Oct 1, 2018 | News
The ICJ expressed disappointment regarding Friday’s ruling by Thailand’s Administrative Court dismissing a case filed against the Royal Thai Police (RTP) for unjustified restriction of the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, and again called on Thailand to lift its ban on political gatherings and fully reinstate fundamental freedoms in Thailand.
On 28 September 2018, the Administrative Court dismissed a case filed by the organizers of a “We Walk Friendship March” (‘We Walk march’) against the RTP and six policemen for restricting the march on the basis that it was in violation of Head of NCPO Order No. 3/2558 (2015) (‘HNCPO Order 3’).
The Administrative Court referred to the Thai Constitution, the Public Assembly Act B.E. 2558 (2015), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which Thailand is a State party, and HNCPO Order 3, in deciding that the march was a public assembly. Its decision clarified that the case had to be dismissed as the RTP’s actions had complied with the Public Assembly Act.
“It is astonishing that more than four years after the coup, HNCPO Order 3 and other repressive laws, orders and announcements which restrict fundamental freedoms remain in place,” said Kingsley Abbott, Senior Legal Adviser at the ICJ.
“The Administrative Court missed a critical opportunity to deliver an opinion that the ban on political gatherings should be lifted and that all laws, orders and announcements that are inconsistent with Thailand’s international human rights obligations should be amended or revoked immediately to reinstate all fundamental freedoms in Thailand,” added Abbott.
The march, which went ahead peacefully, aimed to bring attention to the need in Thailand for universal healthcare services, policies guaranteeing food security, laws that would not violate human rights, and public participation in the development of the Constitution.
Contact
Kingsley Abbott, ICJ Senior Legal Adviser, email: kingsley.abbott(a)icj.org
The ICJ’s full statement in English is available here: Thailand-Ban on Political Gatherings-News-Web Story-2018-ENG
The ICJ’s full statement in Thai is available here: Thailand-Ban on Political Gatherings-News-Web- Story-2018-THA
Sep 27, 2018 | News
Today’s decision by the UN Human Rights Council to create an ‘independent mechanism’ to collect evidence of crimes in Myanmar, is a significant step toward accountability for gross human rights violations, the ICJ said.
“The creation of this evidence-gathering mechanism is a welcome concrete step towards justice,” said Matt Pollard, Senior Legal Adviser for the ICJ.
“But this is a stopgap measure, effectively creating a prosecutor without a court, that only underscores the urgent need for the Security Council to refer the entire situation to the International Criminal Court, which was created for precisely such circumstances,” he added.
The Council’s decision follows on conclusions and recommendations by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (FFM).
The FFM’s 444-page full report described large-scale patterns of grave human rights violations against minority groups in the country, particularly in Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States.
It also highlighted the need for criminal investigations and prosecutions for crimes under international law, something the FFM concluded that national courts and commissions within Myanmar could not deliver.
“National justice institutions within Myanmar lack the independence, capacity and often also the will to hold perpetrators of human rights violations to account, particularly when members of security forces are involved. The latest government-established inquiry in Rakhine State also seems designed to deter and delay justice,” Pollard said.
The Human Rights Council resolution did not create a new international court or tribunal.
Evidence held by the independent mechanism could be made available to international or national proceedings, whether at the International Criminal Court (ICC) or another ad hoc international tribunal, or to national prosecutors asserting jurisdiction over the crimes under universal jurisdiction or other grounds.
While there is no realistic prospect of effective national prosecutions within Myanmar in the near future, evidence held by the mechanism could also be available in future should national institutions eventually become sufficiently impartial, independent, competent, and capable to do so.
A preliminary examination of the situation of Rohingyas, being conducted by the ICC, may also lead to criminal proceedings but will likely be limited to those crimes that have partially occurred within Bangladesh, such as the crime against humanity of deportation.
Bangladesh is a State Party to the Rome Statute of the ICC whilst Myanmar is not.
The Security Council also has authority to refer the entire situation to the International Criminal Court.
“The Myanmar government should stop denying the truth and should work with the international community, and particularly the United Nations, to improve the horrific conditions facing the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities whose rights have been violated so brutally by the security forces, as documented by the Fact Finding Mission,” Pollard said.
