Aug 22, 2017 | News, Publications, Reports, Thematic reports, Video clips
The institutional political crisis in Venezuela has brought the rule of law to near collapse and severely obstructed accountability for those responsible for gross human rights violations, the ICJ concluded in a report released today.
The ICJ’s report Achieving Justice for Gross Human Rights Violations in Venezuela found that the authorities led by President Nicolás Maduro have undertaken a sustained campaign to take control of the Supreme Court of Justice and, with the Supreme Court’s support, suspend the constitutional powers of the former National Assembly and subvert efforts to hold the executive to account within a rule of law framework.
“Rule of law in Venezuela has been replaced by rule of arbitrary executive power,” said Alex Conte, ICJ’s Global Accountability coordinator.
“The Constitution is disregarded, the judiciary cannot exercise its independent function, and the separation of powers is non-existent,” he added.
The ICJ’s report concludes that the human rights situation in Venezuela has deteriorated rapidly in recent years, particularly since 2014.
Extrajudicial and arbitrary executions, the practices of torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary detention, the trial of civilians by military courts and the criminalization and prosecution of political and social dissent have only increased.
“The political context of extreme polarization and the breakdown of the rule of law, along with the judiciary’s lack of independence, have severely obstructed accountability for those responsible for gross human rights violations,” said Conte.
“Victims and their families are left without justice.”
This situation has been further exacerbated by the recent dismissal of Venezuela’s Attorney General, described by the ICJ as a politically motivated act that violates international standards and removes one of the last institutional checks on executive authority and destroys one of the few glimmers of hope for an end to impunity for human rights violations.
Also troubling is the establishment by the new Consituent National Assembly of a ‘Truth Commission’, which the ICJ fears will be a politically manipulated instrument aimed at entrenching impunity for the executive and, when combined with President Maduro’s declaration that legal immunity will be stripped from National Assembly members that have opposed him, a tool to silence Government opposition, rather than to help discharge Venezuela’s duty to promptly, independently and effectively investigate allegations of gross human rights violations.
“Venezuela’s situation of entrenched impunity cannot be resolved without the establishment of an independent judicial authority that can address human rights violations, deter further violations and help bring back the rule of law,” Conte added.
Contact:
Alex Conte, ICJ Global Redress and Accountability Initiative, t: +41 79 957 27 33; e: alex.conte(a)icj.org
Federico Andreu Guzman, ICJ Senior Legal Adviser, Americas, e: Federico.andreu(a)icj.org
Venezuela-GRA Baseline Study-Publications-Reports-Thematic reports-2017-ENG (full report, PDF)
Read also:
ICJ Position Paper on the Dismissal of the Attorney General of Venezuela (August 2017)
ICJ Report, Venezuela: The Sunset of the Rule of Law (October 2015)
ICJ Report, Strengthening the Rule of Law in Venezuela (November 2014)
Jul 25, 2017 | News
Today the ICJ expressed concern about the real threat of criminal prosecution against lawyers Yerlan Gazimzhanov, Amanzhol Mukhamedyarov and Assel Tokayeva (photo) in Kazakhstan.
The ICJ said the action against lawyers was aimed at their discharging of their professional functions on behalf of clients, and not for any genuine criminal misconduct.
The ICJ called on the responsible authorities of Kazakhstan to discontinue the proceedings against the lawyers, which are contrary to international law and standards on the role of lawyers and the rule of law in the administration of justice.
On 22 June, in a court hearing in the criminal case, judge Ubasheva issued interim rulings against the lawyers seeking their prosecution for a number of acts, which on their face do not consist of criminal misconduct. The conduct for which prosecution is sought includes lodging a complaint alleging unethical conduct by the judge with the Commission on Judicial Ethics and Judicial Jury of the Supreme Court of the Republic; filing a motion for recusal of the judge; stating that the crime for which their clients had been accused had in fact been committed by another defendant; and participating in an international conference, rather than attending a court hearing to defend clients.
