as means to evaluate the quality of the judiciary. Further, evaluations of judges are not organized in a regular and consistent manner, and when they do take place, public access to results is restricted or non-existent.[18]

By the end of 2013, the Council had nominated a number of judges for appointment without following any competitive procedure to safeguard the impartiality and quality of appointments, including in relation to two Court of Appeal judges and one judge selected to oversee the action of the military with competence to, for instance, authorize raids.[19]

 

Footnotes    (↵ returns to text)

  1. 1.”Principle

    Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.

     of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary provides in part: “In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.”. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), ”para.

    The requirement of competence, independence and impartiality of a tribunal in the sense of article 14, paragraph 1, is an absolute right that is not subject to any exception. The requirement of independence refers, in particular, to the procedure and qualifications for the appointment of judges, and guarantees relating to their security of tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exist, the conditions governing promotion, transfer, suspension and cessation of their functions, and the actual independence of the judiciary from political interference by the executive branch and legislature. States should take specific measures guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, protecting judges from any form of political influence in their decision-making through the constitution or adoption of laws establishing clear procedures and objective criteria for the appointment, remuneration, tenure, promotion, suspension and dismissal of the members of the judiciary and disciplinary sanctions taken against them. A situation where the functions and competencies of the judiciary and the executive are not clearly distinguishable or where the latter is able to control or direct the former is incompatible with the notion of an independent tribunal. It is necessary to protect judges against conflicts of interest and intimidation. In order to safeguard their independence, the status of judges, including their term of office, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law.

    ↵
  2. 2. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Principle 10.

    Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.

     

    ↵
  3. 3. UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Report to the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/66/289 (2011), para. 22-33, 92. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/73/UK (2001), para. 15;

    The Committee notes that, despite recent improvements, the proportions of women participating in public life, particularly at senior levels of the executive and judiciary and in Parliament, and also in the private sector, remain at low levels.

    The State party should take necessary steps towards achieving an appropriate representation of women in these fields.

    Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on France, UN Doc. CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4 (2008), para. 26;

    The Committee notes with concern that persons belonging to racial, ethnic or national minorities are rarely selected for representative bodies, including the National Assembly, and may occupy few positions in the police, the public administration and the judiciary. (articles 2, 25 and 26)

    The State party should facilitate the participation of persons who are members of minority groups in publicly elected bodies, including the National Assembly and local government. In particular, the State party should seek ways to increase the number of candidates belonging to minorities included in the list of political parties running for elections. The appointment of persons from minority backgrounds as members of the police, public administration and the judiciary, is also important to assure the representation of the needs of varied communities in the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of policies and programmes affecting them.

    Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Sudan, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.85 (1997), para. 21;

    The Committee is concerned that in appearance as well as in fact the judiciary is not truly independent, that many judges have not been selected primarily on the basis of their legal qualifications, that judges can be subject to pressure through a supervisory authority dominated by the Government, and that very few non-Muslims or women occupy judicial positions at all levels. Therefore:

    Measures should be taken to improve the independence and technical competence of the judiciary, including the appointment of qualified judges from among women and members of minorities. Training in human rights law should be given to all judges, law enforcement officers and members of the legal profession.

     Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: General Recommendation XXXI on the prevention of racial discrimination in the administration and functioning of the criminal justice system, UN Doc. A/60/18 (pp. 98-108) (2005), para. 5(d);

    5. States parties should pursue national strategies the objectives of which include the following: …

    (d) To promote proper representation of persons belonging to racial and ethnic groups in the police and the system of justice;

     Concluding Observations on Guatemala, UN Doc. CERD/C/GTM/CO/12-13 (2010), para. 8;

    While noting the efforts made by the judiciary in the area of training, in the provision of interpreters, in the application of cultural expertise and in the appointment of bilingual staff to the courts to improve indigenous peoples’ access to the official system of justice, the Committee reiterates its concern about the problems experienced by indigenous peoples in gaining access to justice, particularly because the indigenous legal system is not recognized and applied and because of the lack of a sufficient number of interpreters and bilingual court officials who are knowledgeable about judicial proceedings. It regrets, in particular, that, when a number of judges were appointed to the Supreme Court in late 2009, no indigenous person was selected (art. 5 (a)).

    Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations on Colombia, UN Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.76 (1999), para. 13.

    It is noted that indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities are underrepresented in State institutions, including in the legislature, the judiciary, government ministries, the military and the civil and diplomatic services.

    ↵
  4. 4. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), para. 19.

    The requirement of competence, independence and impartiality of a tribunal in the sense of article 14, paragraph 1, is an absolute right that is not subject to any exception.The requirement of independence refers, in particular, to the procedure and qualifications for the appointment of judges, and guarantees relating to their security of tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exist, the conditions governing promotion, transfer, suspension and cessation of their functions, and the actual independence of the judiciary from political interference by the executive branch and legislature. States should take specific measures guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, protecting judges from any form of political influence in their decision-making through the constitution or adoption of laws establishing clear procedures and objective criteria for the appointment, remuneration, tenure, promotion, suspension and dismissal of the members of the judiciary and disciplinary sanctions taken against them. A situation where the functions and competencies of the judiciary and the executive are not clearly distinguishable or where the latter is able to control or direct the former is incompatible with the notion of an independent tribunal. It is necessary to protect judges against conflicts of interest and intimidation. In order to safeguard their independence, the status of judges, including their term of office, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law.

    ↵
  5. 5. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Principle 10;

    Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.

    ↵
  6. 6. E.g. Statute of the Iberoamerican Judge, Adopted by the VI Iberoamerican Summit of President of Supreme Courts and Tribunals of Justice (2001), Article 15.

    As some countries admit temporary appointment of judges, this situation aspires to be modified in order to reach the guarantee of non-removal according to the terms of the previous article.

    ↵
  7. 7. See e.g. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Honduras, CCPR/C/HND/CO/1 (2006), ”para.

    The Committee notes the State party’s implementation of selection procedures for judges in accordance with the Judicial Council Act. It is concerned, however, at the failure to establish an independent body to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and to supervise the appointment, promotion and regulation of the profession (article 14 of the Covenant). The State party should take effective action to safeguard the independence of the judiciary, including the prompt establishment of an independent body to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and to supervise the appointment, promotion and regulation of the profession.

     Concluding Observations on the Congo, CCPR/C/79/Add.118, ”para.

    The Committee expresses its concern at the attacks on the independence of the judiciary, in violation of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. It draws attention to the fact that such independence is limited owing to the lack of any independent mechanism responsible for the recruitment and discipline of judges, and to the many pressures and influences, including those of the executive branch, to which judges are subjected.

    The State party should take the appropriate steps to ensure the independence of the judiciary, in particular by amending the rules concerning the composition and operation of the Supreme Council of Justice and its effective establishment. The Committee considers that particular attention should be given to the training of judges and to the system governing their recruitment and discipline, in order to free them from political, financial and other pressures, ensure their security of tenure and enable them to render justice promptly and impartially. It invites the State party to adopt effective measures to that end and to take the appropriate steps to ensure that more judges are given adequate training.

    Concluding Observations on Liechtenstein, CCPR/CO/81/LIE, ”para.

    While noting that the constitutional amendments of 2003 sought to clarify the system of appointment and tenure of judges, the Committee is concerned about some elements of the new mechanism which may not be compatible with the principle of the independence of the judiciary (art. 14).  

    The State party should consider amending the mechanism for the appointment of judges to secure tenure, so as to guarantee fully the principle of the independence of the judiciary. The elements to be reviewed should include: the criteria for the appointment of members to the selecting body, the casting vote of the Princely House and the limited nature of tenure.

    Concluding Observations on Tajikistan, CCPR/CO/84/TJK, ”para.