“Myanmar’s international partners, including neighbours like India, China, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), should exercise their influence to help ensure that Myanmar addresses this serious threat to the stability of the country and the region, by ensuring respect, protection and fulfillment of the full range of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights of the affected minorities,” he added.
The Council resolution makes several other substantive recommendations, including a call on the Government of Myanmar to review the 1982 Citizenship Law, and a recommendation for the United Nations to conduct an inquiry into its involvement in Myanmar since 2011.
Contact:
Matt Pollard, ICJ Senior Legal Adviser (Geneva), e: matt.pollard@icj.org, +41 79 246 54 75.
Frederick Rawski, ICJ Asia Pacific Regional Director (Bangkok), e: frederick.rawski@icj.org
Read also:
Why an IIIM and Security Council referral are needed despite the ICC ruling relating to Bangladesh (13 September 2018)
Government’s Commission of Inquiry cannot deliver justice or accountability (7 September 2018)
ICJ releases Q & A on crime of genocide (27 August 2018)
Myanmar: reverse laws and practices that perpetuate military impunity (16 January 2018)
Summary report of the Fact Finding Mission (12 September 2018)
Full report of the Fact Finding Mission (published 18 September 2018)
Text of the Resolution (unofficial version tabled in advance of the vote)
Myanmar-IIIM statement-Advocacy-2018-BUR (Full story in Burmese)
Sep 27, 2018 | Nouvelles
La décision prise aujourd’hui par le Conseil des droits de l’Homme des Nations unies de créer un “mécanisme indépendant” pour recueillir des preuves de crimes au Myanmar constitue un pas important vers la responsabilité pour les violations flagrantes des droits de l’Homme, a déclaré la CIJ.
«La création de ce mécanisme de collecte de preuves est une étape concrète bienvenue vers la justice», a déclaré Matt Pollard, conseiller juridique principal de la CIJ.
«Mais il s’agit d’une mesure bouche-trou visant à créer un procureur sans tribunal, ce qui ne fait que souligner la nécessité urgente pour le Conseil de sécurité de référer l’ensemble de la situation devant la Cour pénale internationale, qui a été créée précisément pour de telles circonstances», at-il ajouté.
La décision du Conseil fait suite aux conclusions et recommandations de la Mission d’enquête internationale indépendante sur le Myanmar (FFM).
Le rapport complet de 444 pages de la Mission d’enquête a décrit de graves violations de l’Homme perpétrées à grande échelle des droits contre des groupes minoritaires dans le pays, en particulier dans les États de Rakhine, Kachin et Shan.
Il a également souligné la nécessité d’enquêtes et poursuites pénales pour des crimes sous le droit international, ce à quoi la Mission d’enquête a conclu que les tribunaux nationaux et les commissions du Myanmar ne pouvaient pas y répondre.
«Les institutions judiciaires nationales du Myanmar manquent d’indépendance, de capacités et souvent aussi de volonté de demander des comptes aux auteurs d’atteintes aux droits de l’Homme, en particulier lorsque des membres des forces de sécurité sont impliquées. La dernière enquête établie par le gouvernement dans l’État de Rakhine semble également conçue pour dissuader et retarder la justice », a déclaré Pollard.
La résolution du Conseil des droits de l’Homme n’a pas créé de nouvelle cour ou tribunal international.
Les preuves détenues par le mécanisme indépendant pourraient être communiquées à des procédures internationales ou nationales, que ce soit devant la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) ou un autre tribunal international ad hoc, ou aux procureurs nationaux faisant valoir leur compétence pour les crimes relevant de la compétence universelle ou pour d’autres motifs.
Bien qu’il n’y ait aucune perspective réaliste de poursuites nationales efficaces au Myanmar dans un proche avenir, le mécanisme pourrait également fournir des preuves à l’avenir si les institutions nationales devenaient finalement suffisamment impartiales, indépendantes, compétentes et capables de le faire.
Un examen préliminaire de la situation des Rohingyas, mené par la CPI, peut également donner lieu à des poursuites pénales mais sera probablement limité aux crimes qui se sont déroulés en partie au Bangladesh, tels que le crime contre l’humanité en matière d’expulsion.
Le Bangladesh est un État partie au Statut de Rome de la CPI, contrairement au Myanmar.
