Sep 26, 2018 | Advocacy, Non-legal submissions
The ICJ today highlighted the steep decline for human rights and the rule of law in Cambodia, at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.
The statement, made during an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, read as follows:
“Mr President,
The findings reported by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia (A/HRC/39/73; A/HRC/39/73/Add.1), detailing the steep decline for human rights and rule of law in Cambodia prior to and during the 2018 national elections, demonstrate the utter inadequacy of the Human Rights Council’s current focus on technical assistance and capacity-building in Cambodia.
The elections, neither free nor fair, resulted in the ruling party winning all seats in the National Assembly. Post-election, the Government continues to misuse laws to violate rights and harass journalists, human rights defenders, political opposition members and ordinary individuals, as evidenced by the following updates to cases highlighted by the Special Rapporteur.
Unjustified espionage charges hang over two journalists, who spent eight months in detention before being released pending trial.[1] A filmmaker, sentenced to imprisonment for alleged espionage after flying a drone over an opposition rally, was only released by royal pardon after more than a year in jail.
Days after release from two years in jail for conducting a peaceful protest, a land rights activist was handed a six-month suspended sentence for a politically-motivated charge from 2012.[2] Following his release after 18 months in prison for alleged defamation and incitement offences, a political commentator fled Cambodia when fresh politically-motivated charges were mounted against him.[3]
Treason charges remain active against Kem Sokha, leader of the now-dissolved main opposition party, now under house arrest.[4]
A barber and a school principal remain imprisoned for allegedly sharing information online in breach of a lese-majeste law.[5] A woman remains imprisoned for alleged insult and incitement offences for throwing a shoe at a ruling party billboard.[6]
Today, four senior staff from a prominent civil society organization and a National Election Committee official were convicted under politically-motivated charges and handed five-year suspended imprisonment sentences.[7]
Madam Special Rapporteur, what approach should the Council, governments and civil society take to ensure human rights and the rule of law in Cambodia, given that technical assistance and capacity-building alone seem clearly not to be having the necessary effect?
Thank you.”
[1] A/HRC/39/73/Add.1, para 42.
[2] A/HRC/39/73, para 13.
[3] A/HRC/39/73/Add.1, para 35.
[4] A/HRC/39/73/Add.1, paras 18 and 19.
[5] A/HRC/39/73/Add.1, para 46.
[6] A/HRC/39/73/Add.1, para 30.
[7] A/HRC/39/73, para 13; A/HRC/73/Add.1, para 35
Sep 26, 2018
Today, the ICJ has presented a third party intervention before the European Court of Human Rights in Alayif Hasan oglu Hasanov v. Azerbaijan case.
In its submissions, the ICJ stresses that, while lawyers must perform their professional functions in conformity with ethical standards, the systems and procedures in respect of conditions of service, including in respect of admission to the profession and discipline, must not enforce such obligations in a way that impairs the exercise of human rights by lawyers or their capacity to effectively represent their clients.
The ICJ presented the submissions based on the jurisprudence of this Court as well as international standards governing the legal profession.
In particular, the submission addressed permissible restrictions of lawyers’ rights to respect for private (including professional) life under article 8 ECHR and to freedom of expression under article 10 ECHR, as well as the procedural safeguards required to apply such restrictions under article 6 ECHR.
Finally, the submission set out key findings of a recent ICJ fact-finding mission to assess the compliance of the governance of the legal profession in Azerbaijan with international law and standards.
Additional information:
Questions to the parties are available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-184367
“Defenseless Defenders: Systemic Problems in the Legal Profession of Azerbaijan” – ICJ report in Azeri, Russian and English.
Azerbaijan-ICJ submission to ECHR-legal submission-2018-ENG – Submission in English.
Sep 26, 2018 | Advocacy, Non-legal submissions
The ICJ today emphasised the continuing failure of domestic accountability mechanisms to ensure proper accountability for crimes under international law in Libya, speaking at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.
The statement, made during an Interactive Dialogue with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on her oral update on the situation in Libya, at the Human Rights Council in Geneva, read as follows:
“Mr President,
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) remains concerned by the scale and magnitude of the human rights violations that continue in Libya, and the failure of domestic accountability mechanisms to address them.