The various legal procedures used by the lawyers, including their complaint against the judge and the request for the judge’s recusal, are not prohibited by law. On the contrary, acts such as filing motions for recusal, lodging ethics complaints through officially prescribed channels, and performing standard criminal defence functions they constitute regular procedures prescribed in legislation Kazakhstan. They are also fundamental pursuant to the proper administration of justice under the rule of law.
The interim rulings of the court did not provide an analysis of the legal provisions allegedly violated by the lawyers. Certain of the lawyers were said by the court to have “demonstrated superiority over other actors in criminal proceedings.” It was also alleged that the information posted on a Facebook page about the proceedings in which one of the lawyers took part was false. However, the ruling failed to cite any specific details or conduct of the lawyers which would support these conclusions.
Regarding the charge that two of the lawyers had chosen to participate in an international conference rather than appear at the court hearing, this at most would fall under disciplinary procedures governing the conduct of members of the bar, and not the criminal law. The ICJ notes these charges should normally be made to competent disciplinary body, the Collegium of Lawyers, and not the Ministry of Justice through the request of the judge.
In addition to the criminal prosecution, judge Ubasheva asked the Ministry of Justice to take measures against the lawyers for a breach of professional ethics, causing unjustified delays in criminal trial, and contempt of court, and asked the Ministry of Interior to undertake an inquiry to determine whether the conduct of the lawyers constituted an offence punishable under Article 407 of the Criminal Code of Kazakhstan (obstruction of justice).
On 20-21 July 2017, the Criminal Chamber of Appeals examined the lawyers’ appeals against the conviction and interim appeals against the interim rulings.
The appeal proceedings before the Astana City Court were attended by Gulnora Ishankhanova, ICJ Commissioner acting as an ICJ observer.
Kazhakstan-Trial observation 3 lawyers-News-web story-2017-RUS (story in Russian, PDF)
Jul 25, 2017 | News
The ICJ is concerned with the passing of Constitutional Amendment no. 1 of 2017 by the House of Assembly of Zimbabwe on 25 July 2017.
The House of Assembly voted with over two-thirds majority for the amendment of the Zimbabwean Constitution.
The amendment grants the President the right to appoint to office, the Judge President of the High Court, the Deputy Chief Justice and the Chief Justice of Zimbabwe.
Before this amendment the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) spearheaded the process of selection and appointment of judges with the President merely appointing from candidates recommended to him by the JSC.
The enactment of this Bill to law is likely to have a negative effect on the public’s perception of the judiciary. It also has the potential to affect the impartiality and the independence of the judiciary.
“The amendment to the 2013 Constitution will negatively affect public confidence in the judiciary. Not only is this a departure from a position that was in line with international standards and best practices; the amendment is likely to have a ripple effect on the judiciary,” said Arnold Tsunga, the ICJ Africa Director.
“In the short term the executive now has a carrot, which it can dangle in front of judicial officers. If a judge wants to be promoted to Judge President, Deputy Chief Justice or Chief they may have to align themselves with the thinking of the executive. Over time, given the central roles that these three office bearers play in the appointment process and thought leadership, Zimbabwe is likely to have a very executive minded bench,” he added.
To this end the ICJ calls upon the government of Zimbabwe to reconsider its decision to amend the Constitution in the manner proposed in the bill.
The procedure in section 180 of the constitution had distinguished Zimbabwe’s appointment procedures as exemplary in the region.
It is unfortunate that through this amendment the country has failed to consolidate this leadership position.
The amendment would be regressive and poses a real risk of undermining the essential role of the judiciary in securing the rule of law in Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe-Constitutional Amendment-News-web stories-2017-ENG (full statement, in PDF)
Jul 12, 2017 | News
The ICJ is alarmed at ongoing attacks on the rule of law in Poland.
On 12 July 2017, the Government tabled in Parliament draft bill no. 1727, that, if approved, would automatically dismiss all judges of the Supreme Court and let the Minister of Justice decide which judges are to be reinstated or newly appointed.
“This draft law is a direct blow to the principle of separation of powers, the bedrock of the rule of law,” said Massimo Frigo, Legal Adviser with the ICJ Europe Programme.