Le Conseil de sécurité est également habilité à référer la totalité de la situation devant la Cour pénale internationale.
«Le gouvernement du Myanmar devrait cesser de nier la vérité et collaborer avec la communauté internationale, en particulier les Nations unies, afin d’améliorer les conditions de vie dans lesquelles se trouvent les Rohingya et les autres minorités ethniques, dont les droits ont été violés de manière aussi brutale par les forces de sécurité, comme documenté par la Mission d’enquête », a déclaré Pollard.
«Les partenaires internationaux du Myanmar, y compris des voisins tels que l’Inde et la Chine, et des membres de l’Association des nations de l’Asie du Sud-Est (ASEAN), devraient exercer leur influence pour faire en sorte que le Myanmar s’attaque à cette grave menace à la stabilité du pays et de la région en veillant au respect, la protection et la mise en oeuvre de l’ensemble des droits civils, culturels, économiques, politiques et sociaux des minorités concernées », a-t-il ajouté.
La résolution du Conseil contient plusieurs autres recommandations de fond, notamment un appel au gouvernement du Myanmar à réviser la loi de 1982 sur la citoyenneté et une recommandation aux Nations unies d’ouvrir une enquête sur son implication au Myanmar depuis 2011.
Contact:
Matt Pollard, conseiller juridique principal à la CIJ (Genève), e: matt.pollard@icj.org, +41 79 246 54 75.
Frederick Rawski, directeur régional Asie-Pacifique de la CIJ (Bangkok), e: frederick.rawski@icj.org
Sep 27, 2018 | Communiqués de presse, Nouvelles
2018 marque le 60ème anniversaire de l’arrivée à Genève de l’ICJ, à l’initiative du grand juriste Suisse Jean-Flavien Lalive qui était Secrétaire Général de l’Organisation en 1958.
Lors du Congrès de l’ICJ à New Delhi en 1959, le Dr Lalive a contribué à définir les principes de l’Etat de Droit et des droits de l’Homme.
La Déclaration de Delhi, en particulier, constitue à ce jour un instrument fondamental dans la définition de la primauté du droit dont les juristes sont principalement responsables pour sauvegarder et faire progresser les droits de l’Homme.
Cela fait de l’ICJ l’une des plus anciennes organisations internationales basées à Genève.
Elle y joue un rôle unique et prééminent en tant qu’organisation non gouvernementale pour la défense des droits de l’Homme et de l’Etat de Droit dans le monde.
L’ICJ va marquer cet événement par deux activités majeures:
- Une campagne de visibilité du 26 septembre au 9 octobre sur cinq véhicules et tous les écrans intérieurs des trams et bus des TPG avec le slogan « Défenseurs de la justice et des droits humains – Depuis 60 ans à Genève »
- Le lancement de l’Appel du 60ème Anniversaire à tous les avocats du canton et de la Ville de Genève pour qu’ils soutiennent l’ICJ et, à travers elle, leurs confrères moins privilégiés, victimes de persécutions sur les cinq continents.
« Genève peut être fière de son image de capitale mondiale des droits de l’Homme. Elle est un phare pour ces défenseurs de la justice dans le monde. Il faut continuer à le faire rayonner, » souligne Sam Zarifi, secrétaire général de l’ICJ.
« Par son action en 60 ans, l’ICJ a grandement contribué à l’aura de Genève en matière de protection des droits de l’Homme : les campagnes ayant abouti à la création du poste de Haut-Commissaire aux droits de l’Homme en 1993 et du Conseil des droits de l’Homme à l’ONU en 2006, ainsi que celle qui a concouru à l’adoption de la Convention des Nations Unies contre la torture en 1984 sont quelques exemples notoires, » rappelle Olivier Coutau, Délégué à la Genève Internationale.
« Face aux attaques répétées contre les droits de l’Homme, le monde a besoin, plus que jamais, d’une défense compétente, rigoureuse et efficace de l’Etat de Droit par l’ICJ, » ajoute Sam Zarifi, secrétaire général de l’ICJ.
L’Appel du 60ème Anniversaire de l’ICJ est soutenu par la République et canton de Genève.