    The Committee is concerned about the apparent lack of independence of the judiciary, as reflected in the process of appointment and dismissal of judges as well as in their economic status (art. 14, para. 1). The State party should guarantee the full independence and impartiality of the judiciary by establishing an independent body charged with the responsibility of appointing, promoting and disciplining judges at all levels and by remunerating judges with due regard for the responsibilities and the nature of their office. 

     Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan, UN Doc. CCPR/C/AZE/CO/3 (2009), ”para.

    The Committee remains concerned that, despite the reforms undertaken and the progress made during the reporting period, through, inter alia, the amendments in the Judges Act, the adoption of the Judicial Council Act, the establishment of the statute of the Judges’ Selection Committee, the Code of Ethics for Judges, the State party’s judiciary does not appear to be fully independent from the executive branch or from political pressure. The Committee is also concerned about reports that corruption within the judiciary remains a problem (art. 14). 

    The State party should strengthen its efforts to ensure a fully independent judiciary. Given the important prerogatives of the Judicial Council, in particular regarding selection, promotion, and disciplining of members of the judiciary, the State party should ensure that the Judicial Council, in its composition and work, is fully independent from the executive so as to create conditions ensuring full independence of the judiciary. The State party should increase efforts to combat corruption, in particular within its judiciary, by investigating promptly and thoroughly all incidents of suspected corruption. If corruption is established, the officials concerned should face criminal and not only disciplinary sanctions.

    Human Rights Committee,     Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), UN Doc. CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1 (2006), ”para.

    The Committee is concerned about the absence of adequate guarantees for the independence of international judges and prosecutors. It is concerned about the low remuneration of local judges and prosecutors, the low representation of ethnic minorities in the judiciary, the excessive length of civil court proceedings and court backlogs and the frequent failure to enforce judgements (art. 14). UNMIK, in cooperation with PISG as required, should establish independent procedures for the recruitment, appointment and discipline of international judges and prosecutors, ensure adequate terms and conditions for local judges and prosecutors whereby they are shielded from corruption, increase the representation of ethnic minorities in the judiciary, assign additional judges to courts with case backlogs and ensure enforcement of judgements without delay.

    Also see     Draft Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (also known as the Singhvi Declaration), ”Article

    (a) The process and standards of judicial selection shall give due consideration to ensuring a fair reflection by the judiciary of the society in all its aspects. 

    (b) Any methods of judicial selection shall scrupulously safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. 

    (c) Participation in judicial appointments by the Executive or the Legislature or the general electorate is consistent with judicial independence so far as such participation is not vitiated by and is scrupulously safeguarded against improper motives and methods. To secure the most suitable appointments from the point of view of professional ability and integrity and to safeguard individual independence, integrity and endeavour shall be made, in so far as possible, to provide for consultation with members of the judiciary and the legal profession in making judicial appointments or to provide appointments or recommendations for appointments to be made by a body in which members of the judiciary and the legal profession participate effectively.

    Universal Charter of the Judge, Approved by the International Association of Judges on 17 November 1999, ”Article

    The selection and each appointment of a judge must be carried out according to objective and transparent criteria based on proper professional qualification. Where this is not ensured in other ways, that are rooted in established and proven tradition, selection should be carried out by an independent body, that include substantial judicial representation.

    ↵
  8. 8. UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Report to the Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/41 (2009), ”para.

    28. The composition of this body matters greatly to judicial independence as it is required to act in an objective, fair and independent manner when selecting judges. While a genuinely plural composition of this body is recommended with legislators, lawyers, academicians and other interested parties being represented in a balanced way, in many cases it is important that judges constitute the majority of the body so as to avoid any political or other external interference. In the Special Rapporteur’s view, if the body is composed primarily of political representatives there is always a risk that these “independent bodies” might become merely formal or legal rubber-stamping organs behind which the Government exerts its influence indirectly.

    29. In order to ensure that such a body is apt to select judges in an objective, fair and independent manner, the judiciary and other parties directly linked with the justice system must have a substantial say with respect to selecting and appointing the members of such a body. According to some regional standards, members of the independent body should be selected by the judiciary.

