Business and Human Rights: Situation in Izabal, Guatemala

Business and Human Rights: Situation in Izabal, Guatemala

A conference on the situation of business and human rights in Izabal, Guatemala will be held on 29 November 2018 at UNIMAIL University of Geneva at 6:30 pm.

THIS CONFERENCE IS IN FRENCH AND SPANISH ONLY

The conference is co-organised by the International Commission of Jurists, the Department of International Public Law and International Organisation, Faculty of Law, University of Geneva and the Town of Geneva.

Speakers at the conference include Ramon Cadena, the Director of the ICJ Central America Office, Amalia Caal Coc, a local community leader from the Guilermo Torielo Foundation, Maynor Alvarez, Director of Community Relations from the Guatemalan Nickel Company, Solway Group, and Sandra Ratjen, Franciscans International.  The panel moderator is Dr Antonella Angelini from the Department of International Public Law and International Organisation.

The meeting room is R070 at UNIMAIL,  There will be a discussion after the panel. Entrance is free and there will be interpretation in French and Spanish.

Flyer in Spanish (PDF) 

Flyer in French (PDF) 

Special hearing of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) on the role of the Guatemalan Commission against Corruption (CICIG)

Special hearing of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) on the role of the Guatemalan Commission against Corruption (CICIG)

The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) held a special hearing on the role of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) in Boulder, Colarado.

Ramón Cadena, the ICJ Director stated “We regret that the Government of Guatemala requested the IACHR to hold the hearing behind closed doors since all the points discussed were of public interest. The discussions should have been open to the press and the general public. We urge the authorities to ensure there will be no retaliations against the work carried out by human rights organizations and human rights defenders.”

The ICJ welcomed the participation of many NGOs  at the event  and the frank dialogue that took place on this crucial issue for human rights in that country. The Guatemalan government delegation claimed that the Inter-American System of Human Rights was not competent to consider the matter. However, the IACHR maintained it was competent, according to the American Convention of Human Rights and other regional human rights legislation. As an “external observer”, the IACHR  stated it was “surprised” by the latest decisions taken by government authorities at the highest level not to extend the CICIG mandate nor allow the entry of Commissioner Iván Velásquez into the country. It considered these decisions were “excessive” and in no way strengthened the rule of law in Guatemala.

The government delegation further argued that the CICIG acted as a “parallel prosecutor” which affects the internal order of the country. The NGO delegation stated that on the contrary the CICIG acted as a “complementary prosecutor”. The delegation further noted that before the CICIG mandate was approved, the Constitutional Court, in an opinion published in the official gazette on 8 May 2007 (document no 791-2007), considered that the CICIG did not violate the constitutional order nor the rule of law in Guatemala.

The Constitutional Court referred to the CICIG as having “the function of supporting, assisting and strengthening the state institutions responsible for investigating crimes committed by  illegal and clandestine security forces .. and does not exclude the possibility of receiving  support from other institutions in the collection of evidence, provided that the participation has been established in a legal manner, as in the present case.”

The IACHR considered that the essential question  was whether the State of Guatemala already had the judicial independence and strong  institutions necessary to  fight against corruption in Guatemala without the support of the CICIG. The NGO delegation considered, based on different arguments, that the presence of the CICIG in Guatemala was still necessary.

The IACHR also informed the government delegation that it was in their interest to invite an in-situ visit of the IACHR as soon as possible so as to better understand the human rights situation.

The ICJ Director for Central America Ramón Cadena participated in the hearing at the request of the Central American Institute for Social Democracy  Studies (DEMOS), the Committee for Peasant Development (CODECA) and the Network of Community Defenders. The Indigenous Peoples Law Firm had been requested to attend by these organizations but was unable to do so at the last moment.

Successes and Failures of the 39th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

Successes and Failures of the 39th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

The ICJ joined other civil society organisations in addressing the UN Human Rights Council, on the successes and failures of its 39th session, concluding today.

The statement, read by International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), was as follows:

“This session, the Council adopted landmark resolutions on several country situations, further enhancing its contribution to the protection of human rights.

On Myanmar, we welcome the creation of the independent investigative mechanism, which is an important step towards accountability for the horrific crimes committed in Myanmar, as elaborated in the FFM’s report to this session. The overwhelming support for the resolution, notwithstanding China’s shameful blocking of consensus, was a clear message to victims and survivors that the international community stands with them in their fight for justice.

On Yemen, the Council demonstrated that principled action is possible, and has sent a strong message to victims of human rights violations in Yemen that accountability is a priority for the international community, by voting in favour of renewing the mandate of the Group of Eminent Experts to continue international investigations into violations committed by all parties to the conflict.

Furthermore, we welcome the leadership by a group of States on the landmark resolution on Venezuela, and consider it as an important step for the Council applying objective criteria to address country situations that warrant its attention. The resolution, adopted with support from all UN regions, sends a strong message of support to the Venezuelan people. By opening up a space for dialogue at the Council, the resolution brings scrutiny to the tragic human rights and humanitarian crisis unfolding in the country.