“The security of tenure and conditions of service of individual judges are essential to judicial independence,” he added.
Draft bill no. 1727 follows another piece of legislation, recently approved by Parliament, by which the Parliament empowered itself to appoint the majority of the members of the National Council of the Judiciary, the body which selects and governs the judiciary.
That law gives political powers in the Polish legislature and executive, which have increasingly demonstrated deep disregard for human rights and the rule of law, undue influence over the judiciary.
Such deficiencies were also highlighted by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE in May 2017.
“These series of legislative attacks to the independence of the judiciary in Poland must stop. These actions are inconsistent with the international obligations of Poland to ensure the independence of judges,” said Massimo Frigo.
“The European Union must intervene. A EU Member State that directly undermines the checks and balances of its own legal system threatens the founding values of the EU of the rule of law and respect for human rights,” he added.
Contact
Massimo Frigo, ICJ Legal Adviser, t: +41 22 979 3805 ; e: massimo.frigo(a)icj.org
International standards
Particularly in a context like present day Poland, mass removal of all judges from a court, by another branch of government, without a fair and evidence-based individual process for each judge, is incompatible with international standards such as the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (See, ICJ Practitioners Guide no 13 on Judicial Accountability, pp. 99-104). The UN Basic Principles affirm, among other things, that:
1. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.
2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
10. …Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. …
12. Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists.
18. Judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their duties.
19. All disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct.
20. Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an independent review. This principle may not apply to the decisions of the highest court and those of the legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings.
Similar mass removals with politicization of the procedure for reinstatement and new appointments have been condemned as violations of States’ international human rights obligations by, for instance, the UN Human Rights Committee acting under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Poland is also party (see Busyo, Wongodi, Matubaka et al v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc CCPR/C/7878/D/933/2000 (2003), and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (see e.g. Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coelle et al) v. Ecuador, Series C No. 266 (2013) and Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al) v. Ecuador, Series C No. 268 (2013).
Council of Europe standards, in the form of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, provide among other things as follows:
26. Councils for the judiciary are independent bodies, established by law or under the constitution, that seek to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and of individual judges and thereby to promote the efficient functioning of the judicial system.
27. Not less than half the members of such councils should be judges chosen by their peers from all levels of the judiciary and with respect for pluralism inside the judiciary.
44. Decisions concerning the selection and career of judges should be based on objective criteria pre-established by law or by the competent authorities. Such decisions should be based on merit, having regard to the qualifications, skills and capacity required to adjudicate cases by applying the law while respecting human dignity.
45. There should be no discrimination against judges or candidates for judicial office on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, disability, birth, sexual orientation or other status. A requirement that a judge or a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the state concerned should not be considered discriminatory.
46. The authority taking decisions on the selection and career of judges should be independent of the executive and legislative powers. With a view to guaranteeing its independence, at least half of the members of the authority should be judges chosen by their peers.
47. However, where the constitutional or other legal provisions prescribe that the head of state, the government or the legislative power take decisions concerning the selection and career of judges, an independent and competent authority drawn in substantial part from the judiciary (without prejudice to the rules applicable to councils for the judiciary contained in Chapter IV) should be authorised to make recommendations or express opinions which the relevant appointing authority follows in practice.
48. The membership of the independent authorities referred to in paragraphs 46 and 47 should ensure the widest possible representation. Their procedures should be transparent with reasons for decisions being made available to applicants on request. An unsuccessful candidate should have the right to challenge the decision, or at least the procedure under which the decision was made.
49. Security of tenure and irremovability are key elements of the independence of judges. Accordingly, judges should have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age, where such exists.
50. The terms of office of judges should be established by law. A permanent appointment should only be terminated in cases of serious breaches of disciplinary or criminal provisions established by law, or where the judge can no longer perform judicial functions. Early retirement should be possible only at the request of the judge concerned or on medical grounds.
69. Disciplinary proceedings may follow where judges fail to carry out their duties in an efficient and proper manner. Such proceedings should be conducted by an independent authority or a court with all the guarantees of a fair trial and provide the judge with the right to challenge the decision and sanction. Disciplinary sanctions should be proportionate.
