Myanmar: Scrap Cyber Security Draft Law and Restore Full Internet Connectivity

Myanmar: Scrap Cyber Security Draft Law and Restore Full Internet Connectivity

The Myanmar military should immediately abandon the draft Cyber Security Law and end Internet restrictions it has imposed since taking power in a coup on 1 February, said ARTICLE 19, Open Net Association, and the ICJ today.

“It is telling that controlling cyberspace is one of the top priorities of the Myanmar military, which seized power through an illegitimate coup d’etat only last week,” said Sam Zarifi, ICJ’s Secretary General. “The military is used to having total power in Myanmar, but this time they have to face a population that has access to information and can communicate internally and externally.”

Under international law, the rights to freedom of expression and information may only be restricted if prescribed by law, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and necessary and proportionate to that aim. This right applies equally online. In 2018, the UN Human Rights Council condemned ‘all undue restrictions on freedom of opinion and expression online that violate international law’.

“Having illegally seized control of government, the military is trying to ram through a hugely problematic law that would imperil the Myanmar public’s ability to share and access information online,” said Matthew Bugher, ARTICLE 19’s Head of Asia Programme. “The draft law is further evidence of the military’s intent to control online discourse and permanently undermine Internet freedom in the country.”

Human rights bodies and experts have repeatedly condemned Internet shutdowns, which are inherently unnecessary and disproportionate irrespective of their purported objectives. Four UN special procedures with mandates from the Human Rights Council stated in their 2011 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet that, ‘Cutting off access to the Internet, or parts of the Internet, for whole populations or segments of the public (shutting down the Internet) can never be justified, including on public order or national security grounds’. The UN Human Rights Council has repeatedly called on Myanmar to lift Internet restrictions in the country.

Anonymity is furthermore crucial to protecting the right to freedom of expression and other human rights, including the right to privacy. UN Human Rights Council Resolution 38/7 recognizes that ‘privacy online is important for the realization of the right to freedom of expression and to hold opinions without interference, and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association’. The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression in a 2015 report stated that restrictions on encryption must confirm to the three-part test on restrictions to the freedom of expression noted above.

“The ban on online anonymity in the cybersecurity law is not just bad for Myanmar but sets a dangerous precedent for the whole of Asia”, said Kyung Sin Park, Executive Director of Open Net Association, whose founders spearheaded a successful constitutional challenge against a similar law in South Korea in 2012. “The content takedown provisions and criminalization of online speech in the draft law are extremely broad and utterly lacking due process even in comparison to other Asian countries. The proposal smacks of a legislative attempt to extend the powers the military had taken in an unlawful, anti-democratic coup.”

ISPs, online service providers (as defined by the draft law to mean content providers) and other stakeholders have only been given until 15 February for input. This is a clear indication that the military has no intention of engaging in meaningful consultation.

On 10 February, a group of 158 Myanmar civil society organizations released a statement rejecting the draft Cyber Security Law, while reiterating their view that the Myanmar military could not legitimately exercise legislative authority.

“All online service providers inside and outside the country should be alarmed at this intrusion of military authority into cyberspace and refuse to implement these hugely problematic restrictions,” said ICJ’s Sam Zarifi.

SPECIFIC PROBLEMATIC PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT CYBERSECURITY LAW (based on an unofficial translation of the draft law):

Many provisions in the draft law are vague and overbroad, in contravention of the principle of legality. If enacted, the draft law would greatly extend the powers of military authorities to restrict and punish online expression.

The law provides overarching control to the military’s ‘State Administration Council’, a newly-formed body appointed by the Commander-in-Chief. The direct military control of Internet service provision and its role in the policing of content online is in and of itself cause for alarm. Further, the military should in no circumstances be charged with protecting personal data.

Section 29 of the draft law is overly broad as it demands the prevention, removal, destruction and cessation of a broad and vaguely defined range of expression, including online comments deemed ‘misinformation’ or ‘disinformation’, any expression that causes hate and risks disrupting unity, stability, and peace, and ‘written and verbal statements against any existing law’.

Under section 64, any person convicted of creating ‘misinformation’ and ‘disinformation’ with the intent of causing public panic, loss of trust or social division in cyberspace is punishable by three years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both.

International human rights bodies have repeatedly urged governments against laws that create ‘false news’ offences, warning about their potential abuse by governments to suppress criticism and other forms of speech protected by international human rights law.

Section 30 threatens the right to online anonymity by requiring online service providers to retain usernames, IP addresses, national IDs, and other personal data for up to three years, and to provide this information to authorities upon request. For this purpose, Section 28 requires an online service provider to ensure that any device that stores the user’s information must be kept in a place designated by the relevant Ministry.

The draft law also has overly broad catch-all provisions in Sections 61 and 73 respectively whereby online service providers that fail to comply with any provisions of the draft law face a maximum penalty of three years’ imprisonment and a fine and individuals failing to comply with any rules, regulations, notifications, orders, directives, and procedures issued under the draft law are subject to one year’s imprisonment and a fine. These sanctions which are punitive in purpose and effective are non-compliant with the requirement of proportionality under international human rights law and standards on freedom of expression.

The draft law also provides for enhanced power to control the Internet without the benefit of judicial review by independent civilian courts. In the ‘public interest’, a ministry approved by the State Administration Council may temporarily prohibit any online service or take control of devices related to online service provision, as well as permanently ban any online service provider. This is a less stringent standard than that provided under the problematic and much-criticized section 77 of the Telecommunications Act, which allows for shut downs or control of telecommunications in an ‘emergency situation’.

Download

Statement in Burmese.