    See also International Commission of Jurists, International principles on the independence and accountability of judges, lawyers and prosecutors – Practitioners’ guide, no. 1 (2007), pp.45-48.↵
  9. 9. UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Report to the Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/41 (2009), ”para.

    In this connection the Special Rapporteur refers to the appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court of Ecuador in 2005, which were made in accordance with his recommendations,31 in particular those referring to objective criteria to select candidates with a view to their independence, competencies and integrity. This ensured the transparency of the selection and appointment processes. Furthermore, for the first time in Ecuador’s history, public hearings were held at which backgrounds of the nominees could be openly scrutinized. This experience was qualified by the United Nations as a major example of good practices.

    See UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Preliminary Report to the Human Rights Commission on a mission to Ecuador, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.4 (2005), ”para.

    5. Various options for resolving the crisis are being discussed in Ecuador. Rather than expressing a view on the various alternatives, the Special Rapporteur believes that, in keeping with United Nations standards, the country should immediately arrive at a formula to govern the appointment of a Supreme Court which will include the following elements:… (d) Machinery to ensure transparency in the selection of judges and enable members of the public to be aware of the candidates and express their opinions about them.

    ↵
  10. 10. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, ”Principle

    Promotion of judges, wherever such a system exists, should be based on objective factors, in particular ability, integrity and experience.

    Draft Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (also known as the Singhvi Declaration), ”Article

    Promotion of a judge shall be based on an objective assessment of the judge’s integrity, independence, professional competence, experience, humanity and commitment to uphold the rule of law. No promotions shall be made from an improper motive.

     Statute of the Iberoamerican Judge, Adopted by the VI Iberoamerican Summit of President of Supreme Courts and Tribunals of Justice (2001), Article 17.

    Transfers and promotions of judges shall be decided on objective criteria predetermined in the law, based, principally, on the professional experience and capacity of the applicants.

    ↵
  11. 11. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, ”Principle

    Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists.

     Draft Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (also known as the Singhvi Declaration), ”Article

    (b) Subject to the provisions relating to discipline and removal set forth herein, judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or expiry of their legal term of office.

    and 18(c);

    (b) The salaries and pensions of judges shall be adequate, commensurate with the status, dignity and responsibility of their office, and shall be periodically reviewed to overcome or minimize the effect of inflation.

    Universal Charter of the Judge, Article 8.

    Security of office

    A judge cannot be transferred, suspended or removed from office unless it is provided for by law and then only by decision in the proper disciplinary procedure. A judge must be appointed for life or for such other period and conditions, that the judicial independence is not endangered. Any change to the judicial obligatory retirement age must not have retroactive effect.

    Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Camba Campos et Al. v. Ecuador, judgment (28 August 2013), para. 194, 197; Chocrón Chocrón v Venezuela, judgment (1 July 2011) para. 135.↵
  12. 12. Statute of the Iberoamerican Judge, Adopted by the VI Iberoamerican Summit of President of Supreme Courts and Tribunals of Justice (2001), Article 15.

    As some countries admit temporary appointment of judges, this situation aspires to be modified in order to reach the guarantee of non-removal according to the terms of the previous article.

     Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Guarantees for the Independence of Justice Operators, para. 90.↵
  13. 13. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Principles 17-20;

    17. A charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and professional capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure. The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing. The examination of the matter at its initial stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested by the judge.

    18. Judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their duties.

    19. All disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct.

    20. Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an independent review. This principle may not apply to the decisions of the highest court and those of the legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings.

     Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), para. 19-20;

    19. The requirement of competence, independence and impartiality of a tribunal in the sense of article 14, paragraph 1, is an absolute right that is not subject to any exception.The requirement of independence refers, in particular, to the procedure and qualifications for the appointment of judges, and guarantees relating to their security of tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exist, the conditions governing promotion, transfer, suspension and cessation of their functions, and the actual independence of the judiciary from political interference by the executive branch and legislature. States should take specific measures guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, protecting judges from any form of political influence in their decision-making through the constitution or adoption of laws establishing clear procedures and objective criteria for the appointment, remuneration, tenure, promotion, suspension and dismissal of the members of the judiciary and disciplinary sanctions taken against them. A situation where the functions and competencies of the judiciary and the executive are not clearly distinguishable or where the latter is able to control or direct the former is incompatible with the notion of an independent tribunal. It is necessary to protect judges against conflicts of interest and intimidation. In order to safeguard their independence, the status of judges, including their term of office, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law.

