Poland: the ICJ condemns illegitimate appointment of 27 Supreme Court judges

Poland: the ICJ condemns illegitimate appointment of 27 Supreme Court judges

The ICJ today condemned the appointment by President Andrzej Duda of 27 judges to the Supreme Court in place of those forcibly “retired” last July.

“These appointments are patently illegitimate and deal a severe blow to the rule of law in Poland,” said Róisín Pillay, Director of the ICJ Europe and Central Asia Programme.

The new appointments purport to replace the Supreme Court Justices including President of the Supreme Court Małgorzata Gersdorf, whose forced “retirement” is in clear violations of international standards on the security of tenure and independence of judges.

The decision of the President is even more concerning since it contravenes an order of the Supreme Court suspending the law under which these appointments were made, pending a decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

It is a fundamental tenet of the rule of law and principles on the independence of the judiciary that the executive respect decisions duly made by the judiciary.

“In announcing these appointments now, while cases on the forced retirement of Supreme Court judges are still pending at the EU Court, President Duda has disregarded the proceedings of the EU’s apex judicial body,” Róisín Pillay added.

The ICJ considers that the legality of the appointments of the new judges is further compromised by the role played by the now politicized National Council for the Judiciary, whose independence and impartiality has been seriously compromised following recent legislative amendments.

The ICJ urges the Polish authorities to cease all interference with the Supreme Court in carrying out its legitimate functions, and to reverse the measures taken to force the retirement of Supreme Court judges.

Background

This attack against the actions of the Supreme Court occurs amid a systematic undermining of the independence of the judiciary in Poland by the Polish executive and legislative authorities, which attempt to increase political influence in the judiciary and which the ICJ has repeatedly condemned.

Earlier this year Poland issued a new law on the Supreme Court that attempts to force the “retirement” of one third of the Supreme Court judges, including the First President, by lowering the mandatory retirement age for its judges from 70 to 65. This measure clearly contravenes international human rights law and standards.

The European Commission has launched an infringement procedure for lack of compliance of this law with EU law.

In the absence of satisfactory reforms by Poland, on 24 September, the Commission referred Poland to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and asked for interim measures to restore Poland’s Supreme Court to its situation before 3 April 2018.

At the same time Supreme Court of Poland submitted a preliminary ruling request to the CJEU seeking its interpretation on the compliance of the legislation on retirement ages of judges with EU law, in particular with the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age under Directive 2008/78.

Following the jurisprudence of the CJEU, the Supreme Court suspended the effect of national law on the forcible retirement of the judges.

An ICJ letter of 11 July 2018, signed by 22 senior judges from all regions of the world, urged the Polish government to act immediately to reinstate the forcibly retired judges in office.

 

Russian Federation: criminal proceedings against lawyer raise concerns

Russian Federation: criminal proceedings against lawyer raise concerns

Today, the ICJ expressed concern at ongoing criminal proceedings against Mikhail Benyash, a lawyer practicing in Russia, who is charged with use of force against the police and impeding justice.

The lawyer has been detained until 23 November. The ICJ called on the responsible authorities to drop any criminal charge relating to his conduct of professional duties in the courtroom, and to ensure that the lawyer’s rights are protected and that allegations of his ill-treatment are fully investigated.

Benyash alleges that following his apprehension by the police on 9 September, the police beat him up in the car. According to the police report he inflicted the injuries on himself, contrary to demands of the police that he stop doing so.

He was charged with disobedience to the police, which according to the police report was due to “the fact that the police asked Benyash not to injure himself, but he continued self-beating”.  Benyash was convicted and sentenced to 14 days of imprisonment and 40 hours of correctional works.

On 23 September, the day of his release, Benyash was arrested again. He was charged with two further offences: violence against a representative of authority (Criminal Code Article 318(1)) based on an allegation, seemingly not raised at the time of his earlier charge and conviction in relation to the same incident, that in the course of his arrest on 9 September he allegedly bit a police officer and hit another.

On 23 September he was also charged with obstruction of justice (Criminal Code Article 294(1)), reportedly on the basis of an allegation that in a court hearing on 6 May 2018, Benyash had “repeatedly interrupted, gave instructions and objections to the decisions of the judge” and after he had been removed from the courtroom “continued unlawful behaviour”.

According to the lawyer, he was taken out of the courtroom by force due to his motions to allow certain members of the public to be present at the open hearing.

The ICJ is concerned that the criminal obstruction charge against Mikhail Benyash appears to relate at least in part to statements he made in court in the course of carrying out his professional duties of representation of his clients.

The fact that this charge was only laid following his recent arrest, some five months after the alleged incident occurred, also raises questions as to the motivation for bringing the charge forward now.