Contact

Osama Motiwala, ICJ Asia-Pacific Communications Officer, e: osama.motiwala(a)icj.org

Myanmar: ICJ sets out legal deficiencies in Ministry of Transport and Communications Order to block access to specific websites

Myanmar: ICJ sets out legal deficiencies in Ministry of Transport and Communications Order to block access to specific websites

The ICJ published a legal memorandum concluding that the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC) Order to block access to specific websites is not compliant with international human rights law.

The legal memorandum also sets out various remedial options under Myanmar law to question the lawfulness of the Order.

The ICJ focused its human rights analysis on the rights to freedom of expression and access to information and the right to health, which includes access to health information. These rights are well established under general and customary international law. The right to health is guaranteed under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Myanmar is a party.

The MOTC, presumably invoking Section 77 of the Telecommunications Law, ordered telecommunication service providers in March 2020 to take down 2,147 websites found by it to have disseminated “fake news,” adult content, and child sexual abuse content. It is not clear if any of the information under sanction relates to COVID-19, although the pandemic was mentioned elsewhere in one mobile service provider’s press release. Immediately after the release of the MOTC Order, it was discovered that the ban included ethnic news media websites, such as Rakhine-based Development Media Group and Narinjara News, thereby prompting speculation as to the true reasons behind the ban.

The ICJ emphasized the following in the legal memorandum:

  • Blocking access to specific websites engages a wide range of human rights concerns, including but not limited to the person’s right to freedom of expression and right of access to information protected under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and customary international law. While lack of transparency about the State rationale and evidence was an obstacle to a full analysis, the permissible conditions that would justify sweeping limitations on this right do not appear to have been met.
  • In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the MOTC Order also undermines the right to health of all persons in Myanmar. The right to health guaranteed under the ICESCR is reserved to all persons without discrimination and includes access to health information. The MOTC Order effectively hinders access to health information by blocking legitimate sources of information.
  • To challenge the MOTC Order, the following domestic legal remedies are available: (i) filing a complaint with the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission; (ii) filing an application for a constitutional writ before the Union Supreme Court and/or (iii) filing a declaration suit under the Specific Relief Act.

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Myanmar-Memo-on-MOTC-Order-Legal-Memorandum-2020-ENG (PDF)

Contact

Jenny Domino, ICJ Associate Legal Adviser, e: jenny.domino(a)icj.org

Hnin Win Aung, ICJ Legal Adviser, e: hninwin.aung(a)icj.org

Related work

Publication: Myanmar’s ongoing Internet shutdown and hostilities threaten right to health during COVID-19

Statement: Government must lift online restrictions in conflict-affected areas to ensure access to information during COVID-19 pandemic

Report: Curtailing the Right to Freedom of Expression and Information in Myanmar

Publication: Four Immediate Reforms to Strengthen the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission

Publication: Strategic Litigation Handbook for Myanmar

Myanmar: Year-long Internet shutdown must be brought to an end

Myanmar: Year-long Internet shutdown must be brought to an end

As the general internet shutdown in Rakhine and Chin states reaches one year, the ICJ repeated its call for the Myanmar Government to end mobile internet restrictions and temporarily halt hostilities with the Arakan Army.

The ICJ also called for an amendment of Section 77 of the Telecommunications Act, pursuant to which the government can order telecommunications providers to suspend internet services.

“The internet shutdown in Rakhine and Chin states stifles freedom of expression, prevents information-sharing, and exacerbates the plight of affected communities by impeding humanitarian and health access during a global pandemic,” said Frederick Rawski, ICJ Asia-Pacific Director. “Such a drastic measure is disproportionate and unnecessary. The government should focus on fighting COVID-19, instead of waging a battle against its own population.

The shutdown was first imposed on 21 June 2019 by the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC), purportedly to facilitate government objectives in the armed conflict with the Arakan Army.

Section 77 of the Telecommunications Law authorizes the the MOTC to “direct the licensee to suspend a Telecommunications Service, to intercept, not to operate any specific form of communication, to obtain necessary information and communications, and to temporarily control the Telecommunications Service and Telecommunications Equipments” in the event of an “emergency situation” for the “public interest.” However, the law does not define the scope of an “emergency situation.” The ICJ previously described Section 77 to be vague, and warned of abuse by authorities in the absence of independent judicial oversight by civilian courts.

In April, as Myanmar encountered its initial cases of COVID-19, the ICJ highlighted how arbitrary and unnecessary online media restrictions not only violate a person’s right to freedom of expression and information, but also deny access by affected communities to essential health information. Access to health information is a component of the right to health protected under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to which Myanmar is a party.

“The internet shutdown effectively deprives large swathes of the population in ethnic minority states of the benefits of government services, and information about its COVID-19 response,” said Frederick Rawski. “Such a blanket internet shutdown is not necessary for reasons of national security, and undermines the government’s own public health efforts.”

The ICJ recalled that the ICESCR requires States to observe the principle of non-discrimination in enacting measures to protect the right to health. The internet shutdown clearly has a disproportionately adverse impact on the human rights of members of ethnic minorities.

Despite appeals from  UN officials, rights groups, ethnic armed organizations, and ambassadors to Myanmar, the Myanmar Government still refuses to hold a ceasefire throughout the country, including areas of Rakhine and Chin states where the Arakan Army operates. The conflict has resulted in deaths, many from unlawful killings, as well as serious physical and emotional injury, and mass displacement of persons.

Download

Myanmar-Internet-Shutdown-Press-Release-2020-BUR (PDF)

Contact

Frederick Rawski, ICJ Asia-Pacific Regional Director, e: Frederick.rawski(a)icj.org

Related work

Publication: Myanmar’s ongoing Internet shutdown and hostilities threaten right to health during COVID-19

Statement: Government must lift online restrictions in conflict-affected areas to ensure access to information during COVID-19 pandemic

Report: Curtailing the Right to Freedom of Expression and Information in Myanmar

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