Information additionnelle
La réputation internationale de l’ICJ repose sur les piliers suivants:
- 60 Commissaires – juges et avocats éminents – du monde entier et de tous les systèmes juridiques, avec une connaissance sans égale du droit et des droits de l’Homme;
- Coopération avec les gouvernements qui s’engagent à améliorer leur performance en matière de droits de l’Homme;
- Équilibre efficace entre diplomatie, critique constructive, renforcement des capacités et, si nécessaire, dénonciation;
- Accès direct unique aux systèmes judiciaires nationaux et mise en place de normes internationales et de législations améliorées impactant des millions de personnes;
- Guider, former et protéger les juges et les avocats dans le monde afin qu’ils respectent et appliquent ces normes;
- Oeuvrer en faveur de l’accès à la justice pour les victimes, les survivants et les défenseurs des droits de l’Homme, et notamment les personnes issues de communautés marginalisées;
- Gestion rigoureuse basée sur résultats concrets dans l’exécution de ses projets.
En reconnaissance de cette approche efficace, l’ICJ s’est vu décerner, au cours de sa longue histoire, certaines des distinctions internationales les plus prestigieuses : Prix Européen des Droits de l’Homme du Conseil de l’Europe, United Nations Award for Human Rights, Erasmus Prize, Carnegie Foundation Wateler Peace Prize.
En 2018, l’ICJ a offert des formations locales sur les cinq continents, afin que 4,300 juges, avocats et procureurs renforcent leur compétence pour protéger et promouvoir les droits fondamentaux.
L’ICJ a un statut consultatif auprès des Nations Unies, du Conseil économique et social des Nations Unies, de l’UNESCO, du Conseil de l’Europe et de l’Union africaine.
Contact :
Michaël W. Sombart, Directeur Philanthropie & Partenariats stratégiques, t: +41 22 979 38 31 ; m: +41 77 965 98 45 ; e: michael.sombart(a)icj.org
Sep 24, 2018 | Feature articles, News
On October 16, 1998, the former dictator of Chile Augusto Pinochet was arrested in London on a warrant from a Spanish judge. Reed Brody participated in the subsequent legal case.
Reed Brody went on to apply the “Pinochet precedent” in the landmark prosecution of the former dictator of Chad, Hissène Habré, who was convicted of crimes against humanity in Senegal in 2016.
He now works with victims of the former dictator of Gambia, Yahya Jammeh. The ICJ interviewed Brody about the Pinochet case and its legacy.
What was your role in the Pinochet case?
My role started when Pinochet was arrested in London. The case began long before that, of course, in the early years of Pinochet’s dictatorship when brave human rights activists documented each case of murder, and “disappearance.”
The ICJ worked with those advocates to produce a seminal 1974 report on those crimes, just six months after Pinochet’s coup. Shut out of Chile’s courts, even after the democratic transition of 1990, victims and their lawyers pursued a case against Pinochet in Spain under its “universal jurisdiction” law and when Pinochet traveled to London, Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón requested and obtained his detention.
When Pinochet challenged his arrest in court claiming immunity as a former head of state, I went to London for Human Rights Watch, and we and Amnesty International were granted the right to intervene with teams of lawyers in the proceedings at the judicial committee of the House of Lords, then Britain’s highest court.
The Lords cited our research in rejecting Pinochet’s immunity.
You famously described the Lords’ Pinochet decision as a “wake-up call” to tyrants everywhere. Looking back, do you think it was?
Actually no, I think one would be hard pressed to discern a change in the behavior of dictators. Mugabe didn’t quake in his boots, Saddam didn’t clean up his act.
The more important and more lasting effect of the case was to give hope to other victims and activists. When the Lords ruled that Pinochet could be arrested anywhere in the world despite his status as a former head of state, the movement was in effervescence.
As a human rights lawyer, I was used to being legally and morally right, but still losing. In the Pinochet case, not only did we win, but we upheld the detention of one of the world’s most iconic dictators.
The Pinochet case inspired victims of abuse in country after country, particularly in Latin America, to challenge the transitional arrangements of the 1980s and 1990s, which allowed the perpetrators of atrocities to go unpunished and, often, to remain in power.
These temporary accommodations with the ancien régime didn’t extinguish the victims’ thirst to bring their former tormentors to justice.
How did you go from Pinochet to Habré?