“Benyash is currently charged on account of his alleged attack on a police officer and obstruction of justice. While the first charge requires an impartial and independent inquiry, the second charge should be of concern to the entire lawyers’ community”, said Karinna Moskalenko, ICJ honorary member. “We fear that this may lead to lawyers in Russia being charged with obstruction of justice simply for actively expressing their position and objections in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law”, she added.

Furthermore, the ICJ emphasises that under international human rights law, states have obligations to investigate allegations of treatment that may amount to torture or inhuman or degrading in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as other international law norms binding on the Russian Federation.

The investigative authorities have duty to investigate allegations of ill-treatment of the lawyer by police following his arrest on 9 September promptly, effectively and impartially and any persons responsible should be brought to justice.

Read the ICJ’s full statement here: Russia-Statement on Benyash-News-Web Story-2018-ENG

Azerbaijan: ICJ intervenes before European Court of Human Rights in defence of harassed lawyers and civil society

Azerbaijan: ICJ intervenes before European Court of Human Rights in defence of harassed lawyers and civil society

The ICJ made submissions today to the European Court of Human Rights in support of the right of association of Azerbaijan’s lawyers representing applicants before the Court and highlighting the situation of harassment of the legal profession in the country.

The ICJ intervened today in the cases of Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre v. Azerbaijan and Mustafayev and Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre v. Azerbaijan. 

In these cases, lawyer Asabali Mustafayev and its NGO challenged the compliance of the freezing of their assets and criminal proceedings for financial offences as arbitrary interferences with their work as human rights defenders and in representation of clients before the European Court of Human Rights itself.

The ICJ has intervened to highlight the case-law regarding the right to individual application before the Court under article 34 ECHR and its application to the work of lawyers and legal NGOs.

It further examined the systemic practice in Azerbaijan of harassment of lawyers and of NGOs established by lawyers for the purpose of providing legal advice or representation, including representation of applicants before the European Court of Human Rights.

Finally, the ICJ analyzed the implications of such practices with regard to the State’s obligations under article 18 ECHR read together with article 11 ECHR.

Azerbaijan-icj-DHRRC&other-Advocacy-legal submission-2018-ENG (download the submission)

“Defenseless Defenders: Systemic Problems in the Legal Profession of Azerbaijan” – ICJ report in Azeri, Russian and English.

Question to the parties: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-184179

ICJ Commissioner Reed Brody: “Twenty years later, Pinochet’s arrest remains an inspiration”

ICJ Commissioner Reed Brody: “Twenty years later, Pinochet’s arrest remains an inspiration”

On October 16, 1998, the former dictator of Chile Augusto Pinochet was arrested in London on a warrant from a Spanish judge. Reed Brody participated in the subsequent legal case.

Reed Brody went on to apply the “Pinochet precedent” in the landmark prosecution of the former dictator of Chad, Hissène Habré, who was convicted of crimes against humanity in Senegal in 2016.

He now works with victims of the former dictator of Gambia, Yahya Jammeh. The ICJ interviewed Brody about the Pinochet case and its legacy.

What was your role in the Pinochet case?

My role started when Pinochet was arrested in London. The case began long before that, of course, in the early years of Pinochet’s dictatorship when brave human rights activists documented each case of murder, and “disappearance.”

The ICJ worked with those advocates to produce a seminal 1974 report on those crimes, just six months after Pinochet’s coup. Shut out of Chile’s courts, even after the democratic transition of 1990, victims and their lawyers pursued a case against Pinochet in Spain under its “universal jurisdiction” law and when Pinochet traveled to London, Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón requested and obtained his detention.

When Pinochet challenged his arrest in court claiming immunity as a former head of state, I went to London for Human Rights Watch, and we and Amnesty International were granted the right to intervene with teams of lawyers in the proceedings at the judicial committee of the House of Lords, then Britain’s highest court.

The Lords cited our research in rejecting Pinochet’s immunity.

You famously described the Lords’ Pinochet decision as a “wake-up call” to tyrants everywhere. Looking back, do you think it was?

Actually no, I think one would be hard pressed to discern a change in the behavior of dictators. Mugabe didn’t quake in his boots, Saddam didn’t clean up his act.

The more important and more lasting effect of the case was to give hope to other victims and activists. When the Lords ruled that Pinochet could be arrested anywhere in the world despite his status as a former head of state, the movement was in effervescence.

As a human rights lawyer, I was used to being legally and morally right, but still losing. In the Pinochet case, not only did we win, but we upheld the detention of one of the world’s most iconic dictators.