While we welcome the renewal of the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry (CoI) on Burundi,  to continue its critical investigation and work towards accountability, however we regret that the Council failed to respond more strongly to Burundi’s record of non-cooperation and attacks against the UN human rights system.

We also welcome the Council’s adoption of the resolution on Syria, which among other things condemns all violations and abuses of international human rights law and all violations of international humanitarian law committed by all parties to the conflict.

However, on other country situations including China, Sudan, Cambodia and the Philippines, the Council failed to take appropriate action.

On Sudan, we are deeply concerned about the weak resolution that envisions an end to the Independent Expert’s mandate once an OHCHR office is set up; a “deal” Sudan has already indicated it does not feel bound by, and which is an abdication of the Council’s responsibility to human rights victims in Sudan while grave violations are ongoing. At a minimum, States should ensure the planned country office monitors and publicly reports on the human rights situation  across Sudan, and that the High Commissioner is mandated to report to the Council on the Office’s findings.

We also regret the lack of concerted Council action on the Philippines, in spite of the need to establish independent international and national investigations into extrajudicial killings in the government’s ‘war on drugs’, and to monitor and respond to the government’s moves toward authoritarianism.

In addition, we regret the Council’s weak response to the deepening  human rights and the rule of law crisis in Cambodia, failing to change its approach even when faced with clear findings by the Special Rapporteur demonstrating that the exclusive focus on technical assistance and capacity building in the country is failing.

We share the concerns that many raised during the session, including the High Commissioner, about China’s own human rights record, specifically noting serious violations of the rights of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities in Xinjiang province. It is regrettable that States did not make a concrete and collective call for action by China to cease the internment of  estimates ranging up to 1 million individuals from these communities.

On thematic resolutions, we welcome the adoption of the resolution on equal participation in political and public affairs but would have preferred a stronger endorsement and implementation of the Guidelines.

The resolution on safety of journalists, adopted by consensus, sets out a clear roadmap of practical actions to end impunity for attacks. Journalism is not a crime – yet too many States in this room simply imprison those that criticize them. This must end, starting with the implementation of this resolution.

We welcome the adoption by consensus of the resolution on preventable maternal mortality and morbidity and human rights in humanitarian settings. Women and girls affected by conflict have been denied accountability for too long. The implementation of this resolution will ensure that their rights, including their sexual and reproductive health and rights, are respected, protected and fulfilled.

Finally, the Council’s first interactive dialogue on reprisals was an important step to ensure accountability for this shameful practice, and we urge more States to have the courage and conviction to stand up for defenders and call out countries that attack and intimidate them.”

Signatories:

  1. The African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (ACDHRS)
  2. Amnesty International
  3. Article 19
  4. Center for Reproductive Rights
  5. CIVICUS
  6. DefendDefenders
  7. FIDH
  8. Forum Asia
  9. Human Rights House Foundation (HRHF)
  10. Human Rights Watch
  11. International Commission of Jurists
  12. International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)

 

ICJ Commissioner Reed Brody: “Twenty years later, Pinochet’s arrest remains an inspiration”

ICJ Commissioner Reed Brody: “Twenty years later, Pinochet’s arrest remains an inspiration”

On October 16, 1998, the former dictator of Chile Augusto Pinochet was arrested in London on a warrant from a Spanish judge. Reed Brody participated in the subsequent legal case.

Reed Brody went on to apply the “Pinochet precedent” in the landmark prosecution of the former dictator of Chad, Hissène Habré, who was convicted of crimes against humanity in Senegal in 2016.

He now works with victims of the former dictator of Gambia, Yahya Jammeh. The ICJ interviewed Brody about the Pinochet case and its legacy.

What was your role in the Pinochet case?

My role started when Pinochet was arrested in London. The case began long before that, of course, in the early years of Pinochet’s dictatorship when brave human rights activists documented each case of murder, and “disappearance.”

The ICJ worked with those advocates to produce a seminal 1974 report on those crimes, just six months after Pinochet’s coup. Shut out of Chile’s courts, even after the democratic transition of 1990, victims and their lawyers pursued a case against Pinochet in Spain under its “universal jurisdiction” law and when Pinochet traveled to London, Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón requested and obtained his detention.

When Pinochet challenged his arrest in court claiming immunity as a former head of state, I went to London for Human Rights Watch, and we and Amnesty International were granted the right to intervene with teams of lawyers in the proceedings at the judicial committee of the House of Lords, then Britain’s highest court.

The Lords cited our research in rejecting Pinochet’s immunity.

You famously described the Lords’ Pinochet decision as a “wake-up call” to tyrants everywhere. Looking back, do you think it was?

Actually no, I think one would be hard pressed to discern a change in the behavior of dictators. Mugabe didn’t quake in his boots, Saddam didn’t clean up his act.