Impunity prevails for crimes under international law committed during and after the 2011 uprising, including extrajudicial killings, torture and other ill-treatment, and enforced disappearances. Broad amnesty laws allow those responsible to avoid prosecution.
Even in the rare cases where former officials of the Gadhafi regime have faced trial,[1] the integrity of the justice process has been compromised by failures to respect international fair trial standards, including the right to legal counsel and the right to call and examine witnesses.
On August 15, 2018, following an unfair mass trial, 99 defendants were convicted for the killing of 146 anti-Gaddafi protesters in Tripoli during the 2011 uprising.[2] 45 were sentenced to death, violating the right to life.
Such unfair trials and unlawful sentences not only violate the human rights of the accused: they deprive the victims of the crimes of the right to know the truth about the legacy of past violations and the legitimate and untainted justice to which they are entitled. New, fair trials are required.
Political and security instability in Libya undermines the ability of the judiciary to administer justice independently and impartially, including with a view to combating impunity. Judges and prosecutors are threatened, intimidated, abducted and in some instances killed, particularly when attempting to address crimes by members of armed groups.
The ICJ would like to ask the High Commissioner, how can other States and civil society help ensure that Libya, while fully cooperating with the International Criminal Court, implements an effective legal and practical framework to address crimes under international law and eradicate impunity?
Thank you.”
[1] Case 630/2012.
[2] https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/22/libya-45-sentenced-death-2011-killings.
Sep 24, 2018 | Feature articles, News
On October 16, 1998, the former dictator of Chile Augusto Pinochet was arrested in London on a warrant from a Spanish judge. Reed Brody participated in the subsequent legal case.
Reed Brody went on to apply the “Pinochet precedent” in the landmark prosecution of the former dictator of Chad, Hissène Habré, who was convicted of crimes against humanity in Senegal in 2016.
He now works with victims of the former dictator of Gambia, Yahya Jammeh. The ICJ interviewed Brody about the Pinochet case and its legacy.
What was your role in the Pinochet case?
My role started when Pinochet was arrested in London. The case began long before that, of course, in the early years of Pinochet’s dictatorship when brave human rights activists documented each case of murder, and “disappearance.”
The ICJ worked with those advocates to produce a seminal 1974 report on those crimes, just six months after Pinochet’s coup. Shut out of Chile’s courts, even after the democratic transition of 1990, victims and their lawyers pursued a case against Pinochet in Spain under its “universal jurisdiction” law and when Pinochet traveled to London, Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón requested and obtained his detention.
When Pinochet challenged his arrest in court claiming immunity as a former head of state, I went to London for Human Rights Watch, and we and Amnesty International were granted the right to intervene with teams of lawyers in the proceedings at the judicial committee of the House of Lords, then Britain’s highest court.
The Lords cited our research in rejecting Pinochet’s immunity.
You famously described the Lords’ Pinochet decision as a “wake-up call” to tyrants everywhere. Looking back, do you think it was?
Actually no, I think one would be hard pressed to discern a change in the behavior of dictators. Mugabe didn’t quake in his boots, Saddam didn’t clean up his act.
The more important and more lasting effect of the case was to give hope to other victims and activists. When the Lords ruled that Pinochet could be arrested anywhere in the world despite his status as a former head of state, the movement was in effervescence.
As a human rights lawyer, I was used to being legally and morally right, but still losing. In the Pinochet case, not only did we win, but we upheld the detention of one of the world’s most iconic dictators.
The Pinochet case inspired victims of abuse in country after country, particularly in Latin America, to challenge the transitional arrangements of the 1980s and 1990s, which allowed the perpetrators of atrocities to go unpunished and, often, to remain in power.
These temporary accommodations with the ancien régime didn’t extinguish the victims’ thirst to bring their former tormentors to justice.
How did you go from Pinochet to Habré?
With Pinochet, we saw that universal jurisdiction could be used as an instrument to bring to book people who seemed out of the reach of justice.