The Pinochet case inspired victims of abuse in country after country, particularly in Latin America, to challenge the transitional arrangements of the 1980s and 1990s, which allowed the perpetrators of atrocities to go unpunished and, often, to remain in power.

These temporary accommodations with the ancien régime didn’t extinguish the victims’ thirst to bring their former tormentors to justice.

How did you go from Pinochet to Habré?

With Pinochet, we saw that universal jurisdiction could be used as an instrument to bring to book people who seemed out of the reach of justice.

Together with groups like Amnesty, the FIDH, and the ICJ (which wrote an important report on the Pinochet case and its lessons), we had meetings on who could be the “next Pinochet.”

That’s when Delphine Djiraibe of the Chadian Association for Human Rights asked us to help Habre’s victims bring him to justice in his Senegalese exile.

I was excited at the prospect of persuading a country in the Global South, Senegal, to exercise universal jurisdiction, because there was a developing paradigm of European courts prosecuting defendants from formerly colonized countries.

It took us 17 years, but Habré became the first prosecution ever of a former head of state using universal jurisdiction, and indeed the first universal jurisdiction trial in Africa.

1998 was a high water mark for international justice with the adoption of the ICC Rome Statute and Pinochet’s arrest. Neither the ICC nor universal jurisdiction have quite lived up to their expectations. Why?

International justice doesn’t operate in a vacuum, it’s conditioned by the global power structure. Each case, whether at the ICC level or the transnational level, is a product of the political forces which must be mobilized, or fended off, to allow a prosecution to proceed.

Those forces, particularly since September 11, 2001, have been hostile to human rights enforcement in general and to justice in particular. Universal jurisdiction has been subject to the same double standards as the ICC.

The Belgian and Spanish universal jurisdiction laws, which were the broadest in the world, were both repealed when they were used to investigate superpower actions.

But many of the most successful cases have been those in which the victims and their activist supporters have been the driving forces, have compiled the evidence themselves, built an advocacy coalition which placed the victims and their stories at the center of the justice struggle and helped create the political will in the forum state.

I’m thinking not just of Habré, but the genocide prosecution in Guatemala of the former dictator Efraín Ríos Montt, the case in Haiti of “President for Life,” Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, the Liberian cases brought around the world by Civitas Maxima and its partners, the Swiss cases initiated by TRIAL International, and the Syria litigation by ECCHR and others.

These cases were brought before domestic courts either of the country in which the atrocities took place (Guatemala, Haiti) or of foreign countries based on universal jurisdiction, rather than before international courts.

Most of these cases took advantage of legal regimes which allowed victims directly to participate in the prosecutions as “parties civiles,” or “acusación particular” rather than play passive or secondary roles in cases prosecuted solely by state or international officials.

How do victim-driven prosecutions look different than institutional cases?

When it’s the victims and their allies who get the cases before a court, who gather the evidence, and who have formal standing as parties, the trials are more likely to live up to their expectations.

In the Rios Montt case, for instance, the Asociación Para la Justicia y Reconciliacion (AJR) and the Centro Para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH) mobilized the victims, developed the evidence, defined the narrative and, essentially, determined the outlines of the case and chose the witnesses who would testify for the prosecution.

In the Habré case, we spent 13 years building the dossier, interviewing hundreds of victims and former officials and uncovering regime police files. The victims’ coalition always insisted that any trial include crimes committed against each of Chad’s victimized ethnic groups, and that is exactly was happened.

In contrast, a distant prosecutor, disconnected from national narratives and inherently not accountable to the victims or civil society, can be tempted to narrowly tailor prosecutions in the hopes of securing a conviction or avoiding political resistance.

This was the case with the ICC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, where, as Pascal Kambale has persuasively argued, it betrayed the victims’ hopes.

Millions of civilians died in the DRC and Luis Moreno Ocampo only went after two local warlords. I think the current prosecutor is paying more attention to local realities.

The inspiration from victim-driven cases is also greater, and they are to some degree replicable. As Naomi Roht-Arriaza has written, these cases “stirred imaginations and opened possibilities precisely because they seemed decentralized, less controllable by state interests, more, if you will, acts of imagination.”

When I showed Chadian victims video clips of the Ríos Montt trial, they saw in those images exactly what they were trying to do.

Just as the Chadians came to us in the Habré case seeking to do what Pinochet’s victims had done, our hope in getting the Habré case to trial was that other survivors would be inspired by what Habre’s victims had done and say, “you see these people, they fought for justice and never gave up. We can do that too.”

And indeed, Liberian victims and Gambian victims have patterned their campaigns for justice on what Habre’s victims did. So, the Pinochet case continues to be an inspiration.

 

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