The more important and more lasting effect of the case was to give hope to other victims and activists. When the Lords ruled that Pinochet could be arrested anywhere in the world despite his status as a former head of state, the movement was in effervescence.

As a human rights lawyer, I was used to being legally and morally right, but still losing. In the Pinochet case, not only did we win, but we upheld the detention of one of the world’s most iconic dictators.

The Pinochet case inspired victims of abuse in country after country, particularly in Latin America, to challenge the transitional arrangements of the 1980s and 1990s, which allowed the perpetrators of atrocities to go unpunished and, often, to remain in power.

These temporary accommodations with the ancien régime didn’t extinguish the victims’ thirst to bring their former tormentors to justice.

How did you go from Pinochet to Habré?

With Pinochet, we saw that universal jurisdiction could be used as an instrument to bring to book people who seemed out of the reach of justice.

Together with groups like Amnesty, the FIDH, and the ICJ (which wrote an important report on the Pinochet case and its lessons), we had meetings on who could be the “next Pinochet.”

That’s when Delphine Djiraibe of the Chadian Association for Human Rights asked us to help Habre’s victims bring him to justice in his Senegalese exile.

I was excited at the prospect of persuading a country in the Global South, Senegal, to exercise universal jurisdiction, because there was a developing paradigm of European courts prosecuting defendants from formerly colonized countries.

It took us 17 years, but Habré became the first prosecution ever of a former head of state using universal jurisdiction, and indeed the first universal jurisdiction trial in Africa.

1998 was a high water mark for international justice with the adoption of the ICC Rome Statute and Pinochet’s arrest. Neither the ICC nor universal jurisdiction have quite lived up to their expectations. Why?

International justice doesn’t operate in a vacuum, it’s conditioned by the global power structure. Each case, whether at the ICC level or the transnational level, is a product of the political forces which must be mobilized, or fended off, to allow a prosecution to proceed.

Those forces, particularly since September 11, 2001, have been hostile to human rights enforcement in general and to justice in particular. Universal jurisdiction has been subject to the same double standards as the ICC.

The Belgian and Spanish universal jurisdiction laws, which were the broadest in the world, were both repealed when they were used to investigate superpower actions.

But many of the most successful cases have been those in which the victims and their activist supporters have been the driving forces, have compiled the evidence themselves, built an advocacy coalition which placed the victims and their stories at the center of the justice struggle and helped create the political will in the forum state.

I’m thinking not just of Habré, but the genocide prosecution in Guatemala of the former dictator Efraín Ríos Montt, the case in Haiti of “President for Life,” Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, the Liberian cases brought around the world by Civitas Maxima and its partners, the Swiss cases initiated by TRIAL International, and the Syria litigation by ECCHR and others.

These cases were brought before domestic courts either of the country in which the atrocities took place (Guatemala, Haiti) or of foreign countries based on universal jurisdiction, rather than before international courts.

Most of these cases took advantage of legal regimes which allowed victims directly to participate in the prosecutions as “parties civiles,” or “acusación particular” rather than play passive or secondary roles in cases prosecuted solely by state or international officials.

How do victim-driven prosecutions look different than institutional cases?

When it’s the victims and their allies who get the cases before a court, who gather the evidence, and who have formal standing as parties, the trials are more likely to live up to their expectations.

In the Rios Montt case, for instance, the Asociación Para la Justicia y Reconciliacion (AJR) and the Centro Para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH) mobilized the victims, developed the evidence, defined the narrative and, essentially, determined the outlines of the case and chose the witnesses who would testify for the prosecution.

In the Habré case, we spent 13 years building the dossier, interviewing hundreds of victims and former officials and uncovering regime police files. The victims’ coalition always insisted that any trial include crimes committed against each of Chad’s victimized ethnic groups, and that is exactly was happened.

In contrast, a distant prosecutor, disconnected from national narratives and inherently not accountable to the victims or civil society, can be tempted to narrowly tailor prosecutions in the hopes of securing a conviction or avoiding political resistance.

This was the case with the ICC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, where, as Pascal Kambale has persuasively argued, it betrayed the victims’ hopes.

Millions of civilians died in the DRC and Luis Moreno Ocampo only went after two local warlords. I think the current prosecutor is paying more attention to local realities.

The inspiration from victim-driven cases is also greater, and they are to some degree replicable. As Naomi Roht-Arriaza has written, these cases “stirred imaginations and opened possibilities precisely because they seemed decentralized, less controllable by state interests, more, if you will, acts of imagination.”

When I showed Chadian victims video clips of the Ríos Montt trial, they saw in those images exactly what they were trying to do.

Just as the Chadians came to us in the Habré case seeking to do what Pinochet’s victims had done, our hope in getting the Habré case to trial was that other survivors would be inspired by what Habre’s victims had done and say, “you see these people, they fought for justice and never gave up. We can do that too.”

And indeed, Liberian victims and Gambian victims have patterned their campaigns for justice on what Habre’s victims did. So, the Pinochet case continues to be an inspiration.

 

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