    20. Judges may be dismissed only on serious grounds of misconduct or incompetence, in accordance with fair procedures ensuring objectivity and impartiality set out in the constitution or the law. The dismissal of judges by the executive, e.g. before the expiry of the term for which they have been appointed, without any specific reasons given to them and without effective judicial protection being available to contest the dismissal is incompatible with the independence of the judiciary. The same is true, for instance, for the dismissal by the executive of judges alleged to be corrupt, without following any of the procedures provided for by the law.

     see also Statute of the Iberoamerican Judge, Adopted by the VI Iberoamerican Summit of President of Supreme Courts and Tribunals of Justice (2001), Article 16.

    The guarantee of non-removal of the judge extends to transfers and promotions which require the full consent of the interested person. Exceptionally, it may be established in the law the possibility of a judge’s transfer or promotion for necessities of the service or modification of the judicial organisation or temporary assignment of this one, for the same reasons, in order to reinforce another jurisdictional body. In such cases, in which the general interest prevails over the personal one, the respect of the due process shall be guaranteed.

    While as described below in section 4, there must be effective means for holding judges accountable (for crimes, violations of human rights, corruption for instance), all accountability measures must fully respect guarantees of independence and impartiality including as regards grounds and procedures for removal.↵
  14. 14. Constitution, Article 311.

    The Magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice, will be elected by the National Congress, with the favorable vote of the two-thirds part of the totality of its members, from a list of candidates of not less than three for each one of the magistrates to be elected.

    Presented [with] the proposal with the totality of the Magistrates, it will proceed to their election.

    In case that the qualified majority for the election of the complete list of the Magistrates is not obtained, a direct and secrete vote will be effected to individually elect the insufficient [number] of magistrates, as many times as necessary, until the favorable vote of the two-thirds part is obtained.

    The Magistrates will be elected from a list of candidates proposed by an Nominating Board that will be integrated in the following manner:

    1.A representative of the Supreme Court of Justice elected by the favorable vote of the two-thirds part of the Magistrates.

    2.A representative of the College of Attorneys, elected in Assembly;

    3.The National Commissioner of Human Rights;

    4.A representative of the Honduran Council of Private Enterprise (COHEP), elected in Assembly;

    5.A representative of the faculties of professors from the Schools of Juridical Sciences, whose proposal will be effected through the National Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH);

    6.A representative elected by the organizations of the civil society; and,

    7.A representative of the Confederations of Workers.

    A law will regulate the organization and the functioning of the Nominating Board.

    See International Commission of Jurists, La Independencia del Poder Judicial en Honduras (2004-2013) (May 2014), p. 24-27.↵
  15. 15. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2013 Annual Report, para. 279-283.↵
  16. 16. International Commission of Jurists, La Independencia del Poder Judicial en Honduras (2004-2013) (May 2014), p. 43. UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Report on the Regional Consultation on the Independence of the Judiciary in Central America, UN Doc A/HRC/23/43/Add.4 (2 April 2013), page 10. Associación de Jueces por la Democracia, La Independencia Judicial en Honduras: Erosionada en el Marco de la Crisis Institucional (28 October 2013), p. 32-33. ↵
  17. 17. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2013 Annual Report, para. 282-288.↵
  18. 18. Association of Judges for Democracy, Letter to the Council for the Judiciary and Judicial Career Service (23 September 2013), p. 4 (last accessed 19 August 2014).↵
  19. 19. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2013 Annual Report, para. 287; El Heraldo, “Más jueces para la Policía Militar” (17 October 2013), last accessed 16 August 2014).↵
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