Jun 28, 2017 | News
Government moves to amend the regulatory framework of the legal profession in Kazakhstan may undermine its independence and are contrary to the principle of self-regulation of the profession, the ICJ said today.
The ICJ called on the authorities of Kazakhstan to refrain from interference in the governance of the independent legal profession and step back to allow the collegia of lawyers to continue to take responsibility for such matters.
The ICJ stressed that any proposals for reform put forward by the governing bodies of the profession should be developed in consultation with and enjoy the consent of the members of advokatura in accordance with international law and standards on the independence of lawyers.
The ICJ was responding to proposals put forward by the Justice Minister Marat Beketayev for reform of the legal profession in Kazakhstan.
In a statement to Parliament on 29 May 2017 (Report of the Minister of Justice on the issues of further development and reform of the institutes of notary and advokatura on 29 May 2017), the Minister outlined plans to:
- lower training and entrance fees to the profession “in order to simplify access to the profession”;
- broaden the powers of the Republican Collegium to regulate the disciplinary system for lawyers, in light of the Minister’s view that lawyers were avoiding disciplinary responsibility in many cases under the current system;
- require lawyers to undergo annual training followed by exams, which would be set not by the collegia themselves, but by universities or external training centres;
- require lawyers, in addition to the participation in state-funded legal aid scheme, to provide mandatory legal assistance without financial support from the Government, which the Minister described as “pro bono” service
The importance of an independent legal profession which is self-regulating is well recognized and accepted under international standards and by international authorities.
One of the means by which such independence may be guaranteed is the governance of the profession by an organization independent from the State or other national institutions.
International standards provide that it is an important function of the lawyer’s association “[t]o maintain the honour, dignity, integrity, competence, ethics, standards of conduct and discipline of the profession” (Singhvi Declaration, para.99).
In this context, comments by the Justice Minister Marat Beketayev on the need to change the disciplinary system due to lawyers avoiding disciplinary responsibility “for violations committed” is of serious concern, the ICJ said.
While it is important that lawyers who act against the interests of their clients, or otherwise violate standards of lawyers’ ethics are subject to disciplinary responsibility, it is the function of the profession itself to decide on such matters. Disciplinary proceedings should never be used to undermine lawyers’ independence.
Lowering entrance fees for qualifying lawyers may be a positive measure that can enhance access to the profession for qualifying lawyers, in circumstances where such fees are inaccessibly high.
However the initiating and design of such proposals should not be in the hands of the executive, as this may limit the independence and effectiveness of the legal profession.
Financial sustainability of an independent legal profession largely depends on its members’ fees.
The advokatura should be able to regulate and finance its regular operations, including administration and training, the ICJ added.
As noted by the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers in his report of 2009: “… the legal profession is best placed to determine admission requirements and procedures and should thus be responsible for administering examinations and granting professional certificates. This would further help in preserving its independence and self-governance, as advised in the Basic Principles.”
The ICJ is also concerned at suggestions that, as part of continuing legal education, lawyers will be subject to examinations by institutions outside the profession.
While it remains unclear what role or effect such examinations would have, the proposal raises concerns regarding the legal profession’s self-regulation and would risk undermining its independence, the ICJ said.
It should be recalled that, Kazakhstan is required take measures to remove obstacles to the independence of lawyers.
Regarding the proposals on so called ‘pro bono legal assistance’, while it is welcome when any State adopts measures to make legal aid more accessible, such measures should not place an unreasonable burden on lawyers to provide mandatory legal assistance.
The scheme proposed by the Minister for Justice whereby lawyers become responsible for providing legal services without financial compensation for their work is of concern, and appears unlikely to ensure a high quality of legal advice, the ICJ added.
It should be the role of the government to provide regular and sufficient funding for such services, ensuring that legal aid is available for indigent clients in line with international standards.
Kazakhstan-Interference legal profession-News-2017-RUS (Russian version, in PDF)