Together with groups like Amnesty, the FIDH, and the ICJ (which wrote an important report on the Pinochet case and its lessons), we had meetings on who could be the “next Pinochet.”
That’s when Delphine Djiraibe of the Chadian Association for Human Rights asked us to help Habre’s victims bring him to justice in his Senegalese exile.
I was excited at the prospect of persuading a country in the Global South, Senegal, to exercise universal jurisdiction, because there was a developing paradigm of European courts prosecuting defendants from formerly colonized countries.
It took us 17 years, but Habré became the first prosecution ever of a former head of state using universal jurisdiction, and indeed the first universal jurisdiction trial in Africa.
1998 was a high water mark for international justice with the adoption of the ICC Rome Statute and Pinochet’s arrest. Neither the ICC nor universal jurisdiction have quite lived up to their expectations. Why?
International justice doesn’t operate in a vacuum, it’s conditioned by the global power structure. Each case, whether at the ICC level or the transnational level, is a product of the political forces which must be mobilized, or fended off, to allow a prosecution to proceed.
Those forces, particularly since September 11, 2001, have been hostile to human rights enforcement in general and to justice in particular. Universal jurisdiction has been subject to the same double standards as the ICC.
The Belgian and Spanish universal jurisdiction laws, which were the broadest in the world, were both repealed when they were used to investigate superpower actions.
But many of the most successful cases have been those in which the victims and their activist supporters have been the driving forces, have compiled the evidence themselves, built an advocacy coalition which placed the victims and their stories at the center of the justice struggle and helped create the political will in the forum state.
I’m thinking not just of Habré, but the genocide prosecution in Guatemala of the former dictator Efraín Ríos Montt, the case in Haiti of “President for Life,” Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, the Liberian cases brought around the world by Civitas Maxima and its partners, the Swiss cases initiated by TRIAL International, and the Syria litigation by ECCHR and others.
These cases were brought before domestic courts either of the country in which the atrocities took place (Guatemala, Haiti) or of foreign countries based on universal jurisdiction, rather than before international courts.
Most of these cases took advantage of legal regimes which allowed victims directly to participate in the prosecutions as “parties civiles,” or “acusación particular” rather than play passive or secondary roles in cases prosecuted solely by state or international officials.
How do victim-driven prosecutions look different than institutional cases?
When it’s the victims and their allies who get the cases before a court, who gather the evidence, and who have formal standing as parties, the trials are more likely to live up to their expectations.
In the Rios Montt case, for instance, the Asociación Para la Justicia y Reconciliacion (AJR) and the Centro Para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH) mobilized the victims, developed the evidence, defined the narrative and, essentially, determined the outlines of the case and chose the witnesses who would testify for the prosecution.
In the Habré case, we spent 13 years building the dossier, interviewing hundreds of victims and former officials and uncovering regime police files. The victims’ coalition always insisted that any trial include crimes committed against each of Chad’s victimized ethnic groups, and that is exactly was happened.
In contrast, a distant prosecutor, disconnected from national narratives and inherently not accountable to the victims or civil society, can be tempted to narrowly tailor prosecutions in the hopes of securing a conviction or avoiding political resistance.
This was the case with the ICC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, where, as Pascal Kambale has persuasively argued, it betrayed the victims’ hopes.
Millions of civilians died in the DRC and Luis Moreno Ocampo only went after two local warlords. I think the current prosecutor is paying more attention to local realities.
The inspiration from victim-driven cases is also greater, and they are to some degree replicable. As Naomi Roht-Arriaza has written, these cases “stirred imaginations and opened possibilities precisely because they seemed decentralized, less controllable by state interests, more, if you will, acts of imagination.”
When I showed Chadian victims video clips of the Ríos Montt trial, they saw in those images exactly what they were trying to do.
Just as the Chadians came to us in the Habré case seeking to do what Pinochet’s victims had done, our hope in getting the Habré case to trial was that other survivors would be inspired by what Habre’s victims had done and say, “you see these people, they fought for justice and never gave up. We can do that too.”
And indeed, Liberian victims and Gambian victims have patterned their campaigns for justice on what Habre’s victims did. So, the Pinochet case continues to be an inspiration.