With Pinochet, we saw that universal jurisdiction could be used as an instrument to bring to book people who seemed out of the reach of justice.
Together with groups like Amnesty, the FIDH, and the ICJ (which wrote an important report on the Pinochet case and its lessons), we had meetings on who could be the “next Pinochet.”
That’s when Delphine Djiraibe of the Chadian Association for Human Rights asked us to help Habre’s victims bring him to justice in his Senegalese exile.
I was excited at the prospect of persuading a country in the Global South, Senegal, to exercise universal jurisdiction, because there was a developing paradigm of European courts prosecuting defendants from formerly colonized countries.
It took us 17 years, but Habré became the first prosecution ever of a former head of state using universal jurisdiction, and indeed the first universal jurisdiction trial in Africa.
1998 was a high water mark for international justice with the adoption of the ICC Rome Statute and Pinochet’s arrest. Neither the ICC nor universal jurisdiction have quite lived up to their expectations. Why?
International justice doesn’t operate in a vacuum, it’s conditioned by the global power structure. Each case, whether at the ICC level or the transnational level, is a product of the political forces which must be mobilized, or fended off, to allow a prosecution to proceed.
Those forces, particularly since September 11, 2001, have been hostile to human rights enforcement in general and to justice in particular. Universal jurisdiction has been subject to the same double standards as the ICC.
The Belgian and Spanish universal jurisdiction laws, which were the broadest in the world, were both repealed when they were used to investigate superpower actions.
But many of the most successful cases have been those in which the victims and their activist supporters have been the driving forces, have compiled the evidence themselves, built an advocacy coalition which placed the victims and their stories at the center of the justice struggle and helped create the political will in the forum state.
I’m thinking not just of Habré, but the genocide prosecution in Guatemala of the former dictator Efraín Ríos Montt, the case in Haiti of “President for Life,” Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, the Liberian cases brought around the world by Civitas Maxima and its partners, the Swiss cases initiated by TRIAL International, and the Syria litigation by ECCHR and others.
These cases were brought before domestic courts either of the country in which the atrocities took place (Guatemala, Haiti) or of foreign countries based on universal jurisdiction, rather than before international courts.
Most of these cases took advantage of legal regimes which allowed victims directly to participate in the prosecutions as “parties civiles,” or “acusación particular” rather than play passive or secondary roles in cases prosecuted solely by state or international officials.
How do victim-driven prosecutions look different than institutional cases?
When it’s the victims and their allies who get the cases before a court, who gather the evidence, and who have formal standing as parties, the trials are more likely to live up to their expectations.
In the Rios Montt case, for instance, the Asociación Para la Justicia y Reconciliacion (AJR) and the Centro Para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH) mobilized the victims, developed the evidence, defined the narrative and, essentially, determined the outlines of the case and chose the witnesses who would testify for the prosecution.
In the Habré case, we spent 13 years building the dossier, interviewing hundreds of victims and former officials and uncovering regime police files. The victims’ coalition always insisted that any trial include crimes committed against each of Chad’s victimized ethnic groups, and that is exactly was happened.
In contrast, a distant prosecutor, disconnected from national narratives and inherently not accountable to the victims or civil society, can be tempted to narrowly tailor prosecutions in the hopes of securing a conviction or avoiding political resistance.
This was the case with the ICC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, where, as Pascal Kambale has persuasively argued, it betrayed the victims’ hopes.
Millions of civilians died in the DRC and Luis Moreno Ocampo only went after two local warlords. I think the current prosecutor is paying more attention to local realities.
The inspiration from victim-driven cases is also greater, and they are to some degree replicable. As Naomi Roht-Arriaza has written, these cases “stirred imaginations and opened possibilities precisely because they seemed decentralized, less controllable by state interests, more, if you will, acts of imagination.”
When I showed Chadian victims video clips of the Ríos Montt trial, they saw in those images exactly what they were trying to do.
Just as the Chadians came to us in the Habré case seeking to do what Pinochet’s victims had done, our hope in getting the Habré case to trial was that other survivors would be inspired by what Habre’s victims had done and say, “you see these people, they fought for justice and never gave up. We can do that too.”
And indeed, Liberian victims and Gambian victims have patterned their campaigns for justice on what Habre’s victims did. So, the Pinochet case continues to be an